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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a study of the nature of the political system 
in Ahmedabad City during the 1960s and early 1970s. It looks at 
the interaction between the institutional and agitational modes 
which characterize political behaviour in the City, and examines 
the ability of the political system to cope with the challenges 
of rapid urbanization and large-scale migration.
Chapter I introduces the themes of the thesis; Chapter II 
describes the unique historical evolution of Ahmedabad City and 
gives a socio-economic profile of the City. Chapter III outlines 
the functions and powers of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 
the context of considerable State Government control.
Chapter IV examines the unique role played by the business 
community in the political life of Ahmedabad City in collaboration 
with the Gandhian-inspired Majur Mahajan (Ahmedabad Textile Labour 
Association), as exemplified in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
between 1961 and 1965» when business-labour political relationships 
paralleled model employer-employee relationships in the economic 
sphere. Chapter V examines State-Local political linkages and their 
impact on city developments.
Chapter VI looks at agitational politics through the career 
of the Janta Parishad, which broadened from a party of linguistic 
agitation in the 1950s to a party embracing economic agitation 
centred on the textile workers' dearness allowance issue in the 
1960s. Chapter VII analyses the difficulties of sustained mobilization, 
party maintenance and goal attainment experienced by the Janta Pari­
shad in its period of power in the Corporation from 1965 to 1969.
Chapter VIII studies anomic agitation as exemplified in the 
City's Communal Riots of 1969. Chapter IX looks at State-Local 
linkages after the Congress split of 1969. Chapter X draws together 
the various strands of the thesis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEMES OF THE THESIS
The process of urbanization in India as a whole has progressed 
relatively slowly over the last few decades. The proportion of urban 
population has risen comparatively modestly from 11% of the total 
population in 1911 to 18.1% in 1961, and 19.87% in 1971. This is 
compared to an urban population of 78.87% in the UK, 68.09% in Japan, 
55.85% in the USSR, and as much as 41.64% in the UAR. Thus, just over 
80% of India*s population continues to live in villages, and agriculture 
is still the primary occupation of almost 75% of the population. It is 
in India*s villages and districts that the real dynamics of social and 
political change in India are to be found.
What then is the justification for a study of Indian urban politics 
beyond the obvious desire to extend our knowledge of all political 
processes? The point is that, despite a relatively low rate of urbani­
zation in the country as a whole, there is a strong
trend towards concentration of population in the big metropolitan cities 
of India, of which Ahmedabad is one. While the relative proportion of 
urban population in Class II (50,000-100,000 population) and Class III 
(20,000-49,999 population) towns taken together has remained practically 
constant, Le. around 28-29% between 1901-7 1, and the relative proportion 
in Class IV (10,000-19,999 population), Class V (5,000-9,999 population) 
and Class VI (less than 5,000 population) towns has actually declined 
sharply from 48.7% in 1901 to a mere 18.1% in 1971, the proportion of 
urban population in Class I towns (100,000 plus population) has risen 
from 22.9% in 1901 to 52.4% in 1971. According to the 1971 Census, the 
average population per town has risen by about 25% in Class I towns 
alone between and 1971, while there have been very marginal
deviations in the average population in Class II, Class III and
Class IV towns. Thus metropolitan towns are growing at a much faster
Irate than the res-t- of1 urtcv-v_ popu.loiter erf
Ahmedabad is one of the eight largest cities of India, the million 
plus population cities, whose combined population in 1971 was over 
25 million. As much as half of Ahmedabad*s population is composed of 
migrants, and the problems imposed by migration and urbanization on 
the political and administrative and financial resources of the city 
are enormous. Rajni Kothari has focused on the urban component of 
Indian political performance, identifying it as a major crisis point 
in the emerging political and policy profile of the country. He feels 
that the Congress party, dominated by the overall ideology of "village 
development" and motivated by the numerical and electoral strength of 
the rural areas, has failed to respond to the constantly deteriorating 
conditions of urban life.
Thus a study of the nature of Ahmedabad*s political system, and
the ways in which it has been able to cope with some of these challenges
is of very definite interest. In combination with other studies of
3metropolitan city politics in India, it could provide an interesting 
picture of the differences and similarities in the ways in which 
different metropolitan cities were tackling problems of migration and 
urbanization, influenced by their respective regional cultures and 
social structures. It could also provide an insight into the nature
1. See Ruddar Datt, Urbanization and Economic Growth, (1972),
2. See Rajni Kothari} Politics in India. Little Brown Country 
Series (1970).
3. For example, Ali Ashraf, The City Government of Calcutta: A Study
of Inertia (1966); Mary Katzenstein,"The Origins of Nativism: the 
Emergence of the Shiv Sena in Bombay." Asian Survey vol. 1 3, no. 4 
(April}1975)» PP* 386-399.
of the Congress party in the various metropolitan centres.
The study of urban politics has been hampered to some extent by 
a persistent attitude on the part of a large segment of the Indian 
intelligentsia that municipal government ought somehow to be apolitical, 
the exclusive realm of neutral bureaucrats. Even the Rural-Urban 
Relationship Committee was guilty of this attitude in its 1966 Report:^- 
".. Municipal utilities, sanitation, public health and provision of 
various other amenities are meant for the convenience and the well­
being of all citizens and should not be matters of political contro­
versy. The Committee are of the view that most of the local bodies in 
India are tom by party factions and do not fully devote their time 
and energy to serving the people. It seems, therefore, necessary to 
rid the local authorities of party factions and sectional or group 
interests. .."
However, the problem of urban development, like that of national 
development, is ultimately a political problem - it is a function of 
the commitment and capability of the political system to foster 
development. The provision of municipal services and amenities, and 
the carrying out of public improvements require large-scale finance 
and fairly radical legislative and administrative measures. The sine 
qua non for this is effective and dynamic political leadership, 
interested in development programmes and capable of the resourcefulness 
and drive to carry these through.
In addition, at a more basic level, politics and ‘party factions* 
are inescapable in the municipal sphere since the city is composed of 
a large number of different interests competing for the differential 
distribution of benefits in the power of the municipal government, and
4. See Report of the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee (bovem-
ment of India, Ministry of Health and Family Planning .* June 1966).
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for the most favourable allocation of tax burdens.
Many studies of urban politics have primarily been concerned with exploring
the phenomena of voting behaviour per se, using city constituencies merely as
constituencies, and not really concerned with exploring the conditions of the
5urban political system as such. Many economic and demographic surveys of a
number of cities and towns in India exist^, but few have attempted to link these
to political phenomena and explore the political implications and aspects of
economic and demographic trends, and to examine the problems facing cities of
7developing into viable and stable communities.
This study is an attempt to look at the structure and pattern of political 
leadership in Ahmedabad City; the changing social bases of politics, and the 
problems connected with the politicization of various groups and their 
recruitment into the political system, e.g. migrants, casual labourers (the 
Badlis ) and the urban periphery of the unemployed and underemployed.
Throughout, an attempt has been made to relate political phenomena to changing 
social and economic as well as political circumstances, to look at the 
phenomenon of migration, for example, in relation to politics, to relate 
changing economic circumstances to political outcomes. The study is looking 
at the city
5. For example, see Y.M. Sirsikar, Political Behaviour in India : A Case Study 
of the 1962 General Elections. (Bombay : 1965); Aloo J. Dastur, Menon vs. 
Kripalani: North Bomb ay election, 1962.(Bombay : 1967); Paul Brass, "An 
Industrial Labour Constituency : Kanpur". Economic Weekly Special Number, vol. 
14, nos. 28, 29, 30 (July, 1962), pp. 1111 - 18.
6. See, for example, A. Bopegamage, Delhi; a Study in Urban Sociology.-(1954)* 
V.K.R.V. Rao and P.B. Desai, Greater Delhi; A Study in Urbanization.(1966); 
D.R. Gadgil, Sholapur City. (1966); and D.N. Ma.jumdar, Social Contours of an 
Industrial City# (i960).
7* There are, however, an increasing number of studies of the urban political
system as such, for example, D.B. Rosenthal, The Limited Elite(1970 ), and 
Rodney W. Jones, "Linkage Analysis of Indian Urban Politics".Economic and 
Political Weekly, vol. 7> no. 25 (June 17> 1972), pp. 1195 - 1203.
8. See Chapter V.
as a whole, at its economic, social and political life enmeshed together, 
rather than tiying to study particular political processes such as 
voting behaviour in particular constituencies per se, or factionalism 
per se. Problems of urban finance and development - municipal finances 
and the Urban Community Development Project - have also been examined 
in the context of the particular political configuration in Ahmedabad.
The pattern of Ahmedabad City politics has been produced by the 
interaction between the shaping force of the city's unique historical 
evolution, economically, socially and politically, and its regional 
culture on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the structural forms 
and constraints imposed by the framework of the one-party dominant 
federal political structure of India, in which State governments have 
considerable autonomy and power vis-a-vis both the Central Government 
and Local Governments, resulting in a political system of bargaining, 
and the subtle exercise of influence and pressure by each level in the 
political system.
In Ahmedabad, predominantly a textile industrial centre, strongly 
influenced by the Jain-Bania ethos of its business entrepreneurs and 
the practical idealism of Gandhi, the pattern of politics largely 
consisted in the 1960 s (this study is concerned largely with the 
time-period 1960-72) of the dialogue and the interrelationship between 
the mill-owner - dominated business element and the Majur Mahajan trade 
union element within the City's Congress party. This dialogue bore 
striking parallels to the dialogue which had evolved over decades of 
labour relations between the textile magnate employers and the Majur 
Mahajan "outsider" top leadership, drawn from a similar caste, linguis­
tic and regional background. Thus the pattern of political life on 
one level has a strong institutional basis with the business community
and the Gandhian-inspired Majur Mahajan as principal political actors.
Despite the limited autonomy of municipal governments vis-a-vis
State governments in the Indian context, the business-Majur Mahajan
partnership in the Municipal Corporation and other arenas of the urban
political system was able to exert a strong influence on the nature
and shape of governmental outcomes affecting the city. In comparison
to the decision-making power of American municipalities, it might be
argued that studies of civic decision-making are inappropriate in the
Indian context, where municipal government is relatively powerless
with little autonomy. However, although not directly in the chamber
of the Municipal Corporation, major governmental decisions about city
life are being taken, and city actors, at least in Ahmedabad, have
managed to acquire a large say in the outcomes of these decisions.
This was due in large part to their power and prestige within the
10city, and their state-level linkages , which enabled them to be far 
more than the "limited elite" by which D. B. Rosenthal characterizes 
municipal actors.
9
9. The Majur Mahajan trade union and the business element in
Ahmedabad city politics should not be viewed primarily as interest 
groups in the Western sense. They both have a mixed character of 
modem and traditional aspects: the role of the traditional
family and kinship structures - preserved through the ingenious 
device of the managing agency system - has been a key factor in 
the organization of business and industiy in India. Similarly, 
family, community and caste loyalties have played a considerable 
role in the operation of trade union organizations in India. In 
the context of India’s mixed economy, with the government as the 
prime legitimate instrument for modernization and economic growth, 
there is no role for "interest groups" in the Western sense, and 
the strength of autonomous interest group associations is very 
limited. They can only operate effectively from within the coali- 
tional structure of the dominant party, rather than as discrete 
organizational entities. They have to work within and through 
the political system, its parties and factions. See Rajni Kothari 
Politics in India. ^ Little Brown Country Series; 197Cj).
10. Political linkages are defined here as channels for the transmission 
of influence, patronage, support and information between allied and 
interdependent political participants. This definition is very 
close to the one employed by Rodney Jones in "Linkage
Analysis of Indian Urban Politics," Economic and Political
Weekly, h1/ 1 S' C 11, M S ’- |X03.
This brings us to the crucial dimension of state-local linkages 
in Ahmedabad city politics. In Ahmedabad, access to state-level 
leaders and patronage forms an important element in maintaining and 
exercising power within the city. Both the business elite and the 
Majur Mahajan played a part in state-level factionalism, and had 
access to state-level patronage and decision-making authority. They 
were able to manipulate state-local linkages to secure considerable 
benefits for their clientele, the middle class and the 4lite of in­
dustrial workers in the modem sector, devising important mechanisms 
of control over State Government decision-making and financial 
resources. Given the statutory and financial limitations of munici­
pal governments vis-a-vis the State Government, it was remarkable 
what local political actors could achieve on behalf of their clientele 
in the city in the multiple political arenas of the city - the 
Municipal Corporation, and the arenas produced by state-level bodies 
functioning in the city, and the host of voluntary developmental 
associations financed largely by the State Govenment. The absence of 
state-level sources of support to the agitation-based Janta Parishad 
opposition party, when it came to power in the Corporation in 1965, 
was a significant factor in the difficulties it experienced of sus­
tained mobilisation, goal attainment and party maintenance.
There were also strong agitational undercurrents to the city*s 
political life, whose mainspring lay in the widespread sub-standard 
living conditions in the city, and the increasingly pluralistic com­
plexion of Ahmedabad society, due to large-scale migration from other 
areas of Gujarat State and from other States of India, and the strains 
in terms of housing, education, civic amenities etc. placed upon the 
city*s economy by the g-rowtru-j urbanization in the twentieth 
century, creating a fragmented and restless lower class. Agitational
politics in the city surfaced first in the linguistic movement for 
Maha Gujarat in the 1950 s, and later in the economic agitation, 
organized by the Janta Parishad and its labour wing, the Sangram 
Samiti, on the textile workers* dearness allowance issue. Plural 
antagonisms in the city reached a climax in the Communal Riots of 
1969, which were not only anti-Muslim, but also anti-migrant in character. 
Problems of political integration are of primary importance to all of 
India's million plus cities with their large heterogeneous populations.
Thus this study is looking at the urban political system as such - 
defined in terms of the multiple political arenas mentioned above with 
linkages with the state level - of a large metropolitan city. It is 
attempting to relate it to socioeconomic and cultural trends, seeking 
to isolate what is unique about Ahmedabad city politics as well as 
what it may have in common with the problems of other metropolitan 
cities in India.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIOECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF AHMEDABAD CITY
1. Historical sketch of Ahmedabad City, emphasizing the im­
portance of the Jain-Bania ethos, which has striking parallels 
with Weber's thesis of the link between the rise of Puritanism 
and the growth of capitalism, in the city's culture. Gandhi's 
contribution to Ahmedabad political culture is also described.
The importance of the Jain-Bania ethos in the city's cultural life 
Historically, and even today, to a large extent, the Banias 
of Ahmedabad comprise the city's elite, not only economically 
but socially also. The ritually higher castes, the Brahmins and 
the Writer castes, which provided the Bhadralok elite of Calcutta, 
were relegated in Ahmedabad to a far less powerful position. The 
1879 Gazetteer on Ahmedabad described the 10,754* Brahmins, who 
constituted 1 l*6°/o of the city's total Hindu population of
9X6\9 in the following terms: ”... except the Nagars.......of
whom many are in good condition, the majority of Brahmins live on 
alms..." The Nagar Brahmin caste was a major exception: many
had risen to high positions in Government service, others had be­
come clerks, lawyers, moneylenders and merchants.'1'
The Writer Castes were numerically too tiny to have much 
impact on the city's power structure. They constituted only
0.04°/o of the total Hindu population of the city in l879» and 
comprised three castes: 22.6 Brahma-Kshatriyas, 10S- Kayasthas and
4-S Ihrbhus. The Brahma-Kshatriyas, somewhat like the Nagar Brahmins,
Chapter II
1. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV Ahmedabad (l879)» 
p p . 3^ -35'; Zix
were an important minority group, often rich property owners engaged 
as lawyers, moneylenders and in Government service. With the 
Nagar Brahmins, the Brahma-Kshatriyas were often the pioneers of 
social reform and literary activities in the city.
However, it was the Bania caste, the traders, who formed the 
city's elite, challenged only in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries by the growing power of the Patidar caste. In 1879» 
they constituted 2.0/11$ o r of the city's total Hindu popu­
lation. The Banias were divided into two major groups: 9,
Vaishnava Banias (otherwise known as Meshri or Brahmanic Banias), 
while I l j 763, in l879i were Jain Banias (otherwise known as Gujarati 
Shravaks). The Jain Banias had had the edge in terms of wealth 
and influence over the Vaishnava Banias, and one of their number 
held the highest civic office of Nagar Seth or City Head. But, by 
the mid-nineteenth century, the two groups were almost equal in 
numbers, wealth and influence. From these two groups came the 
bulk of the city's financiers and moneylenders, and merchants and 
dealers in cloth and foodgrains.
Of the numerous castes of Husbandmen in the city in 1879»
which together constituted 24\>72jr or 3.6.6°/o of the total Hindu
population - \ 9; 4-4-0 Kanb.is, 2 .0 1 0 koLis , I 4-65 R.a.jpu=fcs<)
13 OS and 9-9-6 MolLIs - the Kanbis were
undoubtedly the most important, an upwardly mobile caste, compris-
H indu­
ing U.I /o of the total/population of the city, subdivided into
the Leva and Kadva subcastes, who were to challenge the old-
established elite in the early twentieth century and eventually
form part of the elite themselves. In 1879i although many were
engaged in agriculture or worked as skilled weavers and artisans,
some had already risen to high positions in Government service or 
acquired wealth in trade. The l8?9 Gazetteer on Ahmedabad 
described them in glowing terms as "sober, peaceable, industrious, 
and, except on occasions like marriages, thrifty."
Of the remaining Hindu castes in tne city, there were 
craftsmen castes, or 9.*7 °/o of the total Hindu population;
11)^98 artisan castes comprising lX-6°/o of the total Hindu popu­
lation; domestic servant castes comprising Z.78°/o of the
total Hindu population; 5~j07? low or backward castes of labourers 
and miscellaneous workers, comprising £. 4*?°/o of the total Hindu 
population; and 7 , unsettled and depressed classes comprising 
7.6 °/o of the total Hindu population. The 1879 Gazetteer on Ah­
medabad gives further details of the caste composition.
The caste structure of Ahmedabad City has a Jain and Vaish- 
nava Bania elite, with the Brahmin and Writer castes playing a re­
latively small role, but another crucial factor is the great spread 
of intermediate castes in the caste structure and the relatively 
small percentage of untouchable depressed classes, who comprised 
only 7*6 %  of the total Hindu population of the city in 1879.
This augured for a relatively stable caste structure, which would 
change gradually and incrementally, rather than with violent up­
heavals like the Brahmin-non-Brahmin struggle taking place in 
South India in the late nineteenth century.
In communal terms, the city’s population of 116,873 in 
l87Z was divided into 9I;6/7 Hindus, 23,^1 Muslims, 26V Christians 
and 47? Parsis, Jews and others. Among the Muslims, many were 
handloom weavers and calico-printers and dyers, who played an 
important part in the labour force of the new textile mills of
the second half of the nineteenth century. There were three
important Muslim castes of traders and shopkeepas, descendants
of converted Hindus - the Bohras, Memons and Khojas. However,
they played a relatively insignificant role in the foundation
of Ahmedabad's modern textile industry.
The actual founders of the city's modern textile industry
were members of the old-established elite with a few Kanbis or
Patels and Parsees in addition. The Gazetteer of 1879 carefully
noted this burgeoning capitalist class:
"As to the caste of the superior capitalist classes
it may be noted that in former days they were mostly
Shravak Banias, but of late the predominance of that 
sect has been impaired by the Vaishnavas, that is to 
say, by the Mesri Banias and Kanbis... To these may 
be added ... a few Parsis."
The motivational springs of this industrial entrepreneurship, 
as well as the source of much of the city's political culture, lay
in the Jain Bania ethos which dominated the city's cultural life,
affecting the Vaishnavas as much as the Jains and permeating the 
whole cultural life of the city.
Ahmedabad was the headquarters of the Gujarati-Jain sect,
which had more than 120 temples in the city in the early twentieth
2century. Facets of Jainism provide striking parallels with Weber's 
thesis of the link between the rise of Puritanism and the growth 
of capitalism in the West. Curiously Weber himself, in his book,
The Religion of India: the Sociology of Hinduism, argues that
Asian religious doctrines are so irrational and other-worldly, when 
their psychological consequences are traced, as to be incapable of
2. Imperial Gazetteer' of India, Abazai to Arcot, vol. X Cl902)
p p .  1 0 6 - 1 1 1 .
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providing a rational, this-worldly secular ethic of the kind required, 
in his opinion, to originate industrial capitalism. Weber was so 
convinced of the "anti-capitalistic spirit" of Hinduism that he 
seriously believed in the possibility that the industrial institutions 
brought into India under British influence, and even the Indian nationalist 
movements, would collapse with the withdrawal of that influence. Although 
he saw that Jainism provided something of an exception with its rudimentary 
"this-worldly asceticism", which was "similar to the ascetic Protestantism 
of the Occident", he concluded that the nonviolence of the Jains had 
prevented them from taking up industry and agriculture, and they had 
"remained confined to commercial capitalism" and had "failed to create 
an industrial organization... due to their ritualistically determined 
exclusion from industry" .
However, there did exist several strands in Jainism which could and did 
provide a motivational frame-work suitable for success in banking and 
commerce, and eventually for industrial entrepreneurship. These ideas 
and values, coupled with the corporate traditions of a strong urban 
mercantile bourgeoisie in Ahmedabad, also permeated the political culture 
of the city.
The Jain belief in ahimsa • or nonviolence meant that many occupations, 
particularly in agriculture, were not open to them. The devout Jain layman 
vowed to be very careful, in choosing a profession, to avoid any business 
which involved the taking of life, however low in the scale, even 
insect life. Thus the Jains
3. See Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and
Buddhism. (Trans, and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale) (Free Press 
of Glencoe: 1958)> P 200; and Milton Singer*s review of the book in 
the American Anthropologist, vol. 63> no. 1 (Peb.y196l), pp 143 ~ 51*
of Western India, and particularly of Ahmedabad, were led to 
specialize in moneylending, banking and commerce, developing 
crucial commercial and trading skills which contributed to their 
successful adaptation in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
to modern industrial production. (However, structural as well as 
ritual factors played a part here, since the Jains of South India, 
in the Karnatak region, remained largely illiterate agricultural­
ists, whereas the Jains of Western India were orientated towards 
commerce, since the cities of Gujarat and Rajasthan were often 
strategically situated on the crossroads of many trading routes, 
and were thus favourably disposed to develop into ancient trading 
entrepots.)
Jainism also had humanistic and individualistic strands.
The Jains believe that man by his own efforts can attain the divine, 
or become God. Mahavira, the great hero and principal Jain saint, 
had unaided worked out his own salvation. In one of the Jain 
sacred books, the Acaranga Sutra, it is written, "ManJ Thou art 
thine own friend; why wishest thou for a friend beyond thyself?" 
Mahavira in one of his sermons is declared to have said that one 
might be reborn as an animal, a god or a demon, but only to a 
human being is the chance of moksha or release from the cycle of 
rebirth and the results of past karma or actions given. The 
Jains, unlike the Hindus, do not believe in a Supreme God who takes 
any active part in the world's governance, declaring that .karma, 
the law of action and reaction, acts automatically, without any 
outside intervention. The great ideal of the Hindus, absorption 
into the Supreme, is alien to Jain thought. The twenty-four Jain 
Saints, known as the Tirthankara,.or the Siddha, perfected ones,
will maintain their separate identity through all eternity.
The Jain religion is characterized by the strictness of its 
moral code, and the austerity which it teaches, which goes, perhaps, 
even beyond the Puritan tradition of austerity in the West. The 
great schism in Jainism between the Svetambara and the Digambara 
sects, which reveals the depths of this austerity, is rooted in a 
dispute about nudity - the Digambara maintain that Jains have so 
little concern for material things that they have no need to wear 
clothing, whereas the Svetambara (this sect is predominant in Western 
India) maintain that light simple clothing is necessary. In 
Jainism, there are certain sects, for example the Sthanakavasi, who 
are against any form of idolatry. The Jains believe that self­
purification and the performance of tapasyas or austerities are 
necessary and good in themselves. The Jain lay vow to avoid false­
hood and exaggeration (one of the twelve lay vows) has important 
repercussions in enhancing the reputation for commercial honesty 
of Jain bankers and merchants. The vow does actually concern itself 
with commercial honesty as such, forbidding a man, for example, 
when selling land and houses to describe the boundaries or the 
number of trees on the estate falsely. If the man taking the vow 
is a banker, he is urged to keep any deposit honestly and give it 
back when demanded, even if no receipt is produced. There is also 
a stricture not to cook the accountsj This emphasis on austerity 
is so vital an influence in Jainism that even today's millwallahs 
of Ahmedabad, the elite textile magnates, often multi-millionaires,
*f. See Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, The Heart of Jainism.(1913).
Mrs. Stevenson, a former scholar of Somerville College,
Oxford, lived in Ahmedabad and Gujarat for many years as 
part of the Irish Mission in Gujarat. She spent more than 
ten years studying Jainism, reading widely and discussing 
with Jain philosophers.
nevertheless eschew ostentation as much as possible. They are
often pure vegetarians, do not touch alcohol, and try to live a
5strict and simple life in their personal habits.
The Jains have shrewdly realized that the true way of in­
creasing one’s wealth is to curb one's desires. Thzs capacity 
for self-denial and self-discipline proved very important for Jain 
businessmen in enabling them to forgo present consumption for the 
sake of saving and capital accumulation. An important Jain lay 
vow was the vow of limitation of possessions (although the priests 
could still be fairly generous]):
"... I take a vow not to possess more of the follow­
ing things than I have allowed myself: a certain
fixed quantity of houses and fields, of silver and 
gold, of coins and grain, of two-footed or four- 
footed creatures,furniture and plenishing. Beyond 
this limit, I will regard nothing as my own possession..."
The case of a Mr. Popat Amaracanda of Cambay, in the early twenti­
eth century, was by no means an isolated one. Mr. Amaracanda, 
when quite a poor man, had promised he would never possess more 
than Rs. 95»000. Later, he became a highly successful businessman, 
but as soon as he had made the prescribed number of rupees, he 
gave all the extra money he made to the building of temples or the 
foundation of animal hospitals. The successful mill wallahs of 
Ahmedabad have kept up the tradition of donating huge sums of money, 
gained in business, for public welfare.
Jainism encourages the belief that one's physical and mental 
state - one's health, intellect and fortunes - are a reflection of
5. This image of plainness and austerity is so well cultivated 
by mi11wallahs of Ahmedabad that recently (late 1972), 
when a group of them were caught surreptitiously drinking 
liquor at a party (Gujarat is a dry state), this created 
a major scandal.
the accumulation of either one's good or evil karma or past actions. 
Thus Jains have a very healthy respect for the prosperous and the 
successful. Success in business is very much seen as a sign of 
grace, the fruit of good moral conduct in the past. It was also 
recognised that to act in accordance with one's caste dharma was 
also a way of doing one's religious duty and attaining salvation, 
providing one's actions are carried out with disinterested motives. 
Thus to be a., scrupulous and successful businessman or a judicious 
and thrifty householder was also a way to salvation. A householder 
was encouraged to be thrifty and prudent, to regulate his expendi­
ture according to his income, and to set aside a quarter of his 
income for savings, a quarter for investment in trade, a quarter 
for household expenses and the rest for charitable purposes.
However, although certain strands in Jainism (many of these 
values were also held in common by the Vaishnava Banias and per­
meated deep into the city's cultural life) encouraged a practical 
asceticism, with certain parallels to Western Puritanism, and 
provided a motivational framework for industrial entrepreneur­
ship and a set of values for the city's cultural life, the in­
stitutional channelling of these motivations and values in strong 
urban and business institutions over the centuries provided the 
concrete structural and institutional basis for later adaptation 
to modern industry and changing forms of urban government.
The existence in Ahmedabad of a powerful urban bourgeois culture 
and institutions over the centuries
Ahmedabad was founded in i k l l A.D. by Sultan Ahmed Shah of 
Gujarat on a site close to the much older trading centre of Ashaval 
Cor Ashapalli or Karnavati). Gujarat and Marwar had long been the
loci of ancient entrepot cities with highly developed business
cultures with knowledge of multiple-entry bookkeeping and well-
developed systems of commercial arbitration and insurance, credit
and speculation.^ Ahmedabad, situated on the crossroads of trade
routes radiating from Sind with its port of Tatta to the West,
to Rajasthan and Delhi in the North, Malwa to the East and the
ports of Cambay, Surat and Broach to the South, became an important
centre of indigenous financial, commercial and industrial activity.
It specialized in the manufacture of textiles, and there is an
old proverb which says that the prosperity of Ahmedabad hangs on
7three threads, silk, gold and cotton.
Ahmedabad, under the Gujarat Sultans, who encouraged trade, 
became an important centre of trade and industry. Its fortunes 
declined temporarily with the decay of the Gujarat dynasty and 
growing Portuguese interference with its trade. In 1572, Ahmedabad 
became part of the Mughal Empire, and its prosperity quickly re­
covered and reached new heights. During the sixteenth and seven­
teenth centuries, Ahmedabad was one of the most splendid cities 
of Western India, perhaps even of the world. At the height of 
its prosperity, the city is said to have contained a population 
of about 9OO1OOO. So great was its wealth that some of the traders 
and merchants were believed to have fortunes of not less than a
6. See T.A.Timberg, a Industrial Entrepreneurship among the 
Trading Communities of India. How the Pattern differs.1'* (July 
1969), Economic Development Report, no. 136 for the Develop­
ment Advisory Service of the Centre for International Affairs, 
Harvard University. Henceforth to be known as Timberg Report.
7. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Abazai to Arcot, vol. X C 190%) pp 
106-11. }>rr
million sterling. From its workshops came masterpieces in
cotton, silk, velvet and brocade with astonishing figures and
patterns, knots and fashions. In 1626, the English traveller,
Sir Thomas Herbert, gave the following description of Ahmedabad:
"... the megalopolis of Gujarat, circled by a 
strong wall with many large and comely streets, 
shops full of aromatic gums, perfumes and spices, 
silks, cottons, calicoes and choice Indian and 
Chinese vanities, owned and sold by the abstemious 
Banians who here surpass for number the other in­
habitants. .."
Mandelslo in his "Voyages" described seventeenth century Ahmeda­
bad craftsmen as famous for their work in silk and cotton, steel,
ggold, ivory, enamel, mother of pearl, paper, lac and bone.
With the close of Aur.angzeb's reign (1707), a period of 
disorder began, which saw the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. 
Mughal Viceroys and Marathas battled over the city. The suburbs, 
deserted at the approach of the Marathas, were never repeopled.
From 1738 to l*/53» Ahmedabad was ruled jointly by the Mughals and 
the Marathas. In 1737» the city passed completely into Maratha 
hands, where it remained until it was annexed in 1817 by the East 
India Company. The excessive greed of the Marathas as sole rulers 
of Ahmedabad caused great discontent. At the time of transfer to the 
British, Ahmedabad was in a sorry plight; the walls were in ruins 
and inside were large tracts covered with fallen houses, mosques 
and tombs, the resort of thieves and highwaymen. To escape taxation, 
some people had taken to living in the suburbs. Trade and manufactures
8. Ibid.
9. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, Ahmedabad (1879)1 
pp2f&*
were almost at a standstill, and there was a great scarcity of 
coin. Imports were charged from 10-25°/o of their value, and 
manufactures were still more heavily burdened by taxes and dues.
The British re-established order and security and lowered the 
town dues, giving a great impetus to trade. The population rose 
from 80,000 in 1817 to 116,873 by 1872. Prosperity and wealth 
returned fairly quickly to the city and trade and manufacture 
began to flourish.
Thus, even if Ahmedabad did not enjoy urban autonomy on 
the European model, ancient urban and mercantile values and in­
stitutions survived there, long after their disappearance in 
other parts of India. Ahmedabad, in the nineteenth century, had 
a well-developed corporate tradition and spirit, a long history 
of trade, finance and industry, a powerful mercantile elite and 
old urban institutions of the Nagarseth. or city head, and the 
maha.jans or trade guilds. The financial and social powers of the 
mercantile elite and the maha.j ans was so great that the city 
government - whether of the Sultans, the Mughals, the Marathas or 
the British - was compelled to take account of their wishes, and 
very often to rule through them. Successive rulers had sought 
to foster trade and favour traders and financiers, since, by con­
trast with the Gangetic plain area the land revenue in Gujarat was 
limited by the lower productivity of the soil in many areas and 
very great political fragmentation, whereas it was often very 
lucrative to tax the extensive trade which passed through Ahmedabad
10. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, Ahmedabad 
(1879), pp. 255-261.
on the way to north India.
The hereditary bourgeois elite consisted of highly respected 
Jain and Vaishnava Vania mercantile and sarafi families. The 
sarafi families were "bankers1' and financiers, who used their own 
capital in the main. They had acted as paymasters and financiers 
to princes and merchants. In the time of the Mughal Emperors, 
the head of the Jain community, Shantidas Jawahari, was the court 
jeweller and financier. They had also been farmers of the land 
revenue and tolls, provided insurance, served as trustees for re­
ligious and charitable purposes and often engaged in commercial 
activities on their own account. ^
The institutions of mahajans, or trade guilds, and panchs, or 
artisan guilds, were well developed in Ahmedabad, and survived 
long into the British period, forming the institutional basis for 
the business and trade union organisations, the Ahmedabad Mill- 
owners1 Association and the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association, 
of the twentieth century. There were about forty trade guilds 
in Ahmedabad in the nineteenth century, predominantly Hindu or 
Jain bodies with hereditary heads known as seths. The heads of 
the artisan guilds, or panchs, were known as patels. The most im­
portant trade guilds were the sarafs1 mahajan, the cloth dealers' 
mahajan and the raw silk dealers' mahajan, although almost all 
trades or crafts from metal-workers to oil-pressers were organized 
in guilds. Admission to the guilds was hereditary or by purchase. A 
guild could embrace members of several castes, and a caste member
11. Kenneth Gillion, Ahmedabad, a Study in Urban History.(1968), 
pp. l6-l8.
could belong to several guilds, but very often memberships of caste 
and guild were coterminous. So closely were the institutions of 
caste and guild inter-related that penalties for breaches of caste 
rules could be enforced even by a guild composed of several castes 
as well as in situations where caste and guild were coterminous.
Such penalties often extended to economic sanctions. The 1879 
Gazetteer of Ahmedabad District quoted a recent example of an un­
fortunate Visa-Shrimali Vania of Ahmedabad, who had offended his 
caste by marrying a widow. He was expelled from the cloth dealers1 
mahajan to which he belonged, and, as a result, was obliged to 
close his shop and leave the town.
The guilds had authority over all matters affecting the parti­
cular trade or craft: they could sanction or prohibit an improve­
ment; fix wages and sometimes prices; fix the hours of working 
and trade-holidays; keep up standards and take any action safe­
guarding the interests of their members against the government, 
other guilds and outsiders. They provided trade security, but they 
generally restricted competition and acted as a brake upon innovation 
and improvement. The 1879 Gazetteer gives a telling example of the 
restriction of competition by guilds: in Ahmedabad, outside masons
settled in the city and began working for eight annas a day in­
stead of ten, the lowest rate allowed by the local guild of masons.
In order to stop this competition, the aldermen of the masons' 
guild induced the aldermen of the potters' guild to issue orders 
that no building materials of any kind should be sold except through 
the agents, dalals, of the former. The rival masons were thus driven 
out of the field, being unable even to get sand for their mortar. 
Perhaps the most important function of a guild was to arbitrate in
trade disputes.
The breach of a guild rule was usually punished by a fine. 
Refusal to pay a fine or any other very grave offence was followed 
by expulsion. Expulsion entailed very grave consequences: if the
man expelled was a master manufacturer, no skilled labourer would 
enter or stay in his service. If he was an operative, no one 
would lend him tools or work along with him, and the ganger, 
mukkadam, would arrange for him only at boy's wages. If he was 
a dealer in exports or imports, the guild brokers would refuse 
to act for him, and, according to the market custom, business was 
impossible without their intervention.
The wealthier guilds had a considerable income from a small 
tax on the import and export of the principle articles of trade; 
from death-bed donations or donations by heirs; from fines and 
entrance-fees; from the auction sale of the right to open a shop 
or from fees levied on those who wished to do business on holidays; 
and from land and sometimes from household property. These funds 
often went to the support of panjrapol or animal homes, strong 
evidence of the pervasive influence of Jainism on all the merchants 
of Ahmedabad. The wealthier mahajans also performed many of the 
welfare functions of modern municipal governments: they often
provided food kitchens, places for the supply of drinking-water 
to travellers, road-side resting-places, parks, hospitals and 
schools. Road-cleaning, and even the maintenance of an adequate 
watersupply^ was often left to the large mahajans.
i2Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, Ahmedabad (l879)i 
pp. 106-113.
The corporate authority of the guilds was buttressed by the 
policy of Government officials to use the agency of the guilds for 
collecting and enforcing their irregular exactions. Even under 
British rule, the guilds were, for a time, utilized in collecting 
trade cesses, which were imposed in lump sum on each guild, and the
13responsibility for realizing this sum was left to the aldermen.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the guilds were less able to 
enforce penalties against individuals, who could resort to the pro­
tection of the courts. The guilds started to practice more internal 
democracy, with constitutions and elected officials and less control 
by the hereditary seths and patels. However their influence was 
still considerable, although it was soon to be replaced by more 
modern forms of trade union and business organisation.
The official head of the financial and mercantile elite and 
the city as a whole was known as the Nagarseth or city head. He 
was also the head of the sarafs1 guild, and of the Jain community, 
another striking example of the strong influence of the Jain communi 
in the city's life. The title of Nagarseth was formally conferred 
by the merchants: on the head of a family long held in respect
for its wealth and public spirit and liberal support of the Jain 
faith. The duties of the Nagarseth were largely honorific and 
symbolic: in times of public calamity, the citizens looked to
him to perform penance for the whole people, for example, if the 
rain held off, he was expected to circumambulate the city walls 
pouring out milk to appease Indra, the offended ruler of the skies.
13. Ibid.
l^ f. Kenneth Gillion, Ahmedabad. (1968) , p.6l.
However, normally, he did not attempt to deal with any public
matter without first consulting the chief alderman of the cloth-
dealers1 guild, known as the Chautano seth, or market chief, who
was also the head of the Vaishnava sect. (So complex were the
inter-relationships between the institutions of sect, caste, guild
and Nagarseth and Chautano seth, that, although the Nagarseth was
head of the sarafs1 guild and leader of the Jain religion, and the
Chautano seth was head of the cloth-dealers' guild and head of the
Vaishnava sect, both sarafs and cloth-dealers could be either Jains
or Vaishnava Vanias.) The Nagarseth and the Chautano Seth to-
gether could usually carry the bulk of the mercantile community
on public and religious matters, although in trade matters the
1 5guilds functioned fairly independently.
Thus Ahmedabad had a powerful urban bourgeois culture and 
institutions of long-standing. It had a long corporate tradition 
and spirit, a largely hereditary bourgeois elite, a long history 
of indigenous financial, commercial and industrial activity and 
well-developed trade institutions, the mahajans and panchs. This 
set the tone and milieu for much of the city's political culture, 
and provided a structural basis for the transformation of a strong 
indigenous financial and mercantile elite into a modern industrial 
elite in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries - an elite 
which was for long dominant in the political as well as the 
economic life of the city.
15. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, Ahmedabad (l879)i 
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The transformation of the old-established Ahmedabad financial
and mercantile elite into a modern industrial elite in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
It was by no means inevitable that Ahmedabad would develop 
into an important centre of modern textile industry. Ahmedabad's 
location - inland, with no suitable port or fuel deposits nearby, 
and only cotton suitable for coarse yarn and cloth production 
growing nearby - meant that fuel (coal) and materials for in­
dustry (machinery, long-staple cotton and mill stores) had to 
be carried for hundreds of miles at discriminatory rail rates 
from Bombay, Bengal and Central India. In addition, the climate 
was very dry, and, as a result, there was a tendency for thread to 
break in the machines.
Ahmedabad was never exposed to large-scale Western influence 
and the widespread effects of Western education in the nineteenth 
century, which were thought to be (erroneously) an essential pre­
requisite for industrialization. Social change in Ahmedabad, 
in contrast to that in Calcutta, and even Bombay, was slow and 
selective. The British presence in Ahmedabad was never obtrusive: 
there was no sizeable English business community there, as in Cal­
cutta, and the bulk of the administration and police was Indian.
The British respected the traditional city offices. The Nagar- 
seth was often used as the medium of communication between the 
sarafs and the Government, and was granted an annual allowance 
in lieu of his rights to collect dues on the city trade. The 
Kazi was regarded as the head of the Muslim community, and both the
16. The railway companies had tariffs which favoured long­
distance traffic to and from the ports, since they naturally 
charged low rates on routes where they had competition from 
other railway companies and high rates where they had no 
competition.
Kazi and the Nagarseth were appointed as a matter of course 
to all important committees.
The progress of Western higher education in Ahmedabad 
was slow. The first two government vernacular schools opened 
in 1826, but the first government English school only opened in 
1846. By 1878, there were twenty-three government schools, in­
cluding one high school and two training college,s, and only 
six private schools. In 1879» the first arts college was opened, 
but, on the whole, there was no great surge among the middle 
classes to acquire Western learning, or, except for the Nagar 
Brahmin caste, to gain admission to government service or the 
legal profession. In 1885, there were only six graduates, 
eighteen pleaders and three licenciates of medicine, surgery and 
civil engineering. In the early crucial stages of industrialization, 
Western education was not needed. However, Ahmedabad was quick to 
respond selectively to the need for technical education in later 
years: in 1886, under the guidance of the first textile entre­
preneur in the city, Ranchhodlal Chhotalal, who had been made 
President of the Ahmedabad Municipality, the Municipality withdrew 
its contribution to the high school and decided to help technical 
education, instead. In 1902, the Ranchhodlal Chhotalal Technical 
Institute was opened, thanks to a large donation by Ranchhodlal's 
son.
The cause of social reform and religious reform was largely 
pioneered by British officers and enterprising Nagar Brahmins and 
Brahmakshatriyas. Its influence was largely limited to the spread 
of women's education, for which wealthy mill owners were prepared 
to give funds. In 1848, the Gujarat Vernacular Society was founded
by Alexander Kinlock Forbes, Assistant Judge at Ahmedabad, with 
the object of encouraging vernacular education and literature. 
Later, Indians joined the Managing Committee. In 18^9» the 
Society started the first Gujarati newspaper, a weekly Vartman, 
and the first public library. In 1851, its press started print­
ing school textbooks and Gujarati grammar books, and, in 185 +^, 
the Society took over the monthly, Buddhi Prakash. In 18571 it 
was renamed the Hemabhai Institute. Bholanath Sarabhai, a 
Vadnagara Nagar Brahmin and a first-class subordinate judge in 
the British service, organized the Dharma Samaj, a religious re­
form society, in 1858, and, in I87I1 founded the Prarthana Samaj,
i
also in the interests of religious reform. Both Bholanath
Sarabhai and another Vadnagara Nagar Brahmin, Mahipatram Rupram
Nilkanth, worked for the cause of women's education. The first
girls' school was founded by funds given by the Jain financier
and millowner, Maganbhai Karamchand, and the widow of another
Jain financier, Hathising Kesrising. This school, together with
another co-educational school, was taken over and run by the
Gujarat Vernacular Society in 1850. Later, another millowner,
Bechardas Ambaidas, endowed the Mahalakshmi Female Training
College. However, the impact of social reform was limited, and,
throughout the nineteenth century, there was no loosening of the
17traditional family structure and the institutions of caste.
Thus Ahmedabad is a striking example of industrialization 
achieved with limited accompanying Westernization and disturbance 
to its traditional social institutions. There was very little
17. Kenneth Gillion, Ahmedabad,(1968), pp. 62-69. (Gillion is 
the source for much of this section.)
British investment in Ahmedabad, no English press and the English 
language was only understood by relatively few Ahmedabadis. Even 
the introduction of Western law was not an essential prerequisite 
for Ahmedabad's industrialization, since there already existed 
there a well-developed market economy, based on contract,indigenous 
systems of banking and insurance, a high level of commercial, 
morality, and machinery for the settlement of disputes through the 
mahajans and seths. The industrial entrepreneurs of Ahmedabad were 
economically progressive, while remaining socially conservative.
The indigenous advantages possessed by Ahmedabad, largely in terms 
of human skills and enterprise, were sufficient for effective in­
dustrialization and outweighed the disadvantages.
An important advantage was its long specialization in textile 
manufacture. It possessed a relatively skilled work force with much 
knowhow which could be adapted to the machine.age. The small plants, 
put up initially by Ahmedabad's entrepreneurs, were fairly readilyj
accepted, since they did not require any radical changes in be­
haviour patterns or social relationships - the various textile de­
partments and processes were organized caste-wise.
Ahmedabad also possessed a skilled class of capitalists,
who constituted a prestigious elite of long-standing. The Jain
Bania ethic of hard work, frugality and money-making was dominant
in the city's culture. In Ahmedabad, trade and finance were not
divorced from production: the sarafs had long been accustomed to
financing trade and industry. In India's industrialization, capital
was often the scarce factor of production, and successful Indian
industrial entrepreneurs were most likely to be traders with large
l8accumulated capital or access to its surrogate, credit. By the
18. See Timberg Report.
mid-nineteenth century, there were quite a few bankers and merchants
in Ahmedabad with large amounts of capital. The Gazetteer of 1879
noted that, according to the 1872 Census, 12,080 persons, besides 
well-to-do cultivators and professional men, "occupied positions 
implying the possession of capital". These included 1,636 bankers, 
money-changers or shopkeepers; 8/f26 merchants and traders; and 
1,998 persons drawing incomes from the rent of houses and shops, 
from funded property, shares, annuities etc. The Gazetteer also 
noted:
"Although the capitalists of this district, more
especially those carrying on business in the city,
suffered heavily on the collapse of the shsre- 
mania in 18^6, there are still among them men 
known to be worth as much as £100,000 to £120,000 
(ten to twelve lakhs of rupees)."^9
Many of these men had prospered recently in the opium and 
cotton trades. However, due to the contraction of former capital 
outlets, such as moneylending to princes and armies, the restriction 
of the opium trade and the decline of their insurance business 
because of better security and competition from the branches of 
English banks, many were looking for profitable new avenues oft
investment. Since the city had a long association with textile 
manufacture, they were willing to listen, in the mid-nineteenth 
century, to schemes of setting up modern textile factories in 
Ahmedabad, particularly after carefully observing the success of 
the first cotton textile mills in Bombay. As another incentive to 
the industrial entrepreneur, interest rates in the city were low - 
only about 2-4°/o per annum.
19. Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, Ahmedabad, 
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The example of Britain's own Industrial Revolution with tex­
tile manufacture setting the pace was of crucial importance. The 
availability, by the mid-nineteenth century, of British textile 
machinery and technical expertise was essential for Ahmedabad's 
entrepreneurs. Many of the first weaving masters were from Lan­
cashire, sent out by English firms, such as Platts of Oldham.
Many engineers were also British, as well as Parsi and Hindu. The 
buildings and technical side of the industry were closely modelled 
on Lancashire. Ahmedabad, by specializing in cloth produced for 
the domestic market, avoided the effect of the decline in the 
foreign market which ruined the old Dacca textile industry.^
However, the traditional institutions of joint family and 
caste were also utilized by the Ahmedabad entrepreneurs to provide 
assured, long-term capital and credit networks. Various tech­
niques had been developed to spread the credit and capital manag­
ing ability of the family "peak" firm as widely as possible. The 
most important innovation was the managing agency, which came to 
be used in Ahmedabad. For the most part, the managing agencies 
were either family units or small private companies dominated by 
the members of one family. Since a contract to manage a business 
was made by the agency and not by individual members of the agency, 
those in charge of the agency could make all appointments, and 
usually members of the agency family automatically occupied key 
positions in the control of the companies managed. The merchants 
and financiers of Ahmedabad belonged to relatively few castes, and 
many were also related by birth and marriage, for example the
20. Gillion, Ahmedabad.(1968), p.78.
families of the Nagarseths, of Hathising, of Maganbhai, and 
Lalbhai Dalpatbhai, are all Jains and related by marriage.
Therefore, in general, the Ahmedabad mill agents cooperated with 
each other, rather than competed. They regarded their firms as 
family trusts to be conserved. Thus the secret of successful 
Indian entrepreneurship often lay in the strong particularistic 
joint family and caste loyalties, which gave a corporate confidence 
and security to business operations.^
The first two textile mill entrepreneurs, Ranchhodlal 
Chhotalal and Bechardas Ambaidas Lashkari, were, to some extent, 
outsiders to the old-established Jain and Vaishnava Bania mercant­
ile and financial elite. Ranchhodlal Chhotalal was a Nagar Brahmin, 
from an old Ahmedabadi administrative, not commercial, family.
He joined government service in 18^5» but his head was buzzing 
with business schemes. In 18^9» seven years before the first 
successful textile mill in Bombay, Ranchhodlal tried to found a 
mill in Ahmedabad, but the Ahmedabad sarafs were reluctant to risk 
their capital on this venture at that stage, until the success of 
the Bombay mills a few years later convinced them of the genuineness 
of the opportunity. By l86l, Ranchhodlal was able to secure the 
financial backing of the leading bankers of Ahmedabad and build 
the Ahmedabad Cotton Mill, which was owned by the Ahmedabad Spinning 
and Weaving Company, a joint-stock company formed in 1859. Other 
shareholders in this company included the most important members 
of Ahmedabad's traditional financial and mercantile elite; Maganbhai 
Karamchand, Nagarseth Premabhai Hemabhai, and Hathising Kesrising,
21. Gillion, Ahmedabad,(1968), pp. 91-9^5 see also the Timberg 
Report and A.K.Rice, Productivity and Social Organization, 
The Ahmedabad Experiment.(195^).
all three were Jains.
The second entrepreneur, Bechardas Ambaidas Lashkari, was 
also somewhat of an outsider. He had made his money in specu­
lation, army contracting and moneylending and was himself a
leading financier. He established the Bechardas Spinning and
\
Weaving Mill in 1867. The first Jain factory promoter was Man- 
sukhbhai Bhagubhai, a Visa Porwad Jain, who opened the Gujarat 
Spinning and Weaving Mill in 1878, and later founded three other
mills. Soon most of the traditional- mercantile and financial elite* • i
families of Ahmedabad had set up textile mills.
Almost all the Ahmedabad mills were built in about equal 
numbers by members of the local merchant Jain and Vaishnava 
Bania communities. Among the early Jain entrepreneurs were the 
following: Maganbhai Karamchand, Kasturbhai Manubhai and Sardar
Seth Lalbhai Dalpatbhai. In 1880, Maganbhai Karamchand bought up 
the Calico Mill, a steam calico-printing mill that had failed, 
and converted it into a spinning and weaving mill. He was a Dasa 
Shrimali Jain of the old sarafi firm of Karamchand Premchand - his 
family is better known today as the Sarabhai family. In l895»
i
Kasturbhai Manubhai, a Visa Oswal Jain, established the Hathising 
Mills Co. In 1897i Sardar Seth Lalbhai Dalpatbhai, also an Oswal 
Jain, promoted the Saraspur Mills. His son, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, 
is one of the leading textile magnates in Ahmedabad today.
There were also many noteworthy Vaishnava Vania entrepreneurs 
In 1888, Harilal Harivallabhdas, a Lad Vania, Parikh Trikamlal 
Jamnadas, Narottamdas Gulabchand, Trikamlal Bhogilal and Giidharlal 
Amrutlal started the Trikamlal (later known as Maneklal) Harilal 
Spinning and Manufacturing Company under a partnership agreement.
Seth Motilal Hirabhai, a Modh Bania, founded the Telia mill in 
l889» the Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Co. in 1896, and thereafter■" I
nine more mills in Ahmedabad and elsewhere. Balabhai Damodardas
and Mangaldas Girdhardas Parekh, both Visa Porwad Meshri Banias,
started the Aryodaya Spinning Mill together in 1892. In 189 ,^
Balabhai and his brother, Amrutlal Damodardas, started the Ahmedabad
Cotton Mills. In 18931 Seth Trikamlal Jamnadas, a Pancha Nagar Bania
and well-known saraf of Ahmedabad, promoted the Manekchowk and
22Ahmedabad Manufacturing Company.
By 190^ f, there were thirty-four mills with about 569*000
spindles and 7*035 looms, employing 18,000 to20,000 workers daily
23and representing a capital of 150 lakhs of rupees.
The influence of Gandhi on Ahmedabad's political culture and its 
municipal institutions.
Gandhi made Ahmedabad his political base from 1915 to 1930, 
and brought the city under the wider influence of the Nationalist 
Movement, involving the textile magnates and textile workers in 
modern political activity for the first time.
Before 1913* there had been little modern political activity 
in Ahmedabad, and,what little there was, had largely been the work 
of newcomers to the city. In 1872, the Ahmedabad Association had 
been formed to represent "the wants of the people" to the government. 
It was succeeded in 1885 by the Gujarat Sabha, whose leading members 
were pleaders and often outsiders to the city, like M.P.Modi, 
a Parsi, and Govindrao Apaji Patil, a Maharashtrian Brahmin. The 
Gujarat Sabha successfully asked the government for special repre­
sentation on the Municipal Commission for the educated classes.
22. Gillion, Ahmedabad, pp. 8l-89; see also Timberg Report.
23. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Abazai to Arcot, vol. X  * PP» 106-11
However, it unsuccessfully sought the right, for the Municipal 
Commission, to elect its own President. It started a Gokhale 
Society and a Dadabhai Naoroji library, and published a monthly 
paper for a time. In 1902, the Indian National Congress held its 
annual session in Ahmedabad, attended by the Nagarseth and leading 
millowners, but, except for this occasion, the mercantile community 
and the mass of citizens took little active interest in nationalist 
politics. Active political interest, at this stage, was largely 
confined to professional people, mainly Brahmakshatriyas, Nagar
24Brahmins and Lewa Patidars.
However, the decision by Gandhi to make Ahmedabad his base
i
in 1915i and the setting-up, in October, 1916, of a branch of 
the Bombay Home Rule League in Ahmedabad by Maganbhai Chaturbhai 
Patel and Jivanlal V. Desai, two local pleaders, with the help 
of the Swadeshi Mitra Mandal and the Gokhale Society, changed 
the situation. Gandhi became President of the Gujarat Sabha and 
revitalized it. In August, 1917, about fifty traders of Ahmeda­
bad enrolled in the Home Rule League, and a ladies' branch was 
formed by Ansuyaben Sarabhai, sister of the textile magnate,
Ambalal Sarabhai, and Mrs. Sumant Mehta. In November, 1917, the 
first Gujarat Political Conference was held at Godhra with Gandhi 
as President.
In these years, Gandhi brought Ahmedabad and Gujarat into 
the mainstream of the Nationalist Movement, arousing mass partici­
pation by linking the Natdoialist Movement with the redress of 
popular local grievances. The Rowlatt Satyagraha, which was accompanied
24. See Kenneth Gillion, ‘'Gujarat in 1919.° In R. Kumar (ed.)
Essays on Gandhian Politics, The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919»
c ino, pp.
by riots in Ahmedabad, marked the entry of Ahmedabad into the 
Nationalist Movement, and the replacement of the moral authority 
of the British by that of the Congress. Nationalist politics 
were skilfully associated with local grievances. Gandhi and the 
Home Rule League were associated with the campaign in Kaira 
district against the payment of land revenue after disastrous 
harvests. This had the effect of mobilizing the enterprising 
caste of Lewa Patidars, who were to provide the backbone of
Congress strength in Gujarat for many decades.I
Gandhi also successfully sought both the financial backing 
of the large Ahmedabad textile millowners and the mass support 
of the textile workers. By 19191 Ahmedabad had 51 mills, employing 
nearly *t0,000 workers, and a majority of the population had come
to be directly or indirectly dependent on the mill industry. Gandhi
i
organized the textile workers during their famous strike from
February-March, 1918, against the millowners1 withdrawal of the
plague bonus. He also helped them found a strong trade union
organization, the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association, also known
as the TLA or Majur Mahajan. However, he did not antagonize the
millowners in the process - indeed, they came to respect his methods
of non-violent arbitration in industrial disputes.
Gandhi's idea of labour-capitalist interdependence and his
belief in the necessity for labour-capitalist harmony and cooperation
in fulfilling the goals of industry permeated deep into the
psychology of both textile magnates and workers. Kasturbhai Lalbhai's
address to his fellow millowners, at the time of the opening
ceremony of a creche in Raipur Mill, revealed the extent of the
25acceptance of Gandhi's ideas:
2.5. Young India , 15 May, 1928.
’’You (the mill owners) should hold all your riches 
as a trust to be used solely in the interest of 
those who sweat for you, and to whose industry 
and labour you owe all your position and prosperity. 
I want you to make your labourers co-partners of 
your wealth. I do not mean to suggest that unless 
you legally bind yburselves to do all that, there 
should be a labour insurrection. The only sanction 
I can think of in this connection is of mutual love 
and regard as between father and son, not of law.
If only you make it a rule to respect these mutual 
obligations of love, there would be an end to all 
labour disputes, the workers would no longer feel 
the need for organizing themselves into unions. 
Under the ideal contemplated by me, there would be 
nothing left for our Ansooyabens and Shankerlals 
to do.M
Gandhi's appeal to the deeply-rooted psychological accept­
ance of self-sacrifice as a means of arousing one's opponent to 
moral awareness was an important principle in his concept of 
labour relations. The Marxist concept of class antagonism and 
warfare, by contrast, made little appeal at first to the Gujarati 
psyche. Gandhi expressed his ideas in the following way:
’’Pure justice is that which is inspired by fellow- 
feeling and compassion. We in India call it Eastern 
and ancient justice. Where there is no place for 
fellow-feeling or compassion, it is known as devilish 
or Western or modern justice. ... In giving up for 
another, the giver experiences a feeling of pride and 
considers it a sign of his strength and not of weak­
ness.
Gandhi's distinct political style, which involved the 
use of the fast, the technique of non-cooperation with government, 
the seeking of maximum public support for his campaigns, his willing­
ness to suffer hardship and jail rather than surrender his prin­
ciples, and his ideal of effecting political and economic change 
through an appeal to the justice and compassion of one's opponent,
26. M.K.Gandhi, Righteous Struggle,(translated by Mahadev 
Desai^
owed much to the prevailing political practice in Kathiawad, 
where he spent his schooldays and where his father had been Prime 
Minister to the ruler of Rajkot State. In Kathiawad's numerous 
small principalities, where political relationships were intensely 
personal and localized, and political struggles often took place 
between members of the same family or clan, a form of political 
protest had survived, whose essence lay in inflicting or enduring 
suffering oneself, or severing relations temporarily in order to 
arouse the moral conscience of one's opponent. This technique 
relied for its effectiveness on the basic mutual interest and 
friendship of the parties concerned. In its nonviolence, this 
technique was also consonant with Jain and Vaishnava traditions, 
which emphasized the fast and self-suffering as means of self­
purification. Gandhi's genius lay in translating these techniques 
on to the all-India stage and making them techniques of mass 
action.^
He also utilized his Bania heritage in securing a strong 
financial and organizational base for his national political acti­
vities, and, for this end, he successfully sought the financial 
backing and support of Ahmedabad's Bania millowners, who also had 
a long tradition of political self-assertiveness and of social service 
Although many Ahmedabad industrialists pledged to use only handspun,
handwoven cloth, even though they themselves ran textile mills, this
i
should not obscure what was a shrewd economic motive in their 
support of Gandhi and the Nationalist Movement - they stood to
i
gain a great deal from the encouragement of the Swadeshi movement, 
the use of home-produced, instead of foreign, products. As early
27. See Howard Spodek, "On the Origins of Gandhi's Political
Methodology: The Heritage of Kathiawad and Gujarat", Journal
of Asian Studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (Feb.^1971), pp«36l-372.
as 1903» Ahmedabad businessmen had established an Indigenous
Articles Protection Association to encourage the use of Swadeshi
goods. Kasturbhai Lalbhai, a leading mill magnate, led the
struggle in the Legislative Assenbly in New Delhi for the removal
of the cotton excise duty and the extension of tariff protection
for Indian industry. Ambalal Sarabhai, another leading textile
magnate, led the movement in Ahmedabad to Indianize management
28cadres in his Calico Mills.j -
The textile magnates of Ahmedabad gave generous and devoted 
support to Gandhi. When he opened his ashram to untouchables, 
many people deserted him,but Ambalal Sarabhai donated Rs. 13,000 
to save the ashram. Kasturbhai Lalbhai became Secretary of the 
Gujarat Famine Relief Committee, and, in 1918, trekked the famine- 
stricken Gujarati villages with Sardar Patel and G.V.Mavlankar. 
Kasturbhai, with Amrutlal Hargovandas, provided financial support
for the Ahmedabad Education Society, which was originally formed
• \  j
to build nationalist colleges in the 1930s, although it continued 
to sponsor new colleges even after independence.
Other industrialists, like Nandas Haridas of Vijaya Mills,
> 1
Ambalal Himatlal of Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills and Vadilal L.Mehta 
cf Sayaji Mills, attended the Vidyapith, the university established 
by Gandhi in Ahmedabad. In 1930, Ranchhodlal Amrutlal of the 
Ahmedabad New Cotton Mills served as President of the INC.
i
During the Quit India movement of 19^2, Ahmedabad millowners 
and millworkers cooperated in a three and a half months' protest
demands of the Second World War promised large profits. The strike
29was finally terminated because of the suffering of the workers.
In the municipal sphere too, until the advent of Gandhi in 
Ahmedabad and the election of his lieutenant, Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel, in 19171 as President of the Ahmedabad Municipality, 
municipal politics had had little concern with wider national or 
provincial issues.
The Ahmedabad Municipality was established in 1857. Before 
this, there had been a Town Wall Committee, consisting of the 
Collector, Judge, Kazi and Nagarseth, which had raised a "town 
wall fund” to repair the town walls, and some of this fund was made 
available for municipal purposes.*'’0 In 1882, with the reforms of 
local government by Lord Ripon, half the members of the Municipality 
were now elected (excluding the President) and the other half con­
tinued to be appointed by the government. The Government appointed 
the first Ahmedabad industrial entrepreneur, Ranchhodlal Chhotalal, 
to be the first non-official President and Chairman of the Municipality's 
Managing Committee. He made bold proposals for increased taxation 
and improvement of the water-supply and drainage of the city, which 
he carried out in the teeth of strong opposition by the majority 
of ratepayers. After Ranchhodlal's death in 1898, the Municipality 
failed to achieve anything of note, and was superseded in 1910 by 
the government for incompetency.
It was not until the restoration of the elective principle in 
the Municipality in 1915» and the election of Gandhi's lieutenant,
Sardar Patel, to the Presidency of the Municipality in 1917 that
the Municipality was drawn, under Gandhi's influence, into the politics
29. Ibid, p. 346.
30. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Abazai to Arcot, vol.X» PP- 106-111.
of the Nationalist Movement.
In 1921, following Gandhi's call for a boycott of govern­
ment educational institutions, the Ahmedabad Municipality started 
a policy of noncooperation with the government in educational 
matters, for which it was promptly superseded by the government 
in 1922. In 1924, it was reinstated with Sardar Patel again elected 
President. Although he resigned in 1928 after losing his majority 
to a group led by Ambalal Sarabhai, by this time, the Municipality 
was firmly committed to a policy of nationalist agitation. The 
Municipality was again superseded in 1942 for endorsing the "Quit 
India" resolution of the AlCC. In the municipal elections of 19^, 
the Congress won a great victory, but the Municipality was promptly
superseded again until 19^6, when the newly-elected Municipality
31declared the previous supersession illegal.
Thus Gandhi exerted a tremendous influence on Ahmedabad's 
political culture as well as its labour relations, bringing Ahmeda­
bad and Gujarat into the mainstream of the Nationalist Movement, 
and mobilizing the textile magnates and workers and the Patidar 
peasantry in the countryside. The textile magnates and textile 
workers, organized into the TLA, were the principal actors inI I
Ahmedabad's political life after Independence, and much of their 
thinking had been profoundly shaped by the ideas of Gandhi, who 
instilled in them ideas of partnership, cooperation and mutual 
interest.
31. Gillion, Ahmedabad.(1968), pp. 153-17^.
The linguistic agitation of the 1950s«
The linguistic agitation of the 1950s for the bifurcation 
of Bombay State into the separate States of Gujarat and Maharashtra 
was a formative and crucial period in the political history of 
Ahmedabad. Ahmedabad, long recognised as a Congress stronghold, 
became anti-Congress in the General Elections of 19571 held in 
the midst of the linguistic agitation. The Maha Gujarat Janta 
Parishad, the major opposition party to the Congress in the 1960s, 
was born in these turbulent years.
The linguistic agitation was a prototype and precursor of 
the agitational movements of the 1960s, involving angry demonstrations 
and police firing, although it remained largely a middle class move­
ment, lacking the mass base that opposition movements in the 1960s 
acquired. Even at the height of the movement for Maha Gujarat, 
the Congress employed the industrial labourers, who largely re­
mained loyal sind disciplined under the leadership of the Majur 
Mahajan, as a counterpoise to the middle class upsurge.
The linguistic movement brought to the surface many oppositional
elements in Ahmedabad's political life, and was a countercurrent
to the general stability of Congress dominance and business-Majur
Mahajan partnership. It revealed the very real constraints under
which Congress dominance operated, being subject to dissent and
dissidence from within which coalesced with angry opposition from
both the right and left wing parties and groups into the umbrella
32organization, the MGJP.
52. The Maha . Gujarat Janta Parishad is known in abbreviation 
as the MGJP.
The issue of linguistic provincialism could be traced backI <
to 1920, when Gandhi reorganized the Congress party on the ex­
plicit basis of Congress-formulated, "linguistic provinces", not
33on administrative lines drawn up by the British. This gave
1 1 -  4
tacit support to movements for the reorganization of states into 
linguistic units.
However, by the time of Independence and Partition, Congress 
was reconsidering the wisdom of its commitment of almost thirty
J
years to the reorganization of states on linguistic lines, moti­
vated, as it now was, by considerations of "national integration" 
and nationbuilding. The Dar Commission appointed by the Constituent 
Assembly in 19^8 under the chairmanship of S.K.Dar, a former Judge
of the Allahabad High Court, to make recommendations on provincial re-)
organization, recommended putting off provincial reorganization 
altogether until there was greater "national integration", and em­
phasized that language "should not be the decisive or even the
3^main factor" in provincial reorganization.
Regarding Bombay State, the crux of the problem of dividing
J
it into two linguistic States of Marathi-speaking people and Gujarati­
speaking peoples was the question of what was to happen to Bombay 
City, with its cosmopolitan, polyglot population. Although the
Marathi-speakers had a slight numerical majority of Bombay City's
J
population, much of the industry, trade, commerce and political
life of the city was dominated by Gujarati trading classes in particular,
33. See the Report of the 35th Session of the INC, held at
Nagpur on the 26, 28 and 31 Dec. 1920, mentioned in R.W.Stern, 
The Process of Opposition in India, Two Case Studies of 
How Policy Shapes Politics<(1970), P.10.
34. See the Report of the Dar Commission in 19^8, mentioned in
R.W.Stern, The Process of Opposition in India,(1970)1 p.12.
and also by Parsi, Marwari and Sindhi businessmen. Gujarati, Parsi, 
Marwan. and Sindhi industrialists and merchants largely controlled 
the Indian Merchants' Chamber and the Bombay PCC, although its 
President was a Maharashtrian, S.K.Patil. They formed the Bombay 
Citizens' Committee, consisting largely of representatives of business 
and the professions, including Tata, Birla, Kilachand and Modi, to 
put their case before the Dar Commission, and its successor, the
States Reorganization Commission. The Bombay PCC, the Bombay Citizens'
i
Committee and the Indian Merchants'Chamber complained that their 
control of the city was not only being challenged on linguistici
grounds, but also by anti-capitalist sentiments expressed by the
35Communist-dominated Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad.
Until 1959, the Congress Government elite refused to allow 
the establishment of Bombay city as the capital of the unilingual 
State of Maharashtra. The Dar Commission rejected the SMP's claim 
on Bombay City, recommending that, in the event of Bombay's 
division into linguistic provinces, Bombay City should be established 
as a separate political unit, because of the belief that Bombay 
City's attachment to a linguistic province would mean its rapid 
descent from its present commanding position "as the nerve-centre 
of our trade and commerce, and our biggest window to the outside 
world".^
The States Reorganization Committee, which presented its 
Report in September 1955, was also reluctant to concede Bombay City
35. The Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad is known in abbreviation 
as SMP.
36. See the Report of the Dar Commission in 1948, mentioned in 
R.W.Stern, The Process of Opposition in India,(1970), p.17.
to the Maharashtrians. It finally recommended the establishment 
of a "balanced bilingual" Bombay State, "balanced*’ between kG°/o 
Marathi and 37°/o Gujarati-speakers. The balance was to be 
achieved by incorporating Gujarati-speaking Kutch and Saurashtra, 
and Marathi-speaking Marathawad, but not Nagpur and Vidarbha, into
i
the new State.
This was rejected by the Maharashtra PCC and the SMP. In
October 1955, the Maharashtra PCC suggested to the Working Committeej
the alternative of a "big bilingual" Bombay, a huge state whichI
would incorporate all Gujarati and Marathi-speaking areas, including
Nag-Vidarbha, with the provision that Gujarat, if it wished, could
\
exercise an "option" to leave the composite State after five years.
The Gujarati position was complicated by a reluctance to give 
up Bombay city, which had strong financial and economic ties with 
Gujarat., in order to gain Maha Gujarat. The Maha Gujarat Parishad, 
in its Memo to the States Reorganization Commission in 195*+1 
claimed that the argument that Bombay was "built by the labour of 
the working classes of Maharashtra and, therefore, they should be 
the masters of the city" was "novel", "futile", and "invalid". The 
Gujarat PCC and its allies, the Gujarat Sima Samiti, an ad hoc 
"citizens1 group" auxiliary of the Gujarat Congress composed of 
lawyers, academics and businessmen who were concerned with staking 
out the borders of a possible Gujarat State, and the Gujarat Sahitya 
Parishad (Gujarat Literary Society), dominated the testimony pre-J i
sented to the States Reorganization Commission on behalf of Gujarat.
i
They argued, in view of the close ties with Bombay city, in favour 
of the multilingual status quo.
Morarji Desai, boss of the Gujarat Congress organization, 
was even more reluctant than other GPCC leaders to separate Gujarat 
off from Bombay city, and state. He had strong ambitions in the 
national political arena, and was angling for the post of Chief 
Minister of Bombay State, which would give him great power at 
the centre. The last thing he wanted was the carving up of the 
territory of Bombay State, and he was even prepared to go along 
with the Maharashtra PCC1s ambitions for a "big bilingual" Bombay
State rather than find his power-base shrunk to the confines of* • \
a separate State of Gujarat.
Only the Maha Gujarat Parishad, a small group, made a case 
before the States Reorganization Commission in favour of the 
creation of a unilingual state in preference to the maintenance 
of the status quo.
In the GPCC resolutions on the States Reorganization Commission 
Report, passed at its Mehmedabad session on October 25th, 1955, 
(published in Congress . Patrika, Nov. 10th, 1955) ^  the GPCC 
accepted the States Reorganization Commission's proposals for a 
"balanced bilingual" Bombay State in preference to the proposals 
of the MPCC for "big bilingual" Bombay, where they might be forced 
to exercise their option leaving Bombay city behind, but it favoured 
as an alternative the "three-unit formula", the creation of three 
separate units of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Bombay city.
Ultimately, the "three-unit formula" was incorporated into 
the States Reorganization Bill of 1956, and the GPCC had come to 
accept the idea of a separate State as a better alternative to the
37. D.N.Pathak, M.G.Parekh and K.D.Desai, Three General Elections 
in Gujarat.(1966), pp. 52-61.
scheme suggested by the MPCC. However, when the bill in this form 
came to a vote in Parliament in August, 1956, an ad hoc multi­
party group of MPs, including leaders of the Bombay PCC, pressed 
the Government to withdraw the "three-unit formula" in favour of 
a "big bilingual" .scheme, which would not include a quit "option" 
for Gujarat. The Government yielded to this demand, and a bill to
this effect passed in the Lok Sabha by a vote of 2*fl to *f0, and
38"big bilingual" Bombay became a State on Nov. 1 st, 1956.
This created a furore in Gujarat, which had hitherto remained 
relatively quiet. The local GPCC leaders and other prominent
citizens of Ahmedabad had never even been consulted about this re-
)
vision of the States Reorganization Bill. The movement for Maha 
Gujarat developed as a reaction to the movement for Samyukta 
Maharashtra, and particularly as a reaction to the sudden creation 
of a "big bilingual" Bombay in which Gujaratis felt their voice 
and influence would be submerged, and which was viewed as a con­
cession by the Congress Government elite to the Marathas. Press 
and public opinion in Gujarat came out strongly against the move. 
All the opposition parties, the Ahmedabad Millowners1 Association 
and the Bar Association protested strongly.
On the 8th August 1956, after the withdrawal of the "three- 
unit formula" had been confirmed, a large group of students, 
who were bitterly disappointed that their new State was suddenly 
denied them, since education, the key to middle class employment,
is primarily a State rather than a Central responsibility, marched\
to Congress House in Ahmedabad in protest. The situation became
38. R.W.Stern, The Process of Opposition in India,(l970)» p«19.
violent with police firing in which some students were killed and
wounded. The Kotwal Commission Report, which also commented on
the police firings of 1956, concluded that the 1956 disturbances
"broke out spontaneously because of a sense of frustration and
shock among the people in Ahmedabad as a result of the denial to
them of a separate State of Gujarat and the firing at the Congress 
39House." The police firings on the students aroused strong public 
sympathy for the cause of Maha Gujarat, for which the dead students 
had become the first martyrs. There were also demonstrations and 
police firings at Kalol in North Gujarat and Nadiad in Kaira 
district. In this delicate situation Morarji Desai behaved with 
singular tactlessness and insensitivity: instead of visiting
Ahmedabad at this time, he chose to go straight to Bombay from 
Delhi, and declared his determination to crush any opposition to the 
bilingual experiment.
Under the leadership of Harihar Khambolja, a law student, 
the students formed the Maha Gujarat Vidyarthi Samiti and controlled 
the movement for about a month.
Soon, in September 1956» a heterogeneous group came together 
to found an umbrella organization to campaign for the cause of 
Maha Gujarat. A citizens' convention- Nagrik Parishad - was called 
at Ahmedabad on the 9th September 1956* attended by nearly 1,000 
delegates from all over Gujarat. The Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad 
was bom in that convention, and Indulal Yagnik, a popular, charis­
matic, radically-inclined political figure, was elected as President.
39. See Shri JusticeS.P.Kotwal, Report of the Cnmn-n smon of Inquiry 
on the Cases of Police Firing in Ahmedabad on the 12, 13 and 
l*f August, 1958. (Goverrmlent of Bombay.)
The Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad, henceforth to be known as the 
MGJP, consisted of the PSP, the Communists, right wing groups, 
radical independents and dissident Congressmen.
The backbone of the MGJP consisted of dissident Congressmen - 
many of them businessmen and landholding farmers. Businessmen, 
particularly those in Ahmedabad, wanted a State capital of their 
own to which they could have ready access since economic success 
was all too dependent on the right political contacts. A more 
particular reason was that many leading businessmen in Ahmedabadi
had made speculative land purchases in anticipation of the con-
1 ' * *
struction of the new State Government buildings - land deals which)
backfired with the news of the creation of "big bilingual" Bombay.
The Ahmedabad Millowners1 Association, known as the MOA, the
i
Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and other commercial associations ini
Ahmedabad strongly condemned the "big bilingual" scheme. Soon after­
wards the business-dominated Ahmedabad City Congress Committee, 
by a vote of 13 to 4, denounced the "big bilingual" solution, 
and dissolved itself into the Nagrik Paksh under the leadership 
of a prominent textile magnate, Chinubhai Chimanlal Seth. It 
formed an uneasy alliance with the MGJP, and won 46 out of a total 
of 64 seats in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections in 
April 1957. Landholding farmers, led by Bhailalbhai Patel in
Kaira district, Purshottamdas Patel in Mehsan.a district and
\ |
Dadubhai Amin in Ahmedabad district, were ready recruits for the 
Maha Gujarat movement since the creation of a separate State of 
Gujarat would put land reform legislation in the hands of "their" 
government, which, they hoped, would be more responsive to their 
wishes.
The Maha Gujarat movement was confined largely to northern 
and central Gujarat, particularly the districts of Ahmedabad,
Mehsana and Kaira. Its nerve-centres were the cities of Ahmeda-i *
bad, Nadiad and Kalol. The movement was weak in Saurashtra and 
Kutch which had strong ties with Bombay city. In the former areas, 
it achieved great success in the 1957 General Elections, often 
challenging the Congress in straight fights. The Congress lost 3 
out of the 13 Parliamentary seats, and 29 out of the 132 assembly 
seats to the MGJP, which secured second place in 32 other assembly 
seats. Other parties and Independent candidates were totally over­
shadowed by the rise of the MGJP. Compared to the 1952 General 
Elections, Congress suffered a fall of nearly 36.6°/o in assembly 
seats in .the three districts of Ahmedabad, Mehsana and Kaira, but 
in the rest of Gujarat (including Saurashtra and Kutch) it improved 
on its 1952 record. Of the 29 JP candidates elected to the Bombay 
Legislative Assembly in 19571 it is important to stress that 19 
were dissident Congressmen, who also constituted 3 out of the 3 
Janta Parishad candidates elected to the Lok Sabha in 1957.
The leftist elements in the Janta Parishad soon fell out
\
with the more rightist elements. Even the two left-wing parties, 
the PSP and the CPI, found it difficult to get on together: the
PSP was bitterly anti-Communist, and was unwilling to run its 
candidates under the Parishad's banner in Southern Gujarat and 
Saurashtra in the 1957 General Elections, and failed to arrive at an 
amicable division with the Communists of some constituencies in 
Ahmedabad’s industrial areas. Most businessmen favoured the "three-
unit formula" which would preserve the independence of Bombay city 
which was so important in economic terms for Gujarat. However, 
the left-wing elements in the MGJP, which came increasingly to be
i
dominated by the Communists, declared themselves perfectly willing 
to surrender Bombay city to the Maharashtrians in order to get 
Maha Gujarat. In June 1957* the executive committee of the Ahmeda­
bad City Janta Parishad, against Indulal Yagnik's advice, alienated 
the business-dominated Nagrik Paksh by taking a stand against the 
"three-unit formula", declaring that it was not a "practicali
proposition", and worse, that it was a scheme of "the Congress 
and the capitalists for continuing the present set-up". Naturally, 
after this outburst, the MGJP began to lose business support.
The increasingly left-oriented MGJP was the precursor of the
J
main opposition party to the Congress in the 1960s, the Janta 
Parishad. In by-elections held in the years following the Second 
General Elections for the assembly seats of Anand, Himmatnagar and 
Jamalpur in Ahmedabad City, the Janta Parishad lost every seat. 
Jayanti Dalai, a prominent PSP leader and member of the MGJP, con-
J  \
firmed before the Kotwal Commission of Inquiry a steep fall in the 
membership of the MGJP from 182,000 in December 1956, to 37*000 in 
June 1958. Left-wing Janta Parishad leaders resolved to adopt 
militant "direct action" techniques to recapture their popular 
support. Their militancy centred on the issue of the memorial to 
the student martyrs of 1956. They requested permission from the 
Nagrik Patcsli -controlled municipal government to erect a martyrs' 
memorial in front of Congress House. Their request was denied, but 
in spite of this left-wing leaders put up a memorial, which was 
removed by the police a few days later in the early morning of the
12th August, 1958. Police action was followed by riots in 
Ahmedabad City, and more incidents of police firing. Thirteen Cor­
porators resigned from the Nagrik Paksha on this issue, and formed 
themselves into a radical left-wing Janta Samiti party. In re- 
elections held in December 1958, all but one were re-elected. 
However, even before the final creation of a separate State of 
Gujarat in May, i960, the Janta Samiti steadily lost support - 
the three by-elections held in the first half of 1958 went against 
the Janta Samiti.
Direct action, however, played an important part in securing 
a reversal of the Congress Government elite's commitment to a "big 
bilingual" Bombay. The Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti and the MGJP 
threatened a massive joint campaign of direct action to begin in 
November 1959 to compel the Congress Government elite to bifurcate, 
or, failing that, to topple the Bombay Government. In August, a 
month after the joint agitation threat was first made, the Congress 
Government elite decided to reopen the Bombay reorganization issue. 
In the negotiations that followed, bifurcation was decided upon, 
with Bombay city conceded to Maharashtra, and financial and terri­
torial compensation, including the territory of Dangs, given to 
Gujarat.
On the final resolution of the linguistic issue by bifurcation 
in i960, the MGJP organization was dissolved. Congress dissidents, 
by and large, returned to the Congress fold. The Nagrik Paksh 
of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation rejoined the Congress in 
April i960. The Mehsana group, which had organized the landholding 
farmers, led by Purshottamdas Patel., also rejoined the Congress,
5 9
but a powerful section of this group refused to join the Congress, 
and, with other leaders of the landholding farmers, like Bhai-
lalbhai Patel of Kaira district and Dadubhai Amin of AhmedabadI
district, provided the main strength of the incipient Swatantra 
Party. The PSP became an independent group, and only the Com­
munists and radical followers of Indulal Yagnik remained to form 
a new organization named the Nutan Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad.
The linguistic agitation of the 1950s had brought out the
brittleness of Congress party dominance in Ahmedabad city, and>
even of the business-Majur Mahajan partnership that dominated city
politics. However, oppositional elements had coalesced and focused
tapped
on a particular issue, which/deep-rooted popular interests and 
sentiments, but there was no viable permanent structure of oppositionI
that seemed capable of challenging the Congress in a sustained 
manner without appeal to a "great issue", public emotions and 
"direct action" techniques. The left-dominated MGJP, however,
V t
gained a new lease of life in the 1960s, when it found another 
"great issue", this time in the economic sphere. Ahmedabad city in
the 1950s and 60s offered fertile ground for agitational oppositional
i i
movements in contrast to the norm of Congress-party dominance and 
business-Majur Mahajan alliance that regulated the city's political 
life.
2. Socioeconomic profile of Ahmedabad City, showing the pre­
ponderance of the textile industry, the fact that diversification 
has also been undertaken by the textile magnates, the impact of 
urbanization and migration etc. A wardwise socioeconomic analysis 
is also made.
The following section seeks to depict and analyse the nature
V )
of the social change brought about in Ahmedabad City by the inter­
action of the forces of industrialization, urbanization and migration. 
The impact of this interaction on the socioeconomic profile of the 
city, on its industrial structure, its ethnic structure, its social 
mobility patterns etc. is analysed. The socioeconomic reality and 
ethnic mix of the city, portrayed below, has had a profound influence 
on the forms of sociopolitical conflict and cooperation between 
different segments of Ahmedabad society.^
Examining first the phenomenon of industrialization, from the 
mid-nineteenth century onwards, Ahmedabad has gradually transformed 
its functional characteristic from trade and commerce to manufactur­
ing industry, largely through the growth and expansion of the cotton 
textile industry and its ancillary industries in the city. So wide­
spread has this change-over been that the 1961 Census of India's 
Special Report on Ahmedabad City noted that the city's "main functional 
characteristic is industrial, its sub-functional type also industrial
and manufacturing, the degrees of other functions being low service
2and moderate trade and transport."
1. For a general discussion of the inter-relationship between 
socioeconomic factors and political developments in the Indian 
context, see Ali Ashraf, The Study of Urban Politics in India:
A Note« ,, (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at
the Indian Institute of Technology in Kanpur:
2. Census of India (I96l), vol. V Gujarat, Part X-A(i) Special 
Report on Ahmedabad City, henceforth to be known as Census 
Special Re-port I.
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The changes in the economic structure of the city can be seen 
in a comparison of the proportions of persons working in various 
industrial categories during the last sixty years (Table l). As 
might be expected in a large urban centre, the primary sector shows a 
steady decline in all categories between 1901 and 1961, while there 
is a significant increase in the proportion of workers engaged in 
manufacturing industries, worked on a household as well as a non­
household basis, from 4^.32°/o in 1901 to 53«63°/o in 19&1. There 
has been a correspondingly small rise in trading and commercial 
activities in the city, since workers in trade and commerce constituted 
only 15.k5°/o of total workers, as against 13.17°/o in 1901. The 
proportion of workers employed in transport, storage and communications 
increased from 1 .3°/o to 3.77°/o between 1901 and 19 6 1, while the 
proportion in construction activities only increased from 1 .70°/o to 
2.66°/o. However, there was a marked fall in the proportion of workers■ t
engaged in other services from 35«82°/o in 1901 to 21.88°/o in 1961.
The pattern of industrial employment in Ahmedabad, as shown in 
Table 1, is in strong contrast to that in Kanpur City, another im­
portant textile centre of roughly similar size (Kanpur had a popu­
lation of 9711062 in 1961). During the early decades of the twenti­
eth century, the biggest growth sector in Kanpur had been manufactur­
ing industry, and the relative importance of manufacturing, trade
t \
and construction had been growing at the cost of miscellaneous ser­
vices. However, between 1931 and 1961, this trend was reversed. 
Absolute numbers in the secondary sector remained almost level, but
in proportion manufacturing visibly shrank. The tertiary sector,/ - 1
however, exhibited a marked increase. Trade and commerce of the
I
tertiary sector showed a lowering of proportion, although the actual
numbers engaged in trade rose. A small increase occurred in 
transport, but the chief increase was in the case of miscellaneous
services whose actual number and proportion both showed a markedi
rise, as the following table indicates:
Table 2. Number of workers of various industrial 
categories in Kanpur in 1951 and 196l, 
and the percentage increase.**
Workers in Workers in °/o Increase
1951 1961
Total population of city 705,585 971,062 37.7
All workers 258,018 316,581 22.7
Categories: I 1,817 8,410 -
II 204 2,245 -
III 1,580 1,992 -
IV + V 116,429 119,372 2.5
VI 4,600 8,004 74.0
VII 50,972 57,085 12.0
VIII 18,749 25,343 35.2
IX 63,867 94,130 47.4
Thus the main trend of the decade 1951-61 in Kanpur was to increase 
the importance of miscellaneous services and to lower the importance 
of manufacturing in the livelihood structure of the population to 
a very appreciable degree. This showed that the increased population 
found more avenues of employment in administration and miscellaneous 
services than in industry and trade, contrary to what had happened 
during the forty years between 1911 and 1951 in which the city had
4. See Census of India (1961), Vol. XV UttarPradesh, Part X,
Special Report on Kanpur City.
made a great advance in manufacturing and commerce. Thus in Kanpur
in 1961, 37.9°/o of total workers were engaged in manufacturing
(household as well as non-household), whereas in Ahmedabad,
33.63°/o were so employed. In Kanpur in 196l, 29.3°/o of total
1
workers, as opposed to 21.88°/o in Ahmedabad, were employed in 
other services. In Kanpur, the tertiary sector as a whole (in­
dustrial categories VII, VIII and IX) gave employment to 33.8°/o 
of total workers, whereas in Ahmedabad the proportion of workers 
in the tertiary sector was only 42.1°/o.
A sectoral analysis of the working population of Ahmedabad City 
in 1961 reveals the overwhelming preponderance of the secondary 
sector, employing workers in manufacturing industries - household 
as well as non-household - and in construction activities, over the 
tertiary sector, employing workers in trade and commerce; transport,I i
storage and communications; and other services:
Table 3. Number and proportion of persons in 
various categories of workers in 
Ahmedabad, 1961.^
Total Total of Primary Sector m . _ _,, , Total ofPopulation all sectors  ^  ^ II & III
1,149.918 557,395 615 456 1,093 2,164
(31.1) (0.01) - (0.01) (0.2)
Secondary Sector ipota  ^of 
IV V VI IV, V & VI
10,892 180,776 9,493 201,161
(1.0) (13.7) (0.8) (17.3)
Tertiary Sector Total Qf
VII VIII IX VII, VIII & IX
33,224 20,633 78,213 134,070
(4.8) (1.8) (6.8) (13.4)
Note: Figures within brackets denote °/o to total population.
3. Census Special Report I, p.230.
Out of a total working population of 357*395 or 31.08°/o of the 
City's total population, the scondary sector provided work to 
201,l6l workers or 17.5°/o of the total City population, whereas 
the tertiary sector engaged only 154,070 workers or 13.4°/o of 
the City population. The existence of a relatively low proportion 
of workers in the tertiary sector,particularly in trade and commerce 
and other services, and the apparent inability of the large manu­
facturing industrial sector to influence and accelerate growth in
trade and commerce and other services (the tertiary services sector
possible
of the economy)indicates a/weakness in the economic structure of the 
City and an impediment to the process of modernization.
In comparison with other cities in India with a population ex­
ceeding one million in 1961, Ahmedabad was on a par with Bombay in
i
having the highest proportion of workers in the secondary sector,
1
but had the lowest proportion, out of all the million plus cities, 
in the tertiary sector:
Table 4. Percentage of workers in each sector in 
the cities of India with population ovey 
one million, to total population, 1961. '
City/Town-group All sectors: Primary Secondary Tertiary
Sector: Sector: Sector
Greater Bombay 4-0.6 0.8 17.6 22.2
Calcutta 40.4 0.1 11.8 28.5
Delhi Town-group 33.-7 0.5 8.5 22.7
Madras 30.5 0.5 9-5 20.5
Hyderabad Town-group 29.9 1.0 6.9 22.0
Bangalore M.A. 
Town-group 32.4 2.5 13.0 16.9
Ahmedabad Town -group 31.1 0.2 17.3 13.6
Ahmedabad City 31.1 0.2 17.5 13.4
6. Census Special Report I, p.231.
Ahmedabad is shown to have the smallest services sector.
On a detailed comparison of the industrial structure of
Ahmedabad and Bombay City* according to the Standard Industrial
i
Classification employed in the 1961 Census of India* it becomes 
clear that manufacturing offers the maximum employment to workers 
in Ahmedabad numbering 189*0^7 or 33.06°/o of the total of all in­
dustrial divisions of the Standard Industrial Classification, whereas 
in Bombay workers in manufacturing number 688,^ -83 persons and con­
stitute k0,05°/o of total workers. Trade and commerce account for
1
55*22^ workers in Ahmedabad, or 13.30°/o of total workers, whereas
\ 1
the corresponding figures for Bombay are 303*817 persons or 17.6°/o 
of total workers. Transport, storage and communications account for 
20,633 workers on 3.79°/o of total workers in Ahmedabad, whereas 
they account for 189,260 workers or 1 1.2°/o of total, workers in 
Bombay. The services division accounts for 66,178 workers or l8.37°/o 
of total workers in Ahmedabad, whereas in Bombay it accounts for 
393*709 workers or 23.3°/o of total workers. Thus in Bombay theJ \ -
tertiary sector of trade and commerce, transport, storage and communi-i
7cations, and services is appreciably larger than in Ahmedabad.
On analysing a more detailed breakdown of the services sector 
(classified according to the National Classification of Occupations), 
one can see the lower proportions of persons engaged in professional, 
technical and related work, such as scientists, engineers, technicians, 
accountants, doctors and labour and social welfare workers in Ahmedabad
7. Census Special Report I, pp. 2Mf-3. See also Census of India 
(1961), vol. X Maharashtra, Part X(l-B), Greater Bombay Census 
Tables.
as compared to Bombay in 196l. In Ahmedabad, 15,828 persons or 
4.4°/o of total workers were employed as professional, technical 
and related workers, compared to 88,743 persons or 5«2°/o of total 
workers in Bombay. The proportion of administrative, executive 
and managerial workers in Ahmedabad was also lower in comparison 
with Bombay: in Ahmedabad, 7*476 persons or 2.1°/o of total workers
were employed as administrative, executive and managerial workers,
g
compared to 67,816 persons or 4 /o of total workers in Bombay.
This relatively small proportion of workers engaged in a
I
professional, technical, administrative, executive and managerial 
capacity in Ahmedabad, coupled with the relative smallness of the 
services sector as a whole, highlights orve source of weakness 
in the economic structure of the City. The overwhelming preponder­
ance of manufacturing industry in Ahmedabad, and the relatively
i
small size of the services sector has had important implications 
for the process of modernization in Ahmedabad: industrial activity
has failed to generate a corresponding growth in the services 
sector, which is a normal feature as incomes grow and demands become
more varied. This has had important consequences in the political
1
sphere too - it has diminished the share of those engaged in com­
munity service and the liberal professions and likely to have liberal 
values in the political power systenof the City, and, it has created, 
in conjunction with the pervasive Jain-Bania tradition, the conditions 
for making the all-important dialogue between business and labour 
the dominant feature of the Ahmedabad political system, and for
8. Census of India (1961), vol. V Gujarat, Part X-B Special
Tables on Cities and Block Directory, pp. 90-92 (henceforth to 
be known as Census Special Report II. See also Census of 
India (1961), vol. X Maharashtra, Part X(l-B), Greater Bombay 
Census Tables.
giving political authority above all to business and trade union 
leaders.
In the industrial structure of the City, there has been growing 
diversification since Independence. The following industries have
experienced 100°/o or more increase in the number of factories orI
workshops belonging to them in the period between 1936 andl960, 
according to figures made available by the Gujarat Bureau of 
Economics and Statistics: they include the manufacture of rubber
and rubber products, basic chemicals, including fertilizers, the
manufacture of miscellaneous chemical products, basic metal industries,
9ferrous, and the manufacture and repair of railroad equipment.
However, the textile industry and its ancillary industries continued 
to dominate the industrial life of the City. Thel96l Census Special 
Report on Ahmedabad City reveals that, regarding the number of work­
shops and factories classified by selected groups of industries, 
the contribution made by textiles was still the highest, as thisI
industry accounted for 31.30°/o of the total industrial establishments 
in the City. Foodstuffs came next with 12.6^ -°/o of the total in­
dustrial establishments, followed by transport equipment with 12.07°/o,
miscellaneous manufacturing industries with 11.00°/o, machinery (of
I
all kinds other than transport) and electrical equipment with 10.9^°/o.
Due to this continuing preponderance of the textile industry,
'  1 * k
it is not surprising to find that the elite structure of AhmedabadI
is dominated by the textile magnate elite, who are also responsible,
to a large extent, for much of the diversification of industry,
9. Census Special Report I, pp. 236-258.
10. Census Special Report I, p.253-
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particularly in the fields of chemicals and machinery manufacture.
The entire textile industry is owned by some fifteen business-houses, 
which* in turn, are related by matrimonial ties. This small, close- 
knit character of the textile magnate elite, coupled with the 
unifying Bania ideology (although the Bania caste in Ahmedabad is 
divided to some extent between the puritanical Jain BanioS and Hindu 
Vaishnavite Banias^), is the key to their success, both economic 
and political. Their power is also buttressed by the fact that they 
are an indigenous, homogeneous group with a strong confidence in 
their elite status due to the legitimization of their power by 
their historical traditions of leadership, their strong roots in 
Gujrati culture and the major role they played in the modernization 
and transformation of Ahmedabad from a trading and commercial centre 
into a more modern and industrialized city in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. They have thus combined in themselves the 
roles of both traditional and modern elites. With their homogeneity 
of outlook and their confidence in their elite status they have had 
a deep impact on the political culture of the City; they have a 
high degree of legitimacy and they are an overlapping elite in the 
sense that they are dominant in various fields, not only economic
\ l
but political and social also, and take a widespread interest in all
12fields of activity, including City government.
Despite the numerical preponderance of small-scale units in 
the industrial structure of the City, the large-scale textile mill 
industry dominates the employment field in manufacturing industries,
f -
11. Kenneth Gillion, Ahmedabad, a Study in Urban History. (1968)
12. See K.D.Desai (lecturer in Politics at Gujarat University, 
Ahmedabad), Some Theoretical Formulations about Ahmedabad 
Politics.(1971).
providing employment to 133»06l persons out of a total labour forcel
of l89i0^ 7 i i.e. it accounts for 70°/o of the total work-force1 ‘ '
engaged in manufacturing industries in 1961, as the following table 
shows:
Table 3. Workers in selected divisions, major/minor 
groups of industrial classification,
Ahmedabad City, 1961.13
Divisions 2 & 3 - Manufacturing Total Workers:
(Household and non-Household Industry) 189*0^7
Major Gr. 23 Textile - Cotton 142,067
Minor Gr. 232 Cotton spinning and
weaving in mills 133i06l
Major Gr. 27 Textile - Miscellaneous 7i798
Major Gr. 36 Basic Metals and their
Products, except Machinery
and Transport Equipment 9il72
'\l+Textile factory workers are a "labour aristocracy", compared 
with rural sector workers, workers in household industry and many 
in the services sector, and even those engaged in other fields ofj  j
manufacturing industry. According to a family living survey conducted 
among industrial workers in Ahmedabad in 1938-39» the average wage 
differential between workers in cotton spinning and weaving in mills, 
and workers engaged in other industrial occupations was very signifi-V 2
cant - in fact, cotton textile mill workers earned on average almost*. 2
twice as much as other industrial workers in the rest of industry.
13. Census Special Report I? p.2^.
14. Phrase coined by Eric Hobbsbawm.
Table 6. Percentage Distribution of industrial 
employees by sex and adults/children, 
and by average monthly income per em­
ployee in cotton spinning and weaving 
in mills, and in the rest of industry 
in Ahmedabad, 1958-59?-1-5
Industry
1. Cotton 
spinning & 
weaving in 
mills
2. Rest of 
industry
All
%  Distribution of Employees 
by sex and adults/children
Total No. Average monthly
Men: Women: Children: Total: of income in Rs.
Employees per employee
94.78 5.22 100 58,772
81.01 14.31 4.68 100 5,252
93.65 5.97 0.38 100 64,024
122.44
67.83
117.96
Textile millworkers of Ahmedabad are also comparatively better 
off than their counterparts in the rest of the country with higher 
wages, a better rate of bonus, high dearness allowance and relatively
good job security due largely to the considerable bargaining powert r
of their powerful representative trade union, the Ahmedabad Textile 
Labour Association (TLA for short), also known as the Majur Mahajan 
Sangh. By 19701 their wages had risen by astute bargaining to a 
range between Rs. 215 and Rs. 325 per month, and their dearness allow­
ance by this time was more than Rs. 175 a month. Their relative 
prosperity can also be gauged from a comparison with the low wages, 
chronic under-employment and job insecurity of the substitute or 
temporary labour force, known as Badlis, who are given occasional 
employment, on a daily basis, in place of absentee permanent textile 
millworkers. The Badlis number approximately 7,000 workers, and
15. See Labour Bureau, Simla (Ministry of Labour and Employment, 
Government of Iridia), Report on the Family Living Survey 
among Industrial Workers in Ahmedabad, 1958-59.
their income ranges only between Rs. 80 and 125 a month. A sure 
index of the elite status of a permanent textile mill worker could 
be seen in the desirability of securing permanent employment status 
to a Badli, who coveted the permanent employee's high wages, job 
security and attendant privileges, won by the powerful Majur 
Mahajan, such as the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, gratuity 
schemes, retrenchment compensation, Employees' State Insurance 
Schemes, leave with wages and provision of mill canteens and rest 
rooms, in addition to the manifold social welfare activities provided 
by a benevolent trade union with a strong financial base, including 
a workers' cooperative bank with a working capital of Rs. 75 lakhs 
and 37i000 members. Through the efforts of the trade union, about 
12,000 textile mill workers have also constructed their own houses 
under cooperative housing schemes, and 1^,000 live in small tenements 
provided by the Gujarat State Housing Board on a subsidized rental 
basis.^
Thus Ahmedabad textile mill workers are relatively better off 
than other groups on the industrial scene. However, their living 
standards were still fairly low, especially in the 1960s, a period 
of great price inflation of essential commodities. A survey, con­
ducted by Mr. Jitendra Dholakia, reader in Economics in the Gujarat 
University School of Social Sciences, to discover how textile mill 
workers in Ahmedabad use their bonus, found that 78°/o are in debt.
The average debt of a textile mill worker was estimated at Rs. l,^ -22.63» 
which is roughly equivalent to seven months' pay. The main cause 
of this indebtedness was found to be "the inability to pay for
16. See G.Y.Patel,"The Ahmedabad Textile Worker" In The Times of
India (Ahmedabad),31 Oct. , 1971.
regular living expenses". Therefore, at least 3«5°/o of the mill 
worker’s monthly income, or his entire bonus, was found to go towards 
debt repayment. This recurrent shortfall in their domestic budgets 
compelled most of the millworkers to look for extra work, except 
for about 20,000 Patidar workers who have small holdings in their 
villages. As a result, over 20,000 millworkers reported for work 
on Sunday, their weekly holiday. This system, known as "rokdi" (cash 
wages are given for work on Sunday), affected the workers' efficiency 
on the following day. Over 10,000 millworkers took up part-time 
employment in their spare-time to supplement their income: they
sold vegetables, served in restaurants, worked as electricians
or manual labourers, etc. Apart from about 30 well-managed mills
i
17(out of 71 in 1961 ), millworkers in the rest of the mills had to
work in sub-normal conditions: the machinery was old, the humidity
plants were often defective, inferior cotton and other raw materials 
were sometimes used which put a great strain on the workers because,
due to frequent breakage, they were subject to unjust penalties.
I
According to a survey conducted by a team of doctors of the tuber­
culosis section of the Civil Hospital, more than 13°/o of the workers 
in spinning departments of textile units were T.B. victims, largely 
because of fuming in the spinning departments. The living conditions 
of 40,000 textile millworkers who ived in chawls and of 10,000 who 
lived in hutments were terrible. According to one housing study, the 
average per capita floor area for a textile workers is 44 sq. ft. and 
only 21°/o of all their households have independent bathrooms and 
latrines. On top of this, the textile millworker has to contend with
17. Census Special Report I, p.9.
a certain amount of corruption on the part of jobbers and shop 
stewards in order to secure his rights. The unemployment figure 
in Ahmedabad is also fairly high, although it is almost certainly 
an under-assessment and does not reflect a great deal of under­
employment. In 1961, the total number of unemployed persons aged 
15 and above was 14,244, of whom one-third were in search of employ­
ment for the first time and two-thirds were employed before but were
lSnow out of work seeking employment. Out of 381,534 males in the 
working ages 13.39, 13,708 or 3.59°/o were unemployed. During 
thel960s, particularly during the later 60s, many thousands of 
textile millworkers lost their jobs due to mill closures.
Growing Impact of Migrant Labour Force on the Economic and
Social Life of the City.
Turning to examine the phenomenon of urbanization, Ahmedabad
has followed the typical pattern of staggering growth experienced by
19large metropolitan cities in India over the last decades. Between 
1872 and 1961, the population of Ahmedabad increased more than ten 
times from 119,672 in 1872 to 1,149,918 in 1961. The annual average 
growth rate between 1872 and 19ol was 9.67°/o. However, really rapid 
increase occurred particularly from 1931 onwards: 1931 to 1941 saw
a growth of 90.73°/o in the City's population, which rose from 310,000 
in 1931 to 3911267 in 1941. During this period Ahmedabad saw intense 
industrial and commercial activity, reflected in the rise in the 
number of textile mills from 60 in 1931 to 8l in 1941, and the develop­
ment of various other ancillary industries and general growth of trade
18. Census Special Report I, pp. 239-66.
19. Ruddar Dutt, Urbanization and Economic Growth.
and commerce. In the subsequent two decades the City's population
grew by the considerable figures of 4l.59°/o or 245,896 persons
between 194l and]951i and by 37.36°/o or 312,795 persons between 
201951 and 1961.
A very large part of this tremendous growth of Ahmedabad City's
population since 1872, and particularly since 1931» can be attributed 
21to migration. In the population of Ahmedabad City in 1961,
584,423 persons or 50.82°/o were migrants, of whom 71*742 or 12.28°/o 
were born elsewhere in the district of enumeration; 321,642 or 55.04°/o 
in other districts of Gujarat; 170,313 or 29.l4°/o in other States 
of India; and 20,654 or 3.53°/o outside India. Thus, a little more 
than two-thirds of the migrants came to the city from areas within 
the State , while 32.67°/o of all migrants came to the City from areas 
outside Gujarat, the bulk of these from other States of India. Com­
pared with Kanpur, the population of Ahmedabad was far more diversified 
and plural, although Kanpur lad a bigger refugee population from out­
side India. Out of a total migrant population of 49.4°/o in Kanpur,
l6.6°/o were born elsewhere in Kanpur district; 67°/o in other
districts of U.P.; 11.2°/o in other States of India, and 6.3°/o outside
22India.
Among migrants from other districts of the State, the neighbour­
ing districts of Mehsana and Kaira contribute 17.63°/o and 8.43°/o 
respectively of the total migrants to the City. Thus these two districts
20. Census Special Report I, pp. 42, 44-3.
21. 1961 Census statistics on migration are based on data relating to
place of birth which, if different from the place of enumeration, 
constitutes evidence of migration.
22. See Census of India (l9ol), vol. XV Uttar Pradesh, Part X,
Special Report on Kanpur City.
together account for 26.08°/o or almost half of the migrants in
this category. The majority of migrants from other States come
from the neighbouring States of Rajasthan, which accounts for
57»743 migrants or 9.88°/o, Uttar Pradesh, which accounts for
47,371 migrants or 8.11°/o of all migrants, and Maharashtra which
accounts for 33,924 migrants or 3.80°/o of all migrants. These three
States together account for 23.79°/o of all migrants to the City,
o 23or approximately 83 /o of migrants from other States of India.
On analysing place of birth according to whether it is rural 
or urban, 397,818 or 68.07°/o of the total migrants have come from 
rural areas as against 163,737 or 28.36°/o, who have migrated from
24towns. Out of all the migrants from the district of Ahmedabad 
and other districts of Gujarat, 288,391 or 73°/o are of rural 
origin. Out of a total of those migrants born in other States of 
India, 109,227 or 64°/o are of rural origin. Thus a large proportion 
of migrants from within the State of Gujarat are of rural origin as 
compared to migrants from other States of India. Of the three States 
which together account for 83°/o of the migrants born in other States 
of India, Rajasthan has sent 44,129 migrants or as much as 77°/o of 
its migrants from rural areas; U.P. has sent 34,932 migrants or 
73°/o of its total migrants from rural areas. In contrast, Maharashtra 
has sent 13,330 migrants or only 43°/o of its migrants from rural 
areas. Other States of India, of which the most important are Madhya
23. From Census of India (1961), vol. V Gujarat, Part X-C Special 
Migrant Tables for Ahmedabad City, pp. 6-7 (henceforth to be 
known as Census Special Re-port III).
24. 20,726 or 3«55°/o come from outside India, and 142 or 0.02°/o 
are unclassified.
Pradesh, Madras, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Mysore and West 
Bengal, have sent a high proportion of urban as opposed to rural 
migrants, i.e. 16,432 migrants or 52°/o of their total migrants 
are from urban areas.
An examination of the communal character of migration is 
25also very revealing. In the total population of the City, Hindus 
numbered 884,736 or 76.94°/o, whereas Muslims numbered 178,398 
or 13.31°/o in 1961. However, in the migrant population in 1961, 
Hindus numbered 479,522 or 82.05°/o, whereas Muslims numbered 
63,098 or only 10.80°/o of total migrants. From the table below, 
it can be seen that the proportion of Muslims has fallen from 20.53°/o 
in 1901 to 15.51°/6 in 1961. The upheavals of Partition, coupled 
with the nature of migration, have largely contributed to making 
Ahmedabad City more Hindu in composition and character over the 
last few decades with important political consequences, not least
by providing more fertile ground for the Jan Sangh. Table
267 illustrates these changes.
A comparison of literacy and educational levels among migrants 
and the general population of Ahmedabad City shows higher levels of 
achievement in attaining teaching,medical, engineering and other 
technical qualifications by migrants. A larger proportion of migrants 
have attained matriculation and University degrees than in the general 
population of the City. Thus migrants are educationally equipped to 
play a very important role in the employment structure of the City, 
and are particularly well qualified for jobs requiring technical
25. Census Special Report I, pp. 202, 154.
26. Census Special Report I, p.202.
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education.
The crucial role of migrants in the economic life of the
City can be seen in the fact that of the total labour force of 351,393,
as many as 233,042 or 71.36°/o are migrants. The following table
gives a detailed breakdown of the contribution of migrants in differ-
28ent industrial categories of workers:
27
Table 8. Migrants classified by category of workers 
and nonworkers in Ahmedabad City, 1961.
Category of workers 
and non-workers:
Total Total
population: Migrants: bution of
Migrants:
°/o Distri- °/o of Migrants to 
total of each cate­
gory of workers/ 
non-workers:
Total
I As Cultivator
II As Agricultural 
labourer
III In Mining, Quarry­
ing, Livestock, 
Forestry*
IV At Household 
Industry
V In Manufacturing 
other than House­
hold Industry
VI In Construction
VII In Trade and 
Commerce
VIII In Transport, 
Storage and Com­
munications
IX In Other Services
X Non-workers
1,149,918
613
436
1,093
10,892
180,776
9,493
20,633
28,213
792,323
384,423
233
367
813
6,227
133,904
7,288
33,224 33,902
13,616
36,680
329,381
100.00
0.04
0.03
0.l4 
♦ 1 .0 8
22.91
1.23
3.80
2.67
9.70
56.36
50.82 
4l. 14
67.32
74.57
57.63
74.07 
76.77
61.39
75.68
72.74
31.07
Fishing, Hunting, Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities
27. Census Special Report I, pp. 144-3.
28. Census Special Report I, p.155.
The largest proportion of working migrants are in manufacturing 
industries other than household (22.91°/o of total migrants), 
followed by other services (9.70°/o of total migrants) and trade 
and commerce (5.80°/o). The contribution of migrants to the total 
working force engaged in cultivation and household industry is 
the least, being 4l.l4°/o and 57.63°/o respectively. In all 
other nonagricultural activities, migrant workers contribute more 
than 60°/o of the total working force, and this figure rises to 
more than 70°/o in mining and quarrying, manufacturing industries 
other than household industry, construction, transport, storage 
and communications and other services. It is also interesting to 
note that 8 out of 10 migrant workers are employees. It is also 
highly significant that out of the 133*904 migrants engaged in 
manufacturing industries (including household), 110,542 or 82°/o 
are engaged in the textile-cotton, jute, wool silk; and textile- 
miscellaneous groups.
A detailed occupational breakdown of migrants by place of 
birth (see Table 9 overpage) gives a very interesting picture of 
the socioeconomic structure and roles of migrant groups of differ­
ent regional origin. First of all, making a detailed comparison 
of the migrant population as a whole with the general population 
in various occupational categories, we find that, although migrant 
workers are heavily represented among transport and communications 
workers, and craftsmen, production process workers and labourers 
not elsewhere classified, they also form a significant proportion 
of white-collar workers in middle class and upper middle class 
occupations, such as teachers, doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers 
and surveyors, administrators and executive officials in government,
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directors and managers in wholesale and retail trade; directors, 
managers and working proprietors in nonfinancial institutions, 
and clerical workers.
The nature of migration to Ahmedabad City has had an import­
ant influence on the political life and culture of the city.^ 
Ahmedabad City culture has been moulded by the dominant Jain and 
Hindu Bania economic elite which is an indigenous and homogeneous 
group with a strong sense of legitimacy and long historical traditions 
The middle class in Ahmedabad has emerged largely as an appendage 
and offspring of the commercial and industrial economic elite,
j
sharing a common cultural outlook and sensing a strong identity of 
interests with the economic elite. Thus these two groups are 
closely interlinked, and, as a result, middle class leadership in 
various fields has found it difficult to adopt a hostile or defiant 
stance towards the dominant economic elite.
In contrast to these two closely-linked and largely homogeneous 
groups, the lower class in Ahmedabad City has increasingly during 
the twentieth century become composed of heterogeneous migrant 
groups, a class of ’'outsiders” with an increasingly large non- 
Gujrati component. This sociostructural pattern of a closely-knit,
cohesive, highly legitimised and dominant upper class on the one/
hand, and a very fragmented lower class on the other hand, with a 
wide gap and lack of communication between them, has considerably 
retarded social and economic mobility in the city, particularly 
of non-Gujrati groups. Figures drawn from Table 9 give some 
indication of this: whereas migrant workers from other areas of
Gujarat State, who constitute 4l.3°/o of total workers in the
29. Table compiled from Census Special Report II, pp. 90-99 
and 296-304 and Census Special Report III, pp. 60-165.
3 0 .  S e e  K . D .  D e s a i ,  Som e T h e o r e t i c a l  F o r m u l a t i o n s  a b o u t  A h m e d a b a d  
P o l i t i c s . ( A h m e d a b a d :  1 9 7 1 )  .
general population, have made some impact in various high status 
and white collar occupations - they constitute approximately 32°/o 
of professional, technical and related workers; ^7°/o of ad­
ministrative, executive and managerial workers; and 3>0°/o of clerical 
and related workers - migrant workers from other States of India, 
who constitute 23°/o of total workers in the general population, 
form a very small proportion of these occupations: they constitute,
approximately, only 12.3°/o of professional, technical and related 
workers; 13°/o of administrative, executive and managerial workers; 
and 10°/o of clerical and related workers. In contrast, migrant 
workers from other States of India form much larger proportions of 
the work force engaged in working class and lower middle class 
occupations: they form 30°/o of craftsmen, production process
workers and labourers not elsewhere classified; 29 /o of workers 
in transport and communications; l6°/o of sales workers; and 28°/o 
of service, sport and recreation workers. Migrant workers from
31. Uttar Pradesh had the largest concentration of its migrant work 
force in the category of craftsmen, production process workers 
and labourers not elsewhere classified, i.e. 23,07^ - or 76.0°/o, 
and 18,078 of these or 60°/o of its total migrants worked as 
spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers in the 
textile industries. Rajasthan, Maharashtra and other States of 
India had lesser, although still very sizeable proportions of 
their migrant workers in these two occupational categories:
19,29^ or 39°/o of all Rajasthan's migrant workers were craftsmen, 
production process workers and labourers not elsewhere classified, 
while, of these, 12,210 or 38°/o of its total migrant labour 
force are employed as spinners, weavers,knitters, dyers and 
related workers. The corresponding figures for Maharashtra were 
8,^13 or 6 3 ° / o  as craftsmen, production process workers and 
labourers not elsewhere classified, and 31628 or kj>°/o as spinners, 
weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers in the textile in­
dustries. The figures for migrants born in other States of India 
were 9i6^3 or 64o/o as craftsmen, production process workers 
and labourers not elsewhere classified.
other areas of Gujarat State, on the other hand, form 4l°/o of 
craftsmen, production process workers and labourers not elsewhere 
classified; ^3°/o of workers in transport and communications;
37°/o of sales workers; and k5°/o of service, sport and recreation 
workers.
In the face of the socioeconomic and political and cultural 
supremacy of the indigenous economic elite of Ahmedabad City, 
migrant workers from other areas of Gujarat State have tended to 
seek accommodation and integration with the dominant culture, 
rather than to challenge the indigenous culture style; whereas non- 
Gujrati migrant groups have tended to remain on the periphery of 
the City's cultural life with a low level of legitimacy, efficacy 
and self-confidence. This situation, coupled with the Gandhian prin-
4
ciples of trusteeship and nonviolent labour-capitalist harmony 
and cooperation, which have permeated, to a large extent, the
dominant trade union, the TLA or Majur Mahajan, and the textile
* \
magnates, has contributed, in large part, to the long history of 
relatively peaceful labour relations h. the city during the twentieth 
century. However, the evolution of this sociocultural pattern of 
a closed and homogeneous and indigenous dominant economic elite 
on the one hand, and a fragmented, heterogeneous, increasingly non- 
Gujrati and migrant labour force on the other hand,was potentially 
a politically dangerous one.
Wardwise Socioeconomic Profile of Ahmedabad City.
After analysing socioeconomic structures and changes at an 
all-city level, we now turn to look more closely at the microlevel 
socioeconomic patterns in different areas and wards of the City.
The 1961 Census Special Report on Ahmedabad City contains a very
i
useful map, illustrating the ecology of Ahmedabad City and showing 
centres of administration, industry, trade and commerce, transport, 
education, old and modern residential areas etc., which can be
visually correlated with a map showing municipal election wards in
32
1969. From these maps and other information in the Special
Report, it is clear that Ahmedabad City is divided into two main 
segments, east and west of the Sabarmati River, with strongly con­
trasting levels of socioeconomic development and prosperity.
On the eastern side or left bank of the river lies the old 
city area, enclosed by the old fort wall, which is the centre of 
banking, insurance, commerce, and the wholesale and retail trade 
in both durable and perishable goods. It is also an old residential 
area of very high density and congestion, largely composed of middle 
and lower middle class persons, such as small businessmen and 
traders, teachers, professional men, municipal and government em­
ployees, shopkeepers, hawkers, etc., who never quite reached the 
point of affluence which would have taken them out into the prosperous, 
modern suburbs of Ellisbridge and Navrangpura on the west bank. It 
comprises the municipal electin wards of Khadia, Kalupur, Shahpur, 
Dariapur and Jamalpur. The railway runs along the eastern edge of 
the old city area from north to south, and it is here that the main 
goods transport centres by rail and by truck are located. The first 
textile mills were built on the periphery of the old city to the 
left of the railway line, but most industrial expansion, including 
the establishment of heavy and light engineering centres, took place
32. The map of municipal election wards in 19^9 was produced by 
the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
east of the railway line, although a few factories have also 
been constructed in the residential localities close to the 
old city wall to the north and south, and along the river front.
The eastern part of the city extending into Asarva, Saraspur,
Gomtipur, Khokera-Mehmedabad etc. is predominantly a working-class 
area with factories and industrial complexes interspersed with 
residential areas of working-class chawls and tenements. It
comprises the municipal election wards of Asarva, Saraspur, Rakhial
33Gomptipur, Khokera-Mehmedabad and Maninagar-Behrampura. The 
municipal election ward of Raikhad contained a pocket of the cotton 
textile mill industry within the old city area. Apart from 
Shahibag and the Cantonment area to the north and some areas 
around Kankaria Lake in the south-west, including Maninagar, where 
some of the elite and well-to-do reside, the area to the east of 
the Sabarmati has witnessed a deterioration in the environment in 
terms of greater congestion, high density, increase in slum areas, 
etc.
In contrast, the municipal wards of North and South Ellisbridge, 
west of the Sabarmati River, contain the spacious residential bunga­
lows of the upper and middle classes. It is a well-planned suburban 
area with a large number of parks and recreation centres and educational 
and institutional buildings, including the University Cairpus, the 
Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association (ATIRA) building 
and the Indian Institute of Management.
Thus the disparity in socioeconomic development and living 
conditions between the two regions, east and west of the Sabarmati,
33. These are 1965 Municipal Election wards.
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is very great. In per capita terms, facilities and conditions in
3 4the east as compared to the west, are totally inadequate, e.g.
water consumption on the west side is almost three times as high
per capita as that on the east side; similarly road length per
capita on the east side is very much less compared to that on the 
35west side. In fact, a strong contrast has been drawn between 
the ’’garden suburbia” of the west bank and the "decaying ghetto” 
to the east.^
Wardwise differences in living conditions and socioeconomic 
structure are very pronounced. Measures of varying living conditions 
in different wards and areas in Ahmedabad City are the nature of 
housing, the extent of single-room households and slum conditions, 
and the provision of amenities and facilities, such as educational, 
medical, recreational etc. The extent of rented accommodation as 
opposed to owned accommodation in different areas of Ahmedabad 
City is a reflection of the pressures of rapid urbanization and 
immigration accompanied by the increasing scarcity of housing, 
particularly cheap housing, and the inadequacy of new construction, 
particularly for low-income families.
A comparison of Census statistics with those collected in a 
survey conducted in 1956-57 by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 
connection with the preparation of slum clearance schemes revealed 
the extent of rented as opposed to owned accommodation in the old
3*f. An impression gained from discussions in March 1971 in Ahmedabad 
with Mr. Mahesh Bhatt, Reader in Public Finances at the University 
of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, who was to undertake a project which should 
prove very illuminating in this connection and which involves a 
cost-benefit analysis of the various municipal election wards in 
terms of the per capita tax burden of different wards, compared 
with the percapita amenities provided and developmental expendi­
ture incurred by the Municipal Corporation.
35. See B.K.Roy Burman, "Social Profile of Ahmedabad”, Seminar, No.
125 (January>1970), pp. 33-38.
36. Ibid.
city area within the fort wall, and the suburban area, and its 
change over a three-year period in these two areas.
Table 10. Comparison of Census statistics, 1961 
with survey conducted by Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation, 1936-37.
No. of families/households: Area within Suburban Total area:
city walls: area:*
i) according to Corporation Survey 76,192 97i^6l 17316^3
ii) " " Housing Census 76,192
°/o of families residing in 
owned houses______________
i) according to Corporation Survey 27,87 6.23 17,08
ii) " " Housing Census 28,93 8,85 17,99
°/o of families residing 
in rented houses_______
i) according to Corporation Survey 72.13 93*77 82.92
ii) " " Housing Census 71.07 91.13 82.01
* excluding Dariapur-Kazipur, Ellisbridge and Sabarma-tl wards
It is clear that the incidence of rented dwellings is very much 
higher in the suburban areas, where migrants have largely settled in 
response to the demand largely for textile and other factory labour, 
than in the area within the city walls, where the indigenous popu­
lation largely resides. Thus, in the suburban areas as many as 
91.13°/o of families lived in rented accommodation, compared to only
7O
7 1.07°/o in the area within the city wallsin 196l.
37. Census Special Report I, p.90.
38. Between 1937 and 196l, due to the promotion of house construction 
activities by the formation of cooperative housing societies, 
receiving aid from the State Government in the form of acquisition 
of land, advance of loan at a reasonable rate of; interest and 
repayment by easy installments, there has been a small reduction 
in the percentage of families living in rented accommodation
from 93.77°/o to 91*13°/o in the suburban area, and from 72.13°/o 
to 71.07°/o in the area within the city walls.
The extent and location of slum areas can be gauged from 
the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation's classification of certain 
hutment and sub-standard housing areas as "slum" areas, which
are located in 15 out of the 29 Census wards in the City. In
39these 15 wards, we can assess the extent of single-room house­
holds and the number of persons per room, a sure index of depriva­
tion, from the following table:
Table 11. Households by number of rooms and number 
of persons occupying them, 1961, in the 
"slum" wards of Ahmedabad City.40;
No. of Households according to number of 
persons in the Household
No. of Rooms: Total
number of 1 2-3 4-6 7-9 10
households person persons persons persons persons +
No. regular room 1 1 - - - -
1 room 16,971 1,449 4,849 7,556 2,575 542
2 rooms 1,396 36 254 613 360 133
3 " 147 1 24 45 4o 37
4 " 90 2 8 35 19 26
5 M and more 47 2 5 14 10 16
Total 18,652 1,491 5,140 8,263 3,004 754
Out of a total number of 18,652 households living in the 15 wards 
containing substantial slum areas, 16,971 or 90.99°/o inhabit one- 
room tenements; 1,396 or 7.48°/o two-room tenements; and only 284 
or 1.53°/o live in more than two rooms. Out of a total number of
39. These fifteen "slum" wards are as follows: Jamalpur - 1,
Raikhad, Kalupur, Shahpur - 1 and 2, Ellis Bridge, Dariapur- 
Kazipur, Shaherkotda, Asarva, Rakhial, Rajpur-Hirpur, Khokera- 
Mehmedabad, Kankaria, Jamalpur T.P.S. and Baherampura.
40. Census Special Report I, p.105.
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16,971 single-room households, 10,131 or about 59°/o contain
between k and 9 persons. Thus, not only are single-room households
predominant, but the majority of these also contain over persons.
A study of the socioeconomic conditions of the slumdwellers
of Ahmedabad City, sponsored by the Universityof Gujarat's School
of Social Sciences, gives an idea of the caste, occupation and
k']income-level of the slumdwellers. As might be expected, Scheduled 
Castes and low castes constitute roughly 50°/o of slumdwellers:
Table 12. Caste-wise distribution of slum households.
Caste: Household Number: ° / .
Vaghri 120 3k .2
Hari j an 36 10.3
Rabari 19 5.>
Kumbha r 5 0.9
Lohar 1 0.3
Rajput 30 8.5
Brahmin 5 l . k
Muslim 2k 6.8
Others 52.2
Total 551 100.0
In terms of occupation, about 60°/o of slumdwellers are
self-employed in the sense that they are not in any regular job
4l. See Mahesh Bhatt and V.K.Chawda of the Gujarat University
School of Social Sciences, A Preliminary Report of the Study of 
the Socio-economic Condition of the Slum-dwellers in Ahmedabad 
City, obtained in March 1971. The Study is based on a survey 
of 351 households in 5 out of the 15 wards classified by the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as containing substantial slum 
areas.
k2. Ibid.
and,therefore, have to depend on any type of physical work on which 
they can lay their hands. The largest category of slumdwellers - 
26.5°/o - consists of those pulling carts and doing other manual 
work. Only 15°/o of slumdwellers are millworkers, and 10.5°/o 
are low-paid Government employees. This is shown in the following 
table:
Table 13. Occupation-wise distribution of
r !  nm Vir>nRA>ir>1 r ls  ^"3slu households.
Occupation: Household Number: °/o:
1. Cart-pulling 
("Hathlari") and
other manual work 93 26.5-J _
2. Making rope, baskets,
toys and dolls etc. 53 15 .1
3. Rickshaw driver l8 5*1
4. Domestic servants 5 1.^
5. Hawker 27 7.7
6. Cattle-rearing and
milk selling 21 6.0
7. Government employee 37 10.5
8. Mill .and factory
worker 53 13.7
9. Miscellaneous work *f2 12.0
Total 351 100.0
Looking at income-levels, 56°/o of slumdwellers obtain aI
monthly income of Rs. 100 or less, while only 10°/o of slum
households get a monthly income of more than Rs. 200. The average
i 1
monthly income per household was only Rs. 12^-30, as the following
table shows:
Table l*f. Group-wise income distribution of
slum households.^
Income-group
(in Rs. per month): Household Number: ° / .
up to Rs. 50 kz 12.0
51 - 100 155 - k k .i
101 - 100 72 20.5
151 - 200 kz 12.0
201 - 300 31 00 •1
00
300 and above _ 2 2.6
Total 351 100.0
Comparing the average monthly incomes of a slumdweller and a 
millworker makes it strikingly clear that the average textile 
millworker constitutes a "labour aristocrac}7-", an elite inI
relative terms. In the previous section (see p. 71 ) we have seen
that the average millworker was earning wages of between Rs. 215 
and 325 per month, and his dearness allowance had gone up to more 
than Rs. 175 a month by 1970.
Variations in the socioeconomic structure of the different 
Gujarat State Assembly constituencies, located in Ahmedabad City, 
can be determined exactly by using the Delimitation of Parliamentary 
and Assembly Constituencies Order of 1966, which gives information 
on the particular 1961 Census wards which make up each Assembly 
Constituency. Thus, using the Delimitation of Parliamentary and 
Assembly Constituencies Order of 1966 coupled with the Primary 
Census Abstract in the 1961 Census Special Report on Ahmedabad
City, one can determine the exact extent of literacy and the 
Scheduled Caste and Tribe population, and the occupational 
structure of all the Ahmedabad City State Assembly electoral con­
stituencies in 1967. The resulting information has been compiled 
into a table (see Table 19).^ Unfortunately it is not possible 
to obtain an exact correlation between 1961 Census wards and 
Ahmedabad municipal election wards, thus socioeconomic information 
relating to the broader category of State Assembly Constituency 
serves to give a broad differentiation of municipal areas.
From Table 19 one can see the wide range in literacy among the 
various State Assembly constituencies from the high level of literacy 
in Khadia constituency (72°/o) to the relatively low level of 
4l.9°/o in Asarva constituency. In general, old city constituencies 
have markedly higher literacy levels than the constituencies located 
in the suburban areas. The literacy levels for old city constituencies 
are in descending order - Khadia with 72°/o, Kalupur with 63.3°/o, 
Jamalpur with 97.1°/o, and Shahpur with only zf9.9°/o. This low figure 
for Shahpur is largely explained by the fact that Shahpur Assembly 
constituency contains parts of the more working-class, suburban 
area of Dariapur-Kazipur). Among suburban constituencies, Ellis 
Bridge has the highest literary level of 97.8°/o, followed by
49. Table compiled from the Election Commission of India (1967), 
Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies 
Order of 1966, and the Census Special Report I, Primary 
Census Abstract, pp. 292-3. In making estimates of the 
literacy, the percentage of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
Tribe population, and the occupational structure of Asarva, 
Dariapur-Kazipur, Kankaria and Shahpur State Assembly Con­
stituencies, it was necessary to use the Block Directory, 
giving information on the population of circles within Census 
wards, contained in the 1961 Census of India, vol. V Gujarat, 
Part X-B Special Tables on Cities and Block Directory. The 
estimates made with the use of the Block Directory are neces­
sarily approximate as it is not possible to know exactly the 
distribution of the population in various circles among the 
categories of literates, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
etc., so one can only approximately calculate the population 
proportions of various circles in different occupational 
categories etc. in a particular constituency.
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Key to Occupational Categories of Workers:
I As Cultivator
II As Agricultural Labourer
III In Mining, Quarrying, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing,
Hunting and Plantations, Orchards and Allied activities
IV At Household Industries
V In Manufacturing other than Household Industry
VI In Construction
VII In Trade and Commerce
VIII In Transport, Storage and Communications
IX In Other Services
Kankaria with *f8.3°/o, Dariapur-Kazipur with *t8°/o, Rakhial,I
with ^3.9°/o and Asarva with zfl.9°/o.
Looking at the extent of Scheduled Castes among the various
State Assembly constituencies, it is clear that they are very
j
much scarcer in the old city constituencies - particularly in Khadia 
and Kalupur, where they only constitute 0.7°/o and 2.6°/o re­
spectively of the population. They are more numerous but still 
below 10°/o in the remaining old city constituencies of Jamalpur 
and Shahpur, where they constitute 8.1°/o and 9.3°/o respectively 
of the population. Apart from Rakhial, where Scheduled Castes form
7.z+°/o of the population, they form above 10°/o of the population 
in all the suburban constituencies. In Ellis Bridge, they con­
stitute 11.2°/o of the population, in Dariapur-Kazipur, 13.1°/o; 
in Asarva l6°/o; and in the Scheduled Caste Reserved constituency 
of Kankaria they form 2*f.2°/o or almost a quarter of the population. 
Scheduled Tribes are far less numerous than Scheduled Castes in 
the Assembly Constituencies of Ahmedabad City. They are negligible 
in Khadia and Kalupur,i.e. below 0.1°/o. In other old city 
constituencies, they only constitute 0.8°/o of the population in 
both Jamalpur and Shahpur. Among the suburban constituencies, they 
constitute the least °/o in Kankaria (0.1°/o), and form 0.3°/o only 
of the population in Ellis Bridge, Asarva and Rakhial. Dariapur-Kazipur 
contains the largest proportion of Scheduled Tribes with 1.3°/o .
The old city constituencies all contain lower proportions of 
total workers,i.e. all below 30°/o, than the suburban constituencies.
Of the suburban constituencies, Ellis Bridge has the smallest pro­
portion of total workers (30.7°/o), followed in ascending order by 
Kankaria with 31.1°/o, Rakhial with 3^.^°/o, Dariapur-Kazipur with
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33«3°/o and Asarva with the largest proportion of 36.6°/o. There 
are insignificant proportions,i.e .below l°/o of cultivators, agri­
cultural labourers and workers in mining, quarrying, livestock,/
forestry, fishing, hunting and plantations, orchards and allied 
activities in all the Assembly constituencies of Ahmedabad City.
The proportion of workers in household industries is the highest 
in Jamalpur constituency (l.*f°/o), and also Ellis Bridge with 1.4°/o, 
followed in descending order by Shahpur with 1.2°/o, Kalupur 
and Dariapur-Kazipur with 0.9°/o, Kankaria with 0.8°/o, Asarva with
0.7°/o, Khadia with 0.5°/o and Rakhial with 0.6°/o.
The lowest proportions of workers in manufacturing other 
than household industry occur in the old city constituencies and 
Ellis Bridge. Ellis Bridge has the lowest with followed
in ascending order by Khadia with 9.^°/o, Jamalpur with 11.3°/o, 
KaHufAir with 11.9°/o, and Shahpur with l4.3°/o. The suburban con­
stituencies, barring Ellis Bridge, are primarily industrial with 
very large proportions of workers in manufacturing industry. The 
most heavily industrial constituencies are Rakhial with 23.9°/o 
of its population engaged in manufacturing industry and Asarva with 
2*f.4°/o. They are followed in descending order by Dariapur-Kazipur 
with 17.7°/o and Kankaria with 17.2°/o.
The highest proportions of workers in construction are in 
Ellis Bridge, which has 1.7°/o of its population so employed; in 
Dariapur-Kazipur with 1.2°/o of its population, and Kankaria with 
l.l°/o. Asarva (0.6°/o), Rakhial (0.6°/o) and all the old city con­
stituencies - Khadia (0.3°/o), Kalupur (0.3°/o), Shahpur (0.7°/o), 
Jamalpur (0.7°/o) - have very much smaller proportions (almost half)
of their population working in construction.
The old city constituencies of Khadia, Kalupur and Jamalpur 
are undoubtedly the centres of trade and commerce in the city 
with 8.0°/o, 7.5°/o and 6.1°/o respectively of their populations 
engaged in trade and commerce. Shahpur and Ellis Bridge have a 
fair proportion of their populatinn engaged in "trade and commerce - 
4.8°/o and k.k°/o respectively. The remaining suburban constituencies 
have very much smaller proportions of their population working in 
trade and commerce - Kankaria has 3.^°/o, Dariapur-Kazipur 3«3°/o, 
Asarva 3.3°/o, and Rakhial only 2.2°/o.
The constituency with the largest proportion of its population 
engaged in transport, storage and communications is Asarva with 
2.7°/o, followed by Dariapur-Kazipur with 2.2°/o and Kankaria with 
1.8°/o. Shahpur and Jamalpur have 1.6°/o and Ellis Bridge 1.3°/o. 
Rakhial has 1.3°/o, and the constituencies with the smallest pro­
portions of their populatinn working in transport, storage and com­
munications are Khadia and Kalupur with 1.2°/o and 1.0°/o respectively
As regards the proportion of the population engaged in other 
services, Ellis Bridge constituency has by far the largest with 
1 2 . 4 ° / o , followed by the old city constituencies in descending 
order - Khadia (7.2°/o), Jamalpur (6.9°/o), Shahpur (6.8°/o) and 
Kalupur (3.^°/o). Among the suburban constituencies, Dariapur- 
Kazipur and Kankaria have a fairly large proportion of their popu­
lation engaged in other services - 6.3°/o for both - but Asarva and 
Rakhial have a relatively small proportion- 4.8°/o and 3.6°/o re-
J
spectively.
From examining the literacy and occupational structure of
State Assembly constituencies in Ahmedabad City, we turn to look
at the caste structure of municipal election wares. The relationship 
between politics and caste is a highly complex and interacting 
one. Caste does provide, particularly in intraconstituency 
electoral politics, the raw material of politics so to speak, but 
traditional caste loyalties and divisions are often transformed 
by the political process, by political organization, tactics and 
leadership, which provide values and incentives which frequently 
cut across traditional loyalties. This has been demonstrated many
b6times by Indian political scientists. Rajni Kothari,in his study, 
in collaboration with Taiun Sheth, of the 1962 Gujarat Legislative 
Assembly election in Baroda East constituency, has clearly shown 
the ability of politics to cut across caste and ethnic loyalties, 
for in this election no community or caste, except the Muslims, 
voted en bloc for any party's candidate. Among Hindu voters, 
although there was a pattern of voting in proximate voting booths, 
voting was based more on individual and family preferences, and 
community leaders were often split between various parties. As 
regards the Muslims,in the reverse direction, politics was able to
J
transform their multiform internal divisions (those between Shias 
and Sunnis, and, within these two main groups, between various 
'Jamat' organizations, such as the Sulemanis, Alvis, Tais, etc., 
and between all these groups and the Vora, Memon, Khoja and Shaikh 
communities) into political cohesiveness. Thus politics more often 
transforms rather than reflects the loyalties and divisions within 
the underlying social structure in a fairly complex manner.
b6. See Rajni Kothari and Taiun Sheth, "The Extent and Limits of
Community Voting: the Case of Baroda EastI' Xn Rajni Kothari
(ed.), Party Systems and Election Studies.(1967).
In Ahmedabad, before the relationship between politics and 
caste can be fully explored, there is a great need for a minute 
anthropological analysis of the caste structure of the metropolis, 
comparable to the work of Owen M. Lynch on social change among 
the untouchables in Agra. Some progress is being made towards a 
statistical picture of the caste structure of Ahmedabad City -i
Dr. V.P.Shah, at the School of Social Sciences at the University 
of Gujarat in Ahmedabad is involved in a project to find out the 
caste distribution in Ahmedabad based on a random sample survey of 
the rolls and registers of Middle and High Schools coveringi
nineteen geographical areas of the city. However, the results 
of this project have yet to be published. A unique feature of
Ahmedabad life, closely related to caste, is the insular and
' b7inward-looking poles, founded by particular caste leaders. These
poles are arenas for social intercourse, neighbourhood patriotism
and internal factional fights. They tend to conserve traditions.
A sociological study of their power and factional structure, 
interpole rivalries, role of pole activists and rowdies, and linkages
k ? .  See Imperial Gazetteer of India, Abazai to Arcot, vol. X, pp.
106-111; and the Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, vol. IV, 
Ahmedabad (l879)» pp. 29^-3* for a detailed description of 
Ahmedabad poles (the word literally means gates). According 
to the latter, poles date from the time of divided rule in 
the City (1738-1733)» when Hindu-Muslim fights were very common. 
Afterwards, from about 1780 to 1832, when the decaying town 
walls had ceased to provide shelter from marauders, the pole- 
gate and watch must have been a very necessary protection^
Each pole, or house group, has only one or two entrances, pro- 
tected by a gateway closed at night as a safeguard against 
thieves. Inside there was one main street with crooked lanes 
branching on either side. Most poles varied in size from five 
or ten to fifty or sixty houses. Poles were almost entirely 
inhabited by Hindus, in some cases by a settlement of families 
belonging to one caste, and in others by families of several 
of the higher castes, Brahmins, Vanias, Suthars and Kanbis.
Most of the poles were established and provided with a gateway, 
at the expense o}' some leading man whose name the pole in many 
cases bore, and whose family held a position of respect as 
the heads of the pole.' The house property in the pole was 
to some extent held in common.
with political life needs to be undertaken before a real microlevel 
understanding of the interaction between caste and politics can 
be achieved.
Urbanization and industrialization in Ahmedabad are trans-
i
forming the traditional caste structure of power, based on the 
traditional leadership of poles and panchayats, the residential 
segregation of castes, and ascribed and exclusive occupational statuses 
The spread of education, the changing distribution of wealth through 
the increasing use of the market system, the growing use of modem 
litigation as opposed to the traditional justice of caste elders, 
the growth of voluntary associations and social reform associations 
organised on modem lines, and, above all, the impact of elections
and the party system and the government's developmental programmes
. \
and schemes for new subsidized housing and slum clearance etc. 
have greatly modified and, in many cases, transformed older patterns 
of caste behaviour and organisation. A new leadership has arisen, 
rooted in the new organisations of the party system, which has 
helped to mediate these changes.
However, in the absence of a detailed anthropological analysis 
of the changing patterns of caste in politics, one can only give 
an impressionistic outline of these changes, and of the caste 
composition of the Municipal election wards,based on interviews 
and newspaper information. During the twentieth century, and parti­
cularly since Independence, the Brahmin-Bania dominance of the party 
system has been increasingly and successfully challenged by the 
rising political power of the Patels or Patidar caste, whose main
48divisions are into Leuva and Kadwa Patidars. Internal Congress
48. See D.F.Pocock, Kanbi and Patidar, The Study of the Patidar 
Community of Gujarat,(1972).
party politics have largely been dominated by the factional conflicts 
along personalistic lines of leaders and aspiring leaders drawn from 
the Brahmin-Bania-Patel upper caste groups, which dominated the 
positions of leadership within the party into the 1960s. Inter­
mediate and low caste political figures are slowly becoming more 
prominent, largely due to the influence and power of the Majur 
Mahajan within the Congress party. Muslims have largely been denied 
an important role in Congress internal politics, and consequently 
the more active elements among them have often turned to the opposi-
j
tion parties, such as the Janta Parishad, for greater political 
scope. A more detailed analysis of caste and politics in Ahmedabad 
City will be made in subsequent sections.
Here, the caste, communal and ethnic composition of the 
various Municipal wards of Ahmedabad City in 1969 will be briefly 
described from data drawn primarily from interviews and newspaper 
information. The data is necessarily impressionistic since the 
1961 Census gives no wardwise breakdown of caste, communal or ethnic 
groups in Ahmedabad City.
Table 16.* Ward-wise caste, communal and ethnic 
composition of Ahmedabad City, 1969.
Ward: Major caste, communal and ethnic composition:
1. Khadia - 1 high-caste Hindus, particularly Patels (Leuva),
many Jains
2. M - 2 high-caste Hindus, many Patels and Jains, and
Brahmakshat riyas
3. Kalppur South large proportion of Muslims, Jain Banias and Marwaris
A-. " North large proportion of Jain and Hindu Banias, Brahmins
and Muslims
3. Gheekanta predominantly Bania, some Patels and Muslims
Ward: Major caste,communal and ethnic composition:
6. Dariapur
7. Vadigam
8. Shahpur
9. Khanpur
10. Manekchowk
11. Jamalpur
12. Raikhad
13. Paldi
lk . Gandhigram
13. Vadaj
16. Sabarmati
17. Budheshvar
18. Madhupura
19. Girdhamagar
20. Asarva
21. Chamanpura
22. Naroda
23. Saraspur
Patels, Muslims, low, and intermediate castes 
like Panchals and Prajapati.
\
Patels, some Muslims and Marwaris, and intermediate 
castes like Rajputs and Khatris
Muslims, intermediate caste Hindus, low caste such 
as Vagris,Rajasthanis, Sindhis and other non- 
Gujaratis, some Patels.
Patels, Parsis and Muslims.
Banias, Jains, Marwaris
Muslims primarily and some Marwaris
Muslims and intermediate caste Hindus
J
upper caste Hindus, particularly Patels, Banias,
Bra h m a k s h atr iya g .
mixed locality: Patels, Brahmins, Banias, Harijans, 
Thakkardas (backward class)
intermediate Hindu castes, some refugees from Pakistan
Patels, Brahmins, Jains, Sindhis, Kshatriyas
mixed locality: Patels, Brahmins, Banias, Marwaris,
Harijans
Banias, Harijans, Vagris, some Muslims, Rajasthanis 
and other non-Gujaratis, some Kshatriyas
high-caste Hindus
some Patels and Muslims, intermediate and low castes:
Kanbis, Harijans, Vagris
some Patels, intermediate and low castes: Harijan$,Vagris 
M " 11 " " 11 u and Sindhis
and Banias, Muslims, intermediate and11 it
low castes
2k, Potalia Talav low castes: Harijans, Vagris, and some Muslims, Banias 
and Patels
23. Bapunagar 
26. Rakhial
intermediate and low castes,some Patels, Muslims, 
Maharashtrians and Sindhis
intermediate and low castes, some Punjabis, Sindhis, 
Bhayyas of U.P.
Ward:
27. Gomtipur
28. Rajpur
29. Amraivadi
30. Khokera- 
Mehmadabad
31. Maninagar
32. Kankaria
Ma.jor caste, communal and ethnic composition: 
intermediate and low castes 
intermediate and low castes, some Patels 
intermediate and low castes
intermediate and low castes, some Patels, Maharashtrians 
and South Indians
high-caste Hindus: Brahmins, Banias, Patels
high-caste Hindus: Brahmins, Banias, Patels, some 
Harijans and Vagris.
33. Behrampura intermediate and low castes, some Muslims and Banias.
* Compiled from interviews with the Ahmedabad Census Officer,
Mr. Doctor, and a lecturer in Social Sciences at Gujarat University, 
Miss Taraben Patel, and a useful description in an Ahmedabadi news­
paper, Sandesh, 8 March , 1969.
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OUTLINE OF THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF 
THE AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Showing the role of the legislative branch and the 
executive, and constraints on the Corporation's 
powers and overall control by the State Government 
under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations 
Act of 19^9.1
Chapter III
In statutory or formal terms, as defined in the BPMC Act of 
19^9 under which Ahmedabad became a Municipal Corporation in 1930, 
an unequal balance of power exists between the urban locality 
and the State Government, to the very definite advantage of the 
latter. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has very little autonomy 
vis-a-vis the State Government. It has circumscribed and limited 
statutory powers, and both its legislative and executive processes 
are susceptible to direct and indirect control by the State Govern­
ment.
This was, to a large extent, a legacy of the British imperial
pattern of State-local relations, whose original purpose was to
legitimize the extraction of local revenue for local services, while
2maintaining centralized control. It was also buttressed, after
1. The Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act henceforth 
to be known as the BPMC Act of 19^ -9.
2. A critic of the BPMC Act of 19^91 Mr. Yusuf Meherally, a State 
legislator from Bombay City, protested, during the debates on 
the Act, that now that India Was an independent and not a 
colonial nation, the Municipal Commissioner, a State Government 
appointee and head of the Corporation's executive wing, should 
no longer continue to have such extensive powers. He said:
"With the example of the Bombay Municipal Corporation in mind,
I cannot help feeling that the powers vested in the Municipal 
Commissioner are very extensive, and that they do not need to 
be so extensive. ... We became members of the Corporation at
a time when the foreign government was in power, and the Municipal 
Commissioner was the watchdog of that government. He was the
Independence, by the desire of State Governments, with a heavily 
rural bias in terms of State legislators, to control all other 
potential foci of power, particularly urban municipalities and 
corporations. Mr. G.D.Vartak, who was the Minister for Local Self- 
Government in the Bombay State Government responsible for drafting 
and proposing the BPMC Act of 19^9» professed to be anxious to 
follow the City of Bombay Municipal Act of 1888, drafted by Sir 
Pherozeshah Mehta, which gave considerable powers to the Municipal 
Board and the Mayor. However, he insisted that the new BPMC Act 
was like the younger brother of the former Act, and that, whereas 
the elder brother had acquired experience, the younger brother 
required some sort of assistance in the form of supervision and con­
trol by the Provincial Government.^
The BPMC Act provided for almost complete separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature. All executive authority 
is vested in the Municipal Commissioner, a career civil servant from 
the State administrative service or the "State cadre" of the IAS, 
appointed by the State Government. He is solely responsible for 
the execution of policy. According to Clause 67 of the BPMC Act:
"Subject, whenever it is in this Act expressly so 
directed, to the approval or sanction of the Corporation 
or the Standing Committee, and, subject also to all 
other restrictions, limitations and conditions imposed 
by this Act or by any other law for the time being in 
force, the entire executive power for the purpose of 
carrying out the provisions of this Act, and of any 
other Act for the time being in force, which imposes
special officer who was appointed to safeguard the interests 
of the foreign power against rising democracy which clamoured 
for more authority. Resolution after resolution that the 
Corporation passed was blocked by the Commissioner..."
See Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, 
Monday, Sept. 19» 19^9. Municipal Corporations Bill (First 
Reading).
3. Ibid., Tuesday, Oct. 11, 19^9> Municipal Corporations Bill.
any duty or confers any power on the Corporation 
vests in the Commissioner."
The Municipal Commissioner holds office for a period not exceeding
three years in the first instance, determined by the State
Government, and renewable from time to time for further periods
not exceeding three years at a time. He may at any time be removed
from office by the State Government for incapacity, misconduct or
neglect of duty. His salary and allowances, from the Municipal Fund,
are determined by the State Government after consultation with 
kthe Corporation. His attentiveness to the wishes of the State
Government are further increased by the fact that his future
postings will be in the bureaucratic agencies of the State government.
The top administrative personnel in the Corporation - Deputy
Municipal Commissioners, Assistant Municipal Commissioners, the
Transport Manager, the City Engineer, the Medical Officer of Health
and the Municipal Chief Auditor - are all appointed by the Corporation
but subject to approval and confirmation by the State Government.
Their salaries and allowances are fixed by the Corporation with
the approval of the State Government. No new permanent office with
a minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, of Rs. 300 or with
maximum monthly salary,1 exclusive of allowances, of Rs. 800 or
more, could be created without the sanction of the State Government.
An increase in the salary of any permanent office is deemed to be
the creation of a new office, if, by reason of such increase, the
minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, amounts .to Rs.' 500 
or m o r e .5 In this way, the State Government controlled the senior
4. See the BPMC Act of 19^ -9. Clause 36.
3. Ibid., Clauses V? and 31.
executive positions in the Corporation.
The executive wing of the Corporation is responsible for 
preparing the budget, and implementing policy. The Municipal 
Commissioner prepares the budget estimates, making proposals con­
cerning taxation and other sources of Corporation income, and 
suggesting the likely expenditure on fixed projects and past 
commitments and any new ventures.^
The Corporation raises most of its revenues from the following
sources: property taxes, consisting of a water tax, a conservancy
tax, a general tax of not less than l2°/o of the rateable value
of lands and buildings, and betterment charges levied from 196^
7onwards. Regarding the general tax, a higher rate could be levied 
in respect of buildings and lands in which any particular class of 
trade or business is carried on by an amount not exceeding half of 
the rate so fixed. The conservancy tax could also be fixed at 
special rates in respect of any hotel, club, stable or other large 
premises. Octroi tax is levied on goods entering the city for 
sale, use or consumption in the city. Licence fees are exacted for 
the licensing of surveyors, architects or engineers, structural 
designers, clerks of works and plumbers, and for making available 
trade licences and other licences for keeping animals and certain 
articles, licences for sale of articles in municipal and private 
markets, licences for sale of articles of food outside markets,
g
licences for dairy products and hawking, and licences for butchers.
6. Ibid., Clause 95*
7. Ibid. The clause on betterment cnarges was added by Gujarat
State Act No. 19 of 196^, s.5«
8. Ibid., see Chapter XI, Municipal Taxation, and Chapter XXII,
Licences and Permits.
Another major source of revenue, although a fluctuating one, comes 
from grants and loans from the State government.
The following table outlines the obligatory and discretionaiy 
taxes available to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation under the 
BPMC Act of 19^9.
Table 1. Showing the Obligatory and Discretionary Taxes
Available to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation
1. Obligatory Taxes: a) property taxes
b) a tax on vehicles, boats and animals
3. Discretionary Taxes:a) octroi
b) a profession tax
c) a tax on dogs
d) a theatre tax
e) a toll on animals and vehicles entering
the city
f) any other tax which the State Legislature
has power under the Constitution to im­
pose in the State, subject to the sanction 
of the State Government.
The last section of discretionary taxes provides ample scope for
conflict between the State Government and the Municipal Corporation,
as one critic of the BPMC Act of 19^9i Mr. Mirza Akhtar Hasan, who
had himself worked as a municipal councillor in the Bombay Corporation
for fifteen years, had perceived during the debates on the Act. He
9had warned:
"In the absence of a clear-cut division of taxation 
(between the State and the Municipal Corporation),
I feel there will be conflict."
9. Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report, Monday, 
Sept. 19i 19^9. Municipal Corporations Bill.
In many Municipal Budget Estimates during the 60s, the Municipal 
Commissioner repeatedly called (in vain) for a share by the 
Corporation in certain State taxes and sources of income which 
related to the city, e.g. the motor vehicle tax, the entertainment 
duty tax, the surcharge levied in addition to the electricity duty 
for consumption of electricity in the Municipal area etc."^
In general, the State Government exercises considerable 
control and supervision over the financial resources of the Muni­
cipal Corporation: all proposed increases and changes in municipal
taxation require the approval of the State Government. Through 
its grants and loans to the Municipal Corporation also, the State 
Government could influence the financial ambitions and viability 
of the Corporation. The Corporation also requires the sanction 
of the State Government for borrowing or taking up at interest by 
the issue of debentures any sum on the security of any immovable 
property vesting in the Corporation or proposed to be acquired by it 
or of all the taxes or of any tax, which it is authorized to levy. 
However, it is permitted to borrow from any bank in which the 
surplus moneys at the credit of the Municipal Fund or the Transport 
Fund are deposited against any public securities in which the cash 
balances of the Corporation are invested."^
The functions of the Corporation are divided into obligatory 
and discretionary duties as set out in the following table:
10. See Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Budget Estimates, 1968-69, 
1969-70 for example.
1 1. BPMC Act of 19^9t Clauses 109, 110.
Table 2. Showing the Major Obligatory and Discretionary
Duties of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.^2
Obligatory Duties:
1. deeming of all public streets and places in the city
2. collection, removal, treatment and disposal of sewage
3. construction, maintenance and cleansing of drains and 
drainage works
4. establishment of a Fire Brigade
3. construction, acquisition and maintenance of public hospitals
and dispensaries, and other measures necessary for public 
medical relief
6. lighting of public streets, municipal markets and public 
buildings vesting in the Corporation
7. regulation of all markets and slaughter-houses
8. maintaining, aiding and suitably accommodating schools for 
primary education
9. road-building and repairs
10. water-distribution
11. enforcement of building codes and licensing.
Discretionary Duties:
1. organization, maintenance and management of maternity and 
infant welfare homes or centres, and institutions for the 
sick and disabled.
2. provision of milk to expectant or nursing mothers or infants 
or schoolchildren
3. swimming pools, public wash houses, bathing places and other 
institutions designed for the improvement of public health
t^. dairies or farms within or without the city for the supply,
distribution and processing of milk or milk products
3. provision of public parks, gardens, play-grounds and
recreation grounds
6. the construction, establishment and maintenance of theatres,
rest houses and other public buildings
7- the building or purchasing and maintenance of dwellings for
municipal officers and servants
8. any other measures for the welfare of municipal servants 
or any class of them
9. provision of electricity and gas
10. provision of transportation facilities within the City
11. other educational objects and making grants to educational 
institutions within or without the City/
12. the establishment and maintenance or the aid of libraries, 
museums and art galleries, botanical or zoological collections
13. the building or purchasing and maintenance of suitable 
dwellings for the poor and working classes
t *
14. any other measure likely to promote public safety, health, 
convenience or instruction.
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has been rather enterprising, 
and undertaken a fair number of discretionary duties of wide scope, 
as well as pursuing fairly rigorously its obligatory duties. Since 
19^7» it has operated a system of local transportation, the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Transport Service or A.M.T.S. It plays a vital role in 
public health services, running seventeen dispensaries, fifteen 
maternity homes, nine family planning centres, three general hospitals 
and a Medical College. It runs Zk2 municipal primary schools and 
an industrial school in the municipal workshop. It is responsible 
for implementing numerous town planning schemes and city development 
plans, controlling land use through zoning and providing infra­
structural facilities, like roads, water etc. in undeveloped areas.
It also runs a Municipal Dairy, distributing on average 57iOOO 
litres of milk per day, a Children's Park or Balvatika, a Zoo, a 
Museum and several libraries and reading rooms. It is also responsible
for licensing and food-control, and the regulation of shops and
13commercial establishments.
13. Census Special Report 1, pp. 277-285--
All these operations of the municipal government are very-
dependent on State supervision, and often financial aid. Basic
municipal services, such as the police, education, public health
and public works, if not directly under State authority, are
deeply influenced by the actions of State officials. The power
of the Corporation to make rules and by-laws is subject to the
sanction of the State Government. In some cases,the power of the
Municipal Commissioner to make Standing Orders, and of the Standing
Committee to frame regulations concerning the grant of leave and
other conditions of service of municipal officers and servants
'[1+requires approval by the State Government. All improvement 
schemes require the sanction of the State Government. The Municipal 
Commissioner's power to declare an area to be a clearance or re­
development area requires not only the approval of the Standing
15Committee, but also the State Government. The State Government 
has the power to require the performance of duties in case of de­
faults by municipal authorities, to call for extracts from the 
proceedings and other documents, to direct a special audit and 
to suspend action under the Act. If all informal controls fail, 
the State Government has the final power to supersede the Corporation 
in case of incompetency, persistent default or excess or abuse pf
powers, and to govern the municipality directly through bureau- 
16cratic officials.
l^ f. See BPMC Act of 19491 Chapter XXIX, Pules, By-laws, Regulations 
and Standing Orders.
13. Ibid., Chapter XVI, Improvement Schemes.
16. Ibid., Chapter XXVIII, Control.
In view of these financial and legal restrictions on the
Municipal Corporation, the ability of the deliberative and
elective wing to make an important contribution to policy-making
is severely restricted. The deliberative wing consists of a
Mayor and Deputy Mayor, three statutory committees and eight other
special committees. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor must be members
of the Corporation, and are elected by the Corporation at its
first meeting after the municipal elections, and at its first
17meeting in the same month in each succeeding year. The following 
table gives details of the statutory and special committees of 
the Corporation:
Table 3. Statutory and Special Committees of the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.^ -^ ""
No. of Members:
12
9 including 4 non-councillor members and 
Chairman, Standing Committee as an ex­
officio member
4l including 3 members appointed by 
the State Government.
12
12
12
12
12
3
12
12
Name of Committee:
Statutory Committees:
1. Standing Committee
2. Transport Committee
3. School Board
Special Committees:
1. Public Works Committee
2. Health Committee
3. Refuse and Sewage 
Committee
4. Recreational and 
Cultural Committee
3. Town Planning
Committee
6. Legal Committee
7. Milk Committee
8. Housing and Improve­
ment Committee
17. Ibid., Chapter II Constitution.
Half of the members of the Standing Committee retire every 
succeeding year. Those retiring after one year are selected by 
lot, and in succeeding years the members who retire are those 
who have been longer in office. All members are eligible for 
reappointment. In the Transport Committee, half of the members 
retire in every second year. The members who retire two years 
after their appointment are selected by lot, and thereafter the 
members who retire are those who were longest in office. Members 
of the Transport Committee and all other Special Committees are 
appointed every year, and are eligible for reappointment.
The most important committees are the Standing Committee,
the Transport Committee, the Pubhc Works Committee and the Housing
and Improvement Committee. The. most important posts in the
Corporation are the posts of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairmen of the
four committees mentioned above. Perhaps the single most powerful
person is the Chairman of the Standing Committee, although this
depends also on the personalities of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor,
who could also exert considerable influence, although, in terms
of formal power, the Mayor does littlemore than preside at
council meetings and ceremonial functions. The Chairman of the
Standing Committee, who chairs the most important committee in the
Corporation on which he has an extra tie-breaking vote, and is
also ex-officio member of the Transport Committee, is often the
19leading figure in the Corporation.
The deliberative wing has the authority to amend the budget, 
and sanction expenditure, and pass by-laws, although the actual
18. Census Special Report 1, p.278.
19. Interview with the Municipal Secretary, other Executive Staff
and leading Co-^porators in March, 1971.
room for initiative and manoeuvre is limited. Although the 
Corporation can levy the general property tax on a graduated scale 
and fix the rates of general taxation and other taxes, the rateable 
value of property and lands on which the general tax is assessed 
is determined by the Municipal Commissioner on the basis of the 
amount of the annual rent for which such land or building might
may require any of its officers to attend any meeting of the Cor-J
poiution at which any matter dealt with by such an officer in the 
course of his duties is being discussed. Corporators also have 
the right to question officers about their administrative actions
Boroughs, whose members served on committees, which exercised 
authority over particular departments, and which, as a whole, had 
virtually unfettered control over the hiring and promotion of 
staff, the sum total of the formal powers of control which Municipal 
Corporators have over the administrative wing is far from impressive.
During the debate on the BPMC Act of 19^9 in the Bombay State 
legislature, there was a very interesting divergence of opinion 
between legislators, who were ex-Poona City municipal councillors 
and other Maharashtrians on the one hand,, and those who had been 
Bombay City councillors. The latter were fearful of the excessive 
powers granted, to the Municipal Commissioner under the BPMC Act, 
whereas the former, Maharashtrians from both rural and urban con­
stituencies, welcomed State supervision and a stronger Municipal 
Commissioner.
20from year to year. The Corporation
and departments. 21 Compared to Municipal Boards of Municipal
20. BPMC Act of 19^ -91 Clause 129 and Schedule A, Chapter VIII.
2m\0 Xbld Clcxuses A-3 ani- L^Lt.
Ex-Bombay councillor legislators, who prided themselves 
on the efficiency and progress of the Bombay municipal council, 
and on the excellent leadership provided by important figures 
in the Nationalist Movement, like Sir Pherozeshah Mehta and 
Sir Dinshaw Wacha, who served their political apprenticeship in 
the Bombay municipal council, looked on the new Act with hostility 
and misgivings. A vociferous spokesman of this group, Mr. Mirza 
Akhtar Hasan of the Trade Unions of Seamen and Dock Workers, who 
had been a Bombay municipal councillor for over fifteen years, 
was aghast at the powers entrusted to the Municipal Commissioner. 
He declared:
"From my experience of the working of the Bombay 
Corporation, extending over fifteen years, I can 
say that the Municipal Commissioner is the Act 
personified. He has been given tremendous, and if 
I may say so, monstrous powers under the Act, and 
the same powers are contemplated in the present 
Bill ... Generally ... when an executive officer 
is made to work in a democratic institution like 
a Municipal Corporation, he is not able to recon­
cile himself to the acts of commission and omission 
of people’s representatives, and there is a struggle 
between the representatives and the executive 
officers...! would suggest to the Honourable Minister 
(for Local Self-Government, Mr. G.D.Vartak) that when 
the Bill goes to the Select Committee the powers of 
the Commissioner should be defined and a provision 
should be added in the Bill whereunder some machinery 
can be set up to harmonize the relations between the ^  
executive and the deliberative parts of the Corporation.M
Mr. ¥usuf Meherally, another ex-Bombay councillor of long­
standing, deplored the reduction of the Mayor to little more than 
a figurehead:
’’Today, the President of the Ahmedabad Corporation... 
is a .definite personality ... What I mean is that be­
cause of their present large powers they can leave
22. See Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates, Official Report,
Monday, Sept. 19* 19^9» Municipal Corporations Bill^p. ST7J.
their impress on municipal administration ...
(Mayor, as envisaged, will be) a decorative figure...
I do not think that it is of any considerable ad­
vantage to have a Mayor who is merely a figurehead."
Mr. Meherally also hoped the Corporation would fully exploit 
their own sources of income before coming to the State Government
23for assistance, and would take the initiative in municipal projects.
Yet another ex-Bombay councillor, Mr. Fazal Ibrahim Rahimtoola,
criticized the enormous powers of supervision and control by the
State Government over Municipal Corporations:
’’The Honourable Minister has taken great pains 
to explain to us the circumstances which have led 
to the introduction of this Bill, and he has also 
at great length given us an idea of how he has 
been anxious to follow the Act which is now in 
force in Bombay, and which, as he .rightly points 
out, was drafted by the late Sir Pherozeshah 
Mehta ... I have been able to glance at the pro­
visions of the Bill, and being once a member of 
the Bombay Municipal Corporation for not less 
thanfifteen years, I can say that this Bill is 
not/all like the Act which is in force in Bombay.
In almost all the provisions of this Bill, there 
is supervision and control by the Provincial Govern­
ment unlike in the Cityof Bombay Municipal Act..."24
In contrast, ex-Poona City municipal councillors and other
State legislators from Maharashtra, including the rural areas,
accepted the fact that the whole rationale behind the strict
separation of powers in the Act seemed to be to eliminate the
authority and "interference" of councillors. They wholeheartedly
accepted the proposals of the Minister for Local Self-Government.
Ex_Poona City councillors, disheartened by the corruption and
inefficiency displayed by Poona municipal councillors, welcomed
23. Ibid., Tuesday, Sept. 20, 1949?pv6S^ §.
24. Ibid., Tuesday, Oct. ||, 1949.
the curtailment of their powers and a strengthening of the 
executive. Mr. A.A.Khan of Poona District, a former Poona 
councillor, expressed their case in strong and picturesque 
language:
"Mr. Speaker, Sir, on several previous occasions 
I had mentioned the mismanagement in the municipal 
affairs of the local bodies of Poona. Some more 
instances have been given by my honourable Friend,
Mr. Popatlal Shah ... We have confessed - and we 
have confessed in very clear terms - that the affairs 
of the Poona City Municipality were in a deplorable 
state, that it was a skeleton which we kept in a 
cupboard for as long as we patiently could and, 
eventually, we brought it out and made a public 
exhibition of it so that Government may be moved 
to improve the fate of the poor man in the street 
and come to his rescue. In fact things were so 
bad that as my honourable Friend, Mr. Karandikar, 
said we felt that any change would be a change 
for the better, and that instead of a municipal 
borough, if we had a municipal corporation with 
centralization of powers, we would prefer it rather 
than put up with the state of affairs which had become 
unbearable..."25
The State legislators from Ahmedabad City, who had also 
been ex-municipal councillors, took a third and highly illuminating 
standpoint. Mr. A.A.Khan expressed astonishment that ex-Ahmedabad 
municipal councillors, whose municipal council was generally praised 
for its efficiency and progress and sound financial position, should 
support an Act which seemed to curtail their powers. The major 
speakers from Ahmedabad City: Mr. Bhogilal D. Lala, an important
city faction leader and spokesman of the textile magnate and business 
element in the Ahmedabad municipal council, and Mr. Khandubhai Desai, 
prominent Majur Mahajan and INTUC trade union leader, both spoke
25. Ibid., Tuesday, Sept. 20, 19^ 9jPp. 64-4-"S'*
in favour of the Act. Behind this seemingly surprising support 
lay a shrewd and realistic confidence in the ability of elected 
representatives to influence and work successfully through municipal 
administrators, despite the enormous power of the State Government
b
and the Municipal Commissioner in Corporation affairs. Mr.
Bhogilal Lala declared: ’’Now under the Corporation Act, a Commissioner
will be appointed with very wide powers. ... and in spite of the
increased expenses, I think on the whole it will be for the benefit
26of the inhabitants and voters of the city.” Mr. Khandubhai Desai
was no less emphatic. ”1 am standing to support wholeheartedly this
Bill ... We find that our city is expanding and many fresh problems
have arisen as a result of it, and that unless we have a corporation
with an executive officer of the rank of Municipal Commissioner under
the control of corporation, the efficiency of the administration is
2 7likely to deteriorate."
Despite the financial and legal restrictions imposed by State 
Governments on Municipal Corporations and outlined above, which 
curtail the ability of Corporators to make important decisions about 
priorities in public policy, Corporators can and do exert important 
informal influence over the administrative process. Corporators 
largely lack the ability to make policy initiatives, but in the Indian 
context of "administering scarcity", there can be little debate about 
the necessity for an adequate water supply, sewage disposal, clean 
and lighted streets, slum clearance etc. The overall concern is for
26. Ibid., Monday, Sept. 19, 19 ^ 9 ,0 .i l l .
27 . Ibid., Tuesday, Sept. 20, 19^9,p. U j .
ensuring an efficient and equitable allocation of municipal 
services, and it is here that Corporators play perhaps their 
most important role as intermediaries between the ordinary 
citizens, their constituents,on the one hand, and the often in­
efficient and corrupt municipal bureaucracy, on the other hand, 
in routine administrative matters concerning adequate street 
lighting, road repair, provision of water-taps, licence applications 
and tax assessments. Although he has no formal control over admini­
strative matters at all, the Corporator is above all concerned
with developing informal means of control over the interpretation
28and application of administrative decisions.
The most effective informal means of control by Corporators
over municipal administrators lies in the political backing a
Corporator can command in his dealings with administrators. Thus 
leaders of important political parties in the Corporation exert 
a great deal of informal influence over administrators, since 
they can threaten leading State-appointed officers with a vote of
censure, for the BPMC Act provides for the removability of the
Municipal Commissioner and the top administrative personnel in 
the Corporation. The Municipal Commissioner can be removed by a /8 
majority of Corporators voting to censure him. The Transport Manager 
and other senior officers, the Deputy Municipal Commissioners, 
Assistant Municipal Commissioners, City Engineer, Medical Officer 
of Health, Municipal Chief Auditor and Municipal Secretary, can 
be removed from office for misconduct, incapacity or neglect of
28. See Roderick Church,"Authority and Influence in Indian 
Municipal Politics: Administrators and Councillors in
Lucknow", Asian Survey, vol. 13* no. 4 (April^1973) 5 pp(
duties on the votes of not less than half of the total Corporators. 
Leading Corporation figures can also use their influence at the State- 
level and their contacts with State-level leaders to intimidate 
senior administrative personnel, for in this way Corporators with 
State-level influence can engineer the transfer of the Municipal 
Commissioner and other State-appointed personnel.^ This State- 
level political backing is largely the preserve of the Corporation's 
Congress . leaders. However, other Corporators can get their "work" 
done through approaching their party leaders, who need to insure 
their support.
In addition, many municipal administrators tend to accept the 
idea that they should be responsive to democratically elected leader­
ship. To guard against the possibility of removal by the Corporation, 
the Municipal Commissioner is careful to build a coalition of support 
in the Corporation by fulfilling the administrative demands of some 
of the more influential Corporators. Top administrators also dis­
cover that in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the Corporation 
they need the cooperation of at least the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor
and the Chairman of the Standing Committee and other important com-i
mittees. The Municipal Commissioner finds that he must work closely
with the Corporation and its leaders, especially in the Standing 
31Committee.
The Standing Committee, in particular, has important powers, 
which the Municipal Commissioner and senior executives of the Corporation
29. BPMC Act of 19*f91 Clauses J>6 and $0 .
30. Transfers of all important Corporation officers lie with the 
State Local Self-Government Department.
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have to take into account. The Standing Committee considers in 
detail the Budget Estimates and proposals of the Commissioner, 
and has the right to make modifications and additions. The Transport 
Committee has similar powers with regard to the estimates of ex­
penditure and income of the Transport Undertaking, which are pre­
pared annually by the Transport Manager. The Standing Committee 
fixes the rates of taxation, and can scrutinize the accounts of the 
Corporation. The Commissioner can make a contract involving an 
expenditure exceeding Rs. 3,000 only with the approval of the 
Standing Committee. Every contract the Commissioner makes over Rs.
1,000 and not exceeding Rs. 3,000 must be reported by him to the 
Standing Committee within fifteen days. All improvement schemes 
planned by the Municipal Commissioner, and his power to declare an 
area to be a clearance or redevelopment area, require the approval
of the Standing Committee and the Corporation. The Corporation
3 2also sanctions the rate of licence fees.
With regard to the appointment and conditions of service 
of municipal officers and servants, the Standing Committee has the 
power to determine the number, designations, grades, salaries, fees 
and allowances of auditors, assistant auditors, officers, clerks 
and servants immediately subordinate to the Municipal Chief Auditor 
and the Municipal Secretary, and to approve their appointment. The 
power of appointing municipal officers, whether temporary or perma­
nent, whose minimum monthly salary exclusive of allowances is or 
exceeds Rs. kOO vests in the Corporation. No new permanent office
32. BPMC Act of 1949. Clauses 103, 73, 270, 272, 276, 280 and 386.
with a minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, of Rs. 100 
or more can be created without the sanction of the Corporation, 
and an increase in the salary of any permanent office is regarded, 
as the creation of a new office, if by means of such increases, the 
minimum monthly salary, exclusive of allowances, amounts to Rs. 100 
or more. The Municipal Commissioner cannot dismiss a municipal officer 
or servant, whose monthly salary exceeds Rs. 200, and the Municipal 
Auditor and Municipal Secretary cannot dismiss a municipal officer 
or servant whose monthly salary exceeds Rs. 130 without t;he previous 
approval of the Standing Committee. Any officer appointed by the 
Corporation, except the Transport Manager, can be suspended by the 
Standing Committee. The Standing Committee can regulate the grant
of leave to municipal officers and servants and, in general, pre-
33scribe any other conditions of service for them.
Thus the Municipal Commissioner and senior Corporation 
executives need the cooperation and support of at least the more 
powerful elements in the Corporation - the Mayor, Deputy Mayor, 
the Standing Committee and other leading Corporators - to safe­
guard their position and enable the smooth functioning of Corporation 
business. As many of the speakers in the cfebate on the BPMC Act 
of 1949 commented, the whole successful functioning of the Corporation 
depends on having a flexible and accommodating Municipal Commissioner, 
on "whether he is bureaucratic or willing to share his powers with 
the Mayor, the Standing Committee and the Corporation as a whole."
Mr. Yusuf Meherally, who had been Mayor of the Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, went on to say of Mr. M.P.Bhatt, who was Municipal
33. BPMC Act of 1949, Clauses 3I1 33* 36 and 463.
Commissioner during his period of power as Mayor:
"When on several occasions substantial differences 
of opinion arose he did not hesitate to differ from 
the opinion of the Mayor or of the Corporation. But 
in spite of difference of opinion, he acted according 
to the opinion of the Corporation, recognising that 
that was the voice of democracy. Where the opinions 
of the Corporation have not been considered, the results 
have been very bad."3^
As we have seen, on the whole, it is in the interest of the 
Municipal Commissioner and his senior executives to be flexible 
and work with Municipal Corporation leaders. On this score, 
speakers in the debate on the 19^9 BPMC Act from Ahmedabad were 
very confident of the ability of Corporators who had the strong 
support of their constituents, and power and backing in the Corpora­
tion, to handle the Corporation’s administrators. As Mr. Gulamhaider 
Valimahomed Momin said:
"Now the question is, who controls the bureaucratic 
executive officer? It is the elected representatives 
of the people who control him. If these 
play their part well and if they do not betray the 
confidence reposed in them by those who elected them, 
then it would be extremely difficult for the executive 
officer to behave like a bureaucrat. If the representa­
tives have done some selfless work by moving about in 
their wards, villages, cities and towns etc. they would 
be able to control the executive officer effectively.
I have myself, as a municipal councillor moved about 
in the various wards in Ahmedabad with Shri Nandaji, 
with Shri Khandubhai Desai and other distinguished 
Ahmedabad municipal councillors who have done very 
good service to the citizens of Ahmedabad. Having 
found out what is necessary to be done the elected 
representatives can approach the executive officers 
of the Municipality to see that the machinery under 
them carries out the necessary duties."33
The Majur Mahajan spokesman in the debate on the BPMC Act
of 19^9 in the Bombay State Legislature, Khandubhai Desai, was
3^. See Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report.
Tuesday, Sept. 20, 19^9 jp46S6.
33. Ibid., Monday, Sept. 19, 19^9, (>lb - 17.
very confident of the ability of Maj r Mahajan Corporators to 
work through the Corporation executives, and negotiate successfully 
with the municipal authorities on behalf of the working class. He 
said:
"I am standing to support wholeheartedly this Bill... 
Personally, I think that, though the powers / of the 
Municipal Commissioner^ look wide, they are necessary 
if we want to see that the administration of a corporation 
runs efficiently. We have our own opinions about the 
Municipal Commissioners appointed by a foreign or alien 
Government. But now the Commissioners will be appointed 
by the democratic provincial Government, and the people 
would have a voice in the appointment of such Commissioners; 
so that he would indeed be a bold Municipal Commissioner 
who would defy even now and then, either directly or in­
directly, the behest of the people o their elected re­
presentatives. There is a provision in the Bill under 
which he is removable by a 3/8th majority... so honorary 
Members need have no apprehension on the score of the 
powers proposed to be given to the Commissioner...”36
In view of the fact that the Majur Mahajan bloc of Corporators
in Ahmedabad represented a powerful trade union in the City and
State, and were a tightly-knit cohesive body, an important element
not only in the local Congress party, but having great influence
and power at the State-level which they could bring to bear on the
city, this optimism was well-founded.
The Ahmedabad business element was represented in the 19^9
State legislative debate by Bhogilal Lala, whose confidence in the
Bill also rested on the enormous prestige and independent standing
of the textile magnates in the City, and on their State-level contacts
and influence. He declared in the debate:
”1 am of the opinion that, by giving wider powers 
to the chief executive officer, namely, the Commissioner 
under this Bill, the morale of the municipality will 
be enhanced. ... Government must be very careful 
about the choice of executive officer, because the
36. Ibid., Tuesday, Sept. 20, 19^9.
whole working of the Bill, when it becomes an Act, 
will depend upon the sort of Commissioner whom we 
are going to appoint."37
Interviews with leading Corporation figures and Corporation 
executives also substantiate this informal influence of Corporators 
on Corporation administrators. This can be based not only on poli­
tical backing within the Corporation and at State-level, but also 
on personal ties with key administrators based on friendship, 
caste affinities, doctor-patient and teacher-pupil relationships, 
and the fact of being old class-mates, neighbours or customers in 
one way or another.^
The lack of influence at the State level does hamper a party 
in power at the local level, which was in opposition to the party 
in power at the State level, in its efforts to influence Corporation 
administration. Mr. Yusuf Meherally commented on this point in the 
debates on the 19^9 BPMC Act in the Bombay State Legislature. He 
said:
"The last point I would like to mention regarding 
the Municipal Commissioner is that, so long as the 
party in the municipality and the party in the 
Government is the same, the scopefor conflict becomes 
limited, since the same party holds the reins of 
office both of Government administration as well 
as of municipal administration. If one party is 
in power in the municipality and a different party 
in Government ... there is bound to be greater scope 
for friction..."39
Thus the legal restrictions of the BPMC Act would circum­
scribe such a party to a far greater degree than the ruling party 
in power at local and State levels. However, it is possible for
37. Ibid., Monday, Sept. 19, 19^9
38. Interviews with leading Corporation figures and Corporation 
executives in Ahmedabad in March 1971. See also Roderick 
Church, loc.cit.
39. See Bombay Legislative Assembly Debates. Official Report,
Tuesday, Sept. 20, 19^9.
opposition Corporators to exercise informal influence over Cor­
poration administration, if they have a sufficient bloc vote 
in the Corporation, and, on an individual basis, through the 
mechanisms of agitation and blackmail. The threat of agitation 
against administrators, whether by taking over Corporation 
meetings or organizing public demonstrations in the streets, 
gives the opposition Corporator leverage with Corporation officials
X
who, above all, seek to avoid public exposure and unfavourable 
publicity. The threat of blackmail by Corporators, who have dis­
covered some improper behaviour by administrators, also relies on
the administrators1 dislike of public exposure and desire to
•^0operate discreetly and inconspicuously.
The political processes described above are the major 
means by which municipal administrative systems, dominated by 
formally non-responsive bureaucrats,are made responsive to the 
preferences of a body of locally-elected representatives.
Since, almost all segments of the Corporation certainly 
all the most articulate and competent Corporators , manage to 
exert informal mechanisms of control over Corporation administrators, 
it is hardly surprising that so few efforts are made by Corporators, 
with the possible exception of some Janta Parishad leaders, to 
change the Corporation form of government to give Corporators 
more authority in administrative matters.
To sum up, the State Government exercises considerable 
supervision and control over municipal government, and the fact 
that leading Corporators, in order to influence administration,
^0. See Roderick Church, loc.cit.
require political backing at the State-level, and, indeed, 
require State-level influence in order to accomplish so much 
of their "work", reflects the very real weakness of local auto­
nomy, and the many tentacles of State power in municipal life. 
However, despite financial and legal restrictions, and a general 
inability to take policy initiatives, enterprising Corporators 
can employ various informal mechanisms for controlling routine 
administrative decisions, and an influential Mayor, with personal 
prestige, financial expertise and a strong hold over the Congress 
Corporation party and sound backing at the State-level, can 
secure a large degree of cooperation from senior Corporation 
executives, and thus exert a creative influence over municipal 
government. This was attempted in Ahmedabad with a fair degree 
of success during the Mayorship of the textile magnate,
Chinubhai Chimanbhai Sheth, between 1930 and 1961, and by his 
successor, Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, between I96I-65.
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BUSINESS - LABOUR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN AHMEDABAD CITY, 1961-65.
The importance of the textile magnate £lite and the textile
labour force, as represented by the Textile Labour Association, in the
economic life of Ahmedabad City was reflected in the city's political
life in the early 1960s. As we have seen, the textile industry, despite
growing industrial diversification,^ was still crucial to the city's
economy in the 1960s. In 1961, there were 62 cotton textile mills
in Ahmedabad City - three spinning units and the rest composite units
having an installed capacity of 2,092,540 spindles and 41>639 looms.
Most of the mills were fully equipped with modern processing plants
for bleaching and finishing, and several with plants for mercerising,
sanforising, dyeing and printing of cloth manufactured by them, all
installed at a capital cost of Rs. 72 crores. The mills turned out
finished fabrics of the value of Rs. 90 crores every year, and gave
2direct employment in 1961 to over 130,000 persons. During the 1960s, 
Ahmedabad accounted for half of Gujarat State's labour force employed
in the modem sector, and over 50% income generated by the manuf-
3acturing sector.
The TLA had an unparalleled position of strength among labour 
unions in India with a membership of over 80% of the textile labour 
force in Ahmedabad, compared with about 35% unionization for the
CHAPTER IV
1. It is important to note that industrial diversification in Ahmedabad 
City, which has taken place in the fields of light and heavy 
engineering, particularly the manufacture of cotton textile machinery 
and diesel engines, and chemical industries, has also been largely 
pioneered and financed by the Ahmedabad textile magnate 4lite.
2. Census Special Report I. pp 8 - 9»
3. Financial Times (Bombay) Supplement on Gujarat,3November , 
1972.
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relatively well organised Indian cotton textile industry as a whole.^
The TLA had a stable and gradually expanding membership in sharp
contrast to the typical extraordinary fluctuations in membership
of many other unions, such as the Bombay Gimi Kamgar Union, in
5response to the ebb and flow of industrial crises. Its finances 
were also strong. The monthly income of the TLA was Rs.55*991 in 1950 
in contrast to the annual average for all Indian unions in 1952-55* 
which was Rs.1906 per month per union. In addition, the TLA, with a 
membership of less than 100,000, accounted for over 80% of welfare 
expenditures incurred by all unions in India, serving approximately
two million members.^ It also had the advantage of a full-time
leadership, and a union staff of nearly 200.
The textile magnate elite, which had transformed itself from a 
trading and commercial elite into a successful industrial ilite, had 
a large degree of legitimacy as an indigenous 4lite with a historical role 
of city leadership developed over many centuries and deep roots in 
Gujarati culture and language. The strength of this 6lite was further 
reinforced by its close-knit and homogeneous nature. About sixteen 
managing agency groups - almost all from the local Gujarati business 
community - controlled the local textile industry. These business 
houses share a common cultural outlook and attitudes, profoundly
shaped by the puritanical Jain Bania complex, and had a tradition of
intermarrying among themselves and, occasionally, with other large 
industrial concerns, mainly in Bombay City, thus preserving their
4. Subbiah Kannappan. "The Gandhi an Model of Unionism in a Developing 
Economy: The TLA in India", Industrial and Labour Relations
Review, ircj $(> I ID , to be known henceforth as
Kannappan III.
5. S.D. Punekarj Trade Unionism in India . (1948 ),
6. Government of India, Labour Bureau, The Indian Labour Year 
Book, (1953-54 ).
cultural homogeneity and the concentration of wealth. The following 
tables showing the family trees of six of the leading Ahmedabad business 
families, going back 3 - 4 generations, illustrate the close-knit 
and homogeneous nature of the Ahmedabad ^lite, preserved by judicious 
marriage-alliances among themselves and with certain important, largely 
Gujarati, industrialist families in Bombay City.
Since, in Ahmedabad, there is a considerable overlapping of Elites 
with the economic £lite dominant socially, culturally and politically 
too, many of these business houses, particularly the houses of Shri 
Lalbhai Dalpatbhai and Shri Harivallabhdas Kalidas, have close 
connections with the political life of the city, and the leadership of
the apex business organisation of the city millowners, the Ahmedabad
0
Millowners1 Association. All but six mills in Ahmedabad are members 
of the MOA, which was founded in 1891. Power and influence within the 
Ahmedabad MOA are tilted in favour of the larger mills, for voting 
rights are determined on the basis of the number of spindles and looms 
of member mills: a member mill has one vote for every 1000 spindles
or part thereof and also one vote for every 250 looms or part thereof.
In 1968, seven units had from JOO - 500 looms, 39 from 500 ~ 1000,
9 from 1000 - 1500, and two had over 1,500 looms. In the same year,
two units had between 10,000 - 20,000 spindles; 13 between 20,000 - 30,000;
21 between 30,000 - 40,000; 10 between 40,000 - 50,000; seven between
50.000 - 60,000; three between 70,000 - 80, 000; and three between
90.000 - 100,000.9
The family-tree of one of the most influential business families 
in Ahmedabad, the Lalbhai Dalpatbhai family, is presented overleaf.^
7
7 .  K . D .  D e s a i  ( L e c t u r e r  i n  P o l i t i c s  a t  G u j a r a t  U n i v e r s i t y ,  A h m e d a b a d ) ,
Some T h e o r e t i c a l  F o r m u l a t i o n s  a b o u t  A h m e d a b a d  P o l i t i c s . ( A h m e d a b a d : 19 7 1).
8. Henceforth to be known as the MOA.
9. The Ahmedabad M0A; Annual Report (1968),
10. These family-trees of important Ahmedabad business families have been 
made available by Shri Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas.
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TABLE 1. FAMILY-TREE OF THE LALBHAI DALPATBHAI FAMILY
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Two important marriage-alliances were contracted in this family: 
Siddharthbhai, son of Kasturbhai Lalbhai, married Vimlaben, daughter 
of Bhogilal Laherchand of Batliboys, a large industrial group in Bombay. 
Mananbhai, grandson of Narottambhai, brother of Kasturbhai Lalbhai, 
the present head of the family, married Anjanaben, who belongs to the 
Garden Silk Mills of Ahmedabad. Among the important business offices 
held by members of this family were the following: Kasturbhai Lalbhai
was himself President of the Ahmedabad MOA from 1935 - 1937 and. again 
in 1939- His nephew, Arvindbhai Narottambhai, was President of the 
MOA from 1957 - 58 and again from 1961-62. Another nephew, Chinubhai 
Chimanbhai, was President of the MOA in 1964-65* and yet another 
nephew, Ajaybhai Chimanbhai was a member of the Managing Committee 
of the MOA in 1969-70. The Lalbhai Dalpatbhai family has taken a keen 
interest in city politics, both indirectly through contributions to 
Congress party funds, and directly through active participation. 
Chinubhai Chimanbhai was active in City Congress politics in the 1950s. 
He became the leader of the Nagrik Paksh in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, which dissented from the official Congress line on the 
issue of a separate linguistic State of Gujarat. He was Mayor of 
Ahmedabad between 1957-61. His wife, Prabhavatiben, also took an active 
part in politics. She was a Congress Municipal Corporator between 
1961 and 1965* and was a member of the Public Works Committee, one 
of the four most influential Corporation committees between 1963 and 
1965.
±36
Another influential big business family was the Sakarlal Shodhan 
family:
TABLE 2. FAMILY-TREE OF THE SAKARLAL SHODHAN FAMILY
Shri Sakarlal Balabhai Shodhan 
= Champaben
, T 1 T I----------------------------------------------
Navnital Shyamsunderbhai Sulochanaben Malvikaben Chandravaliben
= Doliben = Dinbalaben = Gunvantlal = Jagmohanbhai = Natvarlal
i-------------  r
Saurabh Harshbhai 
= Rashmiben (unmarried)
There were two important marriage-alliances in this family: the
family-head, Shri SaTtarlal Balabhai Shodhan, had married Champaben,
who was a member of the Mangaldas Girdharlal family, a large textile
group in Ahmedabad, whose family-tree is included among the six presented
here. His son, Shyamsunderbhai, was married to Dinbalaben, daughter of
Shri Bhogilal of Batliboy Group (a large group manufacturing machinery)
in Bombay. The Shodhan family had also taken its turn as leaders of the
Ahmedabad MOA: Shri Sakarlal Balabhai Shodhan was President of the MOA
from 1937 ~ 1939 and again from 1942 - 1946. His son, Navnitlal Sakerlal,
was President of the MOA in 1953-54, and represented the MDA on the
Gujarat University Senate in 1967 and 1968. The political involvement
of the Shodhan family was indirect rather than direct.
The family-tree of the extraordinary Sarabhai family, whose talents
extend from shrewd business acumen to an appreciation of and involvement
11in the arts and sciences , is presented below:
11. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai was head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, 
and his wife, MrinaXiniben, is an accomplished Indian classical 
dancer.
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TABLE 5. FAMILY-TKEE OF TEE SARABHAI FAMILY
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Three important marriage-alliances have been contracted by this 
family: Gautambhai, son of Shri Ambalal Sarabhai, the family head^had
married Kamaliniben, who belongs to the family of the Khatau Makhanji 
Group, the largest textile mills group of Bombay. Leenaben, daughter 
of Shri Ambalal Sarabhai, married Madanmohan, son of Mangaldas Girdharlal 
of Aryodaya Mills of Ahmedabad. Kartikeya, son of Vikrambhai Sarabhai, 
married Rajshreeben, who also belongs to the Mangaldas Girdharlal family 
of Ahmedabad. Shri Ambalal Sarabhai was President of the Millowners' 
Association in 1918-19 during the historic period of the Weavers'
Strike of 1918 when Gandhi espoused the cause of the textile workers of 
Ahmedabad. However, subsequently, the Sarabhai family have withdrawn 
from the Ahmedabad MOA, and do not participate actively in politics.
They are still, however, a very influential family on the Ahmedabad 
scene with wide business interests, for, besides textiles, they are now 
concerned with engineering and petrochemical industries and the communic­
ations industry, including television.
Another important big business family in Ahmedabad is the 
Lallubhai Gordhandas Mehta family of the Rohit Group of Enterprises:
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TABLE 4. FAMILY-TKEE OF THE LALLOBHAI GOKDHAKDAS MEHTA FAMILY
family: Ramaben, daughter of Chinubhai Lallubhai, married Dr. S.P. Shah,
Managing Director of Tarun Commercial Mills of Ahmedabad. Mridulaben,
daughter of Vadilal Lallubhai, married Dr. Bihari Kanaiyalal Shah,
Managing Director of Ahmedabad Kaiser - I - Hind Mills Ltd., and
Veenaben, another daughter of Vadilal Lallubhai, married Anilbhai Chinubhai
Parikh, Managing Director of Ajit Mills Ltd., of Ahmedabad. Rohitbhai
Chinubhai Mehta was the first member of this family to assume leadership
of the Ahmedabad millowners, when he became President of the MOA from
1969-70. He was also Chairman of the Gujarat State Export Corporation
from its inception in 1965- The Mehta family, particularly Vadilal
Lallubhai Mehta, played an important part in district and State politics.
Vadilal Mehta was, at one time, President of the Ahmedabad DCC, and
Chairman of the Ahmedabad District local Board, and Chairman of the
Gujarat State Transport Corporation. In the State factional conflicts
of the early 1960s between the organizational wing, represented by
Morarji Desai and Balvantrai Mehta, and the ministerial wing, headed
by Dr. Jivraj Mehta, the Chief Minister, Vadilal Mehta came down in support
of the losing side of Dr. Jivraj Mehta, and subsequently resigned from
the Congress, and, a little later, went over to the Swatantra party.
In the 1967 General Elections, he was elected to the Gujarat Legislative
Assembly from Daskroi constituency in Ahmedabad District on the
12Swatantra party ticket. Soon after the Congress split in 1969, he 
threw his lot in with the Ruling Congress. Thus the Mehta family 
took a rather independent and unconventional line in politics, compared 
to other Ahmedabad millowners.
The family of Shri Girdhardas Harivallabhdas Parekh was also a 
leading and influential textile magnate family of Ahmedabad, whose family- 
tree is presented below:
12. Vadilal Mehta had a very comfortable victory in a strai^it fight 
against the Congress candidate, Chhotabhai Jivabhai Patel. Mehta 
secured 34*395 of the votes polled, as against Patel’s 17,268 votes, 
see Indian Election Commission Report on the Fourth General Election. (0tlU:196,|g>
There have been three important marriage-alliances contracted in this
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FAMILY-TEEE OF THE SHRI GIRDHARDAS HARIVAT.T.ABTTBAS PAREKH FAMILY
Three marriage-alliances contracted by this family were particularly 
important. Madanmohan Mangaldas married Leenaben, daugher of the late 
Shri Ambalal Sarabhai. Kamalbhai, his son, married Anjaliben, daughter 
of Hutheesing, head of a large engineering group of Ahmedabad. 
Mahendrabhai Chamanlal married Urmilaben, daughter of Shri Chandrakant 
Jagabhai of Bihari Mills of Ahmedabad. This family played a prominent 
leadership role among Ahmedabad textile magnates. Mangaldas Girdhardas 
had been President of the MOA in 1916-17 and again between 1920-23*
During the latter years, he had represented the millowners on the newly- 
constituted Permanent Arbitration Board with Gandhi as the representative 
of labour. His brother, Chamanlal Girdhardas, had been President of 
the MOA for a whole decade from 1924-34* Madanmohan Mangaldas was 
President of the MOA in 1955-56 and again in 1958-59* Later on he was 
elected President of the Indian Cotton Mills Federation, the apex body 
of Indian cotton textile mills, in 1967 and again in 1968. Harshvadan 
Mangaldas, his brother, was President of the MOA in 1965-66. The 
family of Shri Girdhardas Harivallabhdas Parekh played an indirect 
rather than a direct role in politics through their enormous economic 
power and their donations, political as well as humanitarian.
Perhaps the most politically-conscious and prominent textile 
magnate family in Ahmedabad is that of Shri Harivallabhdas Kalidas, 
whose family-tree is presented below:
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TABLE 6. FAMILY-TREE OF THE SHRI HARIVALLABHDAS KALIDAS FA PI IL. Y
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family. Balkrishnabhai Harivallabhdas married Arundhatiben, sister of
13Shri Arvind N. Mafatlal of the powerful Mafatlal group of Bombay.
Rajeshbhai, son of Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, married Devyaniben 
daughter of Shri Laxmikant Bhagubhai of Cellulose Products, a large 
industrial house of Ahmedabad. Balkrishnabhai Harivallabhdas's daughter 
Nilimaben, married Ashishbhai, son of the late Punamchand Kamani of 
the Kamani Group of Industries of Bombay. Jaikrishnabhai and Balkrishnabkol 
Harivallabhdas have both played an important business leadership role 
both at the State and city level. Jaikrishnabhai was President of the 
MOA in 1956-57 and. again in 1960-61, while Balkrishnabhai was President 
of the MOA in 1967-68. The Harivallabhdas family has been keenly 
political with its ambitions centred on the political fortunes of the 
head of the family, Jaikrishnabkai. Harivallabhdas. In the 1952 General 
Elections, Jaikrishnabhai was elected Congress MLA to the Bombay State 
Assembly from Kalupur-Dariapur constituency, which contains a large 
number of Patels, the caste-group of the Harivallabhdas family. He 
succeeded in polling 58*58% of the total votes in a foui^comered contest 
with a 67.15% voting turnout.^ He was elected a municipal corporator 
in the 1961 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections from the Dariapur 
constituency on a Congress ticket. He secured 8,581 votes out of a 
total of 95*734 votes in a five-seat ward. He was made Mayor of 
Ahmedabad from 1961—65, and was re-elected to the Municipal Corporation 
in the 1965 municipal elections. Later on in early 1971 he was the 
unsuccessful Congress (0) candidate for the Ahmedabad Parliamentary seat 
in the mid-term elections.
There have been three important marriage-alliances contracted in this
15. The Mafatlal family are of Gujarati origin, but their economic 
empire is now based in Bombay.
14. D.N. Pathak (Professor of Political Science) and K.L. Desai (Lecturer 
in Political Science at Gujarat University, Ahmedabad), A Study 
of Political Behaviour in Gujarat with Special Reference to the 
Fourth General Elections in 1967.(1970).
Thus the Ahmedabad textile millowners not only had a very great 
indirect influence over city politics, since the textile industry 
dominated the economic life of the city, accounting for a preponderant 
share of the labour force in the manufacturing sector, strongly 
affecting the city’s employment and prosperity, and providing much of 
the surplus for improving city living standards and amenities , but they 
also played an important direct role in political life in the city, 
particularly in the 1950s and early 1960s. They were in this period 
a multi-role 4lite, accustomed to providing leadership not only in 
economic and social matters, but also in civic affairs.
The presence and activities of this indigenous and dominant ^lite 
over centuries have given a sense of cohesion and continuity to 
Ahmedabad life, and have led to the evolutionary and incremental growth 
of city culture, based on the life-style and values of the Jain 
Bania ethos. There has been a slow pragmatic merging of the traditional 
and modem elements rather than any abrupt cultural breaks and dis­
continuities. In business, commercial attitudes, centred on appreciation 
of tried methods, predictability and pragmatic submissiveness, are 
slowly giving way to more entrepieneurial attitudes, involving belief 
in innovation, risk-taking and confident aggressiveness. In political, 
social and economic life, there is a judicious willingness to adopt
modes and procedures that are shown to be constructive and to "work"
15m  the context of perceived needs and goals.
This historical leadership of the city by the dominant economic 
elite has given it a unique sense of responsibility and involvement 
in city and municipal affairs, enhancing the importance of the municipal
15* K.D. Desai (Lecturer in Politics at Gujarat University, Ahmedabad), 
Some Theoretical Formulations about Ahmedabad Politics . Cl97/]
arena in Ahmedabad City, as against other municipalities such as 
16Indore, because of this personal and paternalistic interest by the
business €lite in municipal affairs and because of their tradition of
financial largesse for civic improvements. The Lalbhai Dalpatbhai
family, for example, has donated as much as Rs.1.26 crores for charity
since Independence. The bulk of it - Rs. 75*56 lakhs - has gone towards
educational schemes. The Mafatlal family has earned a reputation for
itself for its relief works during times of natural disaster, drought
and famine. The family of Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas has donated
about Rs. 30 lakhs over the years. On average, it spends about two
lakhs every year on charity, and every four years donates a much larger
sum for some special purpose. Schools and hospitals have been constructed
throughout the city by the Municipal Corporation with the help of
lavish business donations, for example the Vadilal Sarabhai General
Hospital, the Nagri Eye Hospital, the Lallubhai Gordhandas Hospital,
the Shardaben Chimanlal Saraspur Hospital, the Chinai Maternity Home
1 7etc. all resulted from the munificence of local millowners.
The Gujarat Vidyasabha, whose forerunner was the Gujarat Vernacular 
Society established by Colonel Alexander Kinlock Forbes in 184-8* 
received great encouragement from the business 6lite: Sheth Kasturbhai
Lalbhai donated Rs. 13 lakhs for the development of its activities 
and the construction of a new building for it. The Ramanand Mahavidyalaya 
Arts College, run by the Gujarat Vidyasabha and established under the 
auspices of the Brahmchari Vadi Trust, received a further donation of 
Rs.3 lakhs from the Sheth Harivallabh Kalidas Trust for its building.
1 6 .  S e e  R o d n e y  W. J o n e s ,  I n d i a n  U r b a n  P o l i t i c s  ( B e r k e l e y :  1 9 7 4 ) ,  i n  
w h i c h ,  u s i n g  I n d o r e  a s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e - s t u d y ,  J o n e s  a r g u e s  t h a t  t h e  
m u n i c i p a l  p o l i t i c a l  a r e n a  i s  a  f a i r l y  s m a l l  a n d  c i r c u m s c r i b e d  o n e .
1 7 .  R .  S r i n i v a s ,  A r t x c l e  o n  t h e  A h m e d a b a d  m i l l o w n e r s ,  F i n a n c i a l  E x p r e s s ,  
3 N o v . ? 1 9 7 2 .   ^----------
founded in 1892, and the B.J. Research Institute for postgraduate research,
established with the help of a donation of Rs.200,000 from Sheth
18Bholabhai Jesingbhai.
The Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service, created in April 1947>
was the first municipal transport service in India, and it was formed
due largely to the insistence and backing of the local millowners,
for the State Government was reluctant to put through proposals 
19establishing it. An important mill magnate, Narottam Chandulal was 
Chairman of the AMTS for about ten years during the time Chinubhai 
Chimanlal Sheth was Mayor of Ahmedabad. The financial expertise of 
the textile magnate £lite who helped to run the Corporation was a major 
factor in the launching of bold business ventures by the corporation 
at this time.^
Perhaps the greatest single contribution by the Ahmedabad textile 
£lite to the life of the city, and indeed of Gujarat as a whole, was 
the paramount role they played in the establishment of the sprawling, 
100-odd acre campus of Gujarat University in Navrangpura. A separate 
university for Gujarat was one of the aims of the Ahmedabad Education 
Society, which was established in May, 1935> *>y G.V. Mavlankar,
Balwantrai Thakore and Jiwanlal Diwan and others. The local business 
6lite were from the first closely associated with the work of the 
Ahmedabad Education Society: in the first election under the constitution
The Vidyasabha also mans the R.B. Ranchhodlal Chhotalal Girls’ School
1 8 .  C e n s u s  S p e c i a l  R e p o r t  1 , p p .  1 8 7 - 9 6 .
1 9 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. P i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
2 0 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  J a i k r i s h n a b h a i  H a r i v a l l a b h d a s , . J u l y  1 9 7 3 .
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of the society, Acharya Anandshankar Dhruva was elected president 
and Sheth Kasturbhai Lalbhai chairman of the governing body. With the 
generous financial assistance of the business community, the Society 
was able to establish colleges and other institutions of higher educ­
ation at Ahmedabad, which were to form the basis of Gujarat University.
A donation of Rs.60,000 by Sheth Tribhovandas Hargovandas and Sheth 
Amrutlal Hargovandas enabled the first college, the H.L. College of 
Commerce, to be started by the Society in June, 1936. In June 1937, 
a donation of Rs.2 lakhs by Sheth Chimanlal, Sheth Kasturbhai and Sheth 
Narottaabhai, sons of Sheth Lalbhai Dalpatbhai, enabled the S.L.D.
Arts College to be started. A huge donation of Rs.7 lakhs by Sheth 
Navinchandra Mafatlal went towards the establishment in June, 1946, 
of the M.G. Science Institute. The Shri Lallubhai Motilal Pharmacy 
College was established in June 1947 from the donation of Rs.301,000 
made by Sheth Lallubhai Motilal's widow. The Physical Research 
Laboratory came into existence in 1950 with the cooperation of Dr.
Vikram Sarabhai. The A.G. Teachers' College and the A.G. High School 
were started from donations received from the Achratlal Girdharlal 
Charities Trust; and the H.K. Primary Training College and the H.K.
Primary School from donations received from Sheth Jaikrishna Harivallabhdas 
and his brothers. Sheth Kasturbhai donated Rs. 25 lakhs for an 
agricultural college at Anand so that Gujarat University, which was
established as a teaching and affiliating university in 1949, could
21have all the requisite faculties.
The textile magnate 61ite in Ahmedabad has exerted such a profound 
influence on the social, economic and political life of the city that 
its cultural values have been absorbed by the emerging middle class
21. Census Special Report I pp. 187-192
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which remained, to a great extent an offspring and appendage of the 
textile magnate £lite, culturally closely homogeneous with it, and with 
a close identity of interest perceptions. Thus, for a long time,
middle-class leadership in various fields found it difficult to adopt
22hostile or defiant attitudes to the dominant £lite.
The overwhelming characteristic of Ahmedabad as an industrial and 
manufacturing centre, and the prevalence of the Jain Bania ethic? 
meant that business-labour relations tended to dominate the life of 
the city. In the economic sphere, a unique system of employer-employee 
relations evolved gradually over time between the apex body of millowners, 
the MOA, and the most powerful textile union, the Ahmedabad Textile 
Labour Association. These relationships had a profound impact on 
relationships between the millowners and the TLA in the political 
sphere too. The relationship between the MOA and the TLA was moulded 
by the ideas and practice urged by Mahatma Gandhi, who had taken a 
leading part in the peaceful resolution of an industrial strike 
between workers and millowners in 1918, had helped to found a permanent 
trade union for the workers in 1920, which was officially welcomed 
by the millowners, and had taken an active part in bringing about the 
agreement between millowners, workers and their respective organisations 
to establish permanent conciliation and arbitration machinery for the 
final settlement of disputes. Gandhi was directly associated with 
the work of this machinery for the first difficult eighteen years of 
its existence as the workers’ representative.
Gandhi1s philosophy of industrial relations emphasised that a 
"righteous struggle" could result only in victory for both parties for 
what was won was justice. Labour had a right to "equality" with 
capital, Gandhi felt, but it would realise this only by reform from 
within, by seeking higher levels of responsibility and, ultimately, 
it would be absorbed as co-owner of industry. Workers should regard
22. K.D. Desaij Some Theoretical Formulations about Ahmedabad Politica. (\ 9 1 1)
necessity for education and self-help, and for evolving strong
union organisations "by their own efforts. He wrote in "Young India",
"There is no royal road, I repeat, to gaining your rights, except self-
25purification and suffering". y Thus, the TLA, in absorbing these 
principles, laid stress on developing into a self-sufficient and 
disciplined union organisation, placing as strong an emphasis on 
internal reformation as on material rewards for the workers, emphasising 
peaceful settlement of disputes, failing which the workers should 
resort to arbitration, and the constructive role of the labour organ­
isation in maintaining industrial harmony and as a trustee to the 
country.^
So profound an impact did Gandhi's ideas of labour-capitalist
interdependence and harmony have on the Ahmedabad elite, that a segment
of that 4lite itself, the Sarabhai millowner family itself and upper
class professional people, played a crucial role in the establishment
of a powerful trade union movement in Ahmedabad, the TLA. On the
14th March, 1914» Ansuyaben Sarabhai, sister of Ambalal Sarabhai,
started a small school for workers' children in the Amraipura Chawl
opposite the Jubilee Mill. When, through this contact with the
workers ,she came to know that mills illegally worked more than twelve
hours a day, and children were made to work a full day in different
mills under different names, she drew this to the attention of the
2RInspector of Factories.
themselves, not capitalists, as their enemy, and recognise the
23. Young India , 4 Aug.^1927.
24. See TLA's Constitution, and the pamphlet on the TLA by Khandubhai 
Desai, TLA Ahmedabad,'An Indigenous Experiment in Trade Union 
Movement «(1948^
25. Shantilal Desai, An Outline of the History of the TLA , (1957) (^ n 
Gujarati); S.G. Banker, Gandhi and the Labour Movement . (1965);
The History of Wage Adjustment, published by the TLA; and an 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis by Paresh Majumdar on the TLA at 
Gujarat University.
In 1916, Ansuyaben and Shankerlal Banker, who had worked in the 
Home Rule League, with the help of two Ahmedabad lawyers, Krishnalal 
Desai and Kalidas Zaveri, founded the Majoor Mitra Mandal (Workers' 
Friendly Society), forerunner of the Majur Mahajan, to educate workers 
and give them medical facilities, promote saving and cooperation 
amongst workers' families and remove their grievances relating to pay. 
They formed a cooperative credit society of twelve residents of the 
A-mraipura Ghawl to extricate them from debt. Ansuyaben led the 
Warpers' Strike on 4th December, 1917 (Labour Day), and, under the 
inspiration and cooperation of Gandhi, who had become involved in the 
Weavers' Strike of 1918* Ansuyaben and her upper-class friends played 
a large role in the establishment of the TLA on the 25th February 
1920.
The Weavers' Strike of 1918 was of crucial importance in establish­
ing for the first time, at Gandhi's suggestion, the principle of 
submission of industrial disputes to voluntary arbitration, to which the 
millowners agreed when Gandhi undertook a fast. Due to the responsible 
behaviour of the Majoor Mitra Mandal, and the fasting and advice of 
Gandhi, Ambalal Sarabhai, President of the MOA at that time, suggested 
to its members to agree to the establishment of craft-wise organisations 
of workers in Ahmedabad mills so as to make it easier to negotiate 
with them, and also to agree to refer disputes not solved by negotiations 
with workers' organisations to a board of arbitration. Negotiations
26. Shankerlal Banker and Kalidas Zhaveri were full-time workers in 
the TLA; other high-status "outsider" leaders, Khandubhai Desai 
and Gulzarilal Nanda, joined the TLA as full-time paid officials 
in 1922. Sometime before the Satyagraha movement of 1930, 
other important high-status "outsider"leaders joined the TLA: 
the late Shyamprasad R. Vasavda, the late Ambalal Trivedi, the 
late Somnath Dave, the late N.H. Shaikh, and A.S. Pandya.
were subsequently carried on between Gandhi, representing the workers, 
and a subcommittee of the MOA which resulted in the creation of a 
permanent arbitration board, composed of Gandhi and Sheth Mangaldas 
Parekh, then President of the MOA, to which disputes were to be 
referred in future. The awards of the Board had only a moral binding 
force, and if the two arbitrators could not reach a joint award, an 
umpire was to be called in.
The main features of Ahmedabad's experiment in labour relations, 
as represented by the arbitration machinery created in Ahmedabad, 
were as follows: the procedure before the Permanent Arbitration Board
was of a judicial character in an effort to reach solutions with the 
comparative detachment and objectivity of a judicial inquiry. The 
parties submitted statements of their claims in the impersonal language 
characterising pleadings, and, throughout the proceedings, emphasis 
was placed by the arbitrators and the parties on facts and factual 
arguments, eschewing as far as possible emotive appeals and reliance 
on abstract principles. The Ahmedabad TLA, supported by Gandhi, 
insisted that the millowners should provide it with relevant information 
and facts concerning the economic and financial position of the mills 
and the industry as a whole. The umpires were carefully chosen men of 
high calibre and esteem, respected by all the parties concerned as 
men of broad experience and human understanding. Although the awards 
had only moral force, the TLA learned to rely for their enforcement on 
the procedure of settlement of complaints at the mill level, leading 
eventually to the Arbitration Board, or to refer more serious or general 
disputes directly to the Board.
In reality the work of the Arbitration Board was not arbitration 
in the strict sense, for the arbitrators were partisan representatives 
of the parties to the dispute, and the real arbitration was done by 
the umpire, when they themselves could not come to an agreement.
It was a highly developed form of negotiation and conciliation, of 
collective bargaining. By following the procedure of arbitration, i.e. 
the submission by the parties of their statements or pleadings, the 
presentation of oral and documentary evidence in the manner of a 
judicial inquiry, the task of negotiation and conciliation became 
oriented to a search for relevant facts and data. However, the joint 
awards arrived at were, in essence, collective agreements rather 
than arbitration awards.
Despite initial difficulties, when trade union obstruction and 
victimisation, and the violation of awards and demands for wage 
increases caused union-sponsored strikes (although these were usually 
confined to a limited number of mills and workers), both the MOA and 
the TLA adopted a highly practical and realistic approach to their 
experiment and came to value its contribution to industrial peace.
A sensible attitude of give and take was adopted: in 1923> the one and
only general strike carried out under the auspices of the TLA was a 
disastrous failure, seriously weakening the unions, and, at this stage, 
the employers could have crushed the union out of existence. However, 
they chose instead to negotiate and compromise, giving some concessions 
to the union. Thus, unlike other Indian unions, the TLA did not have 
to fight for the mere right to exist and be recognised with the resulting 
legacy of bitterness. The tradition of business sense and compromise, 
built up as a part of local commercial practice, enabled the millowners 
to see the practical value of organising their relationships with labour 
on an orderly basis. In turn, the labour union made it quite clear to 
the millowners that they were not anticapitalist and did not seek 
class war, but rather sought an intelligent partnership with the 
employers to bring prosperity to the industry and the workers. The 
employers appreciated the union's policy of not making or supporting 
false or exaggerated demands, and its strong policy towards
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unauthorised strikes.
By the 1930s, both parties had come to value their experiment 
in collective bargaining. The President of the MOA, in a speech at 
the MOA’s Annual General Meeting, referred to the umpire’s award in 
the 1936-37 disputes against reduction of wages, which was a great 
disappointment to the millowners, in the following way:
—  "Although the price we have to pay for industrial peace is sub­
stantially heavy, if we were to take a long view of the matter 
I cannot come to any other conclusion but that in the interest of 
all concerned the machinery which makes for peace should be 
preserved at all cost." —  ^
In a TLA statement of Aug. 4"th, 1934* submitted to the Arb­
itration Board on the millowners’ proposal for a wage reduction, 
the following is asserted:
—  "The union wishes to assure the Association (MOA) of their abiding
interest in the welfare of the Industry. The union is not un­
willing to consider any proposal which may emerge from the 
Association and which could result in the good of Industry 
being established without harm to the wage earners."—
In another TLA statement, submitted to the Arbitration Board in 
connection with the 1933-34 wage disputes, the following remark 
was made:
— "The stability of the industry and the good of labour entirely
depend upon the machinery of arbitration slowly built up by a
29line of traditions, convention and precedents." —
27
27. Subbiah Kannappan, "Ahmedabad Experiment in Labour Management Relations:1,”
(April 1959) and "The Ahmedabad Experiment in Labour Management Relations:IU' 
(May 1959) International Labour Review.u-gL. 77 , »-wtrs te/UcTow cu
Kannappan I and Kannappan II.
28. Report of the MOA . (l936)>
29• History of Vage Adjustment in the Ahmedabad Textile Industry t Vol III,
published by the TLA.
The relative industrial peace won through the use of Gandhi’s
arbitration machinery could be seen in the following figures showing
the loss of man-days in strikes at various textile centres in Bombay
30Presidency between 1926—33•
TABLE 1 . LOSS IN MAN-DAYS THROUGH STRIKES IN VARIOUS TEXTILE CENTRES 
IN BOMBAY PRESIDENCY BETWEEN 1926 AND 1933.
TEXTILE CENTRE: AVERAGE NO. OP NO. OP STRIKES: TIME LOSS OP
WORKERS: MAN-DAYS:
Whole Presidency 471 38,848,898
Bombay City 130,000 32,000,000
Sholapur 18,000 1,000,000
Ahmedabad 70,000 138,000
The thorny questions of rationalisation and profit-sharing
bonus, which have plagued the Indian industrial scene and caused
considerable industrial unrest in India, particularly in Kanpur
31and Nagpur in the 1950s, were successfully dealt with in Ahmedabad 
under the existing machinery of direct negotiations and collective 
bargaining. The Delhi Agreement of 1935 marked the acceptance of the 
principle of rationalisation with safeguards for the workers. The 
Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association, widely known as
30. The Report of the Departmental Inquiry on Wages and Employment 
in the Bombay Textile Industry, appointed by the Government 
of Bombay (193^ )*
31* Kanpur and Nagpur in the 1950s witnessed great industrial 
unrest caused by rationalisation problems.
ATIRA, came to play an important part in the settling of highly 
technical questions, such as rationalisation, by undertaking scientific 
studies on rationalisation, work loads and job evaluation at the joint 
request of the MOA, or individual mills, and the TLA. These scientific 
studies and reports became the basis of discussion between the parties. 
In 1951 a-n important agreement was concluded on rationalisation between 
the MOA and the TLA, which also declared that mills should provide 
suitable working conditions, and agreed that ATIRA should give technical 
advice to complement joint investigation of working conditions, which 
would lay down the standards to be adopted by the mills. In this way, 
ATIRA has become a sort of catalytic agent in removing misconceptions
from the minds of the parties and in helping them to a common under-
33standing of their problems.
32
32. ATIRA, the first cooperative research association, was established 
in 1946 by the mills at a capital cost of Rs.69 lakhs. It is 
the first enterprise of its kind in which the cotton textile 
industry and the Government of India have cooperated in the 
field of technical research. A contribution of Rs.52 lakhs 
was given towards the initial expenses by 71 founder-member 
mills supplemented by Rs.19 lakhs by the Government of India, 
which contributed a further Rs.14 lakhs in 1957 towards its 
capital funds. The recurring expenses are shared equally by 
the industry and Government. Membership has been made avail­
able to mills all over India. See Census Special Report I 
and Kannappan II.
33* ATIRA evolved a procedure for making the studies a cooperative 
effort of the parties concerned: when a joint request is
received, a team is formed for the collection of data composed 
of a management representative, a TLA representative and an 
ATIRA representative to allay workers' suspicions.
Regarding the problem of bonus, wage disputes came, in practice, 
to centre on the annual bonus, and only at longer intervals on fixed 
wage rates. Bonus negotiations became recurring occasions of annual 
crises in industrial relations. However, the 1955 Bonus Pact negotiated 
by the parties for five years, and followed by a four year Bonus Pact 
in 1961 ensured industrial peace in Ahmedabad. The principles 
evolved through these Pacts became the core of the Bonus Act of 1965*
When the parties decided in 1939 to abandon the system of the 
private Permanent Arbitration Board and to submit their disputes to 
government-established procedures for settlement under the Bombay 
Industrial Disputes Act of 1938> and later the Bombay Industrial 
Relations Act of 1946, they were, in essence, continuing their previous 
practice under the Permanent Arbitration Board, with the only difference 
being that arbitration came to be exercised not by a body of their 
own creation but by Industrial Courts and Tribunals provided by the 
Government.
The leaders of the TLA and the MOA were involved in negotiations 
together over a long period of time, and evolved a close and informal 
relationship. Under the 1955 arbitration agreement, the two sides 
of industry each appointed its own panel of arbitrators, from whom 
the negotiating parties in industrial disputes were to be drawn. The 
MOA appointed 29 arbitrators on its panel: the President and Vice- 
President of the MOA, and managing agents or managers of some of the 
member mills. The TLA had 20 arbitrators on its panel, which was made up 
of the General Secretary, three Secretaries and other senior officers 
of the union. Except for changes in the officers of the MOA, the 
composition of the negotiating committees has remained relatively 
stable over time with the result that negotiators from both sides 
have become very well acquainted with each other, and their meetings, 
which are often held in the MOA premises, have an informal character.
Over the years, certain traditions and attitudes regarding the process 
of negotiation have been developed: the tradition of reliance upon
facts and factual arguments built up during the period of the Permanent 
Arbitration Board has become a feature of bargaining. The parties have 
developed pragmatic and flexible attitudes to industrial disputes: 
there is little rigid adherence to abstrct principles or inflexible 
maintenance of the initial stands taken by the two sides. A search 
for compromise and practical solutions have come to characterise the 
bargaining process.^
This largely successful working relationship between the leaders
of the MOA and the TLA has been greatly facilitated by the fact that
both are drawn, unlike many other industrial centres in India, from
the same caste, regional and linguistic groups. Both groups of leaders
35are largely high caste, and share a common loyalty to Gujarat and 
the Gujarati language. Outside leadership of the TLA was inevitable 
due to the illiteracy, fear of the employers and caste divisions 
among the textile workers. In addition, due to caste distinctions 
and conventions, it was very unlikely that the millowners would have 
had dealings with trade union leaders drawn from the mills, particularly 
not in the early years of the TLA.
The degree of confidence felt by MOA leaders in the ability 
and sense of responsibility of the TLA and its leaders can be seen 
in its consistent stand against any change in the BIRA of 1946, 
which stipulated that there should be only a single representative
34- Interviews with leading TLA officers, such as Shyamprasad Vasavda 
and Manharlal Shukla, March 1971 in Ahmedabad.
35 • TLA- leaders are largely drawn from the Nagar Brahmin and Bahia 
castes.
Questionnaire of the National Labour Commission in 1967? this point
3 6was made repeatedly as follows:
— "We, however, can attest to the great advantage of recognition 
of a single trade union as the sole representative of labour in 
all industrial matters as provided in the BIRA Act, 1946. Recog^ - 
nition of a number of unions simultaneously in an establishment 
or a local industry will be a great menace to industrial peace."—  
This unique relationship evolved in the economic sphere between 
leaders of the TLA and business leaders was bound to have a profound 
bearing on their political relationship within Ahmedabad City.
Gandhi had envisaged an increasingly important political role for 
the TLA. He wrote in a letter, dated May 10, 1927:^
— "Its direct aim (the TLA) is not in the last degree political. Its 
direct aim is internal reform and evolution of internal strength.
The indirect result of this evolution when, and if, it ever becomes 
complete will naturally be tremendously political. I have, therefore, 
not the remotest idea of exploiting labour or organising it for 
any direct political power of first class importance when it 
becomes a self-existing unit. Labour, in my opinion, must not 
become a pawn in the hands of the politician on the political 
chessboard. It must, by its sheer strength, dominate the 
chessboard." —
This was not an unduly modest ambition for labour’s political future 
by any means.
■union per industry in the local area. In the MOA's reply to the
36. MOA Report of 1967-
37- In M.K. Gandhi's Sarvodaya.^edited by Bharatan Kumarappa) 
^Ahmedabad, Navjivan Publishing House; 1954)
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The TLA early became involved in the politics of the Ahmedabad
7 0
Municipal Corporation. By the 1961 Municipal elections, it captured 
a preponderance of seats in the Corporation, winning 29 out of the 
Congress party’s total of 50 seats in a house of 70 Municipal Corporators. 
It had succeeded in cornering a large number of Congress electoral 
tickets for the 1961 municipal election, in a tussle between its 
General Secretary and political leader, Shyamprasad R. Vasavda, and the 
GPCC President, Thakarebhai Desai. This was due to its loyalist 
stand on the Maha Gujarat issue, when it supported the official 
Congress policy favouring a bigger bilingual State of Bombay, and 
also to the heavily industrial character of Ahmedabad City, which 
had risen in political significance since becoming the capital of the 
unilingual Gujarat Sate in 1960. However, despite the numerical 
preponderance of TLA candidates, business elements in the Corporation
39had the edge of a partnership with Labour elements in the Corporation.
38. Clause 10 in the Objectives of the Constitution of the TLA reads:
"to promote the civic and political interests of the work people". 
Prom 1936 on, the TLA has been contesting elections in the Provincial, 
State and Central Legislatures. In 1924* f°r the first time, an 
untouchable worker nominated by the TLA was elected to the Ahmedabad 
Municipality on behalf of the INC. During 1924> the TLA started a 
new activity of recording workers' complaints regarding municipal 
services, and solving them through negotiations with municipal 
authorities. By 1927» the TLA was actively participating in the 
affairs of the Municipality. In 1927 9 Gulzarilal Nanda scored
a notable victory over his millowner rival in the municipal elections. 
In 1930, the TLA had calculated that there was a deficit of 
26,179 tenements for Ahmedabad workers. Nanda fought hard in the 
Municipality and got his scheme of building an additional 500 
working-class tenements at a tax cost of R S . 4O O -5OO per each 
mill sanctioned. But the millowners outwitted him by persuading 
the Government of Bombay not to sanction its implementation, 
promising the Government that they would themselves build up to 
1000 tenements themselves. By 1937* the TLA had consolidated its 
position in the Ahmedabad Municipality - out of 36 members elected 
on general seats, 9 or 25% belonged to the TLA. See Majur 
Sandesh, 10 Aug. 1933» "10 Dec. 1936 and 28 Oct. 193©* and 
also Paresh Majumdar's unpublished Ph.D. thesis from the University 
of Gujarat on the TLA.
3 9 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. B a n d  M r. L  i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
A close examination of the socioeconomic composition of Congress
Municipal Corporators between 1961 and 1965 reveals a very intersting
• 4- 40picture:
TABLE 8. SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS MUNICIPAL CORPORATORS 
IN AHMEDABAD, 1961-65.
SOCIOECONOMIC CATEGORY: NO. OP CONGRESS CORPORATORS: %
Majur jMillworkers/trade unionists 20 59
Mahajan ^Businessmen/social workers 9 18
Candidates! }
57%
Big Businessmen 8* 1 27 5%
Other medium and small 6 11.8^
businessmen
Professional men 7 13*5
White collar workers 1 2
TOTAL: 51 100
* Including Shrimati Prabhavatiben Chinubhai, wife of the textile 
magnate, Chinubhai Chimanlal Sheth.
What strikes one immediately is the relatively large number of big 
businessmen, most of whom were textile magnates - 8 or 15.7% - and 
the comparatively small number of representatives of the professions
i.e. doctors, teachers, lawyers and social workers - 7 or 15»5%«
Among the Majur Mahajan candidates, a very large proportion, 20 or 39% 
of total Congress Corporators,were mill workers and full-time trade 
unionists. However, 9 were businessmen or social workers, increasing 
the business and professional elements among Congress Corporators. 
There was only one white-collar worker.
40. Socioeconomic data compiled with data provided by the Municipal 
Corporation of Ahmedabad.
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Thus, although the Majur Mahajan got greater representation in 1961-65
A ion Municipal Corporation committees, the relatively large big business 
and business elements continued to be dominant within the Municipal 
Corporation.
41. In 1961, there was a bitter controversy between Shyamprasad Vasavda 
and the powerful President of the GPCC on the propriety of the 
jurisdiction of the latter over the determination of the personnel 
of the Standing Committee of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 
which Congress was in a majority. Vasavda said it was up to the 
Congress municipal members, a majority of whom were from the TLA, 
not the President of the GPCC»to determine who should constitute 
the members of the Standing Committee. Vasavda's view was upheld 
in arbitration by Khandubhai Desai, a senior Congress leader.
See unpublished Ph.D. thesis by Dr. Paresh Majmudar of the 
University of Gujarat.
In all the above committees, the business element, with a large 
big business component, exceeded the Majur Mahajan element during these 
years. The top leadership positions in the Corporation - the coveted 
positions of Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairman of the four most influential 
committees in the Corporation - the Standing Committee, the Transport 
Committee, the Public Works Committee and the Housing and Improvement 
Committee - largely went to big businessmen. So customary was the 
leadership of the textile magnate ^lite in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation that the name of Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, the multi­
millionaire business tycoon who was Chairman and Managing Director 
of Shri Ambika Mills Ltd., and member of the board of directors of nearly
20 leading companies including New Shorrock Mills Ltd., the Nirlon
Synthetic Fibres and Chemicals Ltd., Baroda Rayon Co. Ltd., and the 
Central Bank of India Ltd., was put forward for Mayor of Ahmedabad by 
Congress leaders as early as the time of the January 1961 Congress AICC 
Session at Bhavjiagar, a few months before the municipal elections.
Morarji Desai was among the influential State Congress leaders who suggested 
Jaikrishnabhai's name as the possible future Mayor of Ahmedabad.
At the meeting of the executive committee of the GPCC and the Corporation 
Congress members to decide on the leader of the party in the Corporation, 
Jaikrishnabhai was chosen for the post of Mayor. However, as he himself 
was the first to admit,he was utterly dependent on Majur Mahajan support 
in the Corporation. He said, "Even I was utterly dependent on the
support of the Majur Mahajan, I would not have become Mayor but for their
support." The Mayor has an important part in the selection of Congress 
Chairmen of the various Corporation committees, and the heads of the most
43• D.N. Pathak , The 1961 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Elections # 
^published in Gujarati) c7*H3J.
influential committees were almost all big businessmen:^ Biharilal 
Popatlal Shah, who has a screen-printing business and owns several 
cinema-houses, was made Chairman of the Standing Committee between 
1961 and 1965* Narottamdas Chandulal Shah, an Ahmedabad millowner, 
was Chairman of the Transport Committee from I96O-64, while Dr. A.P.
Shukla was Chairman from 1964-65* Jayantilal Bhikkabhai, another 
important Ahmedabad millowner and future President of the MOA (1968—69)» 
was Chairman of the Public Works Committee from 1961-65* The first 
Chairman of the newly-established Housing and Improvement Committee 
between 1964-65 was Narottam K. Jhaveri, a factory owner engaged in the 
cotton vest export business and director of many Ahmedabad mills and 
other industrial concerns. The President of the Ahmedabad City DCC and 
faction leader with Majur Mahajan support, Vimalbhai N. Shah, was also 
a big businessman and textile magnate.
The period 1961-65 saw a mirroring in the political sphere of the
Municipal Corporation too of the model employer-employee relations
between business and the TLA, which had evolved in the economic sphere.
Both Majur Mahajan leaders and Congress leaders of this period testify
to veiy good relationships between the Majur Mahajan and the business
45element in the Corporation.
The TLA secured a large amount of control over the Urban Community 
Development Project, which was initiated in Ahmedabad in 1962 with the 
help of funds from the Ford Foundation. It also secured some civic 
improvements, including slum clearance schemes and housing programmes 
for industrial workers. To help chawl-dwellers, whose chawls were in 
a very dilapidated condition, lacking amenities, (since the Rent Restriction
44* Interview with Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, March 1971*
45* Interviews with leading business and Majur Mahajan personalities 
in the Corporation, March 1971 in Ahmedabad.
Act took away any incentive on the part of chawlowners to improve and 
keep up their properties) the law, which had prevented the Municipal 
Corporation from taking action with regard to private premises, was 
amended to allow the Municipal Corporation to clean chawls and provide 
water and other connections by contract, sharing the costs on a 50-50 
basis with the chawlowners or tenants.^
However, the TLA thought it wiser to lie low on the issue of the 
concessional rates of municipal taxation imposed on the millowners. 
Millowners had clashed with the Corporation over the municipal taxation 
of Special Properties, including textile mills, in the early 1950s, 
and, through the arbitration of G.V. Mavlankar and H.V. Divetia, it 
was decided to adopt the floor area method of assessing mill taxation, 
whereby a certain rate was fixed per 100 sq. ft. of the mill area 
per months a formula which proved highly concessional to the millowners 
as against the alternative method - the contractors’ test method - by 
which a mill is assessed for municipal taxation according to its present 
capital value, after taking depreciation into account. The TLA Corporation 
members also acquiesced in the rejection of the demand that octroi 
tax on industrial raw materials should be paid by the millowners ad 
valorem instead of on weight as was the prevailing practice, on the 
argument that "the burden of taxation would be too much for the industry 
to bear."^
The main policy decisions of the period 1961-65 bore the unmistak­
able imprint of the vision and ideas of the business elite, facilitated 
by good relations with the TLA element in the Corporation, and State- 
level leaders and bureaucrats. Such was the permeation among the 
middle class of the values of the textile magnate elite that they
46. Interview with D.K. Patel, Deputy Mayor in the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, March 1971 in Ahmedabad.
47• See later chapter on the financial structure and policy of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, C (X A/|ly 3.).
largely identified during the period 1961-65 with the aims within the 
Corporation of the big business leaders, who stamped their vision on 
the work of the Corporation during this period.
A unique and ingenious mechanism was devised in the first months 
of power of the municipal Congress party for formalizing constructive 
relations with the State Government, and tapping State-level financial 
resources. This was undoubtedly a consequence of strong State-local 
linkages possessed by both business leaders and Majur Mahajan leaders 
in the Corporation. A City Coordination Council was instituted in July 
1961 with the approval of the Chief Minister, Jivraj Mehta. Balvantrai 
Mehta, who became Chief Minister of Gujarat in 1965> continued to 
support the Council. It was initially envisaged for a five-year period 
i.e. 1961-65*^
Such a City Coordination Council, drawing upon the resources of 
various authorities and talents, particularly at the State-level, was 
instituted with a view to facilitating the integrated development and 
beautifying of the city as a whole. The Council included the following 
members:
1. The Chief Minister, who headed the Council.
2. The Mayor, textile magnate, Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas.
5* The President of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association.
4. The President of the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
5. The President of the Panchkuva Cloth Merchants'Association.
6. A Labour Representative from the Majur Mahajan.
7. The Municipal Commissioner.
8. The Chairman of the Municipal Corporation's Standing Committee.
9. The Police Commissioner of Ahmedabad City.
10. The President of the Sports Council of Gujarat.
11. An Opposition Member of the Corporation.
48. Information on the City Coordination Council supplied by 
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas.
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The Council was empowered to make analytical studies of the various 
civic problems of Ahmedabad, and to suggest ways and means of solving 
them. The projects implemented under its direction were financed partly 
by the Municipal Corporation and largely by the State Government.
The financial know-how of business leaders and their strong sense
of civic duty was of vital importance in effecting civic improvements
and the provision of municipal services and amenities. For example,
one of the achievements of the City Coordination Council was the initiation
and implementation of a large-scale Sewage Disposal Scheme at Vasna and
Pirana . The problem of sewage disposal had been a long-standing one
for the Municipal Corporation, plagued by continual shortage of funds.
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, the textile magnate Mayor, agreed at a
meeting of the City Coordination Council to arrange for funds, provided
the State Government would guarantee them, which it promptly agreed to do.
Within a very short time, Jaikrishnabhai had arranged a loan of Rs.4»25
crores from the Life Insurance Corporation of India under Government
guarantee, and the project, whereby purified sewage could be used
49for agricultural purposes, could be got underway.
Other large-scale capital-intensive projects, initiated by the 
City Coordination Council, were a water-supply scheme and construction 
of a water-tank at Dudheshwar, and the building of Netaji Subhas Bridge, 
started in 1963> Nehru bridge.
Large-scale schemes for city beautification and development were 
initiated. A grandiose City Development Scheme was initiated to avoid 
congestion and to give the city a rational format of development, 
defining residential, industrial and commercial zones, and demarcating 
a green belt. (This green belt was later to make the Congress very
49. Interview with Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, July 1973*
unpopular with the fanners on the periphery of the city - a local 
grievance which contributed to the Congress defeat in the Municipal 
Corporation elections of 1965)* It was also stipulated that no cinema- 
houses and theatres (whose licences were granted by the State Government) 
would in future be constructed without airconditioning; and permission 
would no longer be granted for the construction of new buildings with 
more than four floors, unless they provided facilities for lifts and 
adequate parking for vehicles.
Recreational, leisure and sports facilities were also envisaged.
The Kankaria lake and its surroundings were developed into pleasure 
gardens, with a special Children's Garden or Balvatika. The Sardar 
Garden was also built at Lai Darwaja. Schemes for stadiums for sports 
and gymnastics, the Sardar Patel Stadium and the Lai Bahadur Shastri 
Stadium, were finalised. Three additional swimming pools, one at Kankaria, 
one at Saraspur and the third at Maleksabha Stadium,were constructed to 
supplement the sole existing public swimming pool in the city. Many 
of these schemes received financial support from the City Coordination 
Council.
Educational and cultural institutions and facilities were strongly
encouraged during this period by the City Coordination Council and
50business donations. Through the Corporation, vast lands were made 
available to the National Institute of Design, the Indian Institute 
of Management, and the Bharatiya Yidya Bhavan, a foremost all-India cultural 
and educational organization, which were established in Ahmedabad at 
this time. Plans were prepared and work started on a lavish Tagore 
Memorial Theatre on the banks of the River Sabarmati. From the estimated 
costs in the Public Works Committee, the actual cost of the Tagore
50. Interviews with leading Corporation executives, and D.K. Patel, 
Deputy Mayor of Ahmedabad, 1969-72, in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
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Theatre was four times higher and nearly Rs.28 lakhs. Although 
education "beyond the primary stage was not the responsibility of the 
Municipal Corporation, a donation of Rs.14 lakhs by the Ahmedabad textile 
magnate, Shri AmrutlalHargovandas, encouraged the Municipal Corporation 
to start a Municipal Medical College to supplement the sole Medical 
College in Ahmedabad City till 1962. The N.H. Medical College was 
started in June 1963 with a student in-take of a hundred. A generous 
donation, from the textile magnate, Rasiklal Nagri, enabled the Corp­
oration to start the Nagri Eye Hospital in Ellis Bridge in 1963*
With the aid of Rs.26 lakhs from TJ.N.I.C.E.F. and Rs. 30*80 lakhs 
from the State Government and Rs. 33*20 lakhs drawn from Corporation 
resources, a major business enterprise, the Municipal Dairy Project, 
was started in 1962. It was begun to help keep milk prices under control 
and to supply pure milk to the people. The idea was mooted at a 
meeting between the Mayor and other Corporation leaders and Dr. Kurian 
of the Amul Dairy in Anand, who promised to give all assistance. A 
unique example of enterprise and initiative by the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, the Municipal Dairy eventually produced 1.10 lakh litres 
of milk per day, and many other dairy products like ice-cream, butter, 
ghee etc. An Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service Workshop was also 
built during 1962-63 at a cost of Rs. 21 lakhs to repair and renovate 
the vehicles employed by the A.M.T.S., another scheme which owed much 
to the entrepreneurial skill of the textile magnates of Ahmedabad.
Thus the period, 1961—65* when the business and trade union 
elements in the Corporation worked in a spirit of cooperation and comp­
romise, and the State Government was receptive to Corporation plans and 
projects, Corporation business functioned fairly smoothly.^ Some
51
51. Interview with Jayantilal Raval, member of the Public Works 
Committee, 1961—65.
5 2 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. E i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
concessions were made to the needs of labour in the form of a certain 
amount of slum clearance, the starting of an Urban Community Development 
Project, which operated largely in labour areas, and a project for the 
Municipal Corporation to clean the chawls by contract. However, the 
actual number of tenements constructed by the slum clearance schemes 
of the Municipal Corporation fell far short of the targets. Out of a 
total of 8,714 tenements proposed for construction under various schemes 
at an estimated cost of Rs. 32,609,188, the Municipal Corporation had 
built only 2,400 towards the close of the year 1961. The situation was 
further aggravated by the fact that 1,476 of the completed tenements 
could not be utilized for the rehousing of slumdwellers, but had to be 
temporarily given to Government civil servants transferred to Ahmedabad 
after the bifurcation of the bilingual Bombay State. As a result, only 
396 tenements, or less than half the total number proposed were allotted 
to the Rabaris a Scheduled Tribe group who formed 2,500 families or 
63.91% of the total number of 3*912 families to be rehoused.^
During this period land values were rocketing sharply as the 
54following table shows:
5 3 .  C e n s u s  S p e c i a l  R e p o r t  I , p p .  1 0 7 - 8 .  T h e  e x t e n t  o f  t h e  s l u m  an d  
h o u s i n g  p r o b l e m s  o f  A h m e d a b a d  C i t y  c a n  b e  g a u g e d  f r o m  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
i n  1 9 6 0 - 6 1 ,  som e 1 8 , 6 5 2  h o u s e h o l d s  l i v e d  i n  a r e a s  r e g a r d e d  a s  s l u m s .  
B y  t h e  l a t e r  6 0 s ,  6 0 , 0 0 0  h u t m e n t s  h a d  b e e n  c o n s t r u c t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
M u n i c i p a l  l i m i t s  a n d  t h e r e  w e r e  some 1 , 1 4 0  c h a w l s .  S e e  M a h e s h  
B h a t t  a n d  V . K .  C h a w d a ,  A P r e l i m i n a r y  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  S t u d y  o f  t h e  
S o c i o e c o n o m i c  C o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  S l u m d w e l l e r s  i n  A h m e d a b a d  C i t y . 
(A h m e d a b a d : 1 9 7 0 ) .
5 4 .  M a h e s h  B h a t t ,  H o u s i n g  P r o b l e m s  o f  a  G r o w i n g  M e t r o p o l i s .
(A h m e d a b a d : 1 9 7 0 ) .
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AND PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE IN LAND VALUE BY YEARS:
TABLE 10. TOTAL LAM) VALUE PER SQUARE YARD: AVERAGE VALUE OF THE LAND
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When the Ashram Road area in Ahmedabad was declared a commercial
area without taking adequate care to control land speculation, the
55land value rose four or five times. A similar effect had occured 
when the site of the University Buildings and the Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission Headquarters were being decided upon- people in the know 
purchased land here and in the surrounding area, anticipating rising 
land values.
The Urban Community Development Project was also unable to accomplish
56very much, particularly in its first four years. Little was done to 
rationalize the tax system - to make octroi taxation ad valorem instead 
of on weight. Taxation of Special Properties remained highly con­
cessional to the millowners.
Thus, although the 1961—65 Corporation did not deal adequately 
with the housing problem, especially the need to concentrate on subsidized 
low-income housing, or cope with the scale of amenities required, 
particularly in the chawls and slum areas, and with taxation problems, 
many large-scale capital projects were undertaken to improve the water- 
supply and sewage disposal, and for educational and recreational purposes, 
and the Urban Community Development Project was instituted. Thus a fair 
amount was achieved, although largely to the benefit of the middle class 
and the comparative ^lite of textile industrial workers. The Corporation 
functioned smoothly during this period due to the spirit of compromise 
and understanding shown by the business and Majur Mahajan elements in 
the Corporation, mirroring constructive and purposeful relations 
evolved in the sphere of industrial relations, and a large degree of 
cooperation and assistance from the State Government was secured.
55» R°y Burman, "Social Profile of Ahmedabad", Seminar No. 125(|970)^31-33
56. See section later on, on the Urban Community Development Project.
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STATE-LOCAL LINKAGES AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS AMD 
THEIR IMPACT ON CITY DEVELOPMENT.
Vertical State-local linkages are highly signifi­
cant in determining the distribution of power and decision­
making authority within the urban political system. The urban 
political system is made up of multiple arenas. In 
Ahmedabad, despite the importance of other arenas more directly 
representative of the State Government in the city, the single 
most important arena is undoubtedly the municipal arena. In 
contrast to smaller municipalities, like Indore, which only 
control minor functions, such as sanitation, water distribu­
tion, road building and repair, enforcement of building codes 
etc. , Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has a very much wider 
field of patronage and control, including the vital jurisdic­
tions of public health, local transportation, public education 
and Town Planning, which directly affect the daily lives and 
well-being of Ahmedabad citizens.
However, as we have seen outlined in chapter III, 
due to the nature of the unequal balance of power between 
urban locality and State, as a result of the BPMC Act of 1949, 
much decision-making and patronage in the municipal arena is 
dependent on having access to State-level leaders and Mini­
sters, who have ultimate control of important jurisdictions 
relating to the city and the municipal arena.
Other important political arenas are often directly 
dependent on State Government funds and control. State-level
CHAPTER V
1. See Rodney Jones's revealing article "Linkage Analysis of 
Indian Urban Politics” Economic and Political Weekly,
vol. 7 , no. 25( June 1?, 197SJ , pp.H ?S — <1 is cusses tAequestion of State-Local relationships in urban politics, 
using Indore as a special case-study.
agencies in the city, such as the Gujarat State Housing Board 
and other State-level organizations concerned with labour, 
health, education etc. are important centres of influence and 
patronage, having a bearing on conditions within the city.
The host of 1 quasi-governmental11 associational 
enterprises spawned by the co-operative movement and other 
developmental programmes of the State Government, such as co­
operative housing societies and educational societies, are 
largely dependent on massive State subsidies, but the distri­
bution and allocation of these State-level developmental resources 
are left to a loosely-regulated and highly decentralized admini­
strative process. Thus these co-operative housing societies, 
educational associations etc. provide excellent opportunities 
for the growth of political roles of mediation between public
authorities and popular demands on the public purse, generat-
2ing important political "micro-arenas’1. These micro-arenas 
have become so important that they are often employed by Munici­
pal Corporators to gather support and votes in municipal elec­
tions. Indeed, those who have succeeded in building up a strong 
leadership and reputation in these micro-arenas are often drawn 
successfully into the municipal arena where they become influen­
tial figures. The importance of holding executive office in 
local voluntary associations, particularly co-operative housing 
societies and educational societies, is evidentein the high pro­
portion of Municipal Corporators who have cultivated these 
positions. Out of the total of 90 Municipal Corporators in the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 1969, 88% held executive
2. Robert C. Wirsing, "Associational Micro-Arenas in Indian 
Urban Politics." Asian Survey, imt, l l . 9-(Apui 1973)^ 4 1 0•
posts in at least one voluntary association, and altogether 
they had 229 such executive affiliations to their credit.
Thus the local politician seeking influence in either 
the municipal arena, or arenas directly controlled by the State 
Government, or the numerous State-subsidized micro-arenas of 
local voluntary associations, must either cultivate links 
with State-level leaders or try to become State-level politi­
cians themselves by translating electoral strength in the 
municipal and local arena into power and office at the State 
level, which, in turn, can buttress and consolidate their 
local power through attention to local needs and the dissem­
ination of local patronage.
To ensure that development policies will benefit 
their interests, to secure State compliance and funds for 
large-scale projects, such as slum clearance schemes, low- 
income housing projects, sewage disposal projects etc., and 
for local voluntary associations, and to influence the condi­
tions of industry, labour and employment in the city, the 
establishment of linkages, i.e. channels of communication 
and influence, with State-level leaders is crucial for local 
politicians. The major actors on the Ahmedabad political 
scene, the textile magnates, the Majur Mahajan and the City 
Congress bosses, derive much of their local strength from 
linkages at the State level and from participation in State- 
level power cleavages. Conversely, it was the lack of leverage 
at the State level, and the obdurate attitude of the then 
State Congress Government that was a major element in the 
difficulties experienced by the Janta Parishad in its four- 
year rule in the Corporation from 1965 to 1969•
It is, therefore, very important to explore the system
the points of interaction of State and local politics, and the
connections of local politicians with State-level personalities 
and their rivalries.
1. State-level Power Cleavages, 1960-70: An Outline.
In Gujarat, regional loyalties and divisions are
fundamental in analysing State-level power cleavages. Caste 
loyalties axe a secondary source of conflict at the State- 
level, interacting with basic regional cleavages; at the same 
time they are important sources of intradistrict conflict.
In the various districts and regions of Gujarat, dominant 
caste groups have managed to exert a preponderant political 
influence, such as the Anavil Brahmins in South Gujarat, the 
Patels in Kaira district and the Banias in Ahmedabad.
Rivalries usually between dominant caste groups, such as that 
between Banias, Brahmins and Patels in Ahmedabad, with lower 
castes often acting as subordinate allies of dominant caste 
groups, form much of the substance of factional conflict within 
districts. In these dominant caste factional struggles, power 
and personality conflicts form the basis of cleavages. However, 
there axe too many divisions (in terms of caste hierarchy and 
economic interest) between Bania, Brahmin and Patel groups from 
different districts for them to form State-wide alliances based 
primarily on caste. Only the Kshatriyas succeeded to some extent 
in forming a State-wide caste federation.^ In many districts, 
intermediate castes of Rajput origin began to coalesce under the 
Varna rubric of Kshatriya, against the dominant caste leadership
of State politics during the period 1960-72, and to establish
3. Rajni Kothaxi and Rushikesh Maru; "Caste and Secularism in 
India". Journal of Asian Studies, vol.25, \ ( lUsI
pp. 5 3 — SO" ’
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which was largely Patidar. In this, they were helped by their 
numerical strength - they constitute about 40% of the popula­
tion of Gujarat as against the Patidars who constitute about 
20-22%. Bhailalbhai D. Patel, leader of the Gujarat Swatantra 
Party during much of the 60s, successfully based the strategy 
of the Swatantra Party on accommodating the Kshatriya-Patidar
Zlalliance. For long the mass base of support for the Congress,
Kshatriya leaders succeeded in demanding better representation
5within Congress ranks.^ However, there was no state-wide 
Kshatriya organisation which could successfully bridge the 
differences between Saurashtra and Gujarat Kshatriyas, who were 
divided in socioeconomic and status terms. Separate organiza­
tions were maintained, the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha and the 
Saurashtra Khedut Sangh, which seldom took common political 
action.
For example, in the 1957 and 1962 General Elections, 
the Kshatriyas of Saurashtra largely remained loyal to the Con­
gress, whereas the Kshatriyas of Gujarat were largely supporting
1Swatantra in 1962. Thus, although caste was important, parti­
cularly in intraregional and intradistrict terms, the basic 
pattern of political antagonisms at the level of the State as 
a whole can best be explained in terms of a regional analysis 
of State-level cleavages.
4 .  K . D .  D e s a i ,  " S o c i o e c o n o m i c  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e  o f  G u j a r a t  P o l i t i c s " .
I n  I q b a l  N a r a i n  ( e d . ) ,  S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  I n d i a . ( M e e r u t :  1 9 6 8 ) .
5. Myron Weiner, MSegmentation and Political Participation:
Kaira District.” m  Party-Building in a New Nation. £ 196^Lp.6Hl?.
6. Saurashtra Kshatriyas were largely landlords with Patidar 
tenants, whereas Gujarat Kshatriyas were tenants or former 
tenants of Patidar landlords.
T . D« N* r l .  <r. Pcvrefe^  cxkcL k :. 0 . Descxuj T k t-ce  G e r v e r x x l
ElgCtvCrfryS i t-y (j~u^cxrr*rt. £ A'kj'w ecLx-boud ' I ?64).
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The first major State-level power cleavage of the 
decade, 1960-70, and, in many ways, the basic power cleavage 
of much of the decade, was the factional conflict, which 
erupted in the early 60s between JivraJ Mehta, the Chief 
Minister of Gujarat, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
Morarji Desai, the State Congress boss, and Balvantrai Mehta, 
who gained control of the GPCC in the early 1960s, won over 
the support of a majority of MLAs and brought about the fall 
of the Chief Minister against the wishes of Prime Minister 
Nehru. At one level, this was a manifestation of the clash 
between ministerial and organizational wings of the Congress, 
taking place in many Indian States at that time in an attempt 
by the party to reassert itself after long years of domination 
by Nehru, who had maintained the supremacy of the governmental 
wing of Congress. In this process, Congress organizational 
elections in Gujarat, which put Balvantrai Mehta and his col­
leagues in power, and the selection of Congress candidates for
Qthe 1962 General Elections played an important role. However,
from a deeper perspective, rivalry between Saurashtra leaders
on the one hand, and Central and Southern Gujarat leaders, on
the other hand, formed the core of the GPCC - ministerial
rivalry that ultimately resulted in 1963 in ousting JivraJ
Mehta, the Chief Minister, and his Saurashtra colleagues,
qRasiklal Pankh and Ratubhai Adani, from power.
To fully appreciate the nature and force of regional 
loyalttes and divisions in the State politics of Gujarat, it 
is necessary to have an understanding of the diverging economic
D.N. Pathak, State Politics in Gujarat: Some Determinants". In
q al Narain (ed.), State Politics in India. (Meerut: 1968).
8. Rajni Kothari, "The Congress System in India!' Xn Party
System and Election Studies. C l9C’T).
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interests and other tendencies towards separation of the
various regions. The Saurashtra-Gujarat rivalry and sense of
10separateness has deep socioeconomic and political roots, 
reflected in weak communication links between the two regions. 
Until the coming of the railway in the late nineteenth century 
and the construction of all-weather roads after 1948,
Saurashtra was cut off from the rest of Gujarat during the mon­
soon each year, and even now Sanashtra has a metre-gauge rail 
system, whereas mainland Gujarat has a broad-gauge system.
The pattern of agriculture and industry have been very different 
in the two regions. Over centuries, patterns of trade in 
Saurashtra developed closer links through the Saurashtra ports 
with Bombay City, and indeed foreign countries and ports, 
rather than with the cities of mainland Gujarat. Since Indep­
endence Sscrashtra has come increasingly to specialize in the 
cultivation of groundnuts. It produces today annually about
1.306.000 tons of groundnuts or one-third of India's total 
groundnut production, utilizing 43% of its total cropland for 
this purpose. Its industries have been largely small-scale 
agro-industries, particularly groundnut-based oil and extrac­
tive industries and small-scale engineering industries geared 
to the needs of agriculturists. It produces today about
50.000 diesel engines per year (20% of India's total produc­
tion) , which are used mostly by the larger farmers in well- 
irrigated areas and in groundnut extraction industries. The 
Gujarat State Government's regulation of the marketing of 
groundnut products, and State tax policies inimical to 
Saimshtra's growing agro-industries have caused continual tension
10. Howard Spodek, "The Case of Injustice to Saurashtra!' 
Asjian^urvey j Crio^)ici'lU),pp,
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between the two regions and a feeling by Saurashtra that it was 
not getting adequate support for its economic development from 
the State Government. This was aggravated by long-standing 
feuds between the ruling groups of the two areas and by their 
very diverse caste hierarchies.
In mainland Gujarat, on the other hand, although
there has been substantial investment in small-scale industry,
there has been a tendency to specialize in large-scale under- 
11takings. This was so marked, particularly in the 1960s, 
that there seemed to be a structural shift in the locational 
pattern of the State's economy with heavy industry clustering 
increasingly in the Central and Southern Gujarat regions.
With the establishment of large-scale cotton textile mills, 
pharmaceutical and chemical factories in the Ahmedabad region, 
and the expansion of the Ahmedabad thermal power plant in 1962; 
and with the establishment of an oil refinery, the Dhuvaran 
thermal power station and a huge fertiliser factory near Baroda 
and a petrochemical complex in South Gujarat during the 60s 
particularly, new and particularly heavy industries seemed to 
be gravitating towards Central and Southern Gujarat. This 
development was undoubtedly helped by the discovery of oil in 
Ankleshvar near Surat and in the Gulf of Cambay, and by a com­
bination of other, less purely accidental factors e.g. the 
fact that these areas were already financially and technolo­
gically the most developed areas of the State and, therefore 
already had a fairly well-developed industrial infrastructure 
invited further development. They were also the most densely 
populated of all the regions of Gujarat, containing the bulk 
of the State's twenty million population, whereas Saurashtra
11. Ibid
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had only four million inhabitants scattered across 20,000 
square miles. Central and Southern Gujarat also contained 
some of the most prosperous and politically powerful groups 
in the State, such as the Anavil Brahmins in South Gujarat, 
from whose ranks the State Congress boss, Miorarji Desai, was 
drawn, Ahmedabad Banias who provided many leading big busi­
nessmen, and Kaira District Patels. Thus the Central and 
Southern parts of the State seemed, particularly in the 60s, to 
be getting a disproportionate share of Government and private 
investment, especially in heavy industry. This was a major 
source of conflict with Saurashtra, and led to allegations by 
Saurashtrians of the economic neglect of Saurashtra by the State 
Government. The other peripheral regions of North Gujarat and 
Kutch too joined with Saurashtra in making allegations of econo­
mic neglect of their areas by the State Government.
In addition to these deep socioeconomic differences 
between Saurashtra and mainland Gujarat, there were also import­
ant political differences and grievances. Saurashtra had a 
distinct political style, stemming from centuries of rule by
petty principalities with its politicians trained in the
12smaller more intimate arenas of local durbars. Saurashtra 
politicians were more concerned with avoiding confrontation 
and more adept at finding a compromise and accommodating as 
many interests as possible. Mainland Gujarat had been under 
direct British rule and was, therefore, more exposed to the 
forces of Western liberalism, English education and technologi­
cal innovations. This was particularly true of the Ahmedabad- 
Surat axis area, which had also come under the direct and
12. John R. Wood,"The Political Integration of British and 
Princely Gujarat" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University; 
1971), quoted in Howard Spodek, "The Case of Injustice to 
Saurashtra", Asian Survey C P lo^m 7$-
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intense influence of the Nationalist Movement led by Gandhi,
Its political leaders tended to be more combative, more direct 
and more aware of class conflicts.
It is interesting to note, however, that internal 
rivalry in Saurashtra between the various former princely states 
could sometimes be more acute than that between Saurashtra and 
mainland Gujarat. This was particularly so with the former 
State of Bhavnagar, which stood somewhat apart from the other 
States, and whose leaders often collaborated with mainland 
politicians. Geographical proximity and a historical pattern 
of trade with British India had kept Bhavnagar closely in touch 
with the mainland, and less concerned about affiliation with 
Saurashtra. Bhavnagar had also not gone in for specializing in 
groundnuts as had most of the other Saurashtra States, and its 
chief cash crop remained cotton. Bhavnagar-Rajkot rivalry was 
particularly intense. It is highly significant that Balvantrai 
Mehta was from Bhavnagar. The aloofness of Bhavnagar from the 
rest of Saurashtra explains to a large extent his collaboration 
with mainland leaders to oust the old Saurashtra leadership of 
Jivraj Mehta and his colleagues from the State Government in 
1963. 15
Mainland Gujarat had a strong political grievance 
against Saurashtra in the early 1960s. By a combination of 
factors, Saurashtra leaders were over-represented in the Gujarat
Cabinet in the early 1960s. When the bilingual State of
11 »Bigger Bombay was created in 1956 as a response to the linguis­
tic agitations taking place in both Maharashtra and Gujarat, 
Saurashtra, which had been a separate unit from 194-8-56, was 
now merged in this bigger bilingual State. Having been a
1 3. Spodek, pAli.
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separate unit previously with the status of Statehood most of 
its political personnel, including some Ministers, were trans­
ferred to Bombay. Thus Saurashtra, as a separate unit, got 
over-represented in the Government and civil service compared
1 Zlto Gujarat proper. In addition, the 1957 General Elections
were fought in Gujarat on the issue of Maha Gujarat, whose
appeal was largely confined to the areas South and North of
Ahmedabad. The linguistic agitation had little influence in
Saurashtra and Kutch, which had close economic and social ties
with Bombay city, and were, therefore, less enthusiastic for
a separate State of MahaGujarat, which would exclude Bombay
City. Thus, while Congress candidates fared badly in many
15areas of mainland Gujarat, where the political supporters
of the MahaGnjarat movement secured all their electoral gains of
16five Parliamentary seats and twenty-nine State Assembly Seats,
14. Saurashtra had separate Statehood and a separate Cabinet
structure between 1948-56, and influential political leaders 
in nationalist and post-Independence politics e.g. U«N. Dhebar 
was at one time President of the A.I.C.C. and very influen­
tial with Prime Minister Nehru. This accounts to some degree 
for the extra political weightage of Saurashtra in the Cabinet 
of the 'big bilingual' State of Bombay, and subsequently in 
the Cabinet of the separate State of Gujarat.
15- Morarji Desai, the Gujarat State Congress boss, in order to 
try to secure his ambitions in the national political arena, which would be better served by a more powerful bigger bi­
lingual State of Bombay than by a truncated separate State 
of Gujarat without Bombay City, persuaded the G.P.C.C. to 
back the bilingual experiment, and go against the regional 
aspirations of the people, see pp.4-8“57.
1 6 .  C o m p a r e d  t o  1 9 5 2 ,  i n  t h e  1 9 5 7  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s ,  C o n g r e s s  s u f f e r e d  
a d e c l i n e  o f  n e a r l y  5 6 .6 %  i n  t h e  S t a t e  A s s e m b l y  s e a t s  won i n  t h e  
t h r e e  d i s t r i c t s  o f  A h m e d a b a d ,  M e h s a n a  a n d  K a i r a .  S e e  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  
M .G . P a r e k h  a n d  K i r t i d e w  D. D e s a i ,  T h r e e  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  G u j a r a t :  
D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  D e c a d e ,  1 9 5 2 - 6 2 . (A h m e d ab ad : 1 9 6 6 ) .
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Saurashtra remained solidly Congress in the 1957 elections.
Two of the ministerial incumbents from mainland Gujarat were 
defeated and could not be included in the Ministry of the 
bilingual State. When the separate State of Gujarat was even­
tually firmed in 1960, fresh elections were impracticable, so 
the Ministry was formed out of those who were already in the 
composite Ministry of the bilingual State. Consequently, three 
out of five Ministers were the Saurashtrians, Jivraj Mehta, 
Rasiklal Parikh and Ratubhai Adani.^ Therefore, the Minis­
terial set-up in the new State had little direct relationship 
with the G.P.C.C., which now in common with other State P.C.Cs 
was attempting to exert stronger influence on the State Govern­
ment. Thus the G.P.C.C.-Ministerial rivalry of the early 1960s 
between Jivraj Mehta, the Chief Minister, and his colleagues on 
the one hand, and Morarji Desai and Balvantrai Mehta on the 
other, can be explained in terms of Saurashtra—  Gujarat rivalry, 
and an attempt by mainland Gujarat leaders to correct the mini­
sterial imbalance which was in favour of Saurashtra at the incep­
tion of the State. Balvantrai Mehta’s ministry (he was Chief 
Minister between 1963 and 1965) was constructed with a view to 
balancing the Saurashtra and Gujarat elements in the Cabinet; 
and, on the accidental death of Balvantrai Mehta in a plane 
crash in 1963, the choice of Hitendra Desai of Surat as the 
new Chief Minister clearly showed that the pendulum of politi­
cal power had swung unmistakably in favour of Central and South 
Gujarat leaders.^®
Keeping in mind this socioeconomic and political 
background of the Saurastra-Gujarat rivalry, we now turn to
17. These three together monopolized most of the important 
portfolios, such as Home, Co-operation, Agriculture.
D - N .  P a t h a k ,  " S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  G u j a r a t :  Som e D e t e r m i n a n t s " .  I n
I q b a l  N a r a i n  ( e d . ) ,  S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  I n d i a . ( M e e r u t :  1 9 6 8 ) .
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analysing the State-level factional conflict of the early 
1960s. The Gujarat-Saurashtra rivalry had remained in check 
under the composite State of Bigger Bombay. However, with 
the creation of a separate State of Gujarat in 1960, this 
narrower field of political activity brought political 
rivalries to the fore. The factional dispute goes back to the 
Bhavnagar Session of the A.I.C.C. in 1961, when the Congress 
President, K. Kamraj^put forward the Ten Year Rule, requiring 
Ministers and M.L.A.s of more than ten years standing to resign 
and devote themselves to party work, as a device to cleanse 
the Congress of its corruption. The G.P.C.C. wing led by 
Morarji Desai and Balvantrai Mehta, who had gained control of 
the State Congress, seized upon this as an excellent instru­
ment with which to dislodge the Saurashtrian Ministerial trio
of JivrajMehta, Rasikal Parikh and Ratubhai Adani from the
19State Government. The G.P.C.C. leaders’ demand that the Ten 
Year Rule should be meticulously observed in the selection of 
candidates for the third General Elections in 1962 clearly 
showed their determination to keep the Saurashtrian trio of 
Ministers out of the elections.
However, Jivraj Mehta and his colleagues were deter­
mined to contest the elections in spite of the hard-line taken 
by the organizational wing of the G.P.C.C. They set about con­
solidating their positions in their respective constituencies of 
Amreli, Junagadh, and Surendranagar. The D.C.Gs of each of 
these constituencies demanded that the sitting Minister alone 
should be given the Congress ticket for the constituency, 
despite the Ten Year Rule. The G.P.C.C. condemned this practice
19* Times of India 1961 #
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of the Mandal and District Committees adopting resolutions
favouring particular candidates from their areas. The Ten Year
Rule would have affected about 40 M.L.As and 8 M.Ps. Of these
only 18 reapplied, and 10 of these withdrew at the appeal of 
20Morarji Desai. Jivraj Mehta and his colleagues, however, 
remained adamant in their determination to contest the elec­
tions. Finally, an understanding was reached with Morarji 
Desai on July 26, 1961, whereby it was decided to leave it to
the P.E.C. to decide whether applications for party tickets
21were according to the rules or not.
Although Jivraj Mehta and a few of his colleagues 
were finally given tickets, the bulk of candidates selected by 
the P.E.C., which was dominated by the organizational wing of 
the party, were sympathetic to that wing; this was a crucial 
tactical gain since, after the elections, the next Chief 
Minister would be chosen by a majority of Congress legislators. 
Jivraj Mehta wrote to the Central Election Committee complaining 
against the selection of candidates. He declared that the 
G.P.C.C. had never adopted the Ten Year Rule, and that it had 
no authority to make such a rule, which only the A.I.C.C. could 
do. He refuted the G.P.C.C. claim that all but two of the can­
didates were selected unanimously. In a statement on November 
16, 1 9 7 1» he added that he had expressed his dissent in the 
G.P.C.C. meeting, which had decided to implement the Ten Year 
Rule, and his determination to write to the C.E.C. urging a 
reconsideration of 21 seats allocated by the P.E.C. and insist­
ing that applications for party tickets which had been withdrawn 
by applicants under pressure of the so-called Ten Year Rule
20. Gujarat Samachar;\\ July , 1961.
21. Times of India ( BombayJuly , 1961.
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should he reconsidered by the G.E.C.
Morarji Desai took this as a direct challenge to his 
leadership, and, at a closed-door meeting of the G.P.C.C. on 
November 11, 1961, he condemned the activities of those who 
were challenging the decisions of the P.E.C.  ^ The leaders 
of the organizational wing declared that the selection of all 
but two of the Congress candidates had been unanimous, and 
that Jivraj Mehta was present at the meeting in which the selec­
tion was made, thus he had no right to challenge these decisions. 
The decision about the implementation of the Ten Year Rule was 
taken at a combined meeting of the P.E.C. and G.P.C.C., and 
was recorded in the minutes of the G.P.C.C., signed by Jivraj 
Mehta, so it was alleged. In spite of this, organizational 
leaders said the objections of certain Ministers were taken into 
account, and the selection of candidates was made entirely on
24the merits of the case and not according to the Ten Year Rule.
The upshot was that, although Jivraj Mehta and his 
colleagues received tickets, the C.E.C. accepted most of the 
suggestions of the G.P.E.C., and made only four changes in the 
assembly nominations, only two of which corresponded with the 
suggestions made by Jivraj Mehta. Thus, out of 48 Ten Year 
Rule-wallas i.e. those affected by the Ten Year Rule, only five 
were given tickets and two more were accommodated by the decis- 
ion of the C.E.C. All seemed to be going smoothly for the 
organizational wing, and the G.P.C.C. let it be known that the 
new Cabinet would be composed bf Balvantrai Mehta as Chief 
Minister, Thakorbhai Desai of South Gujarat, who was the G.P.C.C. 
President, and Babubhai J. Patel of Kaira district. However,
22
22. Gujarat Samachar^lNov. , 1961.
23. ” " ) \\ Nov. , 1961.
24. ” " ,2.1 Nov. , 1961.
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the whims of the electorate upset these elaborate calcula­
tions, for all three stalwarts of the organizational wing 
were defeated in the elections, and Jivraj Mehta once more 
headed the Cabinet with his two colleagues.
Despite this setback, the organizational wing still 
held the winning card: they commanded a majority of the newly- 
elected Congress Party legislators, and an absolute majority 
in the State Assembly. Thus, in 1965, Balvantrai Mehta got 
into the Legislative Assembly from a conveniently vacated seat 
in Sihore constituency and forced a showdown with Jivraj Mehta.
A majority of Congress legislators were loyal to the organiza­
tional wing, and voted out the Jivraj Mehta ministry, and gave
25Balvantrai Mehta his chance to be the Chief Minister.
This set the factional stage for the rest of the
decade: the State Government was dominated by leaders from South
and Central Gujarat and Bhavnagar till the end of the decade; so
much so that an Ahmedabadi Congress politician, could say that
Gujarat was ruled by a clique from Surat, headed by Morayji
26Desai and Hitendra Desai, the Chief Minister after 1965. The
three Saarashtrian leaders remained in the political wilderness
for many long years, nursing their grievances. In the 1967
General Elections, the G.P.E.C. avoided giving tickets to the
27dissident group, led by Rasiklal Parikh and Rabubhai Adani. 
Unlike the 1962 General Elections, the D.C.Qs. were not allowed
2 5 .  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  M .G . P a r e k h  an d  K i r t i d e v  D. D e s a i ,  T h r e e  G e n e r a l  
E l e c t i o n s  i n  G u j a r a t ;  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  D e c a d e ,  1 9 5 2 - 6 2 .  (A h m e d ab ad :  
1 9 6 6 ) .  ----------------------------------------------- --
26. Remark made by Trikamlal Patel, former Ahmedabad D.C.C. 
President in an interview in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
2 7 .  P . N .  S h e t h ,  " E l e c t i o n s  i n  G u j a r a t :  T h e  E m e r g i n g  P a t t e r n " .  I n
S . P .  Varm a an d  I .  N a r a i n  ( e d s . ) ,  F o u r t h  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n  i n  I n d i a ,
V o l .  1 :  P o l i t i c a l  S u r v e y s . ( ftcrvwboc^ ; 1 9 6 8 K
J i v r a j  M e h t a  w a s  f o r  some y e a r s  a b s e n t  f r o m  S a u r a s h t r a  a s  H i g h  
C o m m i s s i o n e r  i n  L o n d o n .
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an effective say in the allocation of tickets, which was 
finally decided by the P.E.C. Congress defections in Saurashtra, 
particularly in Jambusar, Surendranagar, Junagadh and Rajkot, 
gave Swatantra its chance to win a sizable number of seats in 
Saurashtra: it captured the parliamentary seats of Surendranagar, 
Junagadh and Jamnagar and retained that of Rajkot. An import­
ant factor in the Swatantra success was their ability to win 
over the Agriculturists' Association of Saurashtra, controlled 
by the newly-rich farmers-cum-traders of that region, who were 
sympathetic to the Rasiklal group. These rich farmers joined
the Swatantra party before the election on the promise of free
28trade in groundnut seeds and groundnut oil. The Congress 
strength in Saurashtra fell considerably in 1967 compared to 
1962: in 1962 Congress had 34- seats out of 43, whereas in 
1967 it secured only 23 out of 46, losing 11 seats.^
During the mid-60s a separatist political movement 
grew up in Saurashtra, but it failed to gain any real emotional 
hold over the Saurashtra people and leaders. A Rajkot lawyer and 
Congress party leader, Ratilal Tanna, who voiced the grievances 
of Saurashtra against the State Government, and demanded a sepa- 
rate State of Saurashtra , contested the 1967 Parlia­
mentary election from Rajkot as an Independent on a separatist
2 8 .  " G u j a r a t  L e t t e r :  B e h i n d  t h e  S a u r a s h t r a  S t a t e  D e m a n d ."  E c o n o m i c  and  
P o l i t i c a l  W e e k l y , v o l .  1 ,  n o .  2 ( A u g u s t  2 7 ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  7 0 - 1 ;
" G u j a r a t  L e t t e r :  C o n g r e s s  v s .  S w a t a a t r a  i n  G u j a r a t . "  EPW, v o l .  1 ,
n o .  1 0  ( O c t o b e r  2 2 ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  3 9 8 - 4 0 3 ;  " G u j a r a t  L e t t e r :  D e f e c t i o n s
G a l o r e . "  EPW, v o l .  1 ,  n o .  1 7  ( D e c e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  7 2 3 - 5 ;
a n d  A n i l  Bha+t , " T w o - P a r t y  S y s t e m  E m e r g i n g  i n  G u j a r a t . "  EPW. v o l .  1 ,  
n o .  1 7  ( D e c e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  7 1 1 - 1 2 .
2 9 .  " G u j a r a t  L e t t e r :  F e w e r  S e a t s ,  b u t  C o n g r e s s  m o re  C o h e s i v e . "  EPW. 
v o l .  2 ,  n o .  9 (M ar ch  6 , 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p p .  4 7 6 - 9 .
3 0 .  S e e  P'tvtcUxl T a n n a ,  A l a g  S a u r a s h t r a  S h a  N a a t e  ? (Why n o t  a  
S e p a r a t e  S a u r a s h t r a  S t a t e  ? ) ( 1 9 6 7 ) .
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platform, but lost outright, polling only 9.07% of the total 
vote. However, demands for economic justice for Saurashtra 
during the 60s met with greater success: before the 1967 elec­
tions, the Gujarat Government tried to defuse a major economic
issue by cancelling the restrictions on the sale of groundnut
31oil, which had been in effect for two years. i.n the early 
1970s, the oil millers of Saurashtra, led by Vallabhbhai Patel, 
successfully rose up against the Gujarat Government's declara­
tion that 15% of all groundnuts and 20% of the amount being 
exported from the State would be subject to procurement at 
especially low prices for later sale in government-subsidized 
shops. Vallabhbhai Patel railed against the Gujarat Government 
for penalizing the farmers, millers and merchants of Saurashtra 
for the benefit of the upper middle classes of Ahmedabad.^
He led the millers of Saurashtra on strike and rallied Congress(O) 
and Opposition legislators against the State Government's 
policy. Saurashtra's agro-industrial bloc secured almost imme­
diate relief: on Jan. 27th, 1970, the State Government terminated 
the oil levy and replaced it with a policy of voluntary procure­
ment at a much higher price level.
However, the political amMtions of Saurashtra leaders, 
as opposed to their economic demands had little success or out­
let until the Congress split in 1969 and the growing strength 
of Indira Gandhi's Ruling Congress party presented them with an
unprecedented opportunity, which will be dealt with subsequently. 
C£ee CjvcLjsrtet- IX).
These State-level struggles were immensely important
for Ahmedabad city politics: Central and South Gujarat leaders
31. Spodek, pp. .
32. Times of India £ Ahmedabad)^)?Jan. , 1970.
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had secured dominance in the State P.C.C. and State Government, 
and Morarji Desai, Thakorebhai Desai and Hitendra Desai of 
Surat, and Babubhai J. Patel and Tribhovandas Patel of Kaira dis­
trict, had emerged as key Congress leaders at the State level. 
This was the new framework of State power with which aspiring 
Ahmedabad politicians had to come to terms.
2. Business and State-Local Linkages.
The textile magnate ^lite of Ahmedabad played a 
crucial role in city politics during the 1950s and 1960s. A 
representative of the textile magnates, the wealthy millowner, 
0hiimbha±--Chimanbhai Sheth, was Mayor of the Ahmedabad Corpora­
tion for much of the 1950s, and big business men occupied the 
three most influential positions in the Corporation, those of 
Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairman of the Standing Committee for 
much of the 1950s and 60s.
During the early 50s, the Ahmedabad textile elite
was staunchly Congress. However, Ahmedabad business leaders
for the first time took an anti-Congress stance during the Maha
33Gujarat movement for a separate linguistic State of Gujarat.  ^
During this period, for the first time, they came into conflict 
with the national-level leaders of Gujarat, and the State Con­
gress party leaders, who went along with the ambitions of 
national-level, Gujarati leaders in favouring a bigger bilin­
gual State of Bombay. It was better for national-level^Gujarati 
leaders to have a bigger, bilingual State, which included the 
important city of Bombay, over which Gujarati leaders had a 
powerful hold, than a smallunilingual region as a bargaining 
counter in national politics. Moiarji Desai also had aspirations
53* R- W. Stem, The Process of Opposition in India % Two 
.Case Studies of How Policy Shapes Politics t (197Q/«
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to become Chief Minister of Bombay State. The bigger bilingual
State which would send 66 (22 from Gujarat and 44 from Maharashtra)
members to the Lok Sabha, and would include Gujarati-dominated
Bombay, would provide greater bargaining power to the national
Congress leadership of Gujarat. It was for this reason that
Morarji Desai was prepared to sacrifice the regional interests
34of Gujarat to build up his own power at the national level.^ 
Business leaders, however, wanted a State capital of their own 
so they could be near the seat of political power and have 
access to more responsive political patronage. However, at 
the same time, the financial interests of Gujarat and Bombay 
City were interconnected and Ahmedabad business leaders wanted 
to preserve close ties with Bombay city. Thus, although they 
initially backed the Maha Gujarat movement and the M.G.J.P., 
they came to regard the three-unit formula for separate linguis­
tic States of Gujarat and Maharashtra and autonomy for Bombay 
City as the only really satisfactory solution. Thus the capita­
list and upper class elements of Ahmedabad, who had walked out 
of the Ahmedabad City D.C.C. on the linguistic issue and suppor­
ted the MahaGujarat movement, soon backed out and established 
the Nagrik Paksh or Citizens' Party in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation under the leadership of Chinubhai Chimanlal Sheth 
winning an impressive victory of 46 out of the total of 64 
Municipal Corporation seats in the 1957 Ahmedabad Municipal Corp­
oration elections. The loss of business and middle class support
caused the first major dent in Congress electoral hegemony in 
35Ahmedabad City. ^
3 4 .  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  " S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  G u j a r a t :  Some D e t e r m i n a n t s . "  I n
I q b a l  N a r a i n  ( e d . )  S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  I n d i a . ( M e e r u t :  1 9 6 8 ) .
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Elections in Gujarat. (1966).
193
The estrangement between Ahmedabad business leaders 
and the State Congress, however, did not outlive the creation 
of the separate State of Gujarat in May, 1960, and business 
leaders soon reaffirmed their loyalty to the Congress, dis­
banded the Nagnk Paksh and returned to the Congress fold.
The factional rivalry between the G.P.C.C. and the Jivraj 
Mehta ministry of the early 60s found business leaders divided 
to some extent in their loyalties. Some business leaders of 
Ahmedabad, notably Vadilal Mehta andAmrutlal Hargovandas sided 
with Jivraj Mehta in this State-level factional dispute, and,
on the removal of Jivraj Mehta from power, they moved away
36from the Congress. Many others, however, including 
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas were in the camp of Moiarji Desai 
and G.P.C.C. leaders. In the A.I.C.C. session at Bhavnagar in 
early 1961, the G.P.C.C.-ministerial dispute first came to the 
fore and, in addition, discussions were held by G.P.C.C. leaders 
on the coming Municipal Corporation election in Ahmedabad later 
that year, which was viewed as an important rehearsal and indi­
cator for the 1962 General Elections. It is highly significant 
that the name of Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas was put forward 
even at this stage for the post of future Mayor of the Ahmeda­
bad Municipal Corporation, and MorsqjjL Desai himself favoured
37Jaikrishnabhai as the Congress nominee for Mayor.
Jaikrishnabhai had a very good understanding and relationship 
with the victors of the State factional dispute of the early 
1960s,^ who were in power in the G.P.C.C. and the Congress 
legislature party till the end of the decade, and this enabled .
3 6 .  K . D .  D e s a i ,  " S o c i o e c o n o m i c  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e  o f  G u j a r a t  P o l i t i c s . "
I n  I q b a l  N a r a i n  ( e d . )  S t a t e  P o l i t i c s  i n  I n d i a . ( M e e r u t :  1 9 6 8 ) .
37* D.N. Pathak, The 1961 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elec­
tions # C hGl') (in Gujarati).
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him to accomplish many important projects in Ahmedabad City 
during his Mayorship with the co-operation of State-level . 
leaders.^ It was, for example, during the Mayorship of. 
Jaikrishnabhai that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation under­
took the establishment of a large-scale Municipal Dairy in 
1962 to provide a permanent solution to the city's problem 
of acute shortage of pure milk. This project required an 
investment of Rs.90 lakhs. When approached the State Govern­
ment was willing to provide a subsidy of Rs.30.80 lakhs; a 
donation was received from U.N.I.C.E.F. of Rs.26 lakhs, and 
the rest of the money was raised by the Corporation. This 
and other important projects of the period received assis­
tance and co-operation from the State Government - a very 
different situation to that faced by the Janta Parishad in 
its tenure of power in the Corporation from 1965 to 1969»
when it experienced great difficulty in obtaining State Gov-
41ernment financial assistance.
Ahmedabad business leaders also benefited from the 
increasing emphasis on economic development and large State 
investments particularly in Central and Southern Gujarat with 
the shift in State power to Congress leaders of Central and 
Southern Gujarat in the early 60s. With the discovery of 
oil in Cambay in 1958 and Ankleshvar in 1960, the Gujarat 
State Government Established the Koyali oil refinery near
39. State Government co-operation and financial assistance dur­
ing this period was symbolised in the City Co-ordination 
Council, see Chapter IV.
40. Information provided by Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas.
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Baroda, and by 1964 the supply of natural gas to the Dhuvaran 
power station and the Uttaran power-station in South Gujarat 
had begun. Thus private industrial units at Baroda, Ahmedabad,
Surat and Kalol began to receive the benefits of a new supply
42of cheaper and more convenient fuel in the place of coal.
In 1968, the State Government undertook a Regional Development
Plan of the Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat region, which represented
the first attempt at State-level regional planning of a highly
developed area of Gujarat with complex problems of urbaniza-
43tion, transportation etc.
The increasing collaboration between the new State 
Government and business leaders was epitomized in the estab­
lishment in 1961-62 of the first joint-sector enterprise, 
involving massive State investment and drawing on the mana­
gerial skills of business leaders. This was the setting up of 
a nitrogenous fertilizer factory near Baroda, which was the 
most important industrial project of all the schemes included 
in the Third Plan (1961-66). It envisaged an investment of 
more than Rs.34 cror.es, and gas and naptha were made available 
from the newly-established Koyali oil refinery to feed the new 
fertilizer plant, which played an important part in the petro­
chemical complex established in the region surrounding the 
4 4refinery. Thus the Gujarat State Fertilizers Co. Ltd. was 
formed in 1961 to establish and run this vital new joint-
sector project, and significantly the Chairman appointed by
L l . H .  S .  > 1 U  Q ^cv±gjrruL 6 x l S  C cr^ K ^ iS Stc> vs &crl& i>y
Stcctes 6 ~ r o 7 Fi)*>Ico>jCajixL Express: C B cn— btxij'), , g  Nev. J I 97-2 •
43. Gujarat. 1969. (a reference book), p.190.
4 4 .  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c s  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  S o c i o e c o n o m i c  R e v i e w  o f  G u j a r a t  
S t a t e :  1 9 6 5 - 6 6 .  ( D i r e c t o r a t e  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n ,  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  G u j a r a t ,
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the State Government was a leading Ahmedabad textile magnate, 
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas who has remained Chairman of this 
highly successful, profitable and innovative enterprise for 
over a decade. In this way, State-business collaboration 
grew, and the State Government helped Ahmedabad textile mag­
nates to diversify their economic interests. The State Ferti­
lizer plant was also the first venture in rural-urban indus­
trial co-operation, for the manufacture of fertilizers had 
important consequences for agricultural methods and production, 
and the Gujarat State Fertilizers Company Ltd. provided an 
excellent after-sale service, giving guidance and help to farmers 
in how to take the maximum economic benefit from the input of 
fertilizers.
Before 1960, the industrial development of Gujarat 
had suffered from the remoteness of Gujarat business leaders 
from the centre of State power in Bombay City. Before 1960, 
there was not a single public sector undertaking in Gujarat. 
However, with the creation of a separate State of Gujarat in 
1960, the new State Government collaborated with business 
leaders, and gave important concessions and incentives to encou­
rage rapid industrial development in the State, particularly in 
the Central and Southern Gujarat region. Consequently, the 
real industrial development of Gujarat started after 1960: 
total industrial investment, which was about Rs.175 crores 
in 1960 went up to about Rs.850 crores by March 1972. After
4 5 .  J a i k r i s h n a b h a i  H a r i v a l l a b h d a s ,  A r t i c l e  on t h e  G u j a r a t  S t a t e  F e r t i l i z e r  
C o m p a n y . F i n a n c i a l  T i m e s  ( B o m b a y ) ,  S u p p l e m e n t , 3 N o v e m b e r  , 1 9 7 2 .
1960, new industries were exempted from the payment of electri­
city duty on power consumption for the first five years, and 
self-generating units were exempted for ten years. The 
Gujarat Government developed numerous State Corporations to 
act as major instruments of rapid industrial growth. The 
first, the Gujarat State Finance Corporation, was set up in 
1960, and, between 1960 and 1972, it sanctioned loans to indus­
trial units to the value of Rs.37*05 crones. The Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation was also set up in 1962.
It was concerned to provide infrastructural facilities like 
power, water, roads, industrial sheds, post-offices, telephones, 
banks etc. to encourage the establishment of new industrial 
units. The Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation deve­
loped various industrial estates: the pioneering estates being 
those of Naroda, Odhav and Vatva near Ahmedabad. At the recom­
mendation of the City Coordination Council, Ahmedabad (consis­
ting of City leaders and State-level leaders), the Government 
of Gujarat decided to establish an industrial township near 
Ahmedabad. The Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation was 
given the task of developing the three industrial estates of 
Naroda, Odhav and Vatva near Ahmedabad. Narodaj s  about three 
miles away from Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation limit6 on the 
Ahmedabad-Delhi National Highway No. 8-A. The Odhav estate 
is just four miles from Ahmedabad railway station, adjacent 
to the municipal limits; and Vatva township is only two miles
from the municipal limits, and provides large pits for large-
46scale industries requiring railway sidings facilities. In 
1968, the Gujarat Government set up the Gujarat Industrial
46. See Census Special Report I. pp.11-12.
Investment Corporation to help finance small entrepreneurs, 
since the State Finance Corporation and the hanks could not 
innovate and experiment in this regard due either to statutory 
limitations or conservative policy traditions. In collabora­
tion with the Gujarat State Finance Corporation and the 
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, the Gujarat State 
Industrial Investment Corporation has implemented two pioneer­
ing schemes: a Technicians' Scheme, providing technicians
initially with 100% finance to establish an industrial enter-
47prise, and an entrepreneurship development scheme. r State 
aid, particularly financial aid, and development of infra­
structural facilities for industry, was of inestimable value 
to private businessmen, whose dependence on the State for 
licenses for establishing and expanding undertaking*, per­
mits for the import of raw materials, machinery spare parts 
and technological expertise, financial assistance etc. was 
crucial.
Ahmedabad business leaders played a prominent part 
in many of these State-level Corporations: Jaikrishnabhai 
Harivallabhdas was the Chairman of the Gujarat State Ferti­
lizer Company, the first joint-sector enterprise. His brother, 
Balkrishna Harivallabhd as was for a time Chairman of the 
Gujarat State Finance Corporation. Before him, from 1*960 to 
1964, Shri Amritlal Hargovandas, influential Ahmedabadi tex­
tile industrialist;was Chairman, succeeded by another prominent 
Ahmedabad industrialist, Shri Navnitlal Sakarlal Sodhan.
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Chinubhai Chimanlal.textile magnate and former Mayor of Ahmed­
abad, was Chairman of the Gujarat Industrial Development 
Corporation for five years between 1962 and 1967* Another 
leading Ahmedabadi business leader and former President of the 
Ahmedabad Millowners' Association, Jayantihhai Bhikhabhai, was 
Chairman of the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation 
between 1970 and 1972. Another Ahmedabad business tycoon,
Rohit C. Mehta, was Chairman of the Gujarat State Export Corp­
oration, set up in 1965 to promote the growth of exports. Shri 
Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta, textile industrialist of Ahmedabad,
was Chairman of the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation
Aftbetween 1960 and 1966.
During the textile crisis of the mid and late 1960s, 
when textile mills were suffering from the general industrial 
recession, the effects of devaluation of the rupee, acute raw 
material shortages, rising wage bills, lack of working capital 
etc., the Ahmedabad textile 4lite received considerable help 
from the State Government. Up to 1968, the Gujarat Govern­
ment provided guarantees worth Rs.198.50 lakhs and Rs.106.75
ZlQlakhs under reduced margin to textile units. y
Thus Ahmedabad business leaders, in their political 
leadership of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and in their 
wider economic and business interests, established vitally 
important linkages with State-level political leaders, and 
obtained access to important State-level Corporations with 
their wider patronage powers as well as essential political
48. Gujarat, 1969. ( a reference manual) op. 58-60, and informa­tion provided by Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas.
49. Gujarat, 1969.( a reference manual)^ pp.58-60.
and economic support from State-level leaders for expansion, 
diversification and in periods of economic difficulty. In 
municipal matters, from trying to establish important projects 
and schemes for the Municipal Corporation to trying to gain 
reductions in octroi and Special Property taxation, Ahmedabad 
business leaders were well aware of the importance of access 
to and influence with State-level political leaders.
3. The Majur Mahajan and State-Level Linkages.
The Majur Mahajan had evolved a unique form of trade 
unionism under the guidance of Gandhi, based on non-violence, 
co-operation between employers and workers, conciliation and 
voluntary arbitration rather than resort to strikes in the 
settlement of industrial disputes, workers' education and up­
lift. This was backed by an efficient and disciplined trade 
union organization with large and stable membership figures 
and a sound financial base, and the development of a rank and 
file leadership drawn from the working-class, who were elected 
as shop stewards or pratinidhis in each mill.
Its continuing and growing power was, however, 
dependent on close links with the Congress party at the local^ 
State and national levels, and on influence and power in State 
and national trade union circles. Its top-level leaders, parti­
cularly Gulzarilal Nanda and Khandubhai Desai, had close links 
with State Congress and national-level Congress leaders, parti­
cularly Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Morarji Desai. T.L.A. 
leaders, particularly Khandubhai Desai and Gulzarilal Nqnda, 
each at one time General Secretary of the T.L.A., exerted an 
enormous influence on labour legislation in Bombay State and 
in India as a whole, when they were elected to the State and
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national legislatures and made Labour Ministers. Gulzarilal 
Nanda was largely responsible for framing the Bombay Indust­
rial Relations Act of 194-6* while he was Labour Minister in the 
second popular Kher Ministry. The B.I.R.A. regulated labour 
relations in Bombay State and continues in force in Gujarat 
State today. Khandubhai Desai a member of the Working Committee 
of the A.I.C.C. was Central Cabinet Minister for Labour from 
1954- - 57* and on his resignation, the Ministry went to 
Gulzarilal Nanda who later became Home Minister. Thus T.L.A. 
leaders were able to mould labour legislation at both the
State and Central levels according to the experience and prin-
50ciples of the Gandhian trade union movement of the T.L.A.
In addition, a powerful apex body of Gandhian-inspired 
trade unions, the Indian National Trades Union Congress, was 
established in 194-7 by T.L.A. leaders, with the help of Sardar 
Vallabhbhai Patel and the Congress Working Committee, to counter­
act the Communist domination of the All India Trades Union Con­
gress. Gandhian principles of labour relations and trade 
unionism had been disseminated to labour leaders in training 
classes held in Ahmedabad in 1937> and these leaders later 
became key figures in the I.N.T.U.C. In 1938, a formal body, 
the Hindustan Mazdoor Sevak Sangh, had been set up to propa­
gate Gandhian principles of trade unionism. The H.M.S.S. was 
later instrumental, with the help of the Congress Working 
Committee, in setting up the I.N.T.U.C. On the 3rd and 4th May, 
194-7> the H.M.S.S. called a conference in Delhi to establish 
the I.N.T.U.C. at which representatives of 200 trade unions 
with a total membership of 575*000 attended. The I.N.T.U.C's
50. Pamphlets on the T.L.A. by Khandubhai Desai^ 194-7), and 
T.L.A. Annual Reports.
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constitution was similar to that of the T.L.A. with its 
emphasis on negotiations between labour and employers, conci­
liation and adjudication of industrial disputes in preference 
to strike action, the responsibility of workers towards the 
industry and the community, and the use of non-violent con­
stitutional means to redress grievances. Throughout the 50s 
and 60s, the top I.N.T.U.C. leadership was largely in the 
hands of T.L.A. or Ahmedabad-trained leaders. Khandubhai 
Desai was the first General-Secretary of the X.N.T.U.C. and 
Shyamprasad R. Vasavda, General-Secretary of the Ahmedabad 
T.L.A. during the 1960s until his death in early 1975? was 
also a General-Secretary of the I.N.T.U.C. Majur Mahajan 
leaders, notably Somnath Dave, N.H. Shaikh and Arvind Buch, 
all Secretaries of the Ahmedabad T.L.A., have dominated the 
leadership of the Gujarat Branch of the I.N.T.U.C. As princi­
pal labour representative in most of the tripartite bodies con­
stituted by the government from specific wage boards to more 
general policy-oriented bodies at the Central, State or industry- 
level, and as labour representative at the annual All-India 
Labour Conference, in many State cabinets and in various I.N.C. 
bodies, such as the key Working Committee and its subcommittee 
to evaluate the progress of the Plans, the I.N.T.U.C. exerted 
an enormous influence over labour policy formation. I.N.T.U.C. 
leaders were also represented on the boards of several of the 
nationalized public sector enterprises. Thus close links with 
the Congress party and its leaders at the Central and State 
levels, and active involvement in Central and gtate legislation, 
and committees, and bodies, through the I.N.T.U.C. enabled 
Ahmedabad T.L.A. leaders to consolidate and extend their hold 
over the Ahmedabad working-class, and to deliver the goods, in
terms of high wages, bonus, housing etc. through State and 
Central influence to the benefit of the Ahmedabad worker. 
Although there was a genuine attempt by T.L.A. leaders to 
influence All India labour welfare through the I.N.T.U.C. and 
relationships with the Congress party at State and Central 
levels and play a national role, the undoubted feedback of 
this influence on the Ahmedabad worker was a major element in 
the retention by the T.L.A. leaders of a strong trade union 
base in Ahmedabad.
Looking in detail at Majur Mahajan State-local link­
ages in the context of Gujarat in the late '50s and throughout 
the '60s, the Majur Mahajan played a vital role in the local 
and State Congress party. During the Maha Gujarat movement, 
when Trikamlal Patel, then President of the Ahmedabad City 
D.C.C., took a majority of City D.C.C. members out of the Con­
gress to join the Maha Gujarat agitation and eventually form 
the Nagrik Paksh which captured power in the Ahmedabad Munici­
pal Corporation, the Majur Mahajan remained loyal to the Con­
gress party over the linguistic issue, which largely animated 
the middle-class rather than the working-class of Ahmedabad.
The Majur Mahajan constituted about ten to twelve members out 
of a total of seventy in the Ahmedabad D.C.C. and these aligned 
themselves with the Vimalbhai N. Shah faction, known as the
most loyal faction for its loyalty to MorajjjL Desai and the
52G.P.C.C. stand on the linguistic issue. Many Majur Mahajan 
leaders were largely Banias and Nagar Brahmins, and they had 
an excellent relationship with Vimalbhai N. Shah, who was
51. Kannappan III.
5 2 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  Mr. B a n d  Mr. H i n  A hm edabad i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
also a Bania and a Robert Owen-type industrialist with a deep 
interest in trade union activities. Another faction was led 
by Jamnashankar Pandya, a Brahmin, which was known as the loyal 
faction, since, although it dissented from the official State 
Congress line on the linguistic issue, it was not prepared to 
leave the party on this issue. This group was allied with the 
Vimalbhai N. Shah faction. The third faction, at this time, 
was led by Trikamlal Patel and was known as the disloyal fac­
tion for its defection from the Congress on the linguistic 
issue. Although this contained a large Patel element, factions 
did not present clear-cut divisions along caste lines. There 
was competition and rivalry among the dominant castes of Brah­
mins, Banias and Patels in the factional politics of Ahmedabad 
City, but personality conflicts and differences between the 
Majur Mahajan element and business elements were cross-cutting
influences in factional disputes, preventing any rigid divisions
<5*along purely daste lines.
Thus, during the linguistic agitation, the Majur
Mahajan, in alliance with the Vimalbhai N. Shah faction gained
control of the Ahmedabad City D.C.C., which left it in a strong
bargaining position in 1960 on the establishment of a separate
54-State of Gujarat. Unlike, for example, Madurai, where the 
local I.N.T.U.C. union had no formal representation on neigh­
bourhood mandal Congress committee® and, therefore, little 
influence in the City D.C.C., the Ahmedabad Majur Mahajan was 
strongly represented on mandal and taluka Congress Committees,
5 3 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. L a n d  Mr. M i n  A h m edabad  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
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especially in industrial labour wards of the City, and thus 
exerted considerable influence in the City D.C.C., enabling 
it to try successfully for Congress tickets for municipal
corporation State legislative assembly and parliamentary
55elections.^ The increased importance of Ahmedabad as the 
temporary capital of the new State of Gujarat and its predom­
inantly industrial character also increased the political 
leverage of the Majur Mahajan in G.P.C.C. circles, where its 
representatives, Shyamprasad Vasavda, Khandubhai Desai,
Manharlal Shukla and Shantilal Shah, exerted a great deal of 
influence. Shyamprasad Vasavda clashed with Thakorebhai Desai, 
who was President of the G.P.C.C. in 1961, and demanded greater 
power for the Majur Mahajan - in view of the increased import­
ance of Ahmedabad City whose large industrial labour force was 
controlled largely by the T.L.A. - in the selection of candi­
dates for municipalfState Assembly and Lok Sabha elections 
from Ahmedabad City and greater say over the composition of the 
Municipal Standing Committee in particular. Shyamprasad Vasavda 
also demanded that a representative of the T.L.A. and the 
Gujarat I.N.T.U.C. should be taken into the Cabinet as Labour 
Minister as a matter of policy. A tussle ensued between the
55- From the grass-roots upward, the Majur Mahajan was strongly 
represented on Congress party committees, e.g. in the 
largely industrial ward of Baherampura, a 1969 Ahmedabad 
Municipal election ward, two of the three Congress candi­
dates were Majur Mahajan workers, members of the Majur 
Mahajan for many years. In addition, one of them, Madarsing 
Kalusing, was a member of the Kankaria - Baherampura Con­
gress Taluka Committee, and the other, Khemabhai Maganlal Leva, 
wasa member of the Baherampura Ward Committee for thirty 
years. Many Majur Mahajan candidates were Presidents and 
Vice-Presidents of their ward and Taluka Congress Committees, 
see Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election, 1969: Our Can­
didates . a -publication of tne Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 
giving a political and socioeconomic portrait of all party 
candidates.
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Majur Mahajan and the Congress party elements in the G.P.C.C.,
in which Vasavda threatened that, despite a good working
relationship with the Congress for years, it was not impossible
56for the Majur Mahajan to think of leaving the Congress. As a 
result, in the 1961 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections, 
the Majur Mahajan was given the final power of selection of 
31 candidates drawn from the Majur Mahajan and representing 
industrial labour wards in the city. The overwhelming success 
of the Majur Mahajan's municipal candidates, 29 of whom succ­
eeded in winning the elections, reinforced the bargaining 
power of the Majur Mahajan in the 1962 General Elections, for 
with 29 Majur Mahajan municipal corporators, the Majur Mahajan 
element in the Corporation for the first time outnumbered the 
business and middle class element in the Congress Corporation 
party of 50.
Thus in the 1962 General Elections, the Majur 
Mahajan secured the right to nominate four of its own candidates 
for State Assembly seats from industrial labour constituencies, 
and the Lok Sabha candidate from Ahmedabad City. Although the 
prestige Lok Sabha seat cont.e sted by Vasavda himself was lost 
to Indulal Yagnik, the M.G.J.P. candidate, the four Assembly 
Candidates of the Majur Mahajan: Jesingbhai Parmar, Mangubhai 
Patel, Mohanlal Popatlal Vyas and Mangaldas Uttaram Pandya, 
were all successful from their respective constituencies of 
Gomptipur, Shaherkotda, Dariapur-Kazipur and Asarva. In addition,
56. See unpublished Ph.D. thesis on the Majur Mahajan by
Dr. Paresh Majumdar, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad. Vasavda 
is quoted in the Majur Sandesh IS , as saying, "We
have worked with the Congress for years. But at present 
no such situation has arisen as would compel us to think of 
severing our relations with it •••• so long as all these 
things exist there is no reason for us to get out of the 
Congress. But it is true that, if the Congress gives up 
its principles and capable leaders walk out of it, we too 
may think of doing so."
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an unwritten convention came to be established that a Majur 
Mahajan leader would be taken into the State Cabinet as Labour 
Minister. This commenced with the appointment of Mohan!al
Popatlal Vyas of the T.L.A. as Labour Minister of Gujarat
State in 1962. Vasavda was able to select the Labour Minister 
of his choice. In the 1967 General Elections, the Ahmedabad 
T.L.A. again secured the Lok Sabha ticket from Ahmedabad City 
for Vasavda, and four Legislative Assembly tickets from Ahmeda­
bad City. In 1967 also Vasavda was defeated by Indulal Yagnik, 
and the former Labour Minister of Gujarat, Mohanal P. Vyas, was 
also defeated in the State Assembly election from Shahpur con­
stituency. However, the other three T.L.A. State Assembly can­
didates: Jesingbhai Parmar, Manharlal T. Shukla and Shantilal R.
Shah were all successfully elected from Kankaria, Asaxva and
57Rakhial constituencies respectively. (
The swing of political power during the early 60s away 
from Saroashtra leaders to the leaders of Central and Southern 
Gujarat also benefited Ahmedabad and the Majur Mahajan, and 
good working relationships were established between Majur Mahajan 
leaders, like Khandubhai Desai and Vasavda, and Monrji Desai, 
the State Congress boss. The Majur Mahajan also gained power 
in State-level decision-making structures having an important 
bearing on Ahmedabad City, which gave it control of important 
patronage with which to consolidate its dominant position in 
Ahmedabad City. For example, Nurmahomed Shaikh, T.L.A. Secre­
tary, was made Chairman of the Gujarat State Housing Board in 
September 1967- Manharlal Shukla was a member of the 
Employees' State Insurance Corporation.^® The effectiveness
57* Interviews with Majur Mahajan leaders in Ahmedabad in March, 
1971.
58. Majur Mahajan Annual Report( 1967X
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of industrial labour lobbying can be seen in the preference 
shown by the Gujarat Housing Board towards industrial housing 
schemes, many of which were located in Ahmedabad City, as the 
following table shows:
Table 1. Housing Schemes operated by the Gujarat State Housing Board up -bill 19o9.
Housing Schemes; No. of Tenements
1• Subsidised Indus­trial Housing 
Scheme•
2. Low Income Group 
Housing Scheme
3. Middle Income Group Housing Scheme
completed plus incurred up tounder construc- 31.3.'69. ”tion on 31.3.'69.
1974-0 plus 150 Rs.727.72 lakhs
2362 plus 1574- Rs.256.81 lakhs
606 plus 402 Rs.137.74- "
Total: 22708 plus 2126 Rs.1127.27 "
Ahmedabad, being the centre of the modern sector, benefited most 
from industrial housing Schemes (State-subsidized housing tene­
ments were built in many labour wards of the city)• Out of a
lctkhstotal investment of Rs.112 727/ty the Gujarat State Housing 
Board by the end of 1969, the bulk of it, Rs.727*72 lakhs went 
to benefit the industrial workers, particularly of Ahmedabad, 
who constituted, as we have already seen, a labour aristocracy, 
a fcelajrifre ^lite thanks to the efforts of powerful trade 
union organizations, such as the Majur Mahajan. A relatively 
small proportion of total investment Rs.256.81 lakhs, went to 
help the city*s low-income groups. Under the Employees' State 
Insurance Scheme, the Housing Board had undertaken works to the 
value of Rs. 3 cro.res, and had constructed thirty-three dis­
pensaries in Ahmedabad by 1969, and handed these over to the
59. Table taken from Gujarat, 1969' , p.252.
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Employees’ State Insurance Corporation. It was also engaged in constructing 
a 200 bed T.B. Hospital at Naroda, Ahmedabad, and a 500 bed General Hospital 
at Bapunagar, Ahmedabad. Thus the first beneficiary of the activities of 
both the Gujarat State Housing Board and the E.S.I. Corporation was the 
city of Ahmedabad.
Shantilal Shah, another Majur Mahajan leader, was a member of the 
Gujarat State Finance Corporation in 1962, and of the Gujarat
State Road Transport Corporation up till 1967* and, subsequently, as Labour 
Minister of Gujarat State from 1967? he was able to obtain important 
legislative and bureaucratic support for his lieutenants in the Ahmedabad 
labour arena, enabling them to consolidate Congress control of the textile 
labour force after the inroads made by the Sangram Samiti in the mid 60s.
As Labour Minister*^ Shantilal Shah had a unique chance to influence 
industrial workers' housing development. He made it possible for industrial 
workers, with State help, to eventually become owners of their own homes.
A subsidized Housing Scheme was in operation, by which industrial workers 
in cooperative housing societies could build houses, on the basis of a 
50% loan, repayable over a long period, and a 50% subsidy by the State 
Government, in which they would be paying subsidized rent. Shantilal Shah 
succeeded in removing the subsidy element to enable the industrial worker 
to eventually become a house-owner by the principle of hire purchase i.e. 
after paying back the loan to the State Government in installments he would 
change from a tenant to the owner of the property. The return of the 
subsidy element would be utilized for the construction of more houses. 
Shantilal Shah had to bargain hard with the Central Government's Housing 
Ministry, which felt that this would mean the liquidation of the property
60. Interview with Shantilal Shah, March 1971» in Ahmedabad.
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of the State Housing Board through which it was receiving regular rents. 
Eventually the Gujarat Labour Minister was given his way and permitted to 
give 16,689 tenements to industrial workers on a hire purchase basis.
These tenements were sold to the workers at a value less than their 
market price.
Shantilal Shah also brought in a revised and updated Minimum Wages 
Act covering 22 industries. He also amended the Bombay Industrial Relations 
Act of 1947, making a strike in consequence of the nonpayment of industrial 
wages a legal not an illegal strike, by which a worker striking in such a 
case would not lose his privileges such as his provident fund contribution, 
gratuity etc. This was done because, during the crisis which developed in 
the textile industry in the late 1960s, consequent on problems caused by 
devaluation of the rupee and general economic recession, when sick mills 
began to close down, the mill owner would very often refuse to make payment 
for work done. He also started schemes to give alternative occupations and 
retraining to textile workers made redundant by the closing of sick mills, 
such as starting JO Ambar Charka(spinning wheels with six spindles)spinning 
centres in which an industrial worker could earn Rs. 6 a day by spinning; 
providing redundant workers with training in driving cars, trucks and 
rickshaws and getting them licenses and employment (a special quota of 
rickshaw licenses for unemployed workers and some employment in the State 
Road Transport system was granted by the Government of India); and providing 
training in small-scale industries. Thus the Ahmedabad textile labour 
force was in many ways an 6lite, compared to less organised sectors of 
industry and rural workers, with a powerful bargaining position at the Local 
and State level to secure its interests.
During the textile crisis of the late 60s, the Ahmedabad TLA displayed 
its ability to obtain State and Central level support to stem redundancy 
due to the closure of sick mills in Ahmedabad. So powerful was the labour 
lobby that it secured the establishment of the National Textile Corporation
to take over the running of sick mills through individual State Textile
61Corporations. The TLA General Secretary, Shyamprasad Vasavda, played
a crucial part in getting this solution to the crisis in the textile
industry. The TLA, learning from its mistake of tardiness in the dearness
allowance issue, acted very promptly in this case, and Vasavda used his
influence at the Centre to secure the establishment of the National
Textile Corporation. He felt that State-level Corporations alone could
not provide all the capital necessary for running the sick mills, thus he
suggested the establishment of a National Textile Corporation which would
provide funds in the ratio of 51:49 with the State Government for the
running of sick mills. This was in the face of the desire of the more
aggressive Ahmedabad millowners, as expressed in the Manubhai Shah Textile
62Reorganisation Committee Report of August 1968, to scrap the sick mills,
and criticism from industry and the press, summed up in a Times of India
editorial in 1971» which was equally applicable to the earlier period:
  "the authorities must realise that even from the point of view of
creating more job opportunities it will be far better to deploy scarce
resources for setting up a new plant than to fritter them away in running
65a sick factory as a giant unemployment relief scheme" --
In 1969 > the Gujarat State Textile Corporation, chaired by Vimalbhai 
N. Shah, was running three Ahmedabad mills: the New Maneckchowk
Spg. & Wvg. Co. Ltd., the Ahmedabad New Textile Mills Co. Ltd., and the 
Himabhai Mfg. Co. Ltd.6^
61. Interview with Shyamprasad Vasavda, March 1971» in Ahmedabad.
62. The Report of the Textile Reorganisation Committee { appointed 
by the Government of Gujarat; August 1968).
63. Times of India Q cWxd^September, \ 91 I,
64. Gujarat State Textile Corporation's Second Annual Report( 1970^ L
During the textile crisis, Shantilal Shah, Gujarat's Labour Minister,
was prepared to extend every assistance to mill owners to prevent them from
closing down their mills: he was prepared to give a Government guarantee
for any advances they might want from bankers. However, when even this
failed and the newly-appointed State Textile Corporation began to take over
sick mills, Shantilal Shah had to negotiate with bodies like the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation and the Ahmedabad Electricity Company for a suspension
to be followed by a payment of arrears in taxation etc., in easy installments.
The State Government also had to make provision for arrears in money owed
to workers and to provide retrenchment compensation to the workers. With
the revival of public expenditure and the introduction of an export
subsidy scheme for the textile industry, the millowners started an upward
swing in profits and lost their strong objections to the Government's
running of the old, sick, loss-making mills at the cost of the consumer
i.e. paid for by taxation and successive upward revisions of textile 
65prices.
Thus Majur Mahajan power among industrial labour in Ahmedabad enabled 
it to bargain successfully for patronage and decision making power at the 
State level, helping to explain its preponderance in the 1961 and 1969 
Municipal elections and in the State Assembly elections of 1962 and 1967 
in Ahmedabad City. However, the disastrous outcome of the 1965 Ahmedabad 
municipal elections, from the Majur Mahajan viewpoint, showed the extent 
to which even the pragmatic Ahmedabad worker could go in expressing 
ideological hostility to excessive Majur Mahajan insistence on labour- 
capitalist cooperation instead of conflict, and dissatisfaction with 
certain elements of the trade union e.g. the venality of many of the shop 
stewards, the tight control of upper echelons of the union by upper caste, 
non-worker "outsiders" etc. For practical purposes, particularly when
6 5. Interview with Shantilal Shah, Ahmedabad, March 1971,
alternatives such as the Janta Parishad and the Sangram Samiti were at 
a low ebb, the Ahmedabad worker generally supported the Majur Mahajnn. 
However, the ambivalence in his relationship with the dominant Majur 
Mahajan can be seen in his rejection of Shyamprasad Vasavda, the
powerful TLA and INTUC leader, in favour of Indulal Yagnik, the pro-Comm-
66unist radical leader of the Janta Parishad, whose burning oratory 
raged against the Majur Mahajan as a company union out to hoodwink workers, 
and an agent of the exploiting class of millowners. On the whole, however, 
the Ahmedabad worker would, apart from exceptional circumstances as in 
the 1965 Ahmedabad municipal election, tend to vote for Majur Mahaj an 
representatives at municipal and State Assembly elections.
The Majur Mahajan explanation for the continued defeat of Vasavda 
as Congress candidate for the Lok Sabha seat from Ahmedabad City was that 
the industrial labour constituencies of the City are divided between Ahmed­
abad City and Sabarmati (1962) or Gandhinagar (1967) Lok Sabha constituencies, 
and that the Ahmedabad City Lok Sabha seat is dominated by middle class 
elements who are anti-labour. As the TLA Annual Report of 1967 recorded:
— "Although the Congress candidate for Parliament (in Ahmedabad City) did 
not get success because he did not get majority of votes from non-labour 
areas, labour voters indeed deserved greetings for bringing victory to 
Assembly candidates." —
67This explanation has some validity in the 1962 General Election.
Indulal Yagnik secured 134,324 votes or 52.64%* whereas Vasavda secured 
112,731 votes or 44.18% of the total votes. Indulal Yagnik got a lead in 
five out of the seven assembly segments of the Ahmedabad City Lok Sabha 
constituency: these were Shahpur - Ellisbridge, Dariapur - Kazipur,
66. See copies of Indulal Yagnik*s speeches at the mill-gates in the 
Vaki1 Report on the disturbances in Ahmedabad in 1964*
6 7 .  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  M .G .  P a r e k h  an d  K . D .  D e s a i ,  T h r e e  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  
G u j a r a t :  D e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  D e c a d e ,  1 9 5 2 - 6 2 . (A h m e d a b a d : 1 9 6 6 ) ;
I n d i a n  E l e c t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n .  R e p o r t  on t h e  T h i r d  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  
I n d i a ,  1 9 6 2 .  (2 v o l s . )  ( D e l h i :  1 9 6 3 - 6 6 ) .
Jamalpur, Khadia and Dariapur. He lagged behind Vasavda in the two pre­
dominantly industrial labour constituencies of Asarva and Sherkotda. However, 
he did secure a lead, although a narrow one, in the largely industrial 
labour constituency of Dariapur - Kazipur. In the State Assembly 
elections, the Majur Mahajan candidate had only secured a very small margin 
of victory here: Mohanlal Popatlal Vyas secured 18,166 votes compared to
the CPM leader, Dinhar Mekta's 17>257 votes in a straight fight, thus 
he won by only 929 votes. Khadia and Dariapur, two assembly constituencies 
which Congress lost to the PSP candidate, Brahmkumar Bhatt, and the Janta 
Parishad candidate, Manubhai Palkiwala, respectively, gave Indulal Yagnik 
the biggest support. In the Ahmedabad industrial labour constituency of 
Gomtipur, which formed part of the Lok Sabha constituency of Sabarmati 
in 1962, the Congress Lok Sabha candidate, Muldas Vaishya, secured a significant 
lead. The Majur Mahajan candidate from Gomtipur in the State Assembly 
elections, Jesingbhai Parmar, also secured more than 68% of the total votes, 
polling 21,589 votes compared to 7>460 votes secured by the Republican 
candidate, Somchand J. Makwana, who came second. Although this gives 
some support to the Majur Mahajan explanation, except in the case of Dariapur
- Kazipur constituency with its large industrial labour element, it must be 
remembered that, in February 1962, there was no viable alternative to the 
Majur Mahajan in the trade union field: the Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad
was a much weakened body, after the demise of the linguistic issue in 
1960, and had not yet received a transforming impulse to widen its support
- base in the labour areas through the Sangram Samiti.
68However, in the 1967 General Elections, after the success of the 
Sangram Samiti and the Janta Parishad in the Municipal elections of 1965, 
there was a possible alternative to the Majur Mahajan, although the 
Sangram Samiti trade union lacked credibility as a practical union able 
to deal successfully with day-to-day trade union matters. Thus, in 1967»
68. I n d i a n  E l e c t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n .  R e p o r t  o n  t h e  F o u r t h  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  i n
i n  I n d i a ,  1 9 6 7 . (2 v o l s . )  ( D e l h i :  1 9 6 8 ) .
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the Ahmedabad worker expressed his ambivalence towards the Majur Mahajan by- 
supporting its State Assembly- candidates, but rejecting the Majur Mahajan 
boss, Vasavda, even more emphatically than in 1962 as the Lok Sabha 
candidate from Ahmedabad City. There was clear cross-voting between the 
Assembly poll and the Lok Sabha poll in 1967 even in the one strongly 
labour constituency of Asarva, which came within the Lok Sabha constituency 
of Ahmedabad City. In the 1967 State Assembly election, Asarva returned 
the Majur Mahajian candidate, M.T. Shukla, to power with a majority of 
19,733 votes, although his nearest rival, Gordharibhai L. Patel, the CPI 
leader, secured a fairly impressive number of 17>673 votes. However, 
in the Lok Sabha election, as the following table shows, there was definite 
cross-voting in the Asarva segment
69. Electoral figures made available by the Majur Mahajan office in 
Ahmedabad.
TABLE 2. The Voting Pattern in the 1967 Ahmedabad City Lok Sabha Elections
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Indulal Yagnik won by an enormous margin of 85,477 votes in 1967 
over Vasavda compared to a margin of only 21,593 votes in 1962. In 1967, 
he had almost double the number of votes that went to Vasavda, compared 
to a far closer situation in 1962 when he had 134,324 votes compared to 
Vasavda's 112,731 votes. In 1967 all assembly segments without exception 
gave a lead to Indulal Yagnik. He secured a massive lead over Vasavda 
in Khadia, Kalupur, Shahpur, Jamalpur and Ellis Bridge, and a strong 
lead in the two industrial labour constituencies of Dariapur-Kazipur 
and Asarva. In Asarva, Yagnik got 22,215 votes to 18,769 votes gained 
by Vasavda. Vasavda's crushing defeat by Yagnik occured despite a 
vigorous campaign carried out on his behalf by various TLA and INTUC 
leaders. A one rupee per member election fund was solicited from Majur 
Mahajan workers, and J>00 election meetings were called in various labour 
localities in support of Vasavda three months prior to the elections. 
Top-level TLA leaders, such as Nurmahomed Shaikh, ShankerlalBanker, the 
founder member and adviser of the TLA, Arvind Buch, TLA secretary, and 
Khandubhai Desai, all openly campaigned on behalf of Vasavda. In an 
election meeting, Arvind Buch, General Secretary of the Gujurat INTHC, 
declared:
— "If you hope for better results from leaders of the Institutions
which work for you, you must be more vigilant and bring them success 
for the increase of their strength." —  
and Khandubhai Desai, veteran TLA leader, had frankly admonished:
— "Behind the Janta Parishad there is naked communism which has no
70feeling of oneness for our country. Think before you vote for itj'
It is also significant that the Majur Mahajan lost the Shahpur 
assembly constituency. The former Labour Minister of Gujarat State
70. TLA Annual Report (196^
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and Majur Mahajan candidate, Mohanlal P. Vyas, was decisively defeated, 
securing only 15*472 votes compared to the victor, Somabliai Desai, the 
Janta Parishad candidate's 24,075 votes. Even in the MLA constituencies 
which the Majur Mahajan won in 1967, margin of victory was invariably 
less than in 1962. In 1962, although Mohanlal Vyas had only a narrow 
victory over the CPM leader, Dinkar Mehta, in Dariapur-Kazipur, the 
other Majur Mahajan candidates had huge majorities: in Asarva, Mangaldas
Uttaram Pandya won by 15,549 votes, more than double the votes of the 
Janta Parishad candidate, Prahladbhai J. Mukhi, who came second.
Mangubhai Patel inflicted an even more crushing defeat over his nearest 
Janta Parishad rival, the CPI leader, Gordhanbhai L. Patel, securing 
22,149 votes as against the Communist leader's 8,181 votes in Shaher- 
kotda constituency. In Gomptipur constituency, Jesingbhai Parmar 
inflicted an equally crushing defeat on Somchand Makwana of the Republican 
party who only secured 7,460 votes compared to Jesingbhai's 21,589 votes. 
The picture was very different in 1967• Manharlal T. Shukla, Majur 
Mahajan candidate, secured the Asarva Assembly seat with 19,755 votes 
against a very respectable 17,675 votes secured by the CPI leader, 
Gordhanbhai L. Patel, who came second. In Kankaria, Jesingbhai's margin 
of victory was considerably reduced: he gained 19,620 votes, but his
nearest rival, Narsinhbhai Makwana, secured 15,874 votes. In Rakhial 
Shantilal Shah, the Majur Mahajan candidate, won more comfortably with 
25,092 votes; however, his nearest rival, Abdulrazak Biban Shaikh, a 
CPM candidate and prominent Sangram Samiti worker, secured as many as 
17,041 votes.
Thus the Majur Mahajan had important Central and State-level linkages, 
both in the Congress party and government, which enabled it to maintain 
and consolidate a unique influence among the industrial labour force 
in Ahmedabad through access to considerable patronage and decision­
making power on questions affecting labour welfare. However, particularly
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in the 1967 General Elections, the ambivalence of the Ahmedabad worker 
towards the Majur Mahajan can be clearly seen in cross-voting between 
Lok Sabha and Assembly elections and in reduced margins of victory 
for Majur Mahajan candidates in industrial labour constituencies. In 
general, the Ahmedabad worker continued to support the Majur Mahajan 
electorally to secure practical benefits, particularly in local and 
State elections, apart from the 1965 Ahmedabad municipal elections, 
which proved a fiasco for the Majur Mahajan with the successful challenge 
of the Sangram Samiti. However, in the Lok Sabha elections, the 
working-class desire by 1967 for a more militant trade union attitude 
and dislike of shop steward corruption and "outsider" leadership became 
manifest in cross-voting in the industrial constituencies of Asarva
71and Dariapur-Kazipur between State Assembly and Parliamentary elections.
4. CITY CONGRESS LEADERS AND STATE-LEVEL LINKAGES
In the early 1950s, Kantilal Ghia, Ahmedabad district boss (he 
was for many years President of the Ahmedabad Zilla Parishad), with 
the support of Kanjibhai Desai, GPCC President from 1948 to 1960, 
controlled the Ahmedabad City DCC. Trikamlal Patel,who had been 
part of the old Arjun Lala faction, which had opposed Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel in Ahmedabad City, initially cooperated with Ghia and was given 
control of the Congress Organization in Ahmedabad City and became 
President of the Ahmedabad City DCC between 1953 and 1956. (He had been
71. A c c o r d i n g  t o  a  s u r v e y  o f  t h e  A h m e d a b a d  e l e c t o r a t e ,  c o n c e n t r a t i n g
o n  t h e  K a l u p u r  S t a t e  A s s e m b l y  c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  i n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n ,  
"W o u ld  y o u  s a y  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  i s  r u n  f o r  a  f e w  b i g  i n t e r e s t s  o r  f o r  
t h e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a l l ? " ,  "JCf/o o f  A h m e d a b a d  v o t e r s  t h o u g h t  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
w a s  r u n  f o r  a  f e w  b i g  i n t e r e s t s .  T h i s  s h o w s  t h e  r a d i c a l  b e n t  i n  
A h m e d a b a d  p o l i t i c s ,  s e e  K . D .  D e s a i  an d  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  A S t u d y  o f  
P o l i t i c a l  B e h a v i o u r  i n  G u j a r a t  w i t h  S p e c i a l  R e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  F o u r t h  
G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  i n  1 9 6 7 .  (A h m e d ab ad : 1 9 7 0 ) .
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a Secretary of the Ahmedabad City DCC between 1946 and 1950> and Vice- 
President from 1951-52).
However, the linguistic agitation for Maha Gujarat caused Trikamlal
Patel to fall out with the official GPCC line in favour of the bigger
bilingual State of Bombay. He led a large element of the Ahmedabad
City DCC out of the Congress on the linguistic issue. Thus T r i k a m l a l
Patel's faction came to be known as the disloyal faction for its defection
from the Congress on the linguistic issue. This gave the Vimalbhai
Shah faction, supported by the Majur Mahajan and known as the most loyal
faction for supporting official GPCC policy on the linguistic issue,
an opportunity to control the Ahmedabad City DCC. With the death of
Kanjibhai Desai, GPCC President, in 1960, Ghia's influence in Ahmedabad
City politics diminished considerably, and he soon fell out with Trikamlal
Patel. Ghia's influence in Ahmedabad City revived again only in 1969
72with the upheavals of the Congress party split.
Thus, in the early 1960s, Majur Mahajan power at the local level 
was very great, and its State-level representatives in the GPCC, 
particularly Vasavda, were able to secure control of a large number of 
tickets from labour areas in the 1961 Municipal Corporation elections.
The tremendous success of the Majur Mahajan in the 1961 election 
(29 out of 31 Majur Mahajan candidates were elected, a dominating 
element in the Congress total of 50) reinforced their power and control 
over the City DCC.
7 2 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. S a n d  M r. F F  i n  A h m edabad  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 ,  an d  
L o n d o n  i n  J u n e  1 9 7 3  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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In the mid 60s, however, Trinkamlal Patel struggled to gain control
of the Ahmedabad City DCC. He had taken a vigorous part in the State-
level factional struggle between Jivraj Mehta, the Chief Minister,
and the GPCC leaders on the side of MorarjiDesai and the Organizational
leaders. It was Trikamlal Patel, whc* in fact, suggested that Jivraj
Mehta himself should be removed from power since he was openly challenging
Morarji Desai!s leadership and demanding total control of the allocation
of portfolios. Morarji Desai had been concerned, at first, only to
remove Jivraj Mehta1 s two lieutenants, Ratubhai Adani and Rasiklal
Parikh (Minister for Agriculture and Cooperation, and Home Minister respectively),
from power. Trikamlal Patel consistently wooed Morarji Desai at this
time, supporting him in his national ambitions, while a member of the
AICC, to become Prime Minister on the death of Nehru and again on the 
75death of Shastri.
In addition, the 1965 electoral fiasco, in which every single
Majur Mahajan candidate for the municipal elections was defeated in a 
wave of support for the Janta Parishad and Sangram Samiti leaders, 
gave Trikamlal Patel his chance and justification for winning control 
of the Ahmedabad City DCC again. He had clashed bitterly with the 
Majur Mahajan just before the election. He resented the Majur Mahajan1 s 
power to allocate seats in the labour areas, since his own local power- 
base was in Dariapur-Kazipur, an industrial labour locality, which he 
felt entitled him to some tickets in industrial labour wards. Bitterness 
over the English language question bought many Congressmen, including 
Jamnashankar Pandya and his group (known as the loyal faction for 
opposing the official GPCC line on the linguistic issue but remaining 
within the Congress fold) to oppose Vimalbhai Shah's faction, which 
received all the opprobrium attached to the official State policy on the
73. Interview with Mr. L in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
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English language question. Many Mandal Samitis were in revolt 
on the English question and wanted a bigger say in the selection of
t-r a
candidates than the GPCC and Ahmedabad City DCC would allow.
Following the suspension of former City Congress President, Vadilal
Mehta, from the Congress party for his stand in opposition to the
GPCC on the English language question, 50 leading Congressmen of
Ahmedabad, including Jamnashankar Pandya, issued a statement on February
5th, 1965» disapproving of the GPCC decision to suspend Mr. Mehta and
requesting the GPCC to revise its stand on the issue of the teaching
75of English in schools. Thus, in addition to strong Janta Parishad 
and Sangram Samiti opposition, internal Congress factionalism also 
sabotaged the Congress's chances in the 1965 Ahmedabad Municipal 
elections. The Vimalbhai N. Shah faction was held responsible for the 
crushing Congress defeat in these elections and this enabled Trikamlal, 
with the support and help of GPCC President Tribhovandas Patel to gain 
control at long last of the Ahmedabad City DCC. He superseded Vimalbhai 
Shah as President in 1965* and Jamnashankar Pandya became his Vice- 
President and loyal second in command.
Trikamlal Patel had never been on good terms with the Majur Mahajan 
group: he had, on the Maha Gujarat issue, opposeJ the Vimalbhai Shah
faction, supported by the Majur Mahajan, and resented the power given 
to the Majur Mahajan of selecting party candidates in industrial labour 
constituencies. The Majur Mahajan and Trikamlal Patel factions clashed 
again over the selection of candidates for the Legislative Assembly 
elections from Ahmedabad City in 1967* Majur Mahajan had gained
control of four MLA tickets from Ahmedabad City constituencies. However,
74. Sandesh , 17 January 1965*
75. Indian Express ^February , 19^5-
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they refused to allow Trikamlal to have a ticket from their quota.
Eventually Trikamlal Patel managed to secure the MLA ticket in the
Dariapur-Kazipur constituency, an industrial labour constituency,
previously the constituency of the former Gujarat Labour Ministep,
Mohanlal Vyas, through influence with GPCC leaders. He also wanted his
lieutenant, Jamnashankar Pandya, to be given a ticket from Shahpur
constituency, however, the Majur Mahajan were determined to put Mohanlal
P. Vyas forward as the Congress candidate from this constituency, and
in this case they succeeded in overriding the ambitions of Jamnashankar 
76Pandya. Other nominees of Trikamlal’s in Asarva, Rakhial and Kankaria 
constituencies were also overruledby Majur Mahajan influence in the GPEC.
Trikamlal managed to get elected as MLA from Dariapur-Kazipur 
constituency, despite stiff opposition from the CPM candidate, Dinkar 
Mehta, who secured 19,574 votes, compared to Trikamlal!s 20,887 votes. ^  
On becoming an MLA, Trikamlal Patel quit his position as President of 
the Ahmedabad DCC and helped his faithful lieutenant, Jamnashankar Pandya, 
to step into the Presidency of the Ahmedabad DCC, confident that in this 
way he could retain control of City politics while he was an MLA.
Flushed with his victory over the arch-Communist leader, Dinkar Mehta, 
Trikamlal eagerly sought a Cabinet post in the Hitendra Desai Ministry. 
However, he was not accommodated in the Ministry, although the Majur 
Mahajan again secured the post of Labour Minister for their representative, 
Shantilal Shah. Trinkamlal Patel, who felt that his victoiy over the 
Marxist Labour leader, Dinkar Mehta, gave him the right to represent 
Ahmedabad labour, was disgruntled that his claims had been rejected in 
favour of a Majur Mahajan candidate for a Cabinet post. This alienated
76. Faction fighting between the Majur Mahajan and Trikamlal Patel
played a part in the defeat of the former labour Minister, Mohanal 
P. Vyas, in Shahpur in 1967*
7 7 .  I n d i a n  E l e c t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n .  R e p o r t  on t h e  F o u r t h  G e n e r a l  E l e c t i o n s  
i n  I n d i a ,  1 9 6 7 .  (2 v o l s . )  ( D e l h i :  1 9 6 8 ) .
him from the GPCC leadership, particularly from Hitendra Desai, the 
Chief Minister, and he began to indulge in anti-Chief Minister activities. 
The fourth General Elections in Gujarat had left the Congress in a 
much weakened position vis-a-vis the Swatantra party as the following 
table shows:
TABLE J 8 PARTY ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE 1962 and 1967 STATE
ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN GUJARAT
Name of Party No. of Candidates No. of Seats Won % of Votes Pollec
1962 1967 1962 1967 1962 1967
Congress 154 168 115 93 50.77 45.9
Swatantra 106 148 26 66 24.32 58.2
Jan Sangh 26 18 - 1 1.33 2.1
SSP - 15 - - - 0.4
PSP 53 38 7 3 7.88 3.3
Republican
Party
12 3 - - O .58 0.1
Janta Parishad 33 3 1 1 4.24 0.5
Independent 115 220 7 4 10.28 9.5
The already narrow margin of seats between the Congress and Swatantra
became still more narrow as all opposition elements united to topple the
Chief Minister and the Congress Ministry's position became highly precarious.
Trikamlal. took part in some of these toppling movements against the
79Hitendra Desai Ministry.
78. D.N. Pathak, M.G.Parekh and K.D. Desai, Three General Elections in 
Gujarat.(1766) \ The Fourth General Elections: An Analysis .
(Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.* 19lo).
79. Interview with Trikmalal Patel, Ahmedabad, March 1971*
I
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While Trikamlal Patel was moving away from the Chief Minister, Jamnashankar 
Pandya began to assert his independence and courted the favour of the Chief 
Minister. Although two of the four Ahmedabad City DCC Secretaries were loyal to 
Trikamlal, Jamnashankar Pandya consolidated his hold on other DCC executive members 
and established fairly good relations with the Majur Mahajan group. In 1968, 
during the unprecendented floods in August, Jamnashankar Panyda worked hard to 
organise relief work from Ahmedabad to help the disaster areas and the Chief 
Minister’s campaign to save Gujarat from natural calamities. This brought 
w jl Xuuw o_i_l uj.uS,I xavo i w x oh trit> uiU6i Minister.
Seeing his. power-base in Ahmedabad City begin to crumble and deciding against 
defection to the Swatantra party, which was deeply divided into two groups, one 
led by H.M. Patel and the other by the Kshatriya leader, Jaideepsir^ji of Daria,^ 
Trikamlal Patel now concentrated on reversing his anti-Chief Minister activities 
and tried to win the Chief Minister’s favour. He now exerted himself to save the 
Hitendra Desai Ministry from falling, particularly after the Congress split in
811969* Allegations were made that the Swatantra and after the split the Indicate 
too were trying to kidnap MLAs belonging to the Organisation Congress, and induce 
them to defect, thus causing Congress (0) strength to fall very low. So Trikamlal 
Patel acted as a watchman and guard at the MLA hostels to prevent this from 
happening. On March 21st, 19^9> the Gujarat Assembly rejected the opposition 
motion of no-confidence brought against the Hitendra Desai Ministry by 98 
votes to 62, and the proceedings were enlivened by the narration by the 
Congress whip, Mr. Indubhai Patel, of a midnight car chase
80. After the Congress split, Jaideepsinigi of Daria led ~$2 MLAs out of the 
Swatantra party in protest against the Swatantra Party’s refusal to 
allow him to topple the Hitendra Ministry. He formed the Gujarat Praja 
Parishad, but soon joined the Congress V)which later accommodated him and 
two of his colleagues in the Ministry, see the Times of India ( Dombay)^ X X  
March , 1969*
81. The "Indicate" was a popular term for Indira Gandhi's Ruling Congress party 
current at this period, a play on the woid "Syndicate", which was a term used 
to describe the Old Congress or Organization Congress, as most of the Congress 
High Command "Syndicate" members had, in fact, plumped for Congress (0).
and an alleged unsuccessful opposition bid to whisk away a Congress 
81MLA. So strenuous were Trikamlal*s efforts to save the Ministry 
that he eventually won the friendship of Hitendra Desai. He also 
secured the support of the GPCC President, Vajubhai Shah, and the powerful 
GPCC Secretary, who had defected in 1966 from the PSP to the Congress, 
Brahmkumar Bhatt, who both played an important part in preventing 
Jamnashankar Pandya from getting his way in the selection of Congress 
candidates for the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections.
During the 1969 municipal elections, allegations were made against 
Jamnashankar Pandya that he sabotaged the attempt by the former Chairman 
of the Standing Committee,Biharilal P. Shah, who was in line to be the 
next Mayor, to be elected from Maninagar ward, so that his own protlg6, 
Narottambhai K. Jhaveri, could become Mayor instead. In the event, 
Biharilal Shah suffered a suprising defeat at the hands of the Jan Sangh, 
who, for the first time ever, scored a success in the Municipal Corporation 
elections, with two of their members being elected from Maninagar.
Other allegations of shady business deals in real estate made against 
Jamnashankar Pandya further turned City Congress opinion against him.
At the Lucknow session of the Organisation Congress, Morarji Desai 
first put forward his highly controversial plan for a Grand Alliance 
of the Swatantra, Jan Sangh and Congress (0) against Indira Gandhi !s 
Ruling Congress party, which was bitterly opposed by many GPCC leaders. 
Shrewdly, Trikamlal Patel supported Mo rarji Desai over this unpopular 
issue, and thus built up enough support to overthrow Jamnashankar Pandya 
from his position in the Ahmedabad City DCC. This was made easier by
81. Times of India ( Bombay)j2iMarch , 1969*
Jamnashankar Pandya's anti-party speeches, and eventually he defected to
the Congress (R), leaving the Ahmedabad City DCC once more in the hands
of Trikamlal who now made another of his lieutenants, a former City
82DCC Vice-President, Ranchhodlal^a101^  President of the City DCC.
Thus local Congress politicians were intimately concerned with 
State-level political faction struggles, and realised the importance 
of securing allies at the State-level in terms of political patronage 
i.e. power over the selection of Congress candidates in various elections, 
Cabinet positions, which would catapult them into the rank of State-level 
leaders, and other material benefits, which could also help consolidate 
their local power-base.
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82. Interview with Mr. L_ i*\ Ahmedabad, March 1971* Kantilal Ghia, 
another political opponent of Trikamlal also defected to the 
Congress (R) when he did not obtain adequate support in a Peoples* 
Cooperative Bank election.
CHAPTER VI
AGITATIONAL POLITICS IN AHMEDABAD CITY: THE CAREER OF THE JANTA PARISHAD
From Linguistic Movement to Economic Agitation.
On the formation of the separate State of Gujarat in 1960, most 
of the constituent elements of the Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad, which 
included almost every shade of political opinion, felt that, as the 
raison d’etre of the organisation had been achieved, it should now be 
disbanded and only a small committee should be appointed to try to 
have a martyrs' memorial statue put up before Congress House for those
-jwho had lost their lives in the police firing of 1956. However, at 
the Nadiad convention in June 1960, some Independent radicals, led by 
the MGJP President, Indulal Yagnik, decided to continue the organizat­
ion, under the name of Nutan Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad, as an indep­
endent pressure-group, which would work to ensure that the Gujarat 
government, formed as a result of the creation of a separate linguistic 
state through popular agitation, would indeed be a "Peoples' Government" 
("Janta Raj") i.e. run on broad socialist lines for the benefit of the 
mass of kisans and mazdurs. They felt that the representative Govern­
ment of Gujarat and its administration should be conducted in the lang­
uage of the people in order to carry out the aspirations of the mass of 
2the people. The NMGJP was largely an organisation of middle-class 
radicals from inner-city areas such as Dariapur and Shahpur (i.e. middle- 
class and lower middle-class areas as opposed to working class areas), 
which had been most strongly affected by the linguistic agitation. It 
tried to dissociate itself from partisan influences by including in 
its constitution a clause that no member of any political party as such
1. Justice N.K. Vakil, Report on the Incident of Police Firing at 
.^^ hffledabad on the 5th August, 1964, and other Incidents on the 
5th and £>th August, 1964 (henceforth to be referred to as the 
Vakil Report), p. 158
2. Interview with Indulal Yagnik in Ahmedabad in February, 1971*
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can become a member of the new organisation.
Due largely to the carry-over of linguistic sentiments and 
emotional feelings on the issue of the martyrs' memorial, aroused 
during the linguistic agitation, and to the considerable constituency 
nnursing"of its candidates, it secured nine seats out of a total of 
seventy in the 1961 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections. 
Although it was the main opposition party with one seat more than 
the PSP, its impact was considerably reduced by the massive Congress 
majority of fifty out of seventy seats in 1961. As the table below 
shows the majority of these successful Janta Parishad candidates 
were high caste, often professional men, whose electoral strength 
was concentrated in the inner-city areas:
TABLE 1.^  The Ward, Caste and Occupation of Janta Parishad Corporat­
ors elected in 1961.
3
Name Ward Occupation Caste
1. Ashok C. Mehta Kalupur 2 Doctor Jain Bania
2. Somabhai C. Desai Kalupur 2 Doctor Kadwa Patidar
3- Gokuldas S. Patel Kalupur 2 Small Businessman Patel
4. Manubhai Palkiwala Dariapur Lawyer Jain Bania
5. Jayantilal K. Raval Dariapur Employee in private 
firm
Brahmin
6. Vasudev N. Tripathi Shahpur Doctor Brahmin
7- Purshottam D. Patel Shahpur Small Businessman Patel
8. Shamsuddin G. Munshi Shahpur Lawyer Muslim
9. Purshottam Madavji Shahpur Social worker Harijan
3. Vakil Report, p.152
4. Compiled from data made available by the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation in March 1971*
Communist Party Penetration of the NMGJP
At the 6th Conference of the Gujarat State Committee of the Indian
Communist Party in 1962, the Gujarat State Communist Party claimed much
of the credit for achieving a separate linguistic state through the efforts
of Communist party members in the Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad. Its General
Secretary, Mr. Dinkar Mehta, expounded the strategy of a combined peasants'
and workers' movement in the country side and the cities, and the tactical
advantage to the Communists in achieving this of joining United Front
5movements, like the Janta Parishad. Following these tactics, the Comm­
unist Party was opposed to the dissolution of the MGJP, and very vocal 
on the question of the continuation of the organisation. The NMGJP was 
founded with Communist support although Indulal Yagnik tried to preserve 
its independent nature by the clause that no party member could join the 
NM6IP. However, about a year later the clause was dropped, and Communist 
party members began to penetrate the new organisation. Indulal Yagnik's 
thesis of "Janta Raj" was one which was acceptable in ideological terms 
to the Communists. In the elections to the executive committee of the 
Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad (on the 6th Jan., 1964* the organisation 
decided to drop the word "Nutan" in its title and reverted to its orig­
inal name), held during the MGJP Conference in Ahmedabad on the 25th and 
26th January, 1964» Dinkar Mehta, General Secretary of the Gujarat State 
Communist party and leader of the Ahmedabad City Communist party, was
elected one of the Vice-Presidents of the MGJP, and many Communists from
£
Ahmedabad were elected to the executive committee. The following table 
of the officeholders of the Central Executive Committee of the MGJP, 
elected in January 1964* shows that, out of the total of thirty-two, 
twelve were Communist party members, and, out of the Ahmedabad contingent 
of thirteen, seven were Communist party members:
5. Vakil Report, p.173
6. From the Resolutions of the Maha Gu.iarat Janta Parishad's Jan.25-26 
(1964) Conference.
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TABLE 2. The Proportion of Communist Party members of the Central 
Executive Committee of the MGJP elected in January, 1964*
Name____________________ Position_______ Region_________ Party Membership
1. Indulal Yagnik President - -
2. Dinkar Mehta Vice-President Ahmedabad Communist
3. Jashwant Chauhan Vice-Pre sident Surat
4- Janab Esadali Sayyid Vice-President Broach
5. Mithabhai Parsana Vice-President Saurashtra
6 . Keshavlal Bhatt Vice-President Ahmedabad
7. Ratilal Shah Secretary Ahmedabad
8. Manubhai Palkiwala Secretary Ahmedabad
9. Chandubhai Patel Secretaiy Baroda
10. Kantilal Choksi Secretary Broach
11. Manubhai Patel Treasurer Ahmedabad Communist
12. Somabhai Desai Exec. Member Ahmedabad
13. Ashok Mehta Exec. Member Ahmedabad
14. Vasudev Tripathi Exec. Member Ahmedabad
15. Naliniben Mehta Exec. Member Ahmedabad Communist
16. Sohrabbhai Murtuja Exec. Member Ahmedabad Communist
17. Abdulrazak Exec. Member Ahmedabad Communist
18. Gordhanbhai Patel Exec. Member Ahmedabad Communist
19. Sakharam Rathod Exec. Member Ahmedabad Communist
20. Shantilal Vasa Exec. Member Jamnagar Communist
21. Popatlal Patel Exec. Member Rajkot
22. Niruben Patel Exec. Member Bhavnagar Communist
23. Harubhai Mehta Exec. Member Rajkot
.OJ Pranlal Shah Exec. Member Bhuj-Kutch
.LTN
CM Balchandra Trivedi Exec. Member Baroda Communist
26. Vishnuprasad Shastri Exec. Member Baroda
27. Premchand Jain Exec. Member Petlad
28. Thakorbhai Shah Exec. Member Broach Communist
•On
CM Natubhai Shah Exec. Member Surat
30. Amrutlal Desai Exec. Member Surat Communist
31. Mohansinh Barad Exec. Member Surat
32. Dilipchand Thakor Exec. Member Mehsana
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In the following year, Dinkar Mehta was elected President of the
Ahmedabad City Janta Parishad in place of Indulal Yagnik. In September
1963, the Samyukta Kamdar Sangram Samiti (United Workers' Battle Committee)
was set up as the labour wing of the MGJP, and all-India Communist leaders,
Mr. Dange and Mr. Patkar, were invited to address a public meeting held
by the SKSS on the 26th January 1964- Members of the SKSS, including
Mr. Indulal Yagnik himself, attended AITUC meetings, and when the Rashtriya
Sangram Samiti was established in October 1964* AITUC members were rep- 
7resented in it. 
ii) Focus on Economic Issues:
During the mid-60s, the MGJP,which during the linguistic agitation 
had been almost exclusively dependent on middle and lower-middle class 
support confined to the inner-city areas, tried to broaden itself from a 
narrow linguistic agitation appealing to middle-class sentiments and 
interests into a radical economic movement, centred on the explosive 
dearness allowance issue and the spiralling cost of living, appealing 
directly to the working class, especially to the textile mill workers, who 
constitute the dominant element in the labour force. Textile workers 
number about 140,000 and, constitute approximately 84% of the labour
Qforce in manufacturing industry.
The mid-60s, from about 1962, saw a gradual deterioration in the 
economic situation not only in Ahmedabad City and in Gujarat but in 
the whole country. As with most economies heavily dependent on the dominant 
primary sector, bad climatic conditions and the failure of harvests saw 
a deepening food crisis in which the effect on prices generally and the 
necessity to import large quantities of wheat and rice caused a general 
economic recession. It became obvious that greater priority would have 
to be given to the agricultural sector in future Plan outlays. As shown
7. Vakil Report, p. 159*
8. Census Special Report I« p.244-
in Table 3> the All-India wholesale price index rose by 11.9 per cent 
between 1963 1964* and by 8.8 per cent between 1964 and 1965* The
rise was particularly sharp in the case of edible oils, cereals and pulses. 
In 1964> the index for edible oils was 26.8% higher than in 1963* In 
the case of cereals, it was 20.2% higher, and in the case of pulses 40*8% 
higher. This resulted in a 16.6% increase in 1964 over 1963 lor the 
group "food articles". Calculating the average of the percentage varia­
tions over the preceding years, it is found that the wholesale prices 
of all commodities during 1961 to 1965 increased at an average annual 
rate of 6.5%« This rate of increase was particularly marked in the 
case of pulses (18.0%), cereals (9.2%), edible oils (7-7%) and all food 
articles (8.6% )9
The situation in Gujarat, which was a food-deficit State, was part­
icularly serious. The Gujarat State retail price index numbers, cal­
culated on the basis of the prices collected at the District Headquarters 
with the base year 1962, showed a marked upward trend in the prices of 
foodgrains, pulses, ground nut oil and gur. Important foodgrains like 
wheat, ba.jri and jowar showed increases of over 50% and pulses of almost 
80% in 1965 over 1962. Ground nut oil and jur prices went up by 35% or 
more. Correspondingly, the index numbers of consumer prices for the 
working class in Ahmedabad from 1962 to 1965» compiled by the Labour 
Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India, with base 
year 1960, showed a steep rise especially during 1964* as shown in the 
following table: (
9 .  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c s  a n d  S t a t i s t i c s ,  S o c i o e c o n o m i c  R e v i e w  o f  G u j a r a t  
S t a t e :  1 9 6 5 - 6 6 . ( D i r e c t o r a t e  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n ,  G o v e r n m e n t  o f
G u j a r a t ,  A h m e d a b a d :  1 9 6 6 ) .
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10TABLE 4* Index numbers of consumer prices for industrial workers
in Ahmedabad City, 1962 to 1965* (Year 1960 = 100).
Months General Index for 1962: 1963: 1964: 1965:
1. January 102 103 111 130
2. February 103 104 115 127
3* March 103 105 116 125
4* April 103 106 117 125
5* May 104 106 118 128
6. June 105 107 119 127
7* July 105 108 122 128
8. August 105 108 121 131
9* September 105 109 124 131
10. October 105 109 126 130
11. November 106 110 127 131
12. December 105 111 130 132
Annual Average: 104*3 107*2 120.5 128.8
1964? a year of industrial unrest and political agitation in Ahmedabad,
showed the most startling rise in consumer prices of all the years between
1962 and 1965: the consumer price index rose by almost 20 points between
January and December 1964* whereas it had only risen by 3 points between
January and December 1962 and 8 points between January and December 1963»
11and only 2 points between January and December 1965* Table 5 » which
shows a break-down of the consumer price index numbers into group indices 
differentiating between prices for food, housing, clothing etc. for the 
years 1964 and 1965* reveals that the food index, which stood at 110 in
January 1964> reached the level of 138 in January 1965» Among other indices,
10. Prom the Gu.iarat State Socioeconomic Review( 1965-66) } p.27*
11. From the Gu.iarat State Socioeconomic Review/ 1965-66^ p.89*
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236TA~RLE 
5, 
Consumer 
Price 
Index 
Numbers 
for 
Industrial 
Workers 
at 
Ahmedabad, 
1964-65* 
(Base: 
1960 
= 
100).
the index numbeig for all groups except pan, supari, tobacco and intox­
icants were higher in January 1965* than in January 1964* These figures 
directly link up to years of particular political and industrial unrest: 
August 1963 and August 1964 were months of high-pitched industrial unrest 
and political activity marked by hartals. 1963 and 1964 were years when 
the labour wing of the Janta Parishad, the Sangram Samiti, was gaining 
its maximum support.
The Central government's interim measures to deal with the food crisis 
and consequent inflation and hoarding of agricultural commodities were 
price controls, enforcement of stock declaration, a credit squeeze, 
proposals for State trading in foodgrains and the creation of food zones, 
limiting the free movement and trade of agricultural commodities. The 
Gujarat Government bitterly opposed the food zones policy which resulted 
in delays and inefficiency, and was dependent upon inadequate local 
production and massive Central aid which, in 1964> amounted to 60,000 
tons of wheat and 20,000 tons of rice every month, rising to 100,000 
tons of foodgrains per month in 1965 by the increase of 20,000 tons, which 
included coarse grains.^
Against this background of food shortages, inflation and economic 
recession, the conservative, constitutional and non-militant trade 
unionism, represented by the Majur Mahajan, came under attack by a new, 
militant, agitational trade union and labour movement under the leader­
ship of the Samyukta Kamdar Sangram Samiti, the labour and working 
class wing of the MGJP. It represented an attempt by the MGJP, under 
the impact of Communist penetration and the economic situation, to break 
the hold of the Majur Mahajan over the working class in Ahmedabad City.
It reflected as much as it created a mass movement against rising prices 
and inadequacy of dearness allowance paid to industrial workers, but it 
was also a genuine attempt to create an alternative trade union structure 
to that of the Majur Mahajan.
12. rTimes of India (Bombay),3QJan. , 19 6 5-
The transformation of the NMGJP can be seen in a comparison of 
the 1962 General Election Manifesto of the NMGJP with the much more 
economically incisive and detailed Resolutions and Manifesto of the 
Maha Gujarat Kamdar Parishad, resulting from its Conference in Ahmedabad 
on the 25th and 26th January, 1964» to which the all-India Communist
•j "Z -J Atrade union leader, Mr. Dange, was also invited. The former 
concerned itself with deploring the excessive expenditure involved in 
the construction of the new capital city of Gandhinagar, which it 
considered unnecessary anyway; protesting against the Government’s ban 
on the use of loudspeakers in public meetings; demanding a memorial 
for the martyrs of 1956; and agitating for land reforms and govern­
ment concessions to small farmers and owner cultivators. Only a 
small paragraph was devoted to the problems of industrial workers with 
a passing reference to the lack of reality in the figure for house 
rents used in the assessment of the dearness allowance and the meagre­
ness of the bonus paid to the workers in comparison to the enormous 
profits of the millowners.
In the January, 1964» Resolutions and Manifesto of the Maha 
Gujarat Kamdar Parishad, the questions of dearness allowance, bonus, 
wages and conditions of work are dealt with at length in an incisive, 
urgent and authoritative manner. At a huge workers' procession and 
meeting on the 26th January on the Sabarmati River bed, Indulal Yagnik 
made this rousing speech, deploring the fact that the Congress Govern­
ment had not achieved the goals for which the Maha Gujarat struggle 
was fought:
— "Thirty young people have given their lives in order to fulfil the 
dream of the formation of Maha Gujarat by brave Narmad (a Gujarati poet)
13* On the evening of the 25th, Mr. Dange lectured before a huge
meeting of workers which was organised on the dry Sabarmati River bed.
14* NMGJP Election Manifesto( 1962).
and respected Gandhi ji and Sardar. The people of Gujarat have acquired 
this Maha Gujarat after suffering many difficulties and cruelty, and 
still many troubles of middle class Gujaratis and workers and farmers 
and farm workers have not been removed. For four years, this Gujarat 
Congress Government has failed to achieve economic, social and cultural 
freedom. Even after 15 years of Independence, the Indian Congress 
Government has not been able to progress fully. Independence has been 
obtained by precious sacrifices, but the economic independence has not 
come, and that's why in the nation there is a feeling of despair and 
darkness.. In the country, the tussle between the rich and the poor is 
getting worse." —
The Parishad passed resolutions demanding increased bonus; a 25% rise 
in wages; immediate improvement in the assessment of the dearness 
allowance and an ad hoc increment of Rs.25 per month; a reasonable 
minimum wage, especially for municipal employees (who were engaged in 
bitter wage negotiations); that all workers of every industry should 
get social insurance schemes, a provident fund scheme, 21 days leave 
with pay, 15 days sick leave with pay and 10 days casual leave with 
pay; and that mills should provide workers with proper housing accomm­
odation, and no new permits should be given to start new industries with­
out suitable accommodation for workers. A detailed criticism was made 
of the shortcomings and partiality of the Bombay Industrial Relations 
Act of 1946. A proposal was put forward by Ratilal Shah and seconded 
by Shantilal Vasa for the abolition of the Bombay Industrial Relations 
Act; it demanded that the worker should have the right to appeal 
individually and directly to the Labour Court for any dispute and 
not necessarily through the representative union, the Majur Mahajan.
The Workers' Manifesto sought solidarity between industrial workers 
and insecure middle-class employees and white-collar workers such as
clerks, teachers, government and municipal employees, shop assistants, bank, 
insurance and postal employees. It also appealed strongly to the urban
periphery of the unemployed, underemployed and casual labour force:
— "The labour class has been crushed under the mill of exploitation 
and suppression for a long time. Farm workers in the villages, un­
touchables, scheduled Tribes and poor backward class people do not 
earn enough to subsist on in the present days of high cost of living. 
They live in hunger and unemployment for 3-4 months in the year. For 
them there is no bonus or dearness allowance, no legal rights, not 
even huts to live in. Even in a big city like Ahmedabad, lakhs of 
these labourers live in 60,000 filthy hutments, and thousands in little 
rooms in overcrowded and dirty tenements....Wages are not steady in 
small industries and hours of work are also not fixed. There are no 
Laws and even if there are, they are not obeyed. People work like 
slaves. If somebody complains and demands, the sword of unemploy­
ment hangs over him, and there is no amount of injustice and insults... 
In mills, contract system is still existing. For years all the workers 
are called temporary and permanent workers are deprived of their rights.
The owners earning crores of rupees use various tricks by which workers
15do not get dearness allowance and their proper rights"—
The Communists overtly tried to dominate the economic movement, 
centred on the dearness allowance issue, by making their own trade 
union, ^  the Mill Kamdar Union, the principal vehicle of the move­
ment, but Indulal Yagnik, with a mixture of his characteristic ideol­
ogical ambiguity and shrewd political sense, refused to work with an 
overtly Communist union; and it was also generally felt that more 
workers would be weaned away from the Majur Mahajan if a new less 
explicitly Communist union was formed. Thus the Maha Gujarat Mill 
Mazdur Union was formed on January 1st, 1964» and. the Communist 
Mill Kamdar Union merged with it. As a consolation to the Communists
15. Workers1 Manifesto and Resolutions of the Maha Gujarat Kamdar Parishad 
at its meeting on the 25-26 January 1964 in Ahmedabad.
1 6 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
the name of Mill Mazdur Union which was the name of the original
Communist textile workers1 trade union, which was declared illegal in
the 1930s,was adopted. A formula of having as equal a number as possible
of Communist and non-party members of the executive committee of the
Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union was worked out, and, when the Gujarat
unit of the Communist Party split into two in September 1964> an attempt
was made to maintain a balance between CPI, CPM and Janta Parishad
executive committee members. However, the Communist party, and, after
the split in 19&4* bhe CPM became and remained the most active
17element in the new trade union. The following table indicates the 
extent of the Communists as office-holders in the Maha Gujarat Mill 
Mazdur Union in January 1964s
17* From the Workers' Manifesto and Resolutions of the Maha Gujarat 
Kamdar Parishad,(2 5 -26 Jan.1964X
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The economic movement launched by the Samyukta Kamdar Sangram
Samiti, which coordinated the labour activities of the MGJP, and
18the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union, derived its impetus largely 
from the dearness allowance issue, which provided a powerful plat­
form from which to challenge the credibility and the legitimacy of the 
Majur Mahajan, the Gujarat Government and the textile millowners. Although 
the SKSS also tried to organise unions of engineering workers, transport
workers and shop assistants, 90% of its membership and much of its
19impact was on the Ahmedabad textile labour force. The dearness
allowance paid to textile workers of Ahmedabad before 1964 was computed
on the basis of the cost of living index series, which in turn was based
on the Inquiry into the Family Budgets of Industrial Workers in Ahmedabad,
made as early as 1926-27. The purpose of the dearness allowance was to
neutralise price increases so that the workers1 real income and standard
of living would not fall with price rises. The Majur Mahajan had appealed
20to the Industrial Court in 1940 for the first time to grant a dearness 
allowance to the textile workers due to the sharp price rises as a result 
of wartime conditions, black marketeering and profiteering. The Industrial 
Court accepted the necessity for granting d.a. at the rate of Rs.3-8-0 
paise per month on every rise in the cost of living index of eleven points 
for the duration of the war. It accepted the 1926-27 Industrial Workers' 
Family Budget Inquiry as the basis for the cost of living index and cal­
culations of the d.a. At the end of the war, the Majur Mahajan appealed
18. The SKSS was founded in September 1965 as the labour front of the 
MGJP to coordinate the labour and trade union activities that the 
MGJP was about to undertake. The Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdoor Union 
was formed on the 1 January 1964* Similar unions were established 
for transport workers and shop assistants(Gomasta Mandal), and there 
was also an Engineering and General Workers' Union. There was con­
siderable overlapping among the top leadership of the SKSS and the MGMMU.
19. Interview with Dinkar Mehta in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
20. Majur Mahajan pamphlet, Your Dearness Allowance, (translated from the 
the Gujarati, Tamaru Mongvari Bathujf Feb. 196 .^
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to the Industrial Court to continue d.a. due to the continuation of high
prices. Finally in the Court's 1948 Award, the principles for granting
d.a. were fixed permanently, and it was decided that the least paid
worker should get 100% neutralisation of price increases, and should
receive d.a. at the rate of Rs.4-3-8 paise per month for every rise of
eleven points in the cost of living index i.e. 2.84 paise every day for
21every one point rise in the index.
However, with the passage of time, serious anomalies became apparent
in the Government of Gujarat's cost of living index series on which the
d.a. was calculated. There were four main discrepancies in the cost of
living index by the early 1960s. The figure for house rents had been
kept frozen since 1930* when the last inquiry into house rents had
taken place, at the amazingly low figure of Rs.4-91 n.p. The SKSS
justly pointed out in their propaganda that even subsidized rents of rooms
in government and municipal housing tenements were more than this, and
were considerably higher in privately-owned chawls and even hutment-
22dwellers paid more than this. Similarly, the price of cloth had been 
kept fixed since 1952-53 due to the rapidity with which the varieties 
of cloth stated in the 1926-27 Inquiry, and similar varieties went out 
of production. Only thirty items were taken into account in the calcul­
ation of the cost of living index, and many important items such as 
medical expenses, expenses of education, soap, shoes etc. were omitted.
The weight of miscellaneous expenditure had been kept at four, although
2 zit now constituted 13% of expenditure.
21. Ibid.
22. The monthly economic rent for tenement rooms constructed by the Gujarat 
Housing Board in 19&4 varied from Rs.25.70 to Rs.87«35» and subsidized 
rent per month varied from Rs.15.00 to Rs.43*75* See Census Special 
Report I, p.110
25. See Dinkar Mehta, Dishonesty in the Assessment of the Dearness Allow­
ance. (translated from ihe Gujarati, Mongvarina Ankni Chetarpindi). 
Pamphlet published by the SKSS in Jan.1964.
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Government, the Majur Mahajan and the millowners for neglecting these
anomalies in the calculation of the cost of living index series, and
thereby in the assessment of d.a., on the publication in March 1963*
in the Indian Government's Labour Gazette, of the results of a fresh
inquiry into the family budgets of Ahmedabad workers. Following the
recommendation of the Second Five Year Plan, the Labour Bureau, Simla
and the Central Statistical Office had conducted a fresh family budget
inquiry for industrial workers in Ahmedabad in 1958-59» which was based
on a new price evaluation of 222 items in working class expenditure.^
With this as the basis, the Government of India had started publishing the
new cost of living index for Ahmedabad, which started at 100 for the base
year, 1960. Central government experts had recommended that the new cost
of living index series should be linked with the old Gujarat State
index with the linking factor of 2.98, arrived at by taking the annual
average of the monthly index numbers of the State series for the year
251960, which was 298. The Government of India had been trying to persuade 
the Government of Gujarat to adopt the new cost of living index series 
and its linkage factor, after first removing the anomalies in the old 
State series. The SKSS based its popular agitation on these new facts, 
and also criticized the Government of India and the Government of Gujarat 
for not seeking to remove the anomalies in the old State index series 
before linking it to the new index. The SKSS called for the granting of 
d.a. for one year on the basis of the revised and improved old Gujarat 
State cost of living index after which a fresh Family Budget Inquiry 
should take place, which would take account of the higher workers'
The SKSS based its blistering propaganda against the Gujarat
24. Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India. 
Report of the Family Living Survey Among Industrial Workers (in 
Ahmedabad), 1958-59.
25. See Paresh Majumdar's unpublished Ph.D. thesis on the Majur Mahajan. 
^hijarat University, Ahmedabad ;1970)»
living standards and pattern of expenditure, resulting in a greater
26and juster assessment of the d.a.
The strength of the SKSS's appeal lay in its macrolevel approach to 
industrial disputes. It focused attention on the totality of the problem 
of d.a., as it affected all mills and all textile workers. It highlighted 
the total conditions of the industry and the workers, and its propaganda 
that, in 1961-62, using the old cost of living index, actual wages did 
not reflect accurately price increases and thus the workers1 real wage 
was less than during the Second World War, proved devastating.
The Majur Mahajan had a more microlevel piecemeal approach to 
industrial problems. It took up the problem of d.a. in one mill and tried 
to resolve it, and moved on to try to solve another mill’s problems. The 
Majur Mahajan reacted rather late to the trends regarding d.a., and thought 
that the existing machinery was good enough to generate change. In its 
pamphlet, "Tamaru Mongvari Bathu" ("Your dearness allowance"), published 
in February 1964> it tried, somewhat unconvincingly, to justify and 
rationalise its delay in responding to and agitating for the removal of 
the anomalies in the cost of living index, and in seeking to get a fresh 
Family Budget Inquiry instituted. It asserted that, according to 
expert opinion, changes in the pattern of life and expenditure of the 
workers can only be discerned after a period of 10-15 years. Thus, 
according to this reasoning, a new Family Budget Inquiry should have 
been made in 1940—41» but, as the Second World War was going on with all 
its attendant problems of shortages, rationing and inflation, information 
collected at this time would have been misleading. Nevertheless the 
Central Government made an Enquiry into Family Budgets in 1944-45* but the 
Majur Mahajan refused to accept this as a true reflection of workers'
26. See Dinkar Mehta, Dishonesty in the Assessment of the Dearness 
Allowance.
living conditions since people could not use adequate amounts of clothing, 
kerosene, food etc. due to wartime shortages and rationing. The Majur 
Mahajan asserted that an Enquiry could only he held in normal conditions, 
free from the distortions of war and its aftermath, and thus it had 
accepted the 1926-27 Inquiry as the basis for the assessment of d.a. in 
the 1940s. However, even this reasoning could not quite justify a delay 
until 1956 before the Majur Mahajan began to tackle this problem, having 
conducted a small investigation of its own into house rents and cloth 
prices. Even then, it only called for piecemeal changes in the old cost 
of living index series, and did not call for a new Family Budget Enquiry. 
It chiefly concerned itself with writing to the Bombay Government about 
changes in house rents. The Bombay Government replied that, as there 
was a Rent Control Act in Ahmedabad, the question of a rise in house rents 
did not arise! It added that to make an inquiry into house rents alone 
and improve the index only on this score was not scientific. In writing 
to the Central Government about changes in house rents and cloth prices, 
it received the reply that, in a short time, a new inquiry was to be made 
into the whole problem of Ahmedabad workers' living conditions. Thus the 
Majur Mahajan's delayed, piecemeal approach to the dearness allowance 
problem contrasted strongly with the SKSS's broad contention, on which 
its agitation was based, that the workers' real wage had fallen since 
his pay packet did not adequately neutralise sharp price rises due to 
anomalies in the old cost of living index.
The SKSS took advantage of the intergenerational leadership struggle
going on within the Majur Mahajan at this time, and of the workers'
dissatisfaction with Majur Mahajan representatives (Pratinidhis), many
27of whom were trying to rival the old-time jobbers in corruption.
27. Discussions with Jitendra Dholakia, Reader in Economics, Gujarat 
University, Ahmedabad, in March 1971.
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During the early 1960s, the older, paternalistic, middle class leader­
ship of men like the General Secretary Sbyamprasad R. Vasavda, and like 
the two Secretaries, Arvind Buch and Manharlal S h u k l a ; was being chall­
enged by the Inspectors and shop stewards recruited from the rank and
28file of the working class. S.R. Vasavda, Arvind Buch and Manharlal 
Shukla were all Nagar Brahmins, coming from the distinguished caste which 
provided so many leading administrators and professional men in Gujarat.
A large proportion of the officers in the Secretariat of the Majur Mahajan, 
as set out in Table 7» were older high-caste men from middle class back­
grounds or older conservative Harijans, most of whom had been politically 
activated during the Nationalist Movement.
28. Subbiah Kannappan in Kannappan III writes of evidence of an 
independence of outlook among newer workers and the younger 
leaders. Their desire for more responsibility and leadership 
is one of the greatest challenges in the development of the Majur 
Mahajan.
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Another factor in the leadership struggle was the contention that political 
nominees of the Majur Mahajan, especially for the State Legislative Assembly 
seats were drawn largely from high caste, middle-class trade union leaders 
with the exception of a conservative Harijan nominee in a Reserved Constit­
uency.
Parallel to the leadership struggle there was considerable dissatis­
faction felt by the textile workers with Majur Mahajan representatives, 
especially long-entrenched ones, for the workers' job security and conditions 
of work were often dependent on the goodwill of the shop steward. Many 
shop stewards, especially long-entrenched ones, wanted their palms to 
be greased by the worker for good offices in securing him recruitment,
retrenchment compensation according to the Industrial Disputes Act,
30seniority, promotion, a loan from the Majur Sahkari Bank (Workers'
Cooperative Bank, run by the Majur Mahajan) and any other benefits despite
31the fact that the shop stewards are elected by the workers.
30. The MOA, in its replies to the Ciuestionnaire of the National 
Commission on Labour (see MOA Annual Report for 1967* Appendix, p.8), 
admitted that a rational promotion policy did not exist in the 
Ahmedabad textile industry, where traditional promotion methods 
were largely followed, resulting in the fact that the highest, most 
coveted post to which an employee could aspire was that of jobber, 
for which leadership qualities rather than technical expertise were 
necessary, since the jobber had a large say in promotion and many 
other aspects of a millworker's condition of work. The limited 
existence of opportunities for promotion helped to perpetuate this 
system, and due to an entrenched distrust of modernism and 
sophistication, partly resulting from an imperfect understanding of 
Gandhianism, the TLA did not object very vigorously to this state 
affairs.
31. G.Y. Patel, The Ahmedabad Textile Worker, in the Times of India 
(Ahmedabad) ,31 Oct. , 1971* The shop steward had stepped into the 
shoes of the old-time jobber, described in the Royal Commission 
on Labour's Report in 1930> who used to lend money to the workers 
at exorbitant interest rates and help get them accommodation in 
overcrowded slums. All powers regarding the punishment of workers 
were vested in him. See Paresh Majumdar's unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis on the Majur Mahajan. (Gujarat University, Ahmedabadt 1970).
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Indeed so profitable and sought-after was the post of TLA mill represent­
ative that prospective candidates were prepared to spend Rs.2000 or 
more in securing their election. Workers reacted by resentment against 
the Majur Mahajan and a demand for the substitution of the entrenched 
shop steward by a younger, better educated man. In the mid-60s the SKSS 
seemed to provide a possible alternative to the Majur Mahajan, and an 
opportunity to canalize their frustrations with the Majur Mahajan into 
a constructive outlet.
The SKSS made considerable in-roads into the Majur Mahajan support 
base, which is only partially reflected in the steady decline in Majur 
Mahajan membership figures during the mid-60s (See Table 8), because 
many textile workers during this period had a duplicate membership of 
both the Majur Mahajan and the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union. Estimates 
of the peak membership figures of the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union vary 
from 50,000 claimed by SKSS members to 20-30,000 claimed by more 
impartial sources.
TABLE 8. Majur Mahajan Total Membership Figures, 1937-1967.^
YEAR Total Membership
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
78,811 
97,795 
95,876 
101,114  
104,040 
101,315 
93,770 
82,287
1965 March: 94,654
December: 93,687
1966
1967
103,705
111,296
32. Majur Mahajan Annual Reports. 1957-67.
It was largely more militant Muslim,Patidar and non-Gujarati
textile workers from the weaving section of theMajur Mahajan, who joined
33the SKSS and the Maha GujaratMill Mazdur Union. The higher caste 
workers in the weaving section tended to have a more militant political 
consciousness than the more conservative and apathetic Harijan workers 
of the spinning department. Non-Gujarati textile workers, from states 
like Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, were more militant 
because they had come from states with more radical working class 
traditions. The weavers were also technically more advanced, more skilled 
workers and had always been in the forefront of demands for higher 
wage levels and improved working conditions. Even the Textile Labour 
Associations Annual Report for 1963-64 commented on the fall in member­
ship figures, noting that the largest reduction was of 6986 workers from 
the weaving department, whereas in the throstle and reeling departments 
(dominated by Harijans) membership actually increased. (See Table 9).
TABLE 9» The Department-wise strength of Ma.jur Mahajan membership 1963-64.
Group Department No. of Members
1962-63____________ 1963-64
A. Frame, Card 11,870 10,517
B. Throstle 21,174 22,000
C. Reelers 664 740
D. Winders 4,015 3,734
E . ( 1) Weaving 32,194 25,208(2) Warping 3,335 3,029
F. (1) Folding 3,565 3,289
(2) Sizing 5,693 4,383
G. Jobbers, Mukadams - -
H. Clerks 2,664 2,667
I. Engineers, Mechanics 5,638 4,356
J. General 2,958 2,364
93,770 82,287
33. Interview with Dinkar Mehta in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
Although no exact figures are available, it has been estimated that non- 
Gujaratis constitute 20% of the membership of the TLA,^ and the 
following table gives a rough impression of the caste and communal 
composition of the TLA.
TABLE 10. Approximate caste and communal composition of the TLA. 
Department Composition
A. Frame, Card Dominant group; Vagris + Thakurs
and U.P. workers.
Dominant group: Harijans, some
Thakurs
B. Throstle
C. Reelers
D. Winders
E. Weaving, Warping
F. Folding, Sizing
G • Jobbers, Mukadams
H. Clerks
I. Engineers, Mechanics
10-15% Muslims + upper castes 
especially Patels, Barots and 
Brahmins + many non-Gujaratis.
Upper castes
One can also gauge the strength and significance of Muslim and non-/
Gujarati-speakers among the industrial labour force of Ahmedabad City
from the "Report on the Family living Survey Among Industrial Vorkers
in Ahmedabad, 1958-59”» which vev'e^ls the following data;
TABLE 11. Data on the Linguistic and Religious Composition of 
Ahmedabad Industrial Vorkers, 1958-59*
% Distribution of industrial workers1 families by religion:
Hindu; Islam: Others:
85.25 15.56 1.19
% Distribution of Industrial workers1 families by mother-tongue: 
Gujarati: Hindi: Urdu: Marathi: Others:
52.95 26.65 12.20 3.5O 4.74
34* Interview with TLA Secretary, Manharlal T. Shukla, in Ahmedabad
in March 1971•
35. Ibid.
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the Ahmedabad labour force, especially in manufacturing, construction
and transport. (A migrant is defined by the 1961 Census as a person
not bom in Ahmedabad city, so it would include a large proportion of
Gujaratis from surrounding districts). According to the 1961 Census,
7 1.36% of the total labour force are migrants, and the strength of
migrant workers in manufacturing industries other than household and in
construction, transport, storage and communications exceeds 70%.
However, the core of SKSS strength among the textile labour force of
Ahmedabad City consisted of Muslims and non-Gujarati-speakers.
The SKSS and its trade union also attracted younger textile workers,
between the ages of 20-30 years, a reflection of intergenerational
conflict in the trade union movement, and succeeded in getting many
of its members elected on to mill committees, such as canteen committees,
37Provident Fund committees and cooperative committees of various kinds.
It also organized for the first time a large section of the temporary 
or casual labour force, known in Ahmedabad as Badli workers i.e. 
substitute, temporary labour as opposed to permanent operatives. Badli 
workers constitute approximately between 7-10% of the total labour 
force. According to Majur Mahajan sources in 1962, out of a total of 
142,303 workers on textile mill registers, 10,987 were Badlis. who thus 
constituted in 1962, 7*75% approximately of the textile labour force.
The Badli worker was a victim of chronic unemployment, economic 
insecurity, low wages andpoverty, and thus was particularly badly hit 
by rising prices and inadequate d.a. The Badli system of substitute 
labour evolved as a method to meet the day-to-day shortages of the
36. See Chapter 2.2 The Section on the^'Growing Impact of the Migrant 
Labour Force on the Economic and Social Life of the CityV
3 7 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
36The 1961 Census also gives a sense of the importance of migrants in
labour force due to widespread absenteeism in the cotton textile 
industry. The Badli worker was expected to wait regularly every day 
at the mill-gates at the start of the first shift. He was given a 
Badli card on which the supervisor or time-keeper marked "P", if he 
was employed in place of a permanent operative that day, or "I.TJ." 
(involuntarily Unemployed") or "N.B." (No Badli), if there was no 
vacancy that day, in which case he had either to go home or try to 
get work as a casual labourer in the mills i.e. as a bricklayer, 
carpenter, mason, selling vegetables and other goods etc. As a casual 
labourer, he was not entitled to get his name registered on a Badli 
register, and, in all cases, his income would be less than from Badli 
work. In a labour-surplus economy, the Badli system worked well to
the advantage of the management, but the Badlis themselves were in-
3 8variably the victims of economic exploitation.
The Badlis were, by no means, an ephaneral labour force, but 
strongly rooted in Ahmedabad City and committed to the industrial way 
of life. 89% of Badlis had lived in Ahmedabad since childhood. The 
rest had come from certain districts of North Gujarat, Saurashtra and 
from Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Kerala, Rajasthan, Madras and Bengal, 
but the majority of even these had lived for approximately the last 
ten years in Ahmedabad City. Badlis. by and large, had severed their 
major connections with the village, were dependent essentially on 
industrial employment for their livelihood and their persistent demand 
was to become permanent mill operatives, having a secure and dependable 
job at the relatively high wages fixed by Wage Board Awards or collective 
bargaining, and enjoying all the benefits intended only for permanent 
workers in the Factories Act, Employees' Provident Fund Act and
38. See Jitendra Dholakia, Employment, Output and Wages of the 
Substitute-1 Labour. (1968),
Employees1 State Insurance Act, and the additional benefits given by 
the mills i.e. paid privilege leave, casual leave and sick leave. (Badlis 
would be entitled to the latter benefits only if they had completed 
240 days of work in the preceding year, and they were almost never 
allowed to complete this). Badlis did not receive regular presence 
allowance and bonus. The Badli was usually a committed worker, perm­
anently attached to a particular textile mill and a particular occ­
upation in that mill. About 98•7% of Badlis wanted to become permanent 
workers in the same textile mills where they were frequently employed 
on Badli work. They were generally efficient and disciplined workers, 
whose productivity was often equal to, if not slightly superior, to that 
of the permanent worker, because this helped them to secure permanent 
jobs.
The evils of the Badli system were chronic underemployment - 
Badlis worked on average only 167 days a year, and approximately 
84.5% of them remained unemployed when no Badli work was available - 
denial of many rights enjoyed by permanent operatives, particularly 
regarding forms of insurance, low wages and widespread indebtedness. 
According to a survey in 1967 > 33*7% of Badlis had a total income 
(basic wages plus d.a.) of about Rs.100 per month, and 58.7% earned 
between about Rs.100 and Rs.125 (see Table 12). This was less than 
half the average monthly income of a permanent worker, which came to
Rs.248.75.
TABLE 12.^  Distribution of Badli Workers by Income Group, 1967.
Income Group in Rs. No. of Workers: % of Total Workers in Sample:
0-100  185 33.7
10 1-125  138 25.1
125-150 178 32.5
151-200  48 8 .7
549 100
39. Ibid;p.13.
The average income of a Badli worker was Rs.120 per month, hut his 
average expenditure was Rs.210. Only in the case of 14-2% of Badlis 
was there some relief from the additional income earned by other family 
members, thus 85.8% of Badli families were in debt. The debt was 
normally not incurred mainly for marriage and religious ceremonies, 
but largely to finance the consumption of essential commodities, 
thus the basic underlying cause of indebtedness was the inadequacy 
of the Badlis1 wages and d.a. to cover ordinary living expenses at 
a subsistence level. The average debt of a Badli worker was found 
to be Rs.1566 i.e. it exceeded thirteen months' income of the 
indebted household, thus the debt-income ratio which is a measure 
of the economic burden of indebtedness was found to be as high as 
13s1. Almost none of the Badlis resorted to borrowing for the 
purpose of building a house, purchase of land or for education, 
which can be regarded as productive borrowing because it creates 
income-yielding assets. The majority of Badli workers used 
money-lenders, Pathans and Sahukars as their main source of credit, 
but the rate of interest charged by this source was very high, 
ranging from 37% to 60%. (See Table 13).
TABLE 15«^  Distribution of Borrowings of Badli Workers According 
to the Sources of Credit.
Sources of Credit % of total amount of loan taken
1. money-lenders, Pathans and 72.30
Sahukars
2. relatives 20.20
3. friends and fellow workers 5*50
4. jobbers and clerks of the 2.00
textile mills
100
There was also great dissatisfaction among Badli workers regarding 
their method of recruitment for Badli work, and their promotion to
40. Ibid,p .18
258
the state of permanent worker, which took on average about eight 
to ten years for a Badli to achieve. Although recruitment and 
promotion were, in theory, granted according to seniority on the 
special register of Badli workers and according to efficiency and 
productivity, in many cases, influence, nepotism, or corruption
played their role in the calculations of jobbers and supervisors, 
who were responsible for recruitment and promotion. The enormous 
industrial problem caused by disputes about workers' status can be 
seen in the records of the Majur Mahajan, where complaints about 
presence and muster, i.e. a worker's status as substitute, temporary, 
permanent etc., constituted the second greatest source of workers' 
complaints, and, in 1965> superseded complaints about wages as the 
greatest single cause of workers' industrial complaints. (See Table 
14). (it must be borne in mind that non-Majur Mahajan members were 
entitled to use its very effective complaints machinery to redress 
their grievances).
A 1TABLE 14» Analysis of the Nature of Complaints recorded by the 
Ma.jur Mahajan, 1962-1965, 1963-64 and 1965«
Nature of Complaints Number of Complaints
1962-3 1963-4 1965
1. Wages 6074 4960 1997
2. Hours of work 336 299 143
3. Holidays 179 47 90
4. Conditions of work 4328 4012 2320
5. Unjust penal 2530 2435 1591
6. Treatment and procedure 2469 2059 1374
7. Sanitation 127 92 47
8. Mahajan activities 30 25 11
9. Muster 4894 4030 2896
10. Residence and welfare 31 29 11
11. Miscellaneous 308 330 121
TOTAL: 21,306 18,491 10,601
41. See Textile Labour Associations Annual Reports.
SKSS propaganda in the mid-60s that the Majur Mahajan was only- 
interested in the skilled and semi-skilled permanent operative and not in 
the Badli labour force shuck a deep chord of response in the Badlis. The 
Badlis had good cause to fear the entrenched Majur Mahajan shop stewards 
and jobbers who controlled so many of the economic decisions affecting 
their livelihood. The 1967 Survey of Badlis also reveals that the Badli 
workers were largely in debt to money-lenders, Pathans and Sahukars 
because they felt they could not borrow from the Majur Sahkari Bank, 
managed by the Majur Mahajan,because they felt that it and other coop­
erative credit facilities, organised by the Majur Mahajan, were intended 
only for permanent workers. Thus many Badli workers in the mid-1960s 
were organised for the first time by the SKSS and recruited into the 
leftist Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union. Unionisation among the Badlis 
reached the level of 79*2% by the time of the 1967 Survey.^
Thus the Majur Mahajan failed to anticipate textile labour opinion 
politically on the d.a. issue. It was in many ways more like a social 
welfare organisation, working within a caste framework (it had a section 
of welfare workers for each of the Scheduled Caste and Backward Class 
groups, such as the Thakurs, Vagris, Vanzaras etc.) to improve working 
class conditions socially and economically and believing in class 
collaboration, than a radical trade union forging a united political 
consciousness upon the textile workers. When economic conditions were 
good and thus collective bargaining successful, it was dominant.
However, in conditions of economic crisis, as in the mid-60s, it was 
wide open to challenges from more militant, leftist trade unions with 
their thesis of a united working class political consciousness and class 
struggle. The Majur Mahajan thought that the normal machinery was good 
enough to resolve the d.a. issue. However, SKSS agitation for dramatic 
change and propaganda pitched workers' demands very high, so, in order
42. Jitendra Dholakia, Employment, Output and Wages of the Substitute 
Labour. (1968), p.30.
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to undercut the appeal of the SKSS on this issue, the Majur Mahajan 
used its influence with the State government to get an expert committee 
of inquiry appointed to look into the d.a. question in Gujarat, to 
remove anomalies in the old Gujarat State index and link the revised 
index to the new cost of living index series, prepared by the Govern­
ment of Ialia, Thus the M.B. Desai Committee was appointed by the
43Government of Gujarat in September 1963- It revised the old State
index by eight points for house rent and eleven points for cloth on the 
basis of the 1958-59 Family Budget Inquiry, thus revising the Gujarat 
Government's 1960 index from 298 to 317? and making 3• 17 the linking 
factor between the revised old State index and the new index. Thus, 
on the basis of this, the Majur Mahajan, embarrassed by its failure to 
anticipate the strength and urgency of the d.a. issue, sought to claim 
the credit for solving the d.a. problem. However, the intransigeance 
of the millowners, who, while agreeing to pay d.a. on the basis of the 
revised old index under protest, which was only a matter of a further 
Rs. 5,refused to pay d.a. according to the new index with a linking 
factor of 3.17, which would have meant cl l a r ^ e  t* \ C re a s e  i k  the existing 
d.a. which was approximately Rs.70-80, kept the issue alive throughout 
1964, and thus provided the chief raison d'etre for the SKSS. As no 
settlement could be arrived at between the TLA and MOA regarding the 
adoption of the Simla Bureau cost of living index series and the payment 
of d.a. on the basis thereof - on TLA pressure - the Government of 
Gujarat referred the dispute to the arbitration of the Industrial 
Court, which fixed its hearing on the 5"th August 19^4> and on that day 
the SKSS organised a massive hartal.
43. Discussions with Jitendra Dholakia, who was a member of the M.B. 
Desai Committee, in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
Successful Use of Agitational Techniques.
The SKSS successfully used agitational techniques, already 
employed during the linguistic movement, and added new techniques.
Virulent propaganda against the Majur Mahajan, the Gujarat Government 
and the millowners was disseminated through the paper, "Janta Raj11, 
edited and published by Indulal Yagnik from May, 19^4? to September, 1964, 
and restarted in November 1964» with a Communist editor, Subodh Mehta,^ 
through pamphlets such as "Mongvarina Ankni Chetarpindi" ("Dishonesty 
in the Assessment of the Cost of Living"), written by Dinkar Mehta; 
and through fiery speeches and meetings at the mill-gates.
"Dishonesty in the Assessment of the Cost of Living" claimed that, 
on account of anomalies in the old index, the textile workers had been 
exploited and cheated since Independence to the extent of nearly sixty 
crores of rupees. It attacked the Majur Mahajan as a company union in 
collusion with the millowners and the Government to defraud the workers. 
8,000 copies of the first edition of this booklet were sold out in one 
week, so a second edition was brought out in January, 1964* The anti- 
Majur Mahajan tone of this booklet was bitter and sardonic:
— "In Ahmedabad, on the 4th December (1963)> an earth-shattering event 
occurred. On the forty-seventh anniversary of the Majur Mahajan,
Vasavda called a public meeting for Nandaji, but hardly 8-10,000 workers 
went to this; whereas 2 lakhs of workers gathered in Kankaria Football 
Ground to attend the meeting called by the three-month old United 
Workers1 Battle Committee I With this earth-shattering event, the 
Majur Mahajan, which had been bearing down on the workers (i.e. 
oppressing them) rolled down with a crash. Because of this miracle, 
on the 27th December, 1963* in Delhi, at last, the Labour Minister, 
Nandaji, agreed that there was some mistake in the assessment of the 
dearness allowance. After 32 years, someone at last spoke up! ....
44* Vakil Report, p.159
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But what is this mistake? One can call it a mistake if it is a 
matter of a few annas, hut this is a difference of Rs.25 per month at 
least! Every year a cut of Rs.300! And in the last 15 years since Indep­
endence, Rs.4,500 has been stolen from the pockets of each Ahmedabad 
worker. Each year 4ir crores of rupees have been looted from 1-g- lakh 
millworkers, and in 15 years, Rs.67 crores worth of cheating has been going 
on. An honest businessman would say that the mistake can be rectified.
Are Nandaji, Vasavda, the Government and millowners honest enough to be 
ready to say that they accept the mistake? Pay back Rs.4>500 to each worker, 
and from now on give Rs.25 more dearness allowance per month, then we will
believe that you are honest, and that it was only your mistake. Otherwise
all will say that this is not a mistake, but looting, trickery and cheating,
and now this must be brought to an end." —
The booklet also sought solidarity with lower middle class and white- 
collar workers, also badly hit by rising prices; one of the major demands 
of the SKSS was the following:
— "Join their dearness allowance to the cost of living index, and give
full dearness allowance to all industries and occupations and government
employees, bank and insurance company employees, school and college
45teachers etc., in short all workers and white-collar workers"—
Speeches, especially by Indulal Yagnik, as reported in the Vakil 
Report, at the mill-gates were highly incendiary and intemperate in their 
abuse of the Majur Mahajan, the millowners and the Government. The flavour 
of these speeches can be seen in this quotation from a speech made by 
Indulal Yagnik at a meeting held on the 31st December, 1963? near Jay 
Bharat Mills:
— "Let the Police be called out; let there be lathi charges; we are not 
going to be defied. If you spill young blood, there will be
45* Quotations from Dinkar Mehta, Dishonesty in the Assessment of the 
Dearness Allowance. (1964)*
revolution. Chimneys of the mills are really symbolic of the owners. 
Your chimneys may be at their highest and so may be the walls, but the 
awakened workers will make a gap and will get in. The day on which 
the workers of Ahmedabad will come out for their rights, on that day
they will take possession of these mills. Let the walls be as high as
possible and let there be barbed wires but these will not deter the 
workers of India and Ahmedabad, and if any blood is spilled, flames of 
revolution will rise and the Shethias and Managers will have to run 
with the back part of their Dhotis in their hands" —
Indulal Yagnik was an indefatiguable speaker and a brilliant orator 
with an earthy,highlypicturesque use of the Gujarati language.
In addition, a hartal was called out on the 8th August, 1963 (to 
coincide with the anniversary of the death of the Maha Gujarat martyrs 
outside Congress House) in protest on the d.a. issue and against 
rising food prices. Again, on the 5"th August, 1964* a more widespread 
"Ahmedabad bandh" was called out, in conjunction with a "Gujarat bandh", 
on the d.a. issue, which was planned to coincide with the day fixed by 
the Industrial Court for the hearing of the millowners1 dispute with 
the TLA on the payment of d.a. according to the new cost of living
index with a linking factor of This day was chosen in order to
pressurize the Industrial Court into accepting the demands of the SKSS 
for an ad hoc rise in d.a. of Rs.25 per month for one year before a 
new Family Budget Inquiry should be introduced, and a demand for Rs.200
A1per year as bonus. The Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union claimed that
46. The political character of the strike was confirmed by the mixing 
up of demands for a martyrs' memorial and introduction of English 
from the 5th Standard (see next section) with a demand for an
ad hoc rise in d.a. of Rs.25 per month, and bonus as high as 
Rs.200.
47. Times of India (Bombay),6August , 1964-
a ballot was held in all mills concerned, and mill workers had voted
in favour of a strike by an overwhelming majority of 90%. It seems,
however, that a red box and a white box were placed at the entrance
of each mill and that, in meetings and pamphlets, the Maha Gujarat
Mill Mazdur Union explained that those who wanted d.a. according to
the new cost of living index series should vote in the red box, while
those who wanted d.a. as it stood frozen by the millowners on account
of the cessation of publication of the old index should vote in the
white box.^ It was hardly suprising, therefore, that a 90% majority
of votes was recorded in the red box! However, the 1964 hartal was
a serious and extensive disturbance which affected both the mill areas
and the inner city areas. The Times of India , from Bombay, reported,
on August 6th, "day-long clashes between lathi-swinging policemen and
hysterical mobs", in which a police constable was butchered in the
mill areas, several people lost their lives in police firing on a
dangerous mob gathered before Kalupur Police Station, and several
mills, shops and AMTS buses were attacked and damaged.
In protest against the food crisis, Indulal Yagnik in early
1965 called on the people to form food committees all over the State
to bring pressure on the Government to improve the civil supplies 
49administration. Indulal Yagnik himself wrote an open letter to the
Prime Minister, Mr. Lai Bahadur Shastri, deploring the acute food crisis
in Gujarat, and the inadequate measures taken by the Gujarat Government,
50and requesting massive Central assistance. He went on a fast from 
December 25th, 1964,to January 6th, 1965? demanding a proper and 
equitable distribution of foodgrains and edible oil by the Gujarat 
Government, and in particular that the Gujarat Government should
48. Vakil Report, p.153
49. Times of India (Bombay),3Jan , 1965*
50. Times of India 1 (Bombay),2.Jan , 1965*
immediately fulfil its promise of providing ground nut oil to the
people at Rs.1.95per kilo, and that, at least part of the rice
procured under the levy system should be released for sale in fair
price shops. Yagnik's fast aroused such strong public emotions,
51that Shastri himself sent him a telegram on January 1st, which went 
as follows:
— "I can assure you we are doing everything possible to increase the 
supplies of wheat and coarse grains to Gujarat even by cutting down 
allotments to other States. There are, however, physical limits.
All I can do is to assure you that we are doing, and will continue to do 
our best. I would earnestly suggest your now breaking your fast." —
To which, Yagnik sent the reply:
— "Thank you for your wire and for expediting despatch of foodgrains 
to Gujarat. The Gujarat Government has created serious crisis in the 
distribution of rice in spite of a bumper crop and failed in securing 
surplus oil stocks to sell at reasonable prices to the people. Earn­
estly request good offices of your Pood Minister in Gujarat immediately. 
Regret inability terminate fast till these minimum conditions are 
satisfied" —
Finally Yagnik ended his fast following a letter from Mr. Vijaykumar
Trivedi, Civil Supplies Minister of Gujarat, assuring him of the
Government's determination to take all steps to overcome the present 
5 2difficulties.
Thus the SKSS used a variety of agitational techniques, of a 
similar kind to those used during the linguistic movement: published
material, meetings and speeches at the mill-gates, processions, rallies 
(often parallel to and in direct competition with Majur Mahajan rallies 
especially on Labour Day, December 4th, 1963)> hartals, peoples' committees 
and the fast. The new feature of agitational politics in the mid-60s was
51. Ibid.
52. Times of India (Bombay)Jan. , 1965*
its overtly economic nature, its extension into working-class, 
mill areas and its use of the general strike or hartal.
From Agitational Opposition to Ruling Party.
1963” clpa.L
A major issue in elections was the d.a. issue, outlined
in detail above, coupled with the issue of rising prices, especially
of food grains and edible oils. The Congress administration both at
the Centre and at the State level was closely identified with the
food crisis and with the tardiness and inadequacy of measures taken
-fcke
to deal with it, and this had a profound impact on/Ahmedabad Corp-
53oration elections.
The Central government was heavily criticised by the Gujarat 
Government and many organised bodies in Gujarat for its policy of food 
zones and control on the free movement of wheat and rice, which resulted 
in inefficiency and delay in the delivery of foodgrains to Gujarat.
When Mr. Subramaniam, Union Minister of Food and Agriculture, came 
to Ahmedabad on July 21st, 1964> at the request of the State Govern­
ment to study the food situation, representatives of the Congress 
Party and various trade associations, such as the Food-Grain Dealers’ 
Association, the Gujarat Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Sugar 
Merchants’ Association etc.^in their memorandum to the Minister, 
emphasized the need of evolving a national food policy to meet the 
requirements of the entire country, pleaded for the abolition of food 
zones and the free movement of wheat and rice throughout the country 
and urged that, until the zonal system was done away with,the Union
Government should see that Gujarat got adequate and regular supplies
54of rice and wheat.
53- Thus municipal elections, at least in a metropolitan city such as
Ahmedabad, were far from being a matter merely of "sewers and drains" 
and purely localised issues. The Indian polity was sufficiently 
integrated by this time for actions of Central and State Governments 
to have a direct bearing on local elections.
54* Times of India (Bombay) ,11 July , 1964*
The Government of Gujarat was also open to widespread criticism 
for its insensitive handling of the food issue. Due to its partiality 
to the farmers and its reluctance and delay in imposing price controls, 
a very necessary ban on the export of groundnuts and groundnut oil, 
and strict and full rationing in the major cities,it failed to get 
adequate supplies of food at reasonable prices to city-dwellers. All 
political parties in Gujarat were united in pleading with the State
55Government to take action to stop the export of oil to other areas.
At that period, the State produced annually more than 1,000,000 tons
of groundnut oil. The quantity required for local consumption was not
more than 125,000, thus leaving large stocks for export. However, in
the mid-60s, oil-millers and dealers had been pumping out all available
oil to other States, thereby creating near oil-famine conditions in
Gujarat itself. The Gujarat Government declared that a tin of oil
should sell for Rs.35 but the price in mid 1964 was Rs.46 and rising
all the time. For a long time the State Government declared that it was
against any bans and restrictions, but eventually circumstances left
it with no alternative but to ban all exports of oil to other States
in July 1964* Despite confident assertions to the contrary, the
Government experienced difficulty in securing even coarse grains
like jowar, bajri and pulses from surplus States. On September 22,
members of the ruling party and the Opposition in the Vidhan Sabha
criticised the Government for not taking remedial measures in time to
ensure regular supplies of edible oils, and the Civil Supplies Minister,
Mr. Vijaykumar Trivedi, admitted that the ban on exports and the price
56control on groundnut oil should have been imposed earlier. The 
Government was also criticised for inefficient and inequitable dist­
ribution of Central government supplies of wheat and rice, and for 
its half-hearted attempts at food rationing in the six major cities 
of Ahmedabad, Baroda,Bhavnagar, Rajkot, Jamnagar and Surat. The
55* Times of India (Bombay) ,ilJuly , 1964- 
56. Ibid.
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system of rationing introduced in these six major cities and extended
to other cities with a population of 50,000 or more was an informal
one, with a free market functioning side by side, subject to many
57abuses and all the evils of endless queueing.
Thus a major issue in the 1965 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
election was that of rising prices, closely linked with the d.a. 
question, on which for the first time the politically conscious textile 
workers were united in an anti-Congress stance, with the lower middle 
classes of the inner city areas, people in government employment and 
with fixed salaries who were hit very hard by the large price increases. 
The Janta Parishad, in its election manifesto, promised to raise the 
wages of municipal employees and to increase the incidence of taxation 
on the rich and decrease it on the poorer sections of the community.
Another issue which broadly affected the middle classes, including 
the upper middle and business classes, residing in the prosperous new 
suburbs west of the Sabarmati, was the English language question.
The issue centred on the conflict between the Gujarat Government's 
resolve, and especially that of the GPCC in which representatives 
of rural areas predominated,on the one hand, that, in accordance with 
the policy (adopted on the creation of the State) of vemacularizing 
education and administration, English should be taught in schools only 
from the eighth standard, and the Central Government's directive, on 
the other hand,following the dangerous language riots in parts of 
India, that both English and Hindi should be taught from the fifth 
standard. Fourteen Zilla Panchayat Presidents and Presidents of Zilla 
School Committees met on the 21st October, 1964> under the chairmanship 
of the GPCC President, Tribhovandas Patel, and in the presence of
57 • Times of India (Bombay) ,7^September , 1964*
Morarji Desai, and unanimously resolved that the present policy of the
Gujarat Government that English should only he taught from the eighth
58standard was correct. However, in many urban areas, especially 
in Ahmedabad, the State's administrative and business capital, the 
desirability of teaching English early and at a high standard was 
obvious from the point of view of securing white-collar employment and 
higher-status jobs. Thus this issue was another reason for the city's 
anti-Congressism in the Municipal Corporation elections in 1965.
All opposition parties, parents' organisations, student bodies, 
and trade and commercial organisations in Ahmedabad city and a majority 
of the non-Govemment employee members of the Gujarat University Senate 
protested against the teaching of English from the eighth standard only 
and demanded its teaching from the fifth standard. An English Fifth 
Standard Committee of Ahmedabad was set up to protest against the State 
Government's English policy. On March 29th, 1965* Seth Amrutlal Har­
govandas, a prominent Ahmedabad textile magnate, wrote to the Chief
Minister, Mr. Balvantray Mehta, asking him to take into account the
59public opinion of Gujarat on the English question. The Gujarat 
Students' Union and the Youth Association jointly called for a one-day 
token strike in all schools and colleges in Ahmedabad on March 10th 
to protest against "the refusal of the State Government to reconsider 
its English-teaching policy". A programme to observe an "English- 
teaching week" and organise demonstrations in the last week of March 
was planned by the Gujarat State Federation of Secondary Teachers' 
Association.^ Even the Congress members of the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation opposed the State Government's English policy. On February 
16th, 1965> the Congress Corporation members passed a resolution urging 
the State Government to review the policy of teaching English in the
58. Gujarat Samachar ,XK)ctober , 1964*
59. Sandesh ,2?March , 1965.
60. Times of India (Bombay),8March , 1965*
State without prejudice. On March 26th, the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation adopted a resolution urging the Gujarat Government to hold 
an "impartial examination" of the English issue by experts and reconsider 
its present policy on the basis of their recommendations, although it 
rejected a resolution, moved by PSP member Dr. Suresh Shah, urging the 
Municipal School Board to provide for the teaching of English from 
Standard V in the Board's schools from June.^
The only concession that the Chief Minister would make was his
announcement on March 30"^ that private schools were free to teach
English from the fifth standard on a voluntary basis and at their own
expense, and that the present policy of teaching English only from
standard eight in Government schools would not be modified. He also
announced that standards first to seventh would be considered as primary,
declaring that more than 8,000 primary schools in the rural areas had
seven standards, whereas only 575 secondary schools had included Standards
62V, VI, and VII in the secondary stage and this anomaly had to be ended. 
This was also bitterly resented by the teaching profession, parents and 
students in Ahmedabad schools and colleges because it meant that in 
schools wishing to teach English from the fifth standard, fees would 
have to go up, grants to schools which had previously considered them­
selves secondary would be cut, and the pay of such secondary school 
teachers would fall to primary school level. In these circumstances, 
the English Fifth Standard Committee of Ahmedabad counselled its 
supporters not to vote for Congress at the coming Municipal Corporation 
election.^
Another source of weakness for the Congress in this election was 
that the Ahmedabad City Congress Committee and the Congress Corporation 
party and Congress workers at the ward level were split into factions
61. Times of India (Bombay),7)March , 1965*
62. Times of India (Bombay) ,llMarch , 19^5.
63. Sandesh ,3April , 1965*
on the English issue. The most loyal faction in the Ahmedabad City 
Congress (for a detailed account of Congress Party factionalism at 
this time refer back to Chapter V), led by the then current President 
of the Ahmedabad DCC, Vimalbhai N. Shah, supported by the Majur 
Mahajan group, was placed in an uneasy and difficult position of 
reluctant opposition to the GPCC on the English question. However, 
the loyal faction and the disloyal faction of Jamnashankar Pandya and 
Trikamlal Patel united internally in opposition to the State Govern­
ment's English policy, and, after the dfebacle of the 1965 Municipal 
elections, they jointly ousted Vimalbhai Shah from power and gained 
command of the Ahmedabad City Congress. Vadilal L. Mehta, industrialist 
and former Ahmedabad DCC President, came out in overt opposition to 
the State Government's English policy, and he and his supporters 
went from door to door during the election campaign asking voters to 
elect only those who supported the demand for teaching English from 
Standard V. On January 27th, the Gujarat PCC Executive suspended 
Mr. Vadilal Mehta for three years for expressing views contrary to the 
State Government's policy on the teaching of English in secondary 
schools, declaring that his campaign against the English policy of the 
Government was intended to see that those who supported the Congress
and the Government's policy were defeated in next month's municipal
65elections in Ahmedabad, Mr. Vadilal Mehta and his supporters had, indeed, 
been intending to contest seats against the official Congress candidates 
on the English question, and were negotiating an electoral agreement 
with either the United Front of Janta Parishad, SSP and one faction 
of the Republican party or the Democratic Front of Jan Sangh, PSP and the
6 4 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. L i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
65. Times of India (Bombay) ,38January , 1965-
Swatantra party and the other faction of the Republican party. All
opposition parties had agreed to leave Ellisbridge ward free to enable
Vadilal and his friends to engage the Congress in a straight fight
for all the seven Ellisbridge seats. Following the suspension of former
City Congress President, Mr. Vadilal L. Mehta. , from the Congress,
fifty leading Congressmen of Ahmedabad,including Mr. Jamnashankar Pandya,
issued a statement on February 5"th, 1965* disapproving the GPCC decision
to suspend Mr. Mehta and requested the GPCC to revise its stand on the
66issue of the teaching of English. Although Vadilal Mehta revised his
decision to contest all seven seats in Ellisbridge against the official
Congress candidates on an assurance from the Chief Minister that the
Government would appoint a commission to inquire into the controversy,
the Congress remained deeply divided in almost every ward on this issue
to such an extent that no election manifesto was issued - reliance
being placed entirely on the past services of the Congress Party in 
67the Corporation. The Chief Minister's conciliatory gesture to 
Vadilal Mehta was severely criticised by the GPCC executive which 
insisted that there was no reason why the English policy should be 
discussed further after a firm decision had been taken. Nevertheless, 
a joint meeting of the GPCC and the executive of the legislature 
Congress Party decided to set up a four-man (Balvantrai Mehta, Hitendra 
Desai, GPCC President, Mr. Tribhovandas Patel, and former President 
Mr. Thakorebhai Desai) committee to seek out a consensus of the members 
of the GPCC and the legislators on the English policy. However, its 
findings, which were not announced until after the Municipal Corporation
6qelection, did not affect that election.
66. Indian Express (Bombay),6 February , 1965*
67. Times of India (Bombay),3April > 1965*
68. Ibid.
Thus the English policy of the Gujarat Government provided another
major issue in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election of 1965,
which proved highly divisive to the Ahmedabad Congress. There was a
conflict over the selection of candidates between the Majur Mahajan,
supported by Vimalbhai Shah, and the Jamnashankar Pandya and Trikamlal
Patel factions, and Congress candidates were so divided on the English
question that in 1965 "they did not campaign in a united panel in each
municipal ward, but campaigned separately, often against fellow-
69Congress panel members.
The April 1965 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections: Voting Analysis.
The overall results compared with the 1961 municipal election
are as follows in Table 15s 
70TABLE 15. Comparison of the Overall Results of the 1961 and 1965 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections.
Party; 1961 (out of 70 seats); 1965 (out of 78 seats);
1. Congress 50 13
2. Janta Parishad 9 42
3. Republican 0 5
4. PSP 8 9
5. SSP 0 0
6. Jan Sangh 0 0
7. Swatantra Did not contest 0
8. Other Parties 0 0
9. Independents 3 9
70 78
The real strength of the Janta Parishad was 50 in 1965 * because 3 
Independents, (Bachubhai Kapadia and Navanitlal Shah from Ward No. 3
69* More localised issues such as the question of the short-fall of
Rabari rehousing by the Municipal Corporation, and the anger of the 
farmers, especially of Navrangpura, over the proposed green belt, 
have been mentioned in Chapter IV.
70. Much of the data in this section is from the election files of 
Gujarat University’s School of Social Sciences.
Kalupur-1, and Jaimal Thakore from Ward No. 9 South Ellisbridge)
and 5 Republican Party members were elected with Janta Parishad support.
It was a crushing defeat for the Congress and particularly for the 
Majur Mahajan. The Mayor, textile magnate, Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, 
was forced to shift his constituency from Dariapur Ward, where he would 
almost certainly have been defeated on the English issue, to Khokera- 
Memdabad Ward in which his own cotton textile mills were situated.
The Deputy Mayor, Narottambhai K. Jhaveri, a big businessman, lost his 
seat from Kalupur Ward No 4 for the first time since he entered the 
Corporation in 1949* Dr. Amubhai Shukla, Congress Chairman of the 
Transport Committee, was defeated from Jamalpur Ward No. 7* Both the 
President and Secretary of the Ahmedabad DCC, Vimalbhai N. Shah and
71Maneklal Shah, were defeated from Saraspur and Shahpur wards respectively.
The Majur Mahajan had secured 29 out of a total of 50 Congress 
seats in 1961, thus making it numerically the preponderant force in the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Congress party. However, in 1965, it 
was wiped out as a political force within the Corporation since all its 
26 candidates were defeated, including the veteran INTUC leader,
Manharlal Shukla, member of the Health Committee and the Standing Committee 
between 1961 and 1965-
The success and popularity of the SKSS can be seen from the fact 
that eight out of its nine members, held in detention under the Defence 
of India Rules for their part in the hartal on the 5th August, 1964» 
most of whom were left Communists, were elected to the Municipal 
Corporation while they were in jail, since they were not allowed to be 
released on parole by the Government of Gujarat for the duration of the
71. Sandesh , 7 and 8 April, 1965*
election. These eight included Dinkar Mehta, leader of the CPM, other 
left Communists, such as Hanumansing Bajrangsing and Y.B. Patel, and 
Ratilal C. Shah and Sohrabali Murtuja Hussein, secretaries of the SKSS.
A remarkable feature of the election was the success of Lilabhai
Rabari from Shahpur ward. He was the first of his community, the
Rabaris ( a Scheduled Caste of cowherds, who were very numerous in
Ahmedabad City), to ever become a city father. He also won, not from a
Reserved constituency, but as an Independent, not connected with either
the Majur Mahajan or the Janta Parishad, and without spending a paisa.
Women from lower middle class families, grateful for his help in
solving their household problems, training them to run cooperative
societies, organising a worn-eix’s deputation to the Union Pood Minister
on rising prices of foodgrains and edible oils, getting sick persons
admitted to hospitals, raising funds to help provide text-books for
poor school children etc., collected money and presented him with a
bicycle. They also pooled their resources to pay his security deposit
and meet other election expenses, after persuading him to stand as an
Independent in the 1965 Corporation election. On the day of the
election, 150 women contributed flour, vegetables and oil and worked as
cooks to feed the 500 students and others, who had volunteered to carry
on a house-to-house campaign to secure the victory of the first Rabari
city father. Not surprisingly, t h e w o m e n  voting was the highest 
72in Shahpur ward.
Comparison of the 1961 and 1965 Municipal Corporation Elections.
On the establishment of a separate State of Gujarat in May 1960, 
the Janta Parishad lost its main raison d'itre, apart from continuing 
the fight for a Martyr's Memorial, and PSP and SSP supporters fell away.
72. Times of India (Bombay) ,llApril , 1965-
The Mehsana group of the Janta Parishad led by Purshottaadas Patel
joined the Congress, and rightist elements joined the Swatantra. The
Maha Gujarat sentiment, particularly over the Martyrs' Memorial issue,
was still strong enough, particularly in the old city wards, to enable
nine Janta Parishad members to be elected in the 1961 Municipal
Corporation elections in Ahmedabad, although this election was primarily
a Congress, and especially a Majur Mahajan victory with 29 Majur
Mahajan candidates and 21 other Congress candidates elected. In the
1962 General Elections, Maha Gujarat sentiment secured the election of
Indulal Yagnik as the Lok Sabha member from Ahmedabad against the
powerful Majur Mahajan chief,Skyamprasad R. Vasavda, and the election
of Manubhai Palkiwala as MLA in Dariapur ward. In Dariapur-Kazipur,
the Communist leader, Dinkar Mehta, missed victory by only 929 votes.
However, in Ahmedabad District as a whole, the poll percentage of the
Janta Parishad fell from 48*04% in 1957 to only 13.02% in 1962. In
1957> the Janta Parishad had won 29 L.A. seats and 5L*S. seats. In 1962,
it won one L.A. and one L.S. seat, and from being a plausible State
party, had become localised to Ahmedabad City as its major centre of 
73support.
The Janta Parishad did not recapture its electoral verve until the 
linguistic agitation had been broadened into a popular economic agitation, 
centred on the issue of the dearness allowance of textile workers and 
rising prices, in the mid 1960s. In the 1961 Municipal Corporation 
election, the Janta Parishad was not very strong in the Labour areas, 
but, in the 1965 Municipal Corporation election, with the rise of the 
leftist rival trade union to the Majur Mahajan, the Sangram Samiti , 
established by Janta Parishad and Communist workers, the picture had 
been transformed;
73* D.N. Pathak, M.G. Parekh and K.D. Desai, Three General Elections 
in Gujarat. (1966).
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TABLE 16: ^ A Comparison of the Vardwise % of Votes and Seats Secured by
the Congress and the Janta Parishad in the 1961 and 1965 Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation Elections.
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In the 1965 Municipal Corporation election, the Janta Parishad sought 
an alliance of the middle and upper-middle class, on the one hand, 
on the issue of the teaching of English in schools, and the industrial 
working class, on the other hand, on the dearness allowamce issue.
Table 16 clearly establishes the retention by the Janta Parishad of 
important support-bases in the old city wards in 1965* and its 
striking new gains in votes and seats in the labour constituencies 
for the first time in 1965* In 1965* the Janta Parishad raised its 
percentage of total votes from all the wards from 21.4% in 1961 to 
35*72% in 1965» I11 the old city wards, it raised its voting percentage
very significantly in 1965 as compared to 1961 in the wards of Khadia-1 
and 2, Kalupur-1, Jamalpur and Raikhad. In Khadia-1, it raised its 
percentage from 7*2% to 23.46%, although it failed to secure any seats. 
In Khadia-2, it raised its voting percentage from 6.4% to 33*58%, and 
managed to gain one seat. In Kalupur-1, which it had not contested at 
all in 1961, it secured three seats on the basis of 27*50% of the votes, 
pointing to the highly competitive tussle of parties, particularly 
the PSP and the Congress, in this area. In Jamalpur, it raised its 
voting percentage from 13.4% in 1961 to 19.85% in 1965, and managed 
to secure one seat. In Raikhad, which it had not contested in 1961, 
it secured one seat in 1965 on the basis of 24.31% of the votes. In 
Kalupur-2, it managed to win all five seats in 1965 on the basis of a 
slightly reduced vote of 50.40%, compared to 53*5% in 1961, when it 
won three seats. In Dariapur, it raised its voting percentage con­
siderably in 1965 as compared to 1961 i.e. it rose from 4 1*9% to 
55*90%, while the number of seats won was five compared to two in 1961. 
In Shahpur, a Janta Parishad strong hold, surprisingly enough the 
Janta Parishad percentage of votes and number of seats actually went 
down in 1965 compared to 1961 i.e. percentage of votes fell from 45*8% 
to 38.9%, and number of seats from four to three. The explanation for 
this lies in the considerable factionalism within the Janta Parishad 
in this ward in 1965 over the selection of candidates, which caused
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the temporary resignation of Janta Parishad leader,Dr. Somabhai C.
Desai, from the Janta Parishad1s Parliamentary Board on February 17th,
1965» and the decision by Shamsuddin Munshi to resign as Corporator
75and not to recontest the election from Shahpur. In all the 
suburban labour wards, apart from Ellis Bridge and Sabarmati, the 
Janta Parishad made impressive gains in 1965 i-n seats and votes, 
compared to 1961. In Shahibag, it increased its voting percentage from 
32.1% to 38*48% and won three seats, compared to none in 1961. In 
Asarva, it more than doubled its voting percentage, which rose from 
21.6% to 45*8% in 1965? and won a clean slate of five seats in 1965* 
compared to none in 1961. In Saraspur, its voting percentage rose 
from 30*7% in 1961 to 45*52% in 1965* and the seats gained from none 
to five. In Rakhial, the Janta Parishad did well in 1965> gaining 
three seats on the basis of 37*02%. In Gomptipur, the Janta Parishad 
more than quadrupled its voting percentage, which rose from only 11.7% 
in 1961 to 47*18% in 1965? and won for the first time four seats. In 
Khokera-Mehmedabad, the Janta Parishad voting percentage rose more 
than nine times from 6.3% in 1961 to 55*95% in 1965» and for the first 
time it won three seats. In Maninagar-Baherampura, which it had not 
contested at all in 1961, it gained 13*56% of the votes, although it 
could not gain any seats.
In contrast, in comparison with its reasonable performance in 
the old city wards and very good performance in the labour wards in 
1961, the Congress fared poorly in both these areas in terms of seats 
and votes in 1965* However, the Congress fared comparatively worse, 
in 1965> in the old city wards than in the labour wards. In Khadia-1, 
although its voting percentage fell from 35*7% in 1961 to 25.13% in 
1965* it managed to retain one seat, but in Khadia-2 its voting
75* Sandesh February , 1965; and Gujarat Samachar ,llFeb. , 1965*
percentage was almost halved and again it could not secure any seats.
In Kalupur-1, its voting percentage fell drastically from 43*4% to 
16.62%, and it could not retain either of its two seats in 1965- 
Similarly, in Kalupur-2, its voting percentage fell markedly from 
43*7% to 32.69% in 1965, and here also it failed to retain either of
its two seats. In Dariapur, it failed to retain any of its three seats
of 1961, although its voting percentage fell only from 39*2% to 34*54% 
in 1965* In Shahpur, it managed to retain one seat, although its 
voting percentage fell sharply from 39*4% to 26.19%* In Jamalpur, 
it lost all the four seats it had won in 1961, although its voting 
percentage only fell from 36.5% to 30*81% in 1965* In Raikhad, in 
1965> Congress only retained one of its four seats of 1961, and its 
voting percentage decreased from 40.1% to 36.99% In 1965* In the
labour areas, Congress lost seats heavily in 1965 - in Shahibag it
lost all its five seats of 1961, in Asarva all its four seats of 1961, 
in Saraspur all its six seats of 1961, in Gomptipur too it lost all 
its former six seats, in Khokera-Mehmedabad it only managed to retain 
one of its previous four seats, and in Maninagar-Baherampura it retained 
two of its former three seats. In 1965> in the new ward of Rakhial, 
it could not obtain any seats. However, in terms of voting percentage, 
although this fell considerably in 1965? particularly in Shahibag, 
the Congress still had a reasonable core of labour support, despite 
the success of the Sangram Samiti. In Shahibag, its voting percentage 
more than halved from 60.8% in 1961 to 25*79% in 1965* "but in Asarva, 
it remained fairly constant, being 36.8% in 1961 and 36.57% in 1965*
In Saraspur, it fell markedly from 48% in 1961 to 34*52% in 1965; in 
Gomptipur it fell from 42*5% in 1961 to 35*15% in 1965* In Maninagar- 
Baherampura, it fell markedly from 50*2% in 1961 to 33*80% in 1965?
Orv
but in Khokera-Mehmedabad, it fell less dramatically/40.8% in 1961 
to 35*18% in 1965* Thus, although the percentage of votes secured by 
the Congress fell considerably in 1965 compared to the remarkably
high figures of 1961, it still had a reasonable core of labour support, 
around 35%> in 1965? which indicated that the Sangram Samiti would 
have to work very hard to consolidate its sweeping gains in 1965*
The main areas of Congress support in 1965 we**e the Ellis Bridge and 
Sabarmati regions, from where it secured seven out of its total of 
thirteen seats in 1965* In North and South Ellis Bridge, its voting 
percentage fell somewhat to 41*28% and 44*19% respectively in 1965 
from the figure of 55*1% Ellis Bridge ward in 1961; however, 
in Sabarmati, it secured its highest voting percentage in 1965 of 
55*82%.
Since the Congress, even in 1965» managed to retain a core 
of about 35% of votes in the labour areas, the striking victories of 
the Janta Parishad owed a lot to higher voting turnouts in the labour 
areas in 1965 compared to 1961, due to a large extent to the strong 
politicizing impulse of the Sangram Samiti and the campaign on the 
dearness allowance issue and against rising prices.
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TABLE 17: Comparison of Voting Turnout in the Ahmedabad Municipal
Elections of 1961 and 1965* Wardwise.
76
1961 Election 1965 Election
Ward: Voting Turnout
1. Khadia-1 69.2% (1)
2. Khadia-2 67.8% (2)
3. Kalupur-1 67.6% (5)
4. Kalupur-2 58.7% (11)
5. Dariapur 65.2% (4)
6. Shahpur 56.8% (15)
7. Jamalpur 64.996 (5)
8. Raikhad 61.1% (6)
9. Ellis Bridge 59.196 (9)
10. Shahibag 56-596 (14)
1 1. Asarva 58.796 (12)
12. Saraspur 59.596 (8)
13. Gomptipur 58.896 (10)
14. Khokera
Mehmedabad
59.596 (7)
15. Maninagar-
Baherampura
56.196 (15)
Ward: Voting Tumo
1 . Khadia-1 68.596 (5)
2. Khadia-2 70.596 (1)
3. Kalupur-1 64.796 (6)
4. Kalupur-2 65.696 (9)
5. Dariapur 69.596 (2)
6. Shahpur 60.296 (12)
7. Jamalpur 64.096 (8)
8. Raikhad 57.496 (17)
9. S.Ellis Bridge 52.096 (18)
10. N.Ellis Bridge 59.096 (14)
11. Sabarmati 58.8% (16)
12. Shahibag 60.096 (13)
13. Asarva 65.196 (11)
14. Saraspur 64.996 (5)
15. Rakhial 65.096 (4)
16. Gomptipur 65.596 (10)
17. Khoke ra 
Mehmedabad
64.796 (7)
18. Maninagar-
Baherampura
58.996 (15)
Thus, in almost all the wards, voting turnout was considerably higher in 
1965 compared to In the old city wards, a very high turnout was
maintained in Khadia-1; in Khadia-2, it rose from 67.8% in 1961 to 70.5% 
in 1965> the highest of any ward. In Kalupuj?1, it feel somewhat from 
67.8% in 1961 to 64.7% in 1965; however, in Kalupur-2, it rose considerably 
from 58.7% in 1961 to 65*6% in 1965* In Dariapur and Shahpur, turnout 
also rose significantly from 65.2% and 56.8% respectively in 1961 to 69*3% 
and 60.2% respectively in 1965* In Jamalpur, it remained fairly constant
76. Compiled from data made available by the University of Gujarat’s 
School of Social Sciences, Ahmedabad.
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in 1961 and 1965* In Raikhad and South Ellis Bridge, it actually fell 
in 1965 compared to 1961, and in North Ellis Bridge it remained 
constant, as also in Sabarmati. In the labour wards, voting turnout 
was unusually high, and well above the 1961 figure in almost all the 
wards; in Asarva, it rose from 58*7% in 1961 to 63.1% in 1965; in 
Saraspur it was 64.9% in 1965 compared to 59*3% in 1961; turnout in 
Rakhial in 1965 was very high at 65%jin Gomptipur, in 1965,turnout 
was 63.3% compared to 58.8% in 1961; in Khokera-Mehmedabad, turnout 
rose from 59*3% in 1961 to 64.7% in 1965; and in Maninagar-Baherampura, 
it rose more moderately from 56.1% in 1961 to 58.9% in 1965* In 1965» 
the labour wards of Saraspur and Rakhial came within the top five 
wards with the highest voting turnout, whereas in 1961 the two 
labour wards with the highest turnout Khokera-Mehmedabad and Saraspur, 
came seventh and eighth respectively in order of" wards with the highest 
voting turnout.
The greater politicization of the working class in 1965 compared 
to 1961 can also be seen in the marked increase in the wardwise 
number of invalid votes cast in 1965 compared to 1961, which was 
particularly high in the working-class wards in 1965:
TABLE 18. Wardwise Comparison of Invalid Votes in the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation Elections of 1961 and 1965.
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1961 Election 1965 Election
Ward: % of Invalid Votes: Ward: % of Invalid Votes:
1. Khadia-1 1.1 (10) 1. Khadia-1 1.92 (18)
2. Khadia-2 1.4 (2) 2. Khadia-2 1.99 (17)
3* Kalupur-1 1.2 (7) 3. Kalupur-1 2.75 (15)
4* Kalupur-2 1.2 (8) 4* Kalupur-2 4*92 (5)
5* Dariapur 1.3 (5) 5* Dariapur 4.86 (6)
6. Shahpur 1.2 (9) 6. Shahpur 5.07 (3)
7* Jamalpur 1.1 (1 1) 7* Jamalpur 4.12 (10)
8. Raikhad 1.4 (3) 8. Raikhad 4*17 (9)
9* Ellis Bridge 1.0 (13) 9. S. Ellis Bridge 3.01 (13)
10. Shahibag 1.0 (14) 10. N. Ellis Bridge 3.00 (14)
11. Asarva 1-4 (4) 11. Sabarmati 2.72 (16)
12. Saraspur 1.3 (6) 12. Shahibag 4*77 (7)
13. Gomtipur 1.5 (1) 13. Asarva 5*98 (1)
14* Khokera- 0.9 (15) 14. Saraspur 5.67 (2)Mehmedabad
15. Maninagar- 1.1 (12) 15. Rakhial 4.55 (8)Baherampura 16. Gomtipur 3.94 (11)
17* Khokera- 5.61 (12)Mehmedabad
18. Maninagar- 4-98 (4)
Baherampura
In 1961, the percentage of invalid votes varied only between the highest,
1.5% in Gomtipur, to the lowest, 0.9% in Khokera-Mehmedabad. The difference 
between the old city wards and the labour wards was not very great, and, 
indeed, the labour wards of Khokera-Mehmedabad and Maninagar-Baherampura 
were among the wards with the lowest percentage of invalid votes. In 1965, 
the picture was very different. The range of invalid votes was very much 
greater varying from only 1.92% in Khadia-1 to 5*98% in Asarva. The 
percentage of invalid votes was considerably higher in all the 1965 election 
wards, compared to that in the 1961 election wards, and this was particularly
77* Ibid.
marked in the old city wards of Kalupur-2, where it had risen from 
1.296 in 1961 to 4.92% in 1965; Dariapur, where it had risen from 1.596 
in 1961 to 4.86% in 1965; Shahpur, where it had risen from 1.2% in 
1961 to 4.07% in 1965; Jamalpur, where it had risen from 1.196 in 
1961 to 4.1296 in 1965; and Raikhad, where it had risen from 1.496 
in 1961 to 4.1796 in 1965. The increase in 1965 was also very marked 
in the labour wards - the percentage in Shahibag had risen almost 
five times from 1.096 in 1961 to 4*77% in 1965; in Asarva it had risen 
more than four times from 1.496 in 1961 to 5-9896 in 1965; in Saraspur 
too it had risen more than four times from 1 .596 in 1961 to 5-6796 
in 1965; in Rakhial, it was very high at 4-5596 in 1965; in Gomtipur 
it had more than doubled from 1 .596 in 1961 to 5-9496 in 1965; in 
Khokera-Mehmedabad it had more than trebled from 0.996 in 1961 to 
5.6196 in 1965, and in Maninagar-Baherampura, it rose almost five 
times from 1.196 in 1961 to 4-9896 in 1965-
The success of the Sangram Samiti in the mid 1960s in making 
inroads into the seemingly entrenched power of the Majur Mahajan 
could be seen in the almost total reversal of the Majur Mahajan success
at the polls in 1961, in the 1965 Municipal elections. In the 1961 
election, the Majur Mahajan had a 95-5596 success with its candidates,
as the following table shows:
7 8TABLE 19. Candidates of the Majur Mahajan Sangh in the 1961 
Municipal election - their wardwise distribution and success or failure 
at the polls.
Name & No. of Ward: Seats: Candidates who stood: Won: Defea
6. Shahpur 5 1 1 0
8. Raikhad 4 1 1 0
10. Shahibag 5 5 5 0
11. Asarva 5 5 4 1
12. Saraspur 6 6 6 0
15- Gomtipur 6 6 6 0
14- Khokera-Mehmedabad 4 4 4 0
15- Maninagar-Baherampura 4 5 2 1
TOTAL: 59 51 29 2
78~. From  D . N .  P a t h a k ,  t h e  1 9 6 1  A h m e d a ba d  M u n i c i p a l  C o r p o r a t i o n  E l e c t i o n . 
(A h m e d a b a d : 1 9 6 2 ) .
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Thus, in 1961, the Majur Mahajan secured 29 out of a total of 50
Congress seats, making it numerically the preponderant force in the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Congress party. In 1965> despite
bitter Congress factionalism, the Majur Mahajan secured the right of
selecting twenty-six candidates in various wards as the following
table shows:
79TABLE 20. Vardwise distribution of candidates put up by the Majur 
Mahajan in the 1965 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections.
Name and No. of Ward: No. of Majur Mahajan nominated Candidates:
6. Shahpur 1
8. Raikhad 1
11. Sabarmati 1
12. Shahibag 3
13. Asarva 4
14. Saraspur 4
15. Rakhial 3
16. Gomtipur 3
17. Khokera-Mehmedabad 3
18. Maninagar-Baherampura 3
However, in the 1965 Municipal election, the Majur Mahajan was wiped 
out as a political force within the Corporation since all its 26 
candidates were defeated, including the veteran INTUC leader,
Manharlal T. Shukla, member of the Health Committee and the Standing 
Committee between 1961 and 1965» and Shantilal R. Shah, the prominent 
TLA leader, who was later to become the Labour Minister in the Hitendra 
Desai Ministry in 1967 -
The greater politicization of the electorate in 1965 as compared 
to 1961 can also be seen in the fewer number of candidates standing 
as Independents, which fell from 78 in 1961 to 65 in 1965> although more 
intense factionalism within the Congress and the Janta Parishad
79 • Sandesh ,i7February , 1965*
meant a larger number were elected - 9 in 1965 compared to 3 in 1961 —  
particularly in the Ellis Bridge area, whose Congress circles were 
bitterly divided over the issue of the teaching of English in schools. 
However, many of these so-called Independents were in fact supported 
by one or other of the political parties - the Janta Parishad in 
particular backed a fair number of Independent and Republican party 
candidates.
In 1961, attempts were made by the various opposition parties, 
particularly the two main opposition parties, the PSP and the Janta 
Parishad, which also included the Communists, to reach an electoral 
understanding regarding the allocation of seats, although ideological 
differences made a coalition or United Front impossible. Secret 
negotiations took place between the PSP Secretary, Brahmkumar Bhatt, 
and the Janta Parishad leader, Indulal Yagnik. The Gujarat Swatantra 
leader, Bhailalbhai Patel, was anxious for the success of these 
discussions and for the participation of the local Swatantra party in 
them, and he was aided in his desire by Dr. Ganpatram Patel, a Janta 
Parishad leader. A meeting was arranged on March 13th, 1961, between 
candidates of the Swatantra, PSP and Janta Parishad, but this proved 
unsuccessful, and eventually not even a limited understanding on seat 
distribution could be agreed to by the opposition parties against the 
Congress.
Thus wherever there happened to be a straight fight between the 
Congress and an opposition party, the opposition party fared relatively 
well, but, in triangular and multicomered contests, the Congress 
usually had the upper hand. For example in Kalupur-2 ward, there 
was a straight fight between Congress and the Janta Parishad. No 
other party had put up a candidate here, except for the Muslim League, 
which was a fairly insignificant party, which put up a sole candidate
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in this ward, who got a mere 2.8% of the votes. Here the Congress 
and Janta Parishad each put up five candidates. The Congress polled 
29,856 votes or 45-7% of the total vote, and got two seats, whereas 
the Janta Parishad polled 36,566 votes or 55-5% of the total votes, 
and secured three seats. However, the presence of another party’s 
candidate, particularly the PSP, would have meant an inroad into the 
Janta Parishad’s votes and seats. Similarly, in Kalupur-1, both the 
Congress and PSP put up five candidates and both secured two seats 
each on the basis of 39,332 votes or 43-4% of the total votes, and 
40,443 votes or 44*6% of the total votes respectively. One Independent 
candidate also stood, gaining the largest number of votes of all the 
candidates in this wand and winning one seat. However, had he 
not stood, a great many of his 10,810 votes would have gone to the PSP.
In contrast, in a multicomered contest in Dariapur ward, Congress
v
fared comparatively well. Congress and the Janta Parishad had put up
candidates for all the five seats, but the PSP had also put up two
candidates, and there were also four Independent candidates. The
Congress won three seats on the basis of 37,523 votes or 39-2% of the
total votes, and the Janta Parishad won two seats only on the basis of
40,090 votes, or 41-9% of the total votes. The PSP secured 9,205 votes
or 9-6% of the total votes, and the Independent candidates secured
8,916 votes or 9-3% of the total votes. Thus had the PSP and the
four Independents not contested, most of the PSP votes and some of the
80votes of the Independents would have gone to the Janta Parishad.
In 1965 too, attempts were made to form a United Front of all 
the opposition parties against the Congress, including a dissident 
Congress faction led by a former City DCC President and an important 
industrialist, Vadilal Mehta, who had decided to fight against the
80. D.N. Pathak, Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Election of 1961.
official Congress candidates on the English Language question. The
first step was a meeting, presided over by Ratilal Khusaldas Patel,
an important figure in Ellis Bridge, on 21st December, 1964* to form
a nonpolitical "Peoples' Party" on the English Language question,
at which Swatantra and Jan Sangh leaders, including Bhailalbhai
D. Patel, Vasant Gagendragadkar, leader of the State and City Jan
Sangh, and Shambhu Maharaj, an important Hindu religious figure, were 
81all present. A little later, a meeting took place between Janta
Parishad, SSP and Republican party leaders on the formation of a
82United Front against the Congress. However, from the beginning,
there were strong differences of opinion about the allocation of
seats between the various parties, and cracks in the United Front
began to form: Manubhai Palkiwala was particularly insistent on
83more seats for the Janta Parishad. Eventually the PSP joined the
Praja Paksh of the Jan Sangh and Swatantra, and it was renamed the
Democratic Front; thus there were two opposition electoral coalitions
in existence, the United Front of the Janta Parishad, including the
two Communist parties, the SSP and the Republican Party, and the
Democratic Front of the PSP, Jan Sangh and Swatantra.Vadilal Mehta
had negotiations with both sides, with both Indulal Yagnik on the one
hand, and Brahmkumar Bhatt and Bhailalbhai Patel on the other, about
85forming a Citizens' Party on the English question. The Janta 
Parishad was ready to give Vadilal Mehta's group all the Ellis Bridge 
seats, despite strong opposition from the Ellis Bridge Ward Janta 
Parishad party, but Vadilal Mehta said he would prefer the Democratic 
Front , who were ready to give him more seats (17 as against 10-11)
81. Gu.iarat Samachar ,llDec. , 1964*
82. Sandesh ,7lDec. , 1964-
83. Gujarat Samachar ,i*Jan , 1965*
84. Gujarat Samachar ,!8Jan , 1965*
85. Gujarat Samachar ,ljJan , 1965*
and to accept his condition that if Vadilal!s followers were elected
and the English language question was solved, they would return to
86the Congress. However, eventually Vadilal Mehta!s group decided 
not to contest against the Congress official candidates, after Vadilal 
had a talk with the Chief Minister, who reassured him that a Special
8 7Commission would be set up to look into the English Language question. 
Eventually the two shaky coalition groups, the Democratic Front and 
the United Front reached a very imperfect understanding on the 
allocation of seats.
However, in 1965* the multiple-member constituency system, where 
the percentage of votes secured by a party is not always reflected 
in the number of seats won, worked to the advantage of the Janta 
Parishad, and not the Congress. For example, in Jamalpur, although 
the Congress secured 27,302 votes or 30.81% of the total votes, it 
secured no seats at all, whereas the PSP, with only 20,772 votes or 
23.44% of the total votes, won two seats. In the labour wards too, 
such as Saraspur, Asarva, Rakhial and Gomtipur, the Congress secured 
on average about 35% of the total votes, but it failed to win a single 
seat. In Rakhial, although Congress secured 38*43% of the total votes 
it failed to win any seats at all, whereas the Janta Parishad with 
only 37*02% of the total votes won three seats - its votes being 
concentrated among three contenders, rather than split between five. 
Thus, in 1965, multi-cornered contests posed no threat to the Janta 
Parishad, and actually seemed to work in its favour very often, a 
complete reversal of the position in 1961. In Dariapur, despite 
candidates put up by the PSP and the Jan Sangh as well as Independent 
candidates, the Janta Parishad had such a massive lead over the 
Congress with 60,152 votes or 55*90% of the total votes as against
i
the Congress's 37,165 votes or 34*54% of the total votes, that the 9%
86. Sandesh ,8Feb , 1965, and Gu.iarat Samachar ,K)Feb , 1965
87* Sandesh JPFeb , 1965*
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(approximately) of total votes secured by the PSP, Jan Sangh and
Independents failed to have any impact. In Rakhial in 1965* votes
going to Independent candidates (2,458 or 4*17% of the total votes), the
Jan Sangh (1,649 votes or 2.8% of the total votes), PSP (1,696 votes
or 2.88% of the total votes), and the Republican party (8,670 votes
or 14.7% of the total votes) might well have detracted from potentialpresence -tk.e
Congress strength. The^Swatantra Party, which had entered the 
electoral fray for the first time in 1965> the Jan Sangh, which 
increased somewhat its electoral impact in many more wards in 1965 
than in 1961, and the Republican party, which considerably improved
its electoral performance in 1965 compared to 1961, and the PSP
80seemed to operate to the disadvantage of the Congress.
There was undoubtedly a polarization of forces between the Janta 
Parishad and the Congress in 1965* brought about by growing intensity 
of support for the Janta Parishad over the d.a. issue and through the 
Sangram Samiti and a negative distrust of the Congress over its 
handling of the English language question. A partywise analysis of 
deposits lost clearly shows that the Congress and the Janta Parishad, 
and to a lesser extent, the PSP,were the only really serious contenders
for power:
89TABLE 21. % and number of candidates who lost their deposits in the
1965 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election.
Name of Party: No. of Candidates: Deposit Lost: %
1 • Congress 78 1 1.28
2. Janta Parishad 59 - -
3. PSP 25 2 8.00
4. Swatantra 11 6 54.55
5. Jan Sangh 9 4 44.44
6. Republican 15 6 46.15
7. Other 4 2 50.00
8. Independents 65 34 52.31
TOTAL: 264 55 100
88. Municipal voting data made available by the School of Social 
Sciences, University of Gujarat, Ahmedabad.
89. Ibid.
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However, the power of the multiple-member constituency to exaggerate 
the lead of the Janta Parishad could be clearly seen: although the
Congress vote-share as a whole fell from 43*8% in 1961 to 32.87% in 
1965» the difference between its vote-share and that of the Janta 
Parishad (35-72%) was fairly small, and yet the discrepancy in seats 
was very large - 13 for Congress as against 42 for the Janta Parishad. 
Thus only a fairly small shift in support was needed to bring the 
Congress back to power.
The Janta Parishad had increased its vote-share from 21.4% in
1961 to 35-72% in 1965 due largely to its popular economic agitation
on the dearness allowance issue and the very high prices. The change
in the nature of the party from a middle-class,linguistic agitation-based
party to a more working-class agitational party, centering on economic
issues,can be seen in a comparison of the socioeconomic background and
political histories of the Janta Parishad Corporators elected in 1961
90and 1965, as shown in Table 22. In 1961, all the nine Janta Parishad 
Corporators were from the old city wards exclusively. They were 
mainly high-caste Hindus: Brahmins, Banias and Patels, with only 
one Muslim and one Harijan among them. They were almost all in middle- 
class occupations, and a large proportion of them were doctors (3)> 
lawyers(2) and small businessmen. One was an employee in a private 
firm, a white-collar job, and only one was primarily a left-wing 
trade unionist. Almost all were mainly connected with professional 
societies or social welfare societies. They were largely middle- 
class Radicals.
In 1965* on the other hand, a majority of Janta Parishad Corpor­
ators (23) were elected from suburban labour wards, compared to 19 from 
the old city wards. The caste and communal picture had also changed-
* , ---
90. Compiled from data made available by the Municipal Corporation of
Ahmedabad and from interviews in Ahmedabad in March 1971-
although Patels were still the largest group of Corporators (12), 
followed by Banias (7), there was a significant increase in the 
number of Muslim Corporators (6), who outnumbered Janta Parishad 
Brahmin Corporators (£). There was also an important increase in the 
number of Harijan Corporators (4), Rajput and intermediate caste 
Corporators (4) and non-Gujarati Corporators. In terms of occupation 
too, there was an enormous change in 1965 - the largest single group
was now that of millworkers/trade unionists (1 5*), followed by mainly
collar-
small businessmen (HI), doctors (5), lawyers (4),/employees (j,)
and teachers (2). In 1961, there had only been one left wing trade
union Janta Parishad Corporator, but, in 1965, there were fi-Jf- teen,
the majority of whom were members of the CPM. Indeed, the Gujarat
leader of the CPM, Dinkar Mehta, had been elected, along with two
powerful CPM executive committee leaders, Abdulrazak Shaikhbiban
Shaikh and Sohrabali Murtuja Hussein. The degree of penetration
of the Sangram Samiti among the Ahmedabad working class could be seen
in the fact that eleven Sangram Samiti office-bearers and workers
were elected as Janta Parishad Corporators, which included eight
out of the nine Sangram Samiti members, held in detention under the
Defence of India Rules for their part in the hartal on the 5th August,
1964, who were elected from jail, since they were not allowed to
be released on parole by the Government of Gujarat for the duration 
91of the election. The increase in the number of Muslim, Harijan, 
Rajput and intermediate caste and non-Gujarati Janta Parishad 
Corporators is an indication of the new segments of the population 
politicized by the Sangram Samiti, which contained a fairly large 
proportion of Muslim and non-Gujarati workers. Muslim migrant 
workers proved particularly militant since a large proportion were 
from urban areas with fairly militant trade union movements.
91. Times of India, ilApril , 1965*
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Name of 
Corporator:
Ward: Education! Caste: Occupation:
37* Nankubhai B, 
Parmar
38.
38. Vasantlal T. 
Chauhan
Raj pur 
Gomtipur
Rajpur-
Gomtipur
Harijan Trade
IJnionist
Harijan Millworker
39. Ratilal I. 
Patel
40. Chintaman J. 
Pajankar
Rajpur-
Gomtipur
Khokera- Vllth 
Mehmedabad Standard 
Gujarati
41. Praladbhai K. Khokera-
Patel Mehmedabad
Patel
Interme­
diate
Patel
Millworker
White-
collar
worker
43* Bhimjibhai 
K. Mistry
Khokera-
Mehmedabad
Interme­
diate
caste
Businessman
KEY: MGM = Maha Gujarat movement
SS = Sangram Samiti.
Major Political & 
Social Activities:
CPM worker
CPI worker, exec, 
committee member of 
the SS
CPI worker, exec, 
committee member 
of the SS.
A castewise analysis of party candidates in the 1961 and 1965 
Municipal elections gives an indication of the changing caste and 
communal composition and relative strength of groups seeking political 
power and position through a particular party, as the following table 
shows:
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First, it is interesting to note that, although the total number of 
candidates in 1961 and 1965 was almost exactly the same, the number*of 
Bania candidates almost doubled in 1965 * due largely to a fourfold 
increase in the number of Janta Parishad Bania candidates, a 33% increase 
in the number of Congress Bania candidates, and a very great rise in the 
number of Independent Bania candidates. The total number of Brahmin 
candidates remained almost the same in 1965» the slight increase being 
mainly due to a doubling of Janta Parishad Brahmin candidates in 1965•
The total number of Patel candidates rose significantly in 1965 from 
34 in 1961 to 57 in 1965? due laxgely to a 25% increase in the number 
of Congress Patel candidates, an increase in the number of Janta 
Parishad Patel candidates by two and a half times, a small increase 
in the numbers of Independent Patel candidates and an entry for the 
first time in 1965 o f five Swatantra party Patel candidates. The 
total number of Muslim candidates very nearly doubled in 1965* from 
16 in 1961 to 30 in 1965> due to almost double the number of Congress 
Muslim candidates in 1965 * and a trebling of the number of Janta 
Parishad and Independent Muslim candidates. The total number of 
Harijan candidates in 1965 remained constant, although there was a 25% 
fall in the number of Congress Harijan candidates and a 50% fall in 
the number of Janta Parishad Harijan candidates, and a compensatory 
slight rise in the number of Republican party and Independent Harijan 
candidates in 1965* There was also about a 33% rise in the total 
number of other caste candidates contesting in 1965 compared to 1961.
The most noteworthy features are the significant increases in 
the Janta Parishad of upper caste and Muslim elements among its 
electoral candidates in 1965: Banias constituted 20.3% o f all Janta
Parishad candidates in 1965 compared to 7*5% in 1961; Brahmins constituted 
18.6% in 1961 compared to 12.5% in 1961; Patels constituted 25• 3% in 
1965 compared to 15% in 1961, and Muslims constituted 15-2% in 1965 
compared to 7-5% in 1961. Although there was a very slight reduction
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in the percentage of Janta Parishad Harijan candidates in 1965 compared 
to 1961, this was offset to a large degree by the electoral under­
standing between the Janta Parishad and the Republican party with its 
100% Harijan candidates. Thus the Janta Parishad seemed to have 
succeeded in 1965 in forging an alliance between the middle and 
working class on a combined platform of the English language issue 
and rising prices and the dearness allowance issue.
An analysis of the caste and communal composition of Municipal 
Corporators of various parties, elected in 1961 and 1965, reveals 
more clearly the crystallisation of caste and communal forces within
various parties:
94TABLE 24 Castewise analysis of Municipal Corporators of various 
parties, elected in 1961 and 1965:
1961 Election
Party: Bania: Brahmin: Patel: Muslim: Harijan: Rajput: Inter Other: Total:
________________________________________________________mediate:
Congress 15 6 14 5 7 2 - 1 50
Janta
Parishad 3
2 2 1 1 - - - 9
PSP 2 3 2 - - - 1 - 8
Inds. 1 - 2 - - - - - 3
21 11 20 6 8 2
1965 Election
1 1 70
Congress 4 1 6 1 - 1 - - 13
Janta
Parishad
1 6 U 6 4- I 1 4* 42
PSP 3 2 2 1 1 - - - 9
Republican - - - - 5 - - - 5
Inds. 4 - 2 1 - 1 - 1 9
13 9 21 9 10 4- 1 5 78
* including three non-Gujaratis.
94* Ibid.
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The number of Banias and Patels remained fairly constant in 1965 * 
compared to 1961. However, as a proportion of the total Corporators, 
they fell slightly in 1965* In 1961, Congress had the lion's share 
of Bania Corporators, whereas in 1965 the Janta Parishad had the 
largest group of Banias in the Corporation - 1 compared to the 
Congress's 4* In 1961, the largest group of Patel Corporators belonged 
to the Congress, but in 1965 the Janta Parishad had almost doubled 
the number of Congress Patel Corporators. The number and proportion 
of Brahmins fell slightly in 1965 compared to 1961, and their number 
and strength within the Congress and Janta Parishad parties was 
exactly reversed in 1961, the Congress had 6 and the Janta Parishad 
had 2 Brahmin Corporators, but, in 1965* the Janta Parishad had 6 
and the Congress had only 1 Brahmin Corporator. In 1961, Muslim 
Corporators were almost entirely within the Congress fold i.e. 5 out 
of 6 were Congressmen. In 1965» however, an overwhelming majority 
of Muslim Corporators were to be found in opposition parties, part­
icularly in the Janta Parishad. The same is time of the Harijan 
Corporators who, in 1961, were almost entirely members of the Congress, 
whereas in 1965 they were all to be found in various opposition 
parties, particularly in the Janta Parishad and the Republican party.
In 1965, Rajputs, intermediate castes and other castes, including 
three non-Gujaratis, were all to be found, for the first time, among 
the Janta Parishad Corporators. Thus the widespread appeal of the 
Janta Parishad in 1965 seems very clear. They appealed not only to 
larger proportions of Banias, Brahmins and Patels, the traditional 
upper castes, but increasingly to Muslims, Harijans, Rajputs, Inter­
mediate castes and non-Gujaratis. The wide spectrum of caste and
communal and non-Gujarati elements represented among Janta Parishad 
Corporators in 1965 reflected the width and thrust of their appeal 
among major segments of Ahmedabad society, and, for the first time, 
to non-Gujarati groups.
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DIFFICULTIES OF AN AGITATION-BASED LOCALISED PARTY IN POWER 
Difficulties of sustained mobilization, party maintenance and goal 
attainment experienced by the Janta Parishad in its period of power 
in the Corporation, 1965-69» due in large part to difficulties of 
access to State-level patronage and decision-making authority.
1. Difficulties of Sustained Mobilization: advantages of the Majur Mahajan
with its unique social and trade union organization and State-level 
linkages over the Sangram Samiti, which began to decline.
Although, as shown by its successes in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation election of 1965» the Labour wing of the Janta Parishad, 
the SKSS and the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union, mobilized the periphery 
of the underprivileged and the underemployed, such as the Badlis and 
low-paid municipal employees; swung over a significant section of textile 
labour from the Majur Mahajan; aroused lower middle class support 
and even middle and upper middle class support, it failed to sustain 
this mobilization and these support-structures. This was because, 
being merely a locally-based agitational party, it failed to form a 
strong corporate identity and it failed on the criteria of performance, 
of delivering the goods, due to the hostility of powerful elements in 
its environment, particularly the textile magnates, and its inability 
to match the Congress, especially its powerful component, the Majur 
Mahajan, in access to significant patronage and decision-making 
authority at higher levels in the political system, particularly at 
the State level.
In this section it is proposed to deal with the failure of the 
Janta Parishad to sustain its thrust from the lower middle and middle 
class support-structure of its linguistic agitation into the working- 
class, especially textile labour, support-base it achieved culminating 
in the success of the 1965 Municipal election. It failed largely
CHAPTER VII
because of the Majur Mahajanfs enormous influence, through the 
Congress party, over the State Government apparatus^ and its consequent 
tight organizational hold over the textile labour force; the unwilling—  
ness of the business elite to cooperate with the representatives of 
the SKSS and the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union; and its own internal 
dissensions.
The leaders of the Ahmedabad TLA had a major part in framing 
labour legislation in the old Bombay State and in India as a whole, 
especially in the drawing up of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 
of 1946? which is still the main act regulating labour relations in 
Gujarat State today. Thus both State and Central labour legislation 
were permeated with the ideology of the Ahmedabad TLA, and the machinery 
set up for negotiations and arbitration between management and labour 
and the legal adjudication of disputes by the Industrial Courts was 
based largely on the practice of labour relations as it evolved in 
Ahmedabad from the time of the inception of the TLA in 1920.
The particular labour legislation affecting industrial relations 
in Gujarat, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946* was framed 
largely by Gulzarilal Nanda, when he was elected to the Bombay State 
legislature with Khandubhai Desai in 1946, and was appointed labour 
Minister in the second popular Kher Ministiy. This was based on TLA 
practice and was heavily weighted in favour of one dominant represent­
ative union per industry in each local region to the exclusion of other 
smaller, rival trade unions, who were thus handicapped in many ways in
their bid to assume control of the trade union movement in any locality.
2The Act set up the machinery of Industrial Courts for the 
regulation of labour disputes and made a provision for the establishment
1. See previous chapter containing a section on the Majur Mahajan and 
State-local linkages.
2. K.L. Sethi, Bombay Industrial Relations Act and Rules , (Bombay; 19791*
of joint committees of workers1 representatives and management in 
various occupations and undertakings. It also classified trade 
unions into the following categories: approved or representative
union, qualified union and primary union, assigning to them obligations 
and rights. A representative union could only be so designated if it 
could prove at least 25% membership in an industry for the local area for 
three months before application for registration from the State Government. 
An approved or representative union was obliged to have a membership sub­
scription of not less than fifty paise a month; executive committee meetings 
at intervals of not more than three months; record resolutions passed in 
a minute book; provide for government audit of accounts once a year; 
offer disputes not settled in conciliation to arbitration; not resort to 
strikes unless all the methods provided by the Act had been exhausted and 
a majority of the members of the union voted for a strike by ballot.
The representative union had the right to collect subscriptions and dues 
on the premises and put up a notice-board in industrial undertakings; it 
had the right to hold discussions on the premises with employees to 
prevent or settle an industrial dispute, and to meet the employer or 
his agent to redress the grievances of members, and to inspect any place 
in the undertaking. The representative union had the extremely important 
preferential right of appearing and acting in any legal proceedings under 
the Act, and, according to sections 52 and 53 of the Act, no employee 
would be entitled to appear in any legal proceedings in which the 
representative union had done so. In addition, in important proceedings, 
the representative union was given legal aid at government expense.
The Act also specified the categories of qualified and primaiy union.
If in any local area there was no representative union, a union with 15% 
industrial membership could take its place as a qualified union. If in 
any local area neither a representative nor a qualified union existed, 
a union with 5% minimum membership in any occupation of the industry could
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be alternatively registered as a primary union. The sine qua non of 
such a primary union becoming the representative of the workers in the 
industry was its being placed on the approved list. It was also made 
very clear that there could not be more than one representative union 
in the industry: when two or more unions, fulfilling the conditions
necessary for registration, applied to become the representative union, 
the union having the largest membership would be registered.
Thus the provisions of the Act virtually entrenched the represent­
ative union in power and militated against its s u p e r s e s s i o n  b y  a n o t h e r  
union, especially a militant, Communist-inclined union. All the multi­
farious rights accruing to a representative union- particularly the sole 
right of legal representation of the employees in industrial disputes 
and the right to collect subscriptions and dues on the premises of an 
industrial undertaking- meant that it could consolidate its power, with 
a secure financial base, and become the sole vehicle for the redress of 
workers' grievances and thus gain a tight organizational hold on the 
workers, which it would be extremely difficult for a rival union, denied 
these powers and rights, to break.
Thus a union, like the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union of the Janta 
Parishad could achieve a temporary popularity and widespread following 
through agitational techniques and by taking advantage of the workers' 
frustrations with the Majur Mahajan's shop stewards, but it could not 
sustain this because it could not handle the routine aspects of trade 
unionism, the day-to-day settlement of individual and collective grievances 
and complaints through the machinery of the Industrial Court, which only 
allowed the representative union, the Majur Mahajan, the right to legal 
representation of the employees.
The MGMMU could not match the excellent complaints department run 
by the Majur Mahajan with a full-time staff, which recorded every single
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complaint made by every worker (non-members also were allowed to use the 
complaints machinery) in every department, concerning grievances about 
pay, hours, holidays, conditions of work, unjust penalties, conduct and 
procedure, sanitary arrangements, rights of workers about their status 
as substitute temporary, permanent workers etc., grievances against 
the Majur Mahajan and even grievances against the municipality regarding 
the workers' housing and welfare in their areas of residence.
The grievance machinery of the Majur Mahajan works as follows: 
grievances are brought by workers to their mill representatives, who 
put them into writing and take the matter up with the mill authorities, 
first the workers' immediate supervisor, and if the matter is not resolved 
with him, then the department head. The union representative may ask the 
assistance of the TLA inspector for the mill. About 80-90% of complaints 
are settled in this way.
If the complaint is not settled in the department, it is recorded 
at the TLA's Central Office, at which point an investigation is made to 
determine whether the complaint is justified and, if it is not, the 
worker is asked to withdraw it. If the complaint seems to be justified, 
the appropriate group in the Complaints Department (refer back to Chapter YI 
Table 7 showing the administrative structure of the TLA) takes up the 
matter, first with the department head and the supervisors concerned, 
then with the mill manager and finally with the managing agent. The 
senior officer in charge of the group may intervene either with the 
mill manager or managing agent. When a settlement is not reached, the 
group sends a notice of arbitration to the manager or managing agent.
In 1955, a standing Complaints Committee was set up to examine how 
each complaint is settled and the time taken in their disposal. This 
was with the objective of creating uniformity in agreements and settlements 
arrived at with individual mills on the same type of questions and to 
avoid undue delays in settling complaints.
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In recent years, workers have become more conscious of their individ—
ual rights, quicker to assert claims under the agreements and awards,
and to protest against injustices. Their complaints and grievances have
grown in volume, and the importance of providing satisfaction to the
workers has been increasingly reflected in the need for a prompt and
equitable settlement of their complaints and grievances. Thus in the
mills this has become a critical area in the relations between management
and workers, and it has also become the most important of all the TLA!s
3day-to-day activities.
The following table shows the number of complaints and their analysis 
by results in 1965 and 1963-64.
TABLE 1.4 ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS DEALT WITH BY THE MAJUR MAHAJAN BY 
RESULTS, 1963 and 1963-64:
YEAR TOTAL SUCCESSFUL COMPROMISED FALSE TRIVIAL LEGAL PENDING OF
COMPLAINTS AND CLOSED ACTION LAST YEAR
RECEIVED AFTER
INQUIRY
1965 10601 7291 814 - 2239 168 8O46
18491 11849 2205 231 3849 5758
Referring back to Table 14 in Chapter VI reveals the quantum and 
nature of complaints recorded by the Majur Mahajan in 1962-63> 1963-64 and 
1965. The following table reveals the incidence and results of complaints 
specifically regarding municipal work.
3. See Kannappan I, and Dr. Paresh Majumdar's thesis on the Majur
Mahajan. (Gujarat University, AhmedabadS 1970).
4. See TLA Annual Reports ([965 and 1963-64^
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TABLE 2.^ AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS DEALT WITH BY THE MAJUR MAHAJAN 
REGARDING MUNICIPAL WORK, 1965.
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claimed to have controlled effectively about twenty-five mills during the
height of the d.a. agitation and forced individual millowners to negotiate
with MGMMU elected representatives on a few issues and over small disputes
without formal recognition, they failed to retain this control because they
could not solve long-term issues and the mass of individual complaints, and
many of their leaders were victimized and sent to jail. Even the Badlis
were forced to go to the Majur Mahajan to get redress of grievances.^
Thus membership of the MGMMU declined after 1965 and they lost credibility
with the workers. The dilemma facing a small, rival, agitational union
trying to oppose a dominant representative union can be seen in the
duplicate or dual membership of both the Majur Mahajan and the MGMMU at
7the time of the d.a. issue. The workers in their own self-interest 
could not totally sever their ties with the Majur Mahajan, although they 
felt critical or hostile towards it. The millowners and managers were also 
hostile to the SKSS and its union.
Not only did the Majur Mahajan have a virtually unchallengeable com­
plaints machinery for dealing with day-to-day industrial grievances, as 
well as the sole right to negotiate in long-term questions affecting the 
textile labour force, it also had a widespread and effective locality 
organisation and social welfare activities, based on its relatively great
Q
financial strength and effective organisation. The areas of labour
Thus, although the SKSS and the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union
6 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. B B , M r. AA an d  M r. J J  i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
7. The TLA Annual Report of 1965-64 remarked, "It is a sad thing that 
labourers pay their subscription to the Labour Association as well 
as to other unions.... The labourers who try to take advantage from 
both the unions are dangerous to labour organisation."
8. See TLA Annual Report (1966 and 1967).
residence have been divided into 13 wards where Ward Inspectors devote 
themselves to the problems of workers1 housing and general living con­
ditions and improvement. They appoint chawl leaders or chaliagvan to 
help cariy out the social welfare programme. There is also a Volunteer 
Corps (Seva Dal) of approximately 500 workers to help educate and improve 
the lot of the workers. The Majur Mahajan, from its inception, has been 
actively engaged in workers1 education, but, since the municipality 
took over this responsibility generally, it has confined itself to running 
five educational centres: including a school,i.e. kindergarten,for
children in Khokera Memdabad area, a Girls’ Hostel for Backward Class 
girls in Ellisbridge and two study centres in Asarva and Saraspur 
for boys belonging to Backward and Scheduled Castes, such as Vagris 
Vanzaras and Thakardas, where they can live and concentrate on their 
studies unimpeded by the disturbances in their single-room tenement 
homes. In 1967* Maju^ Mahajan provided Rs.10,000 for 1246 
applicants for High School scholarships. There are twenty-three ward 
readings rooms, libraries, and information centres, which work on the 
principle that if the workers contribute a small amount the Majur 
Mahajan will give four or five times as much to buy newspapers and 
books every month. There are also eight gymnasiums operated by the 
Majur Mahajan in different labour localities, and also several 
sewing-classes and spinning centres where workers can learn activities 
for supplementing their income. The Majur Mahajan also runs two 
Maternity Homes and an Allopathic Dispensary, and, since 1950, a 
Department for Rural Relief dealing with land questions and agricultural 
problems, which is especially useful for migrant workers who still 
have material ties with their village. The Majur Mahajan also has a 
special section devoted to the uplift of the Backward Classes, such 
as the Harijans, Vagris, Thakores, Ravalias, Vanzaras and Bhils, 
helping them to be admitted to schools, working through caste organiz­
ations such as the Raval Sudharak Mandal, and organizing Bhajan sessions
and festivities among them. 9 _________________________________ _   .
*9"! See TLA Annual Report (1959-60)1
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Another major activity of the Majur Mahajan is the extension of
the cooperative movement among the workers. The Labour Cooperative
Bank was started in 1947 with the aim of freeing workers from the
heavy burden of interest on their debts and to loan them money at
reasonable interest rates. In twenty years, it doubled its capital
from Rs.10 lakhs to Rs.20 lakhs, and its membership rose from
8,000 to 58>000. It runs a scheme for providing worker members
with a sewing machine on easy installments of payment, and is concerned
with giving loans for productive purposes such as education and
housing. 120 cooperative societies, such as cooperative credit societies
and cooperative housing societies for the workers, are affiliated
to it. It also runs a Khadi Shop, which, in 19^7> sold khadi to
the value of Rs.655>000, and other handmade household articles to
the value of Rs.433>804-^
Thus through the framing of the Bombay Industrial Relations 
Act, heavily weighted in favour of the dominant union, by the 
Ahmedabad TLA leader, Gulzarilal Nanda, and by its enormous social 
welfare activities, the Majur Mahajan had an organisational hold 
on the industrial and social lives of the workers, which the SKSS 
and its union found it very difficult to match when dealing with 
routine aspects of trade unionism as aginst popular agitational 
issues. In addition, the Majur Mahajan had enormous power and 
influence with the State and Central Governments, of which the 
Bombay Industrial Relations Act is a symbol, through its association 
and involvement with the Congress party since the 1920s, which gave 
it a very strong edge over the Maha Gujarat Mill Mazdur Union.
(See Chapter Y).
The Majur Mahajan tried to undercut the appeal of the SKSS 
agitation on the d.a. issue by claiming the credit for getting an 
Expert Committee of Inquiry on the d.a. question in Gujarat
10. See TLA Annual Report (1966 and 196^ ).
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appointed by the Government of Gujarat, which on the basis of the 
Government of India’s Family Budget Inquiry of 1958-59 made a small upward 
revision in the old Gujarat State cost of living index series and linked 
this with the new cost of living index, which would have resulted in a 
S’i nse i*-\- tkt? L-\,ea. r  ^ c uJaKce —j wckcei^, When the
millowners would not accept the linking of the old revised index to the 
new index and took the matter up before the Gujarat Industrial Court, 
and, failing that, the Supreme Court, the Majur Mahajan carefully pre­
pared its brief and won the case, thus claiming credit for finally 
resolving the issue by using peaceful, constitutional, legal methods.
The millowners tried to argue before the Supreme Court that the refer­
ence of the dispute to the Court was invalid because notice of such 
intention had not been given to the representative of the employers by 
the representative of the employees as Section 42 of the BIRA provides.
In addition, they maintained that the new Family Living Survey of 
industrial workers in Ahmedabad in 1958-59? initiated by the Labour 
Bureau at Simla, was inaccurate because of the inadequacy of the sample 
size compared to the earlier Survey of 1926-27? and the impropriety of 
the method of interview adopted by the investigators. They also declared 
that the linking factor of 3*17 was improper and unscientific, claiming 
that the scientific way to deal with the problem presented by the new 
consumer price index recently adopted by the Government of Gujarat would 
be to devise a scheme of d.a. afresh, taking the present basic salary 
(total amount paid to the lowest-paid employee after consolidating 75% 
of the d.a. in the basic wage) as a base, and relating it to the changing 
price pattern from month to month with the base year 1960 = 100. They 
also argued that the additional burden the new rate of d.a. would impose 
was beyond the financial capacity of the industry to bear.
This was successfully counteracted by the following Majur Mahajan 
arguments. Majur Mahajan lawyers successfully argued that Section 42
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was inapplicable to cases where the State Government itself wanted to 
make a reference of the dispute to the arbitration of the Courts, as in 
the present case. They declared that from the Report of the Family 
Living Survey among Industrial Workers at Ahmedabad, 1958-59> it appeared 
that the Survey and fieldwork was the result of the cooperation of 
several expert institutions and was based on accepted principles and 
methods. The size of the sample was determined in the light of the 
permissible margin of error and was selected by the application of 
scientific sampling techniques and according to the principle that it 
is the quality of the survey that is more important rather than the 
size of the sample. Regarding the interview method, they argued that, 
taking into account the fact that a majority of the working class 
population in India is illiterate, the method of interview was the only 
one which could be adopted. The millowners had not placed before the 
Court any material to justify their contention that, for determining the 
linking factor, the behaviour of prices for two to three years should 
have been studied. Further, they successfully maintained the Industrial 
Court contention that to work out an entirely new scale of basic wages 
founded not on the pre-war level of 1939 "but on the cost of living of 
1960 as the base year and to award d.a. thereafter would create a large 
number of new problems, disturb industrial peace and be outside the 
terms of reference. Thus it was right to approve the other course of 
linking the State series with the new series to maintain continuity.
The Majur Mahajan lawyers demonstrated that the additional burden of 
increased d.a. was not beyond the capacity of the industry to pay, 
since the productivity of the industry was increasing and demand for 
textile products would never decrease. They argued that while it was 
true that the textile industry at Ahmedabad has been relying very heavily 
on borrowings, this was a peculiar feature of the Ahmedabad textile 
industry and helped its development, and, therefore, could not be
utilized to show that the financial position of the industry was
unsatisfactory. The clinching argument was that the harmonious
relations which have traditionally existed between employers and
employees must be maintained to help the Ahmedabad textile industry's
11prospects for speedy economic growth.
The SKSS and its union approached the State Government with a
claim that it had a membership superior to that of the TLA and should
12be given the status of representative union. However, the State 
Government did not verify this claim, at which the MGMMU demanded, 
unsuccessfully, that the representative character of a union should be 
established by voting in a secret ballot by the workers for the union 
of their choice and not by verification of membership figures by the 
State Government. All the SKSS and the MGMMU could do was to advocate 
abolition of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and the framing of 
a new set of rules concerning trade unions.
The SKSS and the MGMMU also failed to sustain their impetus due 
to internal dissensions and weaknesses. After the dying down of the 
popular movement for revision of the d.a., Indulal Yagnik, President 
of the SKSS and the MGMMU became quiescent. He had no real organisational 
flair and was ideologically wavering, turning temporarily to the 
Sarvoday movement and talking of renoucing politics. He failed to 
exercise strong leadership to prevent factionalism in the SKSS and the 
MGMMU and ideological and personality clashes between its constituent 
elements which eventually resulted in its disintegration. The middle- 
class, nonpartisan element, represented by Ratilal C. Shah, Vasudev 
Tripathi, Somabhai C. Desai and Manubhai Palkiwala principally (See 
Chapter VI, Table 6,for the composition of the MGMMU executive), and
1 1 .  I n d i a n  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  R e p o r t s ,  A h m e d a b a d  M i l l o w n e r s *  A s s o c i a t i o n  v s . 
t h e  A h m e d a b a d  T e x t i l e  L a b o u r  A s s o c i a t i o n . ( 1 9 6 6 ) .
1 2 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
the CPI refused to work with the CPM and broke cwa^ , leaving the CPM
to return to try to revive the fortunes of its own discarded Mill
Kamdar Union, which had been merged into the MGMMU at the time of its 
13inception. Allegations against Ratilal C. Shah, treasurer of the
SKSS, that he misused union funds discredited it, because the 
Ahmedabad textile worker was used to the meticulous financial account­
ability of the TLA, where the account books are open for inspection.
Thus the SKSS also failed because it was primarily symptomatic 
of an agitational movement, not of a sustained, penetrating organiz­
ational thrust. It made good political capital out of anti-Majur Mahajan 
propaganda and played up the role of corruption in the Majur Mahajan, 
but it could not really buildup a convincing grass-roots organization 
and a cadre of good secondary-level leadership. It was not so much 
a rival militant class union, providing a real alternative to the 
Majur Mahajan>but more a popular front against vested interests, 
containing people of differing ideologies which broke up under the 
weight of its own internal dissensions as soon as the people were no 
longer angry.
1 3 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. A ,  B B , J J  a n d  AA i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
14* Congress anti-Janta Parishad propaganda used in the 1969 Ahmedabad 
municipal elections.
Difficulties of party maintenance and the resulting political 
paralysis of the Janta Parishad, illustrated by the case of the 
Ahmedabad Urban Community Development Project.
The Janta Parishad was composed of heterogeneous elements of 
differing ideologies, including some personalistic factions. The 
main groups were the CPI, CPM and Independent Radical middle class 
elements, which contained the Somabhai C. Desai and Manubhai Palkiwala 
factions.
These constituent elements began to quarrel among themselves 
almost from the accession of the Janta Parishad to power in the 
Corporation in April, 1965- The greatest source of dissension 
centred on the allocation of posts or positions of power in the 
Municipal Corporation, especially on the allocation of the positions 
of Mayor and Deputy Mayor, and the Chairmanships of influential 
committees, such as the Transport Committee, the Standing Committee, 
the Public Works Committee and the Housing and Improvement Committee.
The most serious conflicts took place over the position of
Mayor. There was tacit agreement on the principle that the Mayorship
should rotate annually between the four principal groups in the Janta
Parishad: the CPI, CPM, the Manubhai Palkiwala faction, and the
Somabhai C. Desai faction. Thus it was implicitly understood that a
leading member from each of these groups in turn would be voted
1Mayor by the municipal Janta Parishad party. In the first year, 
1965-66, the backing of the party's charismatic father-figure, Indulal 
Yagnik, secured the election of Somabhai C. Desai, a medical practit­
ioner, as Mayor - he was almost the first non-mill owner to become
1. Interview with Janta Parishad leaders, including Somabhai Desai, 
Vasudev Tripathi and Manubhai Palkiwala, in Ahmedabad, in March 
1971.
the symbolic leader of Ahmedabad City.
In the second year, conflicts over the post of Mayor intensified. 
Dinkar Mehta, the Marxist Communist leader, was proposed as the party!s 
candidate for Mayor in 1966-67. At first, almost all groups within 
the Janta Parishad, excluding the CIM, were against this. Indulal 
Yagnik and the Somabhai C. Desai group were against Dinkar Mehta 
because they thought that, if a Marxist Communist were to become Mayor 
of Ahmedabad City, this might prejudice the chances of the Janta 
Parishad party doing well at the polls in Ahmedabad City and else where 
in the forthcoming General Elections of February, 1967* Thus they 
wanted a repeat of Somabhai C. Desai as Mayor. Relations between 
Manubhai Palkiwala and his group and the Marxist Communists, especially 
Dinkar Mehta, had never been good. The CPI group, headed by Gordhanbhai 
Patel, was also hardly anxious to have a rival Communist leader in 
power. Thus the Somabhai C. Desai faction, the Manubhai Palkiwala 
faction and the CPI tried to combine against Dinkar Mehta as the 
party’s mayoral candidate.
However, they could not agree among themselves on who should be 
the next Mayor from among their leaders. Manubhai H. Palkiwala, a 
popular, ruthlessly ambitious young lawyer, was keen to secure the 
coveted position for himself, and thus was at loggerheads with the 
Somabhai C. Desai faction and the CPI over this. Thwarted in his 
desire, Manubhai Palkiwala became interested in cooperating with Dinkar 
Mehta, and with Palkiwala's support, Dinkar Mehta was voted party 
candidate for Mayor. At this, the now isolated Somabhai C. Desai 
faction threatened to leave the party. Indulal Yagnik realised
2
2. Interview with Indulal Yagnik in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
forthcoming General Elections of 1967* if the Janta Parishad broke
up, so he smoothed down the ruffled feathers of the Somabhai C. Desai
faction and allowed the majority decision to have Dinkar Mehta as
the party's candidate for Mayor to remain.
Despite this internal fracas, party discipline held sufficiently
well for Dinkar Mehta to be, in fact, elected Mayor by the Corporation.
However, an ominous sign for the future was the revolt against party
discipline by a few more conservative, petit-bourgeois and strongly
anti-Communist individuals in the party, like Jayantilal Raval, who
actually voted against the party candidate. One of these, Praladbhai
Patel, actually went as far as to stand against Dinkar Mehta as an
Independent candidate, supported by the Congress party and the
PSP.^ Praladbhai Patel, Jayantilal K. Raval and a few like-minded
individuals subsequently left the Janta Parishad in 1968 and joined
the Congress party on the issue of the granting by the Janta Parishad
of the dearness allowance to municipal employees on a par with that
of Central Government employees.
Despite these conflicts and particularly disruptive behaviour
by Manubhai Palkiwala, whose group threatened to leave the Janta
Parishad municipal party, if certain members who had not voted for
the group's nominees for municipal committee positions, were not
removed by the 23rd June 1966, the Janta Parishad held together to
fight the General Elections of 1967• Manubhai Palkiwala, keeping in
mind the advantages of fighting for election as an MLA under the label
5of the MahaGujarat Janta Parishad, did not carry out his ultimatum.
3 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
f
4 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. CC i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
5. Press statement made by the President of the Ahmedabad City Janta 
Parishad, Dinkar Mehta, on the 21 May, 1967*
the gravity of the situation, and the possible repercussions in the
In the 1967 General Elections, Indulal Yagnik won a great victory
in the contest for the Lok Sabha seat from Ahmedabad City constit-
ency against the veteran TLA and INTUC leader, Shyamprasad R. Vasavda.
Manubhai H. Palkiwala and Somabhai C. Desai were also elected, on the
MGJP ticket, MLAs from Kalupur and Shahpur consituencies respectively
with handsome majorities. The two Communist leaders, Dinkar Mehta
and Gordhanbhai L. Patel were defeated, although gaining second place,
from Dariapur-Kazipur and Asarva constituencies respectively.
However, after the General Elections of 1967> the Janta Parishad
gradually began openly to disintegrate and actual defections began
to occur. Indulal Yagnik, instead of maintaining party discipline
and standing above the party's factions, wavered between one faction
and another,^ trying to placate each and play one off against the other.
In May 1967 he favoured Gokuldas S. Patel, a member of Manubhai
Palkiwala's faction, as the party's candidate for the key position of
Chairman of the Standing Committee against the decision by the party's
sub-committee of five to have Jaimal Thakore, a clever and astute
advocate, as the party's candidate. Yagnik eventually acquiesced in
Jaimal Thakore's successful election as Chairman but his actions
had increased the rifts in the party and lessened the force of party 
7discipline. In general, however, Indulal Yagnik supported the
Q
Somabhai C. Desai faction.
After the 1967 General Elections and the disintegration of the 
SKSS and the MGMMU consequent on the resolution of the dearness 
allowance issue, there was no longer any great political or economic 
movement or contest of mass concern, so Indulal Yagnik fell into a
6 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB a n d  M r. AA i n  A h m e d a ba d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
7. Dinkar Mehta's press statement, 21 May, 1967*
8 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
state of complete demoralisation and inactivity. It has been said
of him that he was "the instrument of a movement, never the leader
9of a party". He reached such a low ebb and state of ideological
confusion that he even seriously toyed with the idea of renouncing
party politics altogether and becoming a Gandhian and joining
Vinoba Bhave's Sarvodaya movement. He told press representatives
that he would like to propagate a new creed of partyless government
and to follow in the footsteps of Gandhi ji and AcharyaVinoba Bhave
in talcing to self-restraint and to the constructive service of the
common man. He also told them he would launch a Shanti Seva Dal
manned by part-time volunteers. He corresponded with Acharya Bhave,
Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, and Mr. Narayan Desai, secretary of the
Gujarat Sarvodaya Mandal, and attended the Sarvodaya workers' confer-
10ence at Mount Abu on June 6th, 1967. A little later, Indulal Yagnik 
announced his decision to remain in active politics. Mr. Jayaprakash 
Narayan and Mr. Shankerao Deo had advised him to retain his individ­
uality, but cooperate with Sarvodaya for constructive work. Thus he 
did not join the Sarvodaya movement, but expressed his intention to 
work for the Shanti Seva Dal and the Tann Seva Dal in collaboration
with the Sarvodaya organisation in Gujarat and with the help of
11the Swadeshi Sabha recently formed in Ahmedabad. Thus, as rifts
in the Ahmedabad Janta Parishad deepened and his own thoughts were
transferred to a higher plane, Indulal Yagnik even ceased to come to
party meetings, and, finally, he did not take any part in the municipal
12elections of 1969 in Ahmedabad.
9. Neeru Desai, correspondent for the Gu.iarat Samachar .
10. Times of India ,^ -June , 1967•
11. Times of India ,U.June , 1967 -
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The greatest internal blow to the Janta Parishad came in July
1967> with the defection of Manubhai Palkiwala and his entire group
of ten: Ashok C. Mehta, Gokuldas S. Patel, Popatlal Patel, Pu.rskotfcir>v
(1. Parmar, Bhimjibhai K. Mistry, Gunwantbhai Patel, Gulammustafa
A. Sheikh, Kantilal Patel, Ratilal Shah and Sakalchand C. Modi.
The defection of Manubhai Palkiwala's group to the SSP virtually
meant the founding of the SSP in Ahmedabad, which had been practically
non-existent before. The major cause of his defection was his being
denied the coveted position of Mayor in April, 19^7» in favour of
Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi, and the party's refusal to meet his excessive
demands for key positions for members of his faction on important
13Municipal Corporation committees.
Despite ike Udko-^  Sufpc-.-t c^the Rightist Communists, who had formed an
1 4alliance with Manubhai Palkiwala's faction for sometime, Dr.
Vasudev N. Tripathi, a popular medical practitioner from Shahpur
not overtly identified with any group within the Janta Parishad,
became the party's candidate for the position of Mayor in April,
1967» with the support of Dinkar Mehta and the CPM and Indulal Yagnik
1 5and the Somabhai C. Desai faction. Manubhai Palkiwala was at 
loggerheads with the Somabhai C. Desai faction, and had always 
had difficulties with the CPM and Dinkar Mehta, of whom he said:
— "I could never work with Dinkar Mehta. He is a professor type, 
a good orator, but he cannot get the pulse of the people. He is 
a sectarian." ------^
1 3 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. CC i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
14. Dinkar Mehta's press statement, 21 May, 1967*
15* Interview with Dinkar Mehta in Ahmedabad in March 197"! •
16. Interview with Manubhai Palkiwala in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
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As a consolation, Manubhai Palkiwala was elected Deputy Mayor 
on May 4th, 1967» but he remained highly dissatisfied and continued 
his disruptive and high-handed behaviour. In the meeting of the Janta 
Parishad municipal party of the 7th May, 1967> at which the resolution 
giving all authority to the party's leader, Dr. Vasudev Tripathi, 
in the matter of the formation of new committees was put forward 
by the Rightist Communist, Chintaman Pajankar, Manubhai Palkiwala's 
group remained absent, and Manubhai himself only came for a few 
minutes. The resolution was passed unanimously, and Dr. Vasudev 
Tripathi attempted to apply the principle of giving each of the 
major groups in the Janta Parishad equal representation, when he
17appointed party members to the new Municipal Corporation committees.
Manubhai Palkiwala began to make excessive demands that members 
of his group should gain powerful positions on Municipal Corporation 
committees. In particular, he demanded that the majority of members 
and the Chairmanship of the Transport Committee should go to his 
group, despite the fact that, in 1965-66, Dr. Ashok C. Mehta of his 
group had been Transport Committee Chairman, and, in 1966-67 also, 
the Chairman was originally a member of his group. In addition, 
Manubhai himself had secured the powerful position of Chairman 
of the Standing Committee in 1965-66, and a member of his group, 
Natvarlal Patel, had been Chairman of the Public Works Committee.
By comparison, the Marxist Communistscomplained that their members 
had hardly been chairmen of any committees, not to speak of the more 
influential ones. This time Manubhai Palkiwala was not permitted by 
the party to have such preponderant influence in important Committees,
17. Dinkar Mehtas's press statement 21 May, 1967*
particularly the Transport Committee, and he finally walked out of 
the party with his group of ten. The CPI, however, who had been 
closely associated with Manubhai Palkiwala1s group for some time, 
decided not to follow his example, making the following statement 
shortly before his defection:
— "If Manubhai Palkiwala resigns from the Janta Parishad municipal 
party, we will not go along with him, and even if he establishes a 
separate group in the Municipal Corporation, we cannot support him" — 
The defection of Manubhai Palkiwala1s group was a major blow to 
the Janta Parishad because it meant that it lost its majority in 
the Corporation. It was reduced in strength from 42 members, out 
of a total of 78 Municipal Corporators, to 31* Over the following 
months, its strength fell even further with the defection of conserv­
ative, a n t i - Communist elements, like Jayantilal K. Raval and Pral- 
adbhai Patel in 1968, and the Independent middle class Radical,
Dr. Vasudev Tripathi, in January 1969* During the last years of its 
term of office in the Municipal Corporation, the Janta Parishad 
nominees for important positions on Municipal Corporation committees 
were often defeated. In its last two years, the Janta Parishad lost 
its majority, and, therefore, its control of the Transport Committee, 
as shown by the following table:
18. Quoted in Dinkar Mehta's press statement, 21 May, 1967-
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In the Public Works Committee, the Janta Parishad had only a steady 
50% of the membership, except for the year 1966-67, when its membership 
rose to 8 out of a total of 12. In the Housing and Improvement Committee, 
Janta Parishad membership fluctuated between 6 to 7 out of a total of 12.
21On the Municipal School Board, the Janta Parishad soon lost its majority.
Thus, during its last two years in power, the Janta Parishad found 
it increasingly difficult to conduct municipal affairs and retain effective 
control of municipal committees. Even when its own members were in a 
majority on a particular committee, they were often paralysed by internal 
group rivalries. This is sharply illustrated by the case of the Urban 
Community Development Project, for the Janta Parishad failed to utilise 
the political potential of the UCDP to its own advantage due to the loss 
of party discipline, bitter internal relations among its constituent 
groups, and the loss of its majority within the Corporation by mid 1967-
22The Urban Community Development Project
Aims, Organisation and Programme Content of the UCDP
A pilot Urban Community Development Project was set up in Ahmedabad 
in 1963 with the financial assistance of the Ford Foundation and with the 
Municipal Corporation as the administrative agency for implementing the 
Project. The Ford Foundation agreed to pay the initial costs of setting
up the Project, if the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation would pay 50% o f
23the recurring cost of running the Project.
21. Janta Parishad election manifesto for the 1969 Municipal Corporation 
elections.
22. The Urban Community Development Project was formally inaugurated on 
the 28th February 1963» by the Mayor of Ahmedabad, Jaikrishnabhai 
Harivallabhdas. The first Citizens’ Development Council, or Vikas 
Mandal, was formally inaugurated on the 1st April, 1963*
23. Ahmedabad Urban Community Development Project, 1962-65, a booklet 
produced by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
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Its aims were primarily to raise levels of participation among local 
urban residents, and to mobilise local resources, leadership, and 
initiative with a view to involving the citizens in the wider process 
of development of their own areas and of the city at large. It was 
hoped to involve the local urban residents in solving some of their 
urgent socioeconomic problems through the principle of self-help within 
a democratic framework through the establishment of democratically 
elected Citizens' Development Councils or Vikas Mandals at the level 
of mohallas and groups of mohallas. The ultimate aim was to evoke the 
cooperative efforts of the people and prepare the ground for the eventual 
democratic decentralisation of municipal services. It was also hoped 
that, by strengthening community life and creating a sense of belonging 
among the residents of local areas, migrants to urban areas would be 
helped to adjust to city life without too much disorientation and 
emotional strain.
Another objective was to ensure fuller utilisation of technical 
and welfare services by helping the community, especially the relatively 
disadvantaged sections, to locate what assistance was.available from the 
municipality, higher governmental levels and voluntary organisations so 
that they could obtain maximum benefits from facilities provided, and 
from various Government and municipal development programmes. It is 
important to notice that the financial outlay for the Project was 
intended to go largely towards procuring high quality highly paid staff 
and towards research and evaluation of the Project. Actual local devel­
opment programmes were ideally conceived of as financed entirely by 
local fund-raising efforts with initially for some years the promise of 
a 50% matching contribution to the cost of local schemes from the Urban 
Community Development Department.^
The organisational structure of the UCDP can be seen from the 
following chart:
24. Ibid
TABLE 5« Organisational Chart of the UCDP.2 8
Municipal Corporation
Standing Committee
I
Urban Community Development 
Committee
Municipal Commissioner
Deputy Municipal Commissioner
I----
Deputy Director
Investigators
Director _____I___  1Chief Community 
Organiser
Neighbourhood
Organiser
ICommunity
Organiser
Field Programme 
Organiser
Neighbourhood
Council
I
Vikas Mandal
I
Vikas Sabha
In theory, areas for the operation of the UCDP were selected in different
election wards from among the following groups:
1. areas with predominantly industrial labour population, who are 
residents of privately-owned chawls.
2. socially and economically backward areas with a homogeneous Hindu 
population.
3. housing colonies for the municipal Harijan Health Staff workers.
4. a government housing colony comprising clerical staff.
5. old village sites which have come under the municipal limits 
as a result of city expansion.
25. From Evaluation Study of the Formation and Working of the Vikas
Mandals, produced by the Urban Community Development Department of 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
6. slum areas selected under the Slum Clearance programme of the city.
7. areas with predominantly Muslim population.
Two Community Organisers, one male and one female, were assigned 
to each area, which covered on the average two to three Vikas Mandals, 
which each contained on the average 500 to 1000 families. They were 
supervised and guided by the Neighbourhood Organiser, and above him by 
the Chief Community Organiser. The Community Organisers, before they 
started functioning in an area, were acquainted with the necessary 
information and knowledge during the period of inservice training.
They also had access to the social profiles which had been prepared 
on the areas. They began their work by establishing personal contacts 
with the families in the selected area and explaining to them the 
objectives and contents of the programme. These initial contacts 
helped to familiarise them with the problems of the area, the leadership 
pattern, group relations and channels of communication. After the 
initial face-to-face personal contacts were over, the Organisers met 
the residents of the particular mohalla or chawl - which became known 
as a Vikas Sabha or sub-block Council and was coextensive with a chawl 
or mohalla with an approximate population of between 50 to 100 families 
- in a group, in which the problems of the chawl or mohalla were dis­
cussed and representatives of the mohalla were elected to the Vikas 
26Mandal Executive. One Vikas Mandal usually contained between four and
eight Vikas Sabhas. After the election of Vikas Sabha representatives, 
the Community Organisers contacted them individually and in groups, 
and a meeting or two of all the Vikas Sabha representatives was held 
to finalise the list of the office-bearers of the Vikas Mandal Executive.
26. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation booklet on the UCDP.
Generally, formal elections of office-bearers were avoided, and they were
selected by discussion and consensus, thus generating an atmosphere of 
27mutual trust.
The whole process took about two to three months, giving the 
Community Organisers an excellent opportunity during this period to study 
local problems and the reactions of the various communities to the 
programme. This process continued till Vikas Mandals were formed to cover 
the entire areas assigned to the team of workers placed in a particular 
Neighbourhood. The Community Organisers were responsible for stimulating 
and guiding the Vikas Mandal leaders to formulate and implement programmes, 
always keeping them in the picture and giving them full credit for the
v  2 8work.
There were no prescribed targets or set pattern of activities for 
the Vikas Mandals in the UCDP. The theory was that the programmes should 
be open-ended and rooted in the real needs of the people. However, an 
Evaluation Study of the formation and working of the first ten Vikas Mandals 
after a year's operation, conducted by the Urban Community Development
Department, revealed that physical improvement, health and recreational
29activities accounted for 60.8% of all Vikas Mandal activities. Physical 
improvement programmes included the whitewashing of chawls, and the repair 
and maintenance of lanes and by-lanes, urinals, lavatories and bathrooms. 
Health programmes included the organisation of cleanliness competitions 
linked with the celebration of festivals such as Gandhi Jayanti, Diwali etc, 
in which the residents of various Vikhas Sabhas participated; family 
planning propaganda; teaching about nutrition, prenatal and postnatal care of
27. Evaluation Study
28. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation booklet on the UCDP.
29. Evaluation Study
women, child care; the setting up of Balmandirs or children's playgroups; 
and an immunization programme. Educational activities included school 
admission campaigns, setting up rotating libraries and a book distribution 
project, organising an elocution competition on a city-wide level and 
organising a Mock Municipal Corporation programme for students of the 
Tenth and Eleventh Standards of 85 High Schools. Recreational and 
cultural activities included the organisation of Bhajans,Garbhas, Fancy 
Dress Competitions, baby shows, film and puppet shows, dramas, a Civic
30Pledge to beautify the city programme etc. and the celebration of festivals. 
The most ambitious programmes were those concerned with bringing electricity, 
water and drainage connections to the chawls. Difficult landlord-tenant 
relationships, in which the landlord felt that the rents were too low to 
justify his undertaking improvements, and the tenant felt that it was the 
landlord's responsibility to carry out improvements and that the Municipal 
Corporation should see to this, resulted in a continued neglect of civic 
amenities in chawl areas. The Municipal Corporation could do little owing 
to legal difficulties in compelling the landlord to carry out improvements. 
This situation, for example, had prevailed in Manekpura Chawl in Kankaria 
Neighbourhood. However, estimates were now made that expenditure of 
Rs.350 per family would be involved in bringing electricity connections.
A Community Organiser, at a Vikas Mandal meeting, suggested that if a 
sizable number of families were to apply jointly for electricity, expend­
iture per family would be reduced, and that families wanting electricity 
should save Rs.10 a month to meet the required expenditure. This was 
achieved by the 22nd January, 1965, when electricity connections were 
brought to 29 families at an aggregate cost of Rs.4000» In view of the 
large number of connections taken, the Ahmedabad Electricity Company had
30. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation booklet on the UCDP.
laid the main cable free of cost.
Political implications of the UCDP and the discontinuation of the 
Project from October, 1966.
After the accession to power of the Janta Parishad in April 1965»
the UCDP was discontinued from October, 1966, after the Corporation,
which had a majority of Janta Parishad members at that time, failed to
sanction the budget proposal for paying 50% of the recurring cost of 
32the UCDP. There were various deep-rooted political motivations for 
this move on the part of the Janta Parishad-dominated Municipal 
Corporation:
Ma.jur Maha.j an influence over many of the existing Vikas Mandals
The UCDP had only partial coverage of the city's election wards, 
and, therefore, aroused political conflicts between the Janta Parishad 
and the Congress, with the Janta Parishad asserting that the scheme 
did not cover many areas of Janta Parishad influence and support, and 
was, almost wholly, confined to Congress, and especially Majur Mahajan- 
dominated areas. The Janta Parishad declared that Majur Mahajan 
workers had become entrenched in many of the Vikas Mandal Executives.
The Majur Mahajan had, indeed, been the first to bring the UCDP
into Ahmedabad. They felt that with their widespread and effective
organisation, coupled with Ford Foundation finance, they could better
accomplish their task of social welfare in the labour areas of Ahmedabad
City. Before the scheme was undertaken, Dr. Marshall B. Clinard, Ford 
Foundation Consultant for Urban Community Development, and Mr. B. 
Chatterjee, Director of the Urban Community Development Department in
31
51. Report of the Seminar on UCD, sponsored by the UCD Dept, of
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and held in Ahmedabad from the 
20th - 22nd December, 1965*
32. Interview with Mr. N.M. Desai, Secretary of the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
New Delhi, had discussions with Majur Mahajan leaders, such as Shyamprasad
R. Vasavda, Manharlal Shukla, Arvind Buch and the veteran Shankerlal 
33Banker. Majur Mahajan leaders took Dr. Clinard and Mr. Chatterjee
on a tour of the slum areas of the city, and showed them the kind of
activities that the Majur Mahajan itself was engaged in, in the working 
34class chawls. They tried to persuade Dr. Clinard that their own work 
was similar in nature to that envisaged by the UCDP, and that, therefore, 
they ought to be given the responsibility for running the UCDP in Ahmedabad. 
They also argued that they ought to be given the financial aid and 
necessary training of the UCDP, rather than the government, because 
government projects were never efficient since government administrators 
were not conversant with the daily lives and behaviour of the people,
35like Majur Mahajan workers, who were in constant touch with the workers.
The Ford Foundation had originally thought the atmosphere in 
Ahmedabad was right for the initiation of the UCDP there because of the 
TLA's constructive work in the city, and there was a stage when the Ford 
Foundation was convinced by Majur Mahajan arguments into assigning 
responsibility for the UCDP to the TLA. However, it finally decided 
against this, because there were legal difficulties about giving a 
grant of this nature -to a non-governmental body, because the TLA had 
a definite political bias, and because it felt that, with the Majur 
Mahajan as the administrative agency for the UCDP, it would be difficult 
for it to operate in middle and upper middle class areas of the city.
The Project was finally assigned to the Municipal Corporation, which had 
all the city wards under its jurisdiction and could help to coordinate 
the work of the UCD Department with that of other Municipal Corporation
33. Interview with Mr. Vitalbhai H. Patel, ex-Chief Community Organiser
UCDP, in Ahmedabad in March 197*1 •
34. Interview with Mr. I.D. Patel, ex-Community Organiser, UCDP, in
Ahmedabad, in March 1971*
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Departments.
The Majur Mahajan acquiesced in this, and, because its members 
dominated the Municipal Corporation after its massive electoral victory 
in 1961, it felt it could secure a certain amount of control over the 
UCDP and its development funds. The TLA promised the Ford Foundation
37full cooperation from its men in the Municipal Corporation for the UCDP.
In particular, the Majur Mahajan secured control over the choice
of areas where the UCDP was to be initiated, since, due to lack of
resources and the desirability of concentrating efforts for the slow
process of nurturing Yikas Mandals, the Project only covered a limited
number of areas in some of the election wards. The policy regarding
the selection of areas was decided unofficially by Congress party leaders,
of whom Manharlal T. Shukla was very influential in securing agreement
on the selection of mainly Congress areas , and areas where the Majur
38Mahajan had some influence. They then briefed Dr. Jyotsna Shah, 
the Director of the UCDP, who put the proposals before the Municipal 
Commissioner, who had the formal powers of decision. Afterwards the 
powers of selection were vested in the Urban Community Development 
Committee, which came into existence a year later, and which was
dominated by a majority of Congressmen, including influential Majur
39Mahajan leaders, up to March, 1965.
Thus the two original areas selected; Kankaria Neighbourhood and 
Rajpur-Hirpur Neighbourhood were areas of deep Majur Mahajan institut­
ional penetration. The subsequent areas, taken up for the Project, were 
also areas of Majur Mahajan influence i.e. Asarva Neighbourhood and
36
36. Interview with Mr. I.D. Patel, ex-Community Organiser, UCDP, in
Ahmedabad in March 1971*
37. Interview with M.T. Shukla in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
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Bapunagar Neighbourhood. In Bapunagar, for example, quarters were
provided by the Gujarat Government Housing Board at a very reasonable
rent in 5000 tenements, alloted only to textile and factory workers.
Here Majur Mahajan influence was very strong. The Housing Board itself
had allotted quarters in this area for the Majur Mahajan to run its
activities, such as the amba charkas activity whereby the Charka Samiti
gave the Majur Mahajan spinning wheels on loan, which it, in turn, loaned
out to women of Bapunagar, who could thus earn Rs.2 a day by selling
their produce to the Majur Mahajan cooperative, the Khadihat, which,
40in turn, sold it to the Khadi Gramodyog Board at the State level.
In these areas, there was naturally a close interaction between 
Majur Mahajan institutions and personnel and the Vikas Mandals of the 
UCDP. 60% of Vikas MandalExecutives bad representatives of the Majur 
Mahajan on them.^ Majur Mahajan representation was especially strong 
on Vikas Mandal Executives in the Kankaria,Rajpur-Hirpur, Asarva and 
Bapunagar Neighbourhoods, e.g. in the Rajpur-Hirpur area, a Vikas Mandal 
President was Pitamber Parmar, a very active Majur Mahajan worker, and 
in Bapunagar Neighbourhood, another active Majur Mahajan worker was 
President of a Vikas Mandal, Kantibhai Barot.^ The 65% of the Vikas 
MandalExecutives who had had previous leadership experience, as revealed
43by the UCD Department's Evaluation Study, seems to tally fairly 
closely with the % who were Majur Mahajan workers, because very often 
the Majur Mahajan was the only organisation operating in many of the 
chawls before the initiation of the UCDP. Many social profiles of UCDP 
areas revealed this, for example the one on the Rajpur-Hirpur area declared:
40. Ibid
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43* See Evaluation Study.
— "In this area, no other social, political or economic institution is 
working other than the Majur Mahajan. If the UCD Department will work in 
this area, it can be sure of the help, cooperation and support of the Majur 
Mahajan." — ^
The philosophy behind the UCDP, that the cooperation of voluntary
agencies in the area should be obtained, and that the Project should
supplement rather than compete against their activities, helped the
45Majur Mahajan to become so powerful in these Yikas Mandals. The
UCDP, indeed, supported Majur Mahajan institutions, if they existed in
any UCDP area e.g. family planning activities would be taught from a
Majur Mahajan-run Mahila Mandal, if it existed in the area, or if there
was a gymnasium, run by the Majur Mahajan, the UCDP did not set up a
rival body. In the areas of Kankaria, Rajpur-Hirpur, Asarva and Bapunagar,
the Municipal Corporators were also largely drawn from Majur Mahajan
workers, and thus, in these areas, the Majur Mahajan personnel and its
institutions gave full cooperation to the UCDP. Kankaria Neighbourhood
46led all others in the accomplishment of programmes under the UCDP.
Janta Parishad Municipal Corporators viewed the establishment of largely 
Congress and PSP-dominated Vikas Mandals as a threat, and criticized 
the part played by the Vikas Mandals in the 1965 Municipal Corporation 
elections.
As the Vikas Mandals began to get underway, Congress Corporators 
from city areas and areas west of the Sabarmati felt that the Vikas 
Mandals could well play an important role in deciding their future 
political careers and provide an important platform for them to express
44• Social Profile on Rajpur-Hirpur, prepared for the UCD Dept, by 
Pannalal M. Inamdar andChandrika R. Shah.
45. See Scheme for Pilot Projects in Urban Community Development, 
prepared following recommendations made in the Third Plan.
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their views, since Corporators were ex-officio members of Vikas Mandal 
Executives and could attend all Vikas Mandal meetings. Congress 
Corporators from these areas on the TJCD Committee of the Municipal 
Corporation alleged that Ford Foundation funds were being spent in a few 
areas of the city only, and demanded an extension of the UCDP to their 
areas. Thus Vikas Mandals were begun in Kochrab-Paldi, a slum pocket 
in Ellisbridge area, and in the west bank Sabarmati area, and in the 
Congress-dominated Muslim pockets in Jamalpur city area. PSP Corporators, 
such as Martandray Shastri, Ajitbhai Patel, Dr. Sureshbhai M. Shah and 
Jayendra T. Vaidya in Khadia,were generally ready to cooperate with the 
Congress over the UCDP, and wanted Vikas Mandals set up in wards where
they were influential, such as Khadia Ward No. 1 and No. 2, and in parts
of Kalupur 1.
However, Janta Parishad Corporators, who realised that the Vikas
Mandals could form a new rival political leadership in many areas,
viewed their establishment as a threat. Vikas Mandal leaders took
advantage of their right of direct access to local government bodies
and their right to see any officer of the Corporation on behalf of the
Vikas Mandal, and undertook work formerly done only by Majur Mahajan
workers, and succeeded in getting things redressed. Thus they built up
their image as the new leaders. Vikas Mandals in city areas, where the
Janta Parishad was powerful, were largely situated in Congress areas,
and Janta Parishad Corporators,especially Manubhai Palkiwala and his
followers in Dariapur, remained highly suspicious of them and of their
Presidents. Manubhai Palkiwala alleged that even the Community Organiser
48in Dariapur area, Popatlal Patel, was associated with the Majur Mahajan.
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Even in Shahpur area, which had four out of five Municipal Corporators
from the Janta Parishad, Vikas Mandals were established in slum pockets
with Congress and even Majur Mahajan influence, as in Shahpur-Vagrivas- 
49Nagoriwad area. See Appendix 1, which shows the main political 
influences in the various Vikas Mandals, established up till the 26th 
August, 1965-
The Janta Parishad also criticized the part played by the Vikas
Mandals in the 1965 Municipal Corporation elections. In the elections,
the Neighbourhood Organiser would often be consulted as to who should 
50be given tickets. Tickets were sometimes given to Vikas Mandal 
leaders e.g. Narsibhai Makwana, who worked in the Laxmipura-Nanpura
51Vikas Mandal in Kankaria, got the PSP ticket and was successfully elected. 
Vikas Mandal Executives often took part in electioneering, and, as they 
were largely dominated by Congress, Majur Mahajan and PSP sympathisers, 
this was naturally resented by the Janta Parishad. The UCD Department
even had to close down during the election period because of all the
52political campaigns going on in the Vikas Mandals.
49• Social Profile of the Shahpur-Vagrivas-Nagorivad Project,
prepared for the UCD Department, which declared that there was
no other influence apart from that of the INC in the area.
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Difficulties between the Urban Community Development Department and 
other Municipal Corporation Departments, and differences in the concept 
of a social worker.
Tensions and jealousies developed between the employees of other 
Municipal Corporation Departments, and the staff of the UCDP. Municipal 
employees wanted their own relatives and friends to find employment in 
the UCDP, but they were prevented from doing this by the tough selection 
procedures. Dr. Jyotsna Shah, the first Director of the UCDP, appointed 
a selection committee, consisting of the Deputy Municipal Commissioner, 
Mr. N.H. Thakore, Dr. CLinard, the Director of the Gujarat University 
Postgraduate School of Philosophy, the Director of the Social Science 
School in Baroda, and herself. This committee selected the first out­
standing batch of thirteen to work in the UCDP. However, subsequent 
selections were made by the Municipal Commissioner in the same way as
the selection of other Corporation staff, and the calibre of workers 
55dropped.
In addition, the UCD Department did not obtain smooth cooperation 
from other Municipal Corporation Departments because the salaries of 
UCD staff were very much higher than the salaries of other municipal 
employees, who felt highly dissatisfied at this. These high salaries 
had been fixed by Dr. Clinard, and the Ford Foundation, in general, had 
insisted that a major part of their funds should be used to procure staff 
of the highest quality by offering good salaries. Thus the UCD staff 
did not get good cooperation from other Municipal Corporation Departments 
e.g. during the UCDP's campaign for school admissions, school admission 
forms were brought to the houses of families to be filled in and a 
discussion between educationalists was to be organised. However, the
53. Interview with Mr. R in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
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Municipal Commissioner declared that the School Board was already 
doing work of this kind and the rule that parents must go to the schools 
to fill up admission forms could not be circumvented. Headmasters also 
did not cooperate in checking the regular attendance of school children.
The Janta Parishad members, especially Indulal Yagnik with his 
Gandhian sympathies, and the Communists, also objected to the type of 
social worker recruited into the UCD Department, although for very 
different reasons from the jealous municipal employees. They objected 
to the recruitment of highly educated middle class youths, whom they 
felt were not really suited to social service. Janta Parishad members 
felt that graduates were not necessarily required since very often they 
could not really identify with or communicate with the common people.
They also felt that it was inappropriate to pay such large salaries to 
the UCD staff, and adhered to the Gandhian ideal that the social worker 
should be a simple man, who could teach the people by example and 
perform necessary heavy tasks with them instead of merely counselling 
them.^
D. Janta Parishad criticism of American influence in the UCDP and of the 
trivial nature of the work done.
Some Janta Parishad members, including Indulal Yagnik and particularly 
extremist Communists like Manubhai T. Patel, criticized the UCDP as a 
CIA plot to instill American cultural ideas into the working class of
56Ahmedabad city. Janta Parishad members, in particular, pointed out 
the limitations of the ideology of self-help, which underlay much of 
the UCD philosophy.
The prerequisite of having matching contributions from the people 
for all projects and programmes undertaken by the community severely
55 • Interview with Mr. Dinkar Mehta in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
56. Ibid.
restricted the scope of what could be achieved and, consequently, fairly
small activities only could be organised e.g. dustbins costing Rs.1
each were given out to the people and, for this, 8 annas was collected 
57from each family. Larger projects meant a greater financial outlay 
from the people and a longer gestation period, therefore, the people 
would easily become frustrated and lose interest. The 50% matching 
contribution clause meant that the important schemes of securing 
electricity and water connections were only undertaken after the second 
or third year of the Project, because they were extremely expensive and 
required long periods of saving e.g. in Laxmipura-Nanpura Vikas Mandal, 
sixty families had to contribute Rs.50 each in cash before the main 
pipeline for water connections to their chawl could be laid, and, after
this, individual families in a tenement had to find Rs.200-400 to get
58water connections for their tenements. More expensive projects, like 
new housing, were out of the question due to the impossibility of securing 
a 50% matching contribution from slum dwellers.
The Ford Foundation had stipulated that not more than 10% of 
its funds (Rs.8 lakhs over three years in all) was to be spent by way 
of direct financial aid for individual programmes, as the bulk of the 
funds should be spent on starting the pilot project, paying high salaries 
for good staff and studying the results. The Ford Foundation envisaged 
a gradual rise in the contributions from the people i.e. ratios of 60% 
contribution: 40% aid, 70% contribution: 30% aid until eventually
the Vikas Mandals would be self-supporting, and financial aid to them 
could be totally stopped. This was a very different ideology and structure 
from the rural scheme of democratic decentralisation, Panchayati Raj.
57. Interview with Mr. I.D. Patel in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
58. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation booklet on the UCDP.
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However, due to the matching contributions provision not even this sum
of 10% was spent on direct financial aid for projects by the time the
UCDP was discontinued in October 1966, and most of the money was only
59spent during the later years of the Project.
As a result of the ideology of self-help and the lack of sufficient 
powers and resources, given to the UCDP, to effect significant changes 
and thereby raise levels of participation and legitimacy of the urban 
political system in the same way as Panchayati Raj in the rural areas, 
the UCDP was open to the charge of the Janta Parishad against the 
triviality of the work achieved as measured against the outstanding 
problems of the people. Indulal Yagnik coined the biting phrase des­
cribing the UCDP as "a puppet-show for the people" i.e. concerned with 
the trivia of organising Bhajan sessions and mehndi and hair style 
competitions and producing amateur dramatics rather than with the 
pressing economic and employment needs of the people. ^
Even the Government of India Scheme for pilot projects in UCD, 
drawn up after the directives of the Third Plan, desired greater attention 
to be paid to the initiation of economic programmes like the establishment 
of consumer cooperatives, industrial cooperatives, small-scale and cottage 
industries1 units to help tackle the unemployment problems of the cities.^ 
However, this aspect was played down by the Ahmedabad, UCDP, with the 
Evaluation Report on the formation and working of the first ten Vikas 
Mandals making the following rationalisation for this:
59* Interview with Mr. Vitalbhai H. Patel in Ahmedabad in March 1971•
60. Interview with Mr. Indulal Yagnik in Ahmedabad in March 1971*
61. See Scheme for Pilot Projects in Urban Community Development .
— " 1. In the Rural Community Development, emphasis is laid on
economic improvement, especially development of agricultural and small 
industries. In Urban Community Development, improvement in living 
conditions receives greater attention.
'C
2. Rural Community Development as it has developed in India is 
primarily "programme -oriented" whereas urban programmes should be 
"process" or "people-oriented". This means that the activities 
undertaken under the Urban Community Development programme subserve
the more important objectives of creating consciousness in the community
62and developing its capacity to deal with its problems."- --
The Janta Parishad aimed close to the mark when it questioned the
relevance of many of the UCDP's activities to the more urgent economic 
and employment problems of the people. The UCDP had neither the finances 
nor the powers to effect significant changes of this kind, and the
efficacy of raising consciousness of their needs in the people without
providing adequate means for satisfying those needs could well be questioned. 
Thus, despite the Ford Foundation’s apparent willingness to extend
the UCDP agreement even after the accession to power in the Municipal
63Corporation of a Communist-dominated Janta Parishad, the UCDP 
was discontinued from October ^[366 by a vote of the Janta Parishad- 
dominated Municipal Corporation.
62. See Evaluation Study
63. On August 29th, 1966, Mr. Samuel E. Bunker, Assistant Representative 
of the Ford Foundation wrote a letter to Mr. H.K.L. Capoor, the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Commissioner, in which he praised the good 
work of the UCDP and conveyed the Ford Foundation's decision to 
continue to support the project for another year until July 22,
1967> without any conditions attached to this extension.
Failure of attempts by Janta Parishad leaders to restart the UCDP 
and make it operate to the benefit of the Janta Parishad party due 
to intraparty indiscipline and lack of resources.
Certain members of the Janta Parishad, especially Dinkar Mehta, 
who became Mayor on coming out of jail in April 1966, and including 
Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi, Jaimal Thakore, Chairman of the Standing 
Committee and Nandubhai Raval, Chairman of the Recreational and 
Cultural Committee, felt that, as the Janta Parishad was in power in 
the Municipal Corporation, they should attempt to remodel the UCDP 
and make it operate in favour of Janta Parishad interests. They also 
felt that the UCDP, once it was operating to their advantage, would 
help to secure for the Janta Parishad the active support and loyalty 
of the people, especially in labour and inner city areas. Thus they 
wanted to restart the UCDP, after making some structural and personnel 
changes.^
Their major recommendations for remodelling the UCDP included 
the following demands: they wanted a lowering of salary scales for all
UCDP Departmental staff from the Director down to the peon. They 
desired an inclusion in the UCDP of additional areas where the Janta 
Parishad had a support-base - Manubhai Palkiwala was particularly 
anxious to have his political base area in Dariapur included in the 
Project. They demanded that the Director should not merely be concerned 
with doing office-work in the UCD Department, but should also work 
actively in the Neighbourhoods. There were tentative proposals to 
change some of the Community Organisers and put in their place more 
Gandhian-style social workers, probably with Janta Parishad leanings. 
Many of the recently victorious Janta Parishad Corporators, after the
64* Interview with Dinkar Mehta and Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi in
Ahmedabad in March 1971•
1965 Municipal Corporation elections, wanted the leadership of the 
Vikas Mandals to be changed to accommodate their representatives and 
supporters.^
Dr. Lilaben Shah, the then current UCDP Director, and many of the
UCD staff were perfectly willing to accept large changes as long as
the UCDP was not abandoned. The Director and the staff agreed to a
lowering of their salary scales, knowing that they could not fall
below that of other Municipal Corporation employees. The Director openly
told Janta Parishad leaders that the power of selection of areas for
the UCDP lay with the Corporation, not with the Director, so the Janta
Parishad should go ahead and include their own areas in the UCDP. The
Community Organisers agreed to the device, to enable the extension
of UCDP areas, of the engagement of part-time workers, paid only Rs.75
per month as salary, who would act as physical education instructors,
sewing teachers for the ladies etc., thus leaving the Community Organiser
to act merely as a coordinating factor in particular Vikas Mandals.
Indeed the staff and UCDP Director were almost willing to give Janta
Parishad leaders a blank cheque so long as the Project could be restarted-
with the Director going so far as to declare that she was ready to
continue the Project even if the funds for it were to be supplied from 
66Communist China.
However, the Project could not be restarted because of the limit­
ation in resources for the UCDP, which meant that UCDP areas could not 
be rapidly expanded. Although Janta Parishad leaders discussed with 
the Chairmen and Secretaries of the Vikas Mandals that there should be 
a change in the Community Organisers and in the workings of the UCD 
Department, the Vikas Mandal leaders did not appear to want changes.
It had proved almost impossible to dislodge old-established Vikas Mandal
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leadership at the Vikas Mandal elections by the representatives of newly-
elected Janta Parishad Corporators, because these Corporators were often
new to politics and had not consolidated an effective network of
influence. Moreover, the Majur Mahajan, after its massive electoral
defeat in the 1965 Municipal Corporation elections, doubled its efforts
to create good relations with the people; therefore, despite their
wishes, new Janta Parishad Corporators had not succeeded in changing
67Vikas Mandal leadership.
The major reason, however, for the failure to restart the UCDP 
on new lines, advantageous to the Janta Parishad, was the deterioration 
in intraparty discipline by mid 1967* Dinkar Mehta and Dr. Vasudev 
N. Tripathi could not convince their own colleagues to accept a new 
UCDP scheme due to intensive group rivalry within the Janta Parishad.
In the early years, there had been a general prejudice in the Janta 
Parishad against the so-called American influence in the UCDP, which 
resulted in the discontinuation of the UCDP in October 1966. However, 
efforts to restart it on different lines failed due to worsening inter­
group relations in the Janta Parishad and conflicts between the groups 
as to who would run the UCDP, who would become the Chairman of the UCD 
Committee etc. The more conservative, anti-Communist elements in the 
Janta Parishad were afraid that UCD activities, which had been taking
place largely in working class chawls, would work to the benefit of the
68Communists. Indulal Yagnik and the Somabhai C. Desai group opposed 
the UCDP, guided by the counsels of Maneklal Thakore of the Janta 
Parishad executive, who had produced an unfavourable report for the
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party on the UCDP. Manubhai Palkiwala personally was in favour of the
UCDP, but his group opposed it. The Communists, particularly extreme left-
wing Communists such as Manubhai T. Patel and Baluram Gupta, were almost
70united against the UCDP. Dinkar Mehta, Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi and
some other Independent middle class Radicals found it almost an impossible
task to secure a consensus on restarting the UCDP. A subcommittee of
all parties in the Municipal Corporation was appointed on the 27th July,
1967, to study the UCDP and the possibilities of restarting it. It was
composed of Shrimati N a l i n i b e n  Mehta, wife of Dinkar Mehta, as Chairman,
Gokuldas Patel, Baluram Gupta, Jaimal Thakore, D.K. Patel of the Congress,
Martandray Shastri of the PSP, and Bachubhai Kapadia. The committee
sat in conflict for several months, and by the time it finally agreed
on restarting the UCDP in the Janta Parishad's last year of rule in the
Corporation, the Janta Parishad itself had disintegrated and the possibility
of securing a successful majority in favour of restarting the UCDP in
71the Municipal Corporation seemed remote.
After Manubhai Palkiwala's defection in the summer of 19^7» the 
Janta Parishad lost its majority in the Corporation, and it was so riven 
by inter-group conflicts that the Janta Parishad leaders, in favour of 
restarting the UCDP, were forced to seek the concurrence of one or other 
of the main opposition parties - either the Congress or the PSP - if the 
Project was to be revived. However, neither the Congress nor the PSP would 
cooperate with the Janta Parishad over the restarting of the UCDP. They 
suspected that the Janta Parishad would try to take advantage of the various 
Vikas Mandals in the working class chawls. In time, also, the UCDP became 
an electoral issue in the 1969 Municipal Corporation elections, with both 
the Congress and the PSP decrying the closing of the UCDP by the Janta
6 9 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. K i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
7 0 .  I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  M r. AA a n d  M r . D i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
7 1 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r .  BB i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
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Parishad, and unwilling to help the Janta Parishad to restart the Project
for fear that the prestige attached to the UCDP would go to the Janta 
72Parishad.
72. Ibid.
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APPENDIX 1. Political influences in the UCDP Vikas Mandals.
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.Difficulties of goal attainment: difficulties in achieving the economic
goals of the Janta Parishad in the Corporation due to the hostility of 
the business community over Special Property taxation, which crippled 
the finances of the Municipal Corporation and resulted in extensive 
litigation up to the level of the Supreme Court, and due to the limited 
powers of the Corporation vis-'&.-vis the State Government, which proved 
uncooperative to the Janta Parishad-dominated Corporation.
As proclaimed in their election manifesto of 1965* and reiterated 
by Dfinlcar Mehta, while he was Mayor of Ahmedabad in November, 1966, at 
a debate on the financial condition of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corpor­
ation organized by the Ahmedabad Junior Chamber, the Janta Parishad's 
political philosophy was summed up in the phrase: "the Municipal Corp­
oration's administration should not be run in the interests of any one 
class, but in the interests of all the people".
Dinkar Mehta, at the Junior Chamber debate, went on to state more 
fully the aspirations of the Janta Parishad now it had obtained power in 
the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, commenting disparagingly in passing 
on Congress efforts to beautify the city at the expense of providing 
many areas with even primary facilities:
— "In the history of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, a new 
era has started. Previously the capitalist class had a stronghold in 
the Corporation, and it was administered for their benefit. Taxation 
was also levied looking to their interests. It is necessary to change
this entirely, and the Janta Parishad has started these changes....
It is necessary to provide the citizens with entertainment facilities 
and also to beautify the city by the provision of parks, swimming-pools, 
a stadium etc., but it is a general belief that more attention should 
be paid to providing the primary needs of the people such as water,
1 .  D i n k a r  M e h t a ,  S p e e c h  on t h e  F i n a n c i a l  C o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  A h m e d a b a d
M u n i c i p a l  C o r p o r a t i o n . G i v e n  a t  a  d e b a t e  o n  t h i s  t o p i c  o r g a n i z e d  b y  t h e  
A h m e d a b a d  J u n i o r  C h a m b e r  a t  t h e  Town H a l l  o n  N o v .  2 0 ,  1 9 6 6 .
( C y c l o s t y l e d  m a n u s c r i p t  t r a n s l a t e d  f r o m  t h e  G u j a r a t i . )
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lighting, sewage-disposal, roads, housing and health facilities ....
The socialist principles adopted by the Congress to create a
socialist society were not followed by it, and instead of the city's
general development, only the rich areas of Ellisbridge and Shahibag
were developed at the expense of lakhs of rupees to make them like
Paris, and this was done at the sacrifice of the development of middle
class suburbs and labour areas. Moreover, there was a great deal of
inequality in the taxation frame-work. The socialist society can be
established only by taxing the rich and the industries which can bear
it, and by aiding the poor and middle class people. The Congress
Party failed in this because of the vested interests of the capitalists,
and that is why its fall came in the Municipal Corporation. We have
started towards the goal of establishing the socialistic society with
2the cooperation of the public, slowly but surely ...."
Thus the Janta Parishad aimed at removing the inequalities in 
the development of different areas of the city, and at creating a 
balanced development in the interests of all the classes not just the 
capitalist class. However, in this aim, they came across many diff­
iculties, not least of which were the limited powers of the Corporation 
vis-^.-vis the State Government under the BPMC Act of 1949> and the 
uncooperative attitude of the Congress-dominated State Government.
They also had to face the hostility of the business community over 
Special Property taxation which crippled the finances of the Corpor­
ation. The following section analyses these difficulties of the Janta 
Parishad-dominated Corporation, and outlines the minor achievements 
they were finally able to make.
2. Ibid.
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A. Financial Crisis for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation caused by 
the refusal of the Textile Magnates to accept the assessments on 
Special Property Taxation during the later 1960s.
During the 1950s and 1960s the expenditure of the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation rose at a faster rate than the receipts. The 
overall income of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation which was 
R s . 2 . 4 7  crores in 1950-51 rose to Rs.11.86 crores in 1967-68, thus 
registering an overall rise of 380.1%. Over the period 1951 to 1970 
the total receipts rose at the annual average rate of 31%* The total 
expenditure, which was Rs.1.81 crores in 1950-51» rose to Rs.14*19 
crores in 1967-68, showing an overall rise of 683.9%* Over the period 
1951 to 1970 the total expenditure rose at the annual average rate 
of 51%* This trend became far more pronounced during the 1960s due to 
increasing developmental expenditure. Up to 1963~64> the overall 
budgetary position showed surplus for most of the years. It is only 
after 1963-64 that there were continuous budget deficits year after 
year except for the year 1966—67 -
Against this background, the dispute between the millowners and 
the Municipal Corporation over the taxation of Special Property in the 
mid 60s caused a situation of financial crisis during the Janta 
Parishad tenure of power in the Corporation, reducing its ability to 
carry out a vigorous programme of city development.
The origin of the dispute goes back beyond the accession of the 
Janta Parishad to power in 1965» and was, in a sense, an endemic problem 
of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. However, it was certainly 
aggravated by the Janta Parishad's ideological rigidity and inability 
to provide a bridge between the millowners and the Municipal Corpor­
ation, as the Congress party was later able to do successfully after it
3. Mahesh Bhatt and M.S. Trivedi^ , Finances of the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation. (University School of Social Sciences, Gujarat University: 
I96§). Mahesh Bhatt and M.S. Trivedi are respectively Reader in 
Economics and Lecturer in Economics at the University School of 
Social Sciences, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad 9 *
came to power in the Corporation in 1969.^ The situation was further
aggravated by a tendency to psychological over-reaction and insecurity
exhibited by the whole body of millowners due to their loss of control
over the Corporation on the Janta Parishad accession to power in 1965*
Although the assessment and levy of the property taxes is strictly
speaking the sole concern of the Municipal Commissioner and his executive
officers (the Standing Committee of the Corporation having only the
right of determining the rate or % of tax), in practice the nature of
the political regime in power in the Corporation does have a marked
5influence over the assessment officers. The ascendancy of the Janta 
Parishad to power in 1965 provided a general political climate of 
radicalism and more particular pressurization of assessment officers, 
resulting in a strong drive for recovery of arrears and better collection 
of property taxes, greater insistence on taxing plant and machinery 
and an increase in rateable values on applying the contractors' test 
method of assessment and after the quadrennial revision of property 
taxes which came into effect from the 1st April 1967.^  The Municipal 
Commissioner stated in the Budget Estimate for 1966-67;
—  "(b) Income from taxes
The increase of Rs.29.96 lakhs on this account is traceable to 
the drive already undertaken for the recovery of the past years' arrears.
Further, the recovery of current demand will be effected to the 
maximum limit, leaving the minimum arrears for collection in future"—
In particular, the assessment of Special Properties, mainly mills and 
factories, tripled. Uncertainty regarding income from special property
4 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. Z i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
5 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. E i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
6. AMC, Budget Estimate, 1966-6 7.
taxation, which formed about 40% of total revenue income, due to litigation
by millowners, made it more difficult for the Janta Parishad to carry out
7its programme of social and developmental measures.
The financial tug-of-war between the textile magnates and the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation over Special Property taxation went back 
to the very beginning of the Corporations history. In 1951 > the 
Ahmedabad Municipality became the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation under 
the BPMC Act of 1949• Under the Municipal Boroughs Act the basis of 
assessment of all properties had been a certain percentage of the capital 
value, but after 1951 this method of assessment was no longer available. 
After 1951 the basis for assessment of all properties within the city 
became the annual rent i.e. what a hypothetical tenant would pay if the 
property was let out from year to year. In the early 1950s there was an 
upward revision of the annual rent and therefore taxes went up. Unhappy 
at this prospect, the Ahmedabad Millowners1 Association approached the 
Municipal Corporation, requesting both sides to find a mutually-acceptable 
solution to this problem by negotiation to avoid conflict and the expense 
and bitterness of litigation. The Congress party, containing a very 
influential segment of businessmen, provided a bridge between the parties 
during these negotiations. Through the arbitration of Kasturbhai Lalbhai, 
perhaps the leading textile magnate, and Bogilal Lala, an influential 
Congressman in the Corporation, with H.V. Divetia, a Judge of the Gujarat 
High Court, as umpire, a settlement was reached in 1951 which proved 
highly concessional to the Ahmedabad millowners, reflecting their political 
preponderance during this period. According to this settlement, the floor 
area method of assessment, applying a certain rate per eveiy 100sq. ft. 
of the property, was agreed upon. The rate fixed was highly concessional 
to the millowners, and, due to the ad hoc nature of the agreement, the 
usual four-yearly revisions were dispensed with.
7. AMC, Budget Estimate, 1971-72.
This agreement lasted unchanged till 1958-59• From 1959 onwards, 
the Municipal Corporation suggested to the millowners that, though the 
period of the agreement had expired, the same formula should continue 
with slight modifications in the rate per 10O sq. ft. to allow for higher 
prices and consequently higher costs to be borne by the Municipal 
Corporation. Negotiations were carried on with Kasturbhai Lalbhai, the 
leading spokesman for the millowners. Though they broke down at one 
stage, eventually a slightly higher rate was agreed to, though this was 
not to the extent the Municipal Corporation had wanted. A few mills 
remained outside the agreement and began a process of litigation that was 
to go on for many years.^
This second agreement lasted till 1964-65* when some of the textile 
mills (approximately 10-20) challenged the floor area method of assess­
ment, not the quantum in the High Court, thus turning back on their 
own suggestions in 1951* In order to appreciate this some what suprising 
volte face, it is necessary to understand the background of deteriorating 
economic conditions for the cotton textile industry during the mid 60s 
period, and the fact that the millowners at this time were divided in their 
approach to the problem of municipal valuation of mills: generally
speaking, it was the economically weaker, less productive mills, badly hit 
by deteriorating economic conditions and therefore unable to pay municipal 
taxes, who sought a way out through litigation and were advised (or rather 
misadvised, as it turned out later) by their lawyers to get the floor 
area method declared illegal in the Courts and the assessments struck down.
During the mid 1960s, economic conditions over the whole country, 
and particularly for the cotton textile industry began to deteriorate.
Due to the successive failure of the monsoon and bad harvests, including 
a poor yield for the indigenous cotton crop, there was an economic recession 
throughout the country, resulting in cost inflation and generally low 
consumer purchasing power. The cost of factors in the cost of
8. Interview with Mr. Panchal, Dy. Municipal Commissioner for Ahmedabad
in March 1971 • ________________________________________
production of the cotton textile industry rose significantly. There 
was an acute shortage of cotton during these years, and market prices
ruled at about Rs.100 per candy above the ceiling price for raw cotton.
While the output of cotton remained stagnant around 55 lakh bales, after
scaling a peak of 64 lakh bales in 1965-64* the spindleage had gone up
from 14»11 million at the beginning of 1963 to 16.61 million by the end
of November 1966, and the needs of the industry (at a fully utilised
10capacity) exceeded 72 lakh bales by 1967•
Another important reason for the mills1 difficulties over the
availability of cotton was the mal distribution of stocks among the various
units. Another problem was posed by the fact that the holding power of
the cotton farmer had been greatly increased by the penetration of the
cooperative system of marketing (80% of Gujarat's cotton was now
routed through these cooperatives) with the result that the slump in
cotton prices that had in the past marked the harvest was rapidly
disappearing. By virtue of their great holding power, the cooperatives
retained their stocks and pierced the price ceilings by large margins.
The mills were reluctant to pay prices beyond the ceilings as in previous
years, because devaluation of the rupee had pushed up their maintenance
11and expansion costs and the price of imported cotton.
Another cost of production, the wage bill, had gone up considerably 
during these years, particularly regarding the payment of dearness 
allowance. The following table shows the increase in monthly d.a. of 
Ahmedabad textile workers between 1963 and 1966:
9. ‘Times of India , (Bombay) ,5TApril ., 1967•
10. Times of India , (Bombay),!3April , 1967*
11. Times of India , (Bombay) ,)£November : speech by the Commerce 
Minister, Manubhai Shah, in the Lok Sabha.
9
361
TABLE 2. Rise in Ahmedabad Textile Workers' d.a., 1965-66.1 ?
YEAR: D.A. Per Month of 26 working days in Rs.
1965 8 7 - 8 - 5
1964 118 -15 -10
1965 128 -15 -10
1966 1 4 5 - 3 - 1
The Ahmedabad Millowners' Association, in desperation, in October 1966 
went as far as to seek to terminate the d.a. award and obtain neutralis­
ation at a level lower than the 100% granted by the existing award to 
mill workers in view of the unprecendented rise in the consumer price 
index nos. and the steady deterioration of the financial position of the 
industry.^ ^
The millowners also complained that controlled prices of cloth (about
40% of the cloth output of the mills was under statutory control) did not
take into account the tremendous current cost inflation,^ and constantly
demanded an increase in the controlled prices to the extent of 20-30%
and were dissatisfied with the grant of an increase of 4.5% by the
15Central Government in April 1967• Their ultimate demand was for
16decontrol of cotton and cloth prices. They also complained of heavy
17taxation by the Central and State government.
Thus Ahmedabad millowners maintained that the overall cost of
production had risen by as much as 51% between i960 and 1965* and. that
18the year 1965 alone saw a rise of 14%> see the following table.
12. Report of the Ahmedabad Millowners' Association (j 196 .^
13« Times of India (Bombay),^ -October , 1966.
14. MOA Report f  1967).
15. Times of India (Bombay) ,|£April , 1967*
16. Times of India (Bombay) ^ November ., 1966.
17. MOA Report(  196^ ).
18. Ibid, Appendices, p.200
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Elements of Cost of 
Manufacture
1960 1964 1964 % Rise 
over 1960
1965 1965 ? 
Rise c 
1960.
1. Raw Materials 4450 5871 52% 6428 44%
2. Stores 1835 2596 41% 2883 57%
5. Wage Bill 3241 4210 30% 4688 48%
4. Fuel and Power 623 1056 70% 1123 80%
5. Interest charges 191 407 113% 545 185%
6. Miscellaneous 998 1365 37% 1492 49%
TOTAL 11338 15505 37% 17159 51%
Under the cumulative effect of the above difficulties, while profits
before tax of Ahmedabad mills was R s .9 « 5 1  crores in 1 9 6 0 ,  it fell to
R s . 3 * 5 4  c r o r e s  i n  19 6 5  -  a  r e d u c t i o n  o f  63%. I n  1 9 6 0 ,  o n l y  one m i l l
s^ made a loss; this figure rose to 15 in 1962, 18 in 1963 and 26 in 1965•
In 1965> out of 57 mills in Ahmedabad , 31 made a profit of Rs.5.81 crores
but /remaining 26 incurred a loss of Rs.2.27 crores, leaving a surplus
19
b a l a n c e  o f  o n l y  R s . 3 « 5 3  c r o r e s .
As a result of the above adverse economic conditions, several
Ahmedabad mills were threatened with closure during the mid 60s period.
The Indian Cotton Mills* Federation, the apex body of Indian cotton
textile mills, (whose president in both 1967 and 1968 was the Ahmedabad
textile magnate, Madanmohan Mangaldas) threatened a block closure of all
mills for a fortnight from December 19> 1966, and sealing of 6% of
20spindles due to the acute shortage of cotton. This proposal would have
19. MOA Report( 1968).
20. Times of India (Bombay),| December , 1966.
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rendered about 700,000 textile workers idle, with a loss in wages of 
about Rs. 7 crores (though half of this might be paid in the fonn of 
lay-off compensation), and a loss in production of about Rs. 32 crores 
worth. This was narrowly averted by a Central Government Ordinance in 
December 1966, providing extraordinary powers to deal with the cotton 
textile crisis and including a scheme of compulsory closure of mills for 
one day in a week from December 12th until conditions improved with 
normal lay-off compensation paid to the 700,000 workers who would be 
rendered idle.^
Thus, due to the generally deteriorating economic position of the
cotton textile industry in the mid 60s, about ten mills, out of a total
of about 60, were not in a position to pay any municipal tax because they
were verging on bankruptcy. Many of these weaker, less productive mills
had accumulated tax arrears, and in order to forestall the Corporation
from issuing warrants for the attachment of their properties, they were
22advised by their lawyers to go to Court. The New Manekchowk 
Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. was the most tenacious of these 
mills in pursuing litigation through the Gujarat High Court to the 
Supreme Court, and became the symbol and leader of this group of 
mills, ultimately winning the famous Supreme Court case of February 
21st 1967> known as "New Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. 
and Others vs. the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad". The New 
Manekchowk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. was later
21. Times of India (Bombay), 4 December^ 1966.
22. Interview with Mr. K.K. in Ahmedabad in March 1971 •
among the list of those closed mills, for whose unemployed workers the 
TLA requested the Ahmedabad Millowners1 Association to give priority in 
recruitment on December 7th 1968; and on 21st February 1969 it was 
declared a relief undertaking by the Government of Gujarat under the 
Bombay Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act of 1958> thus
23suspending all its rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities.
It was these weaker mills who were advised by their lawyers (it 
turned out that the lawyers did not understand the real interests of their 
clients because later the floor area method of assessment, which was 
largely concessional to millowners, was declared illegal, and replaced 
by the contractors1 test method by which assessments rose phenomenally) 
to challenge the validity of the floor area method of assessment, and to 
submit that the imposition of property tax on plant and machinery was 
beyond the legislative competence of the State^ and therefore the
|
Corporation whose taxing powers derived from those of the State. It was 
felt that the floor area method, which imposed a flat rate and did not 
take into account factors like age, location, quality etc. of the 
factories, was discriminating against the weaker mills under Article 14 
of the Constitution. Thus there was a division of interests and the lack 
of a unified approach to the problem of municipal valuation of mill 
property on the part of the millowners.
After a fairly long legal battle, the writ petitions on behalf of 
the New Manekchovk Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd., and other mills, which 
had been dismissed by the Gujarat High Court on other grounds, finally 
succeeded in the Supreme Court Judgement of February 21st, 1967* The 
Supreme Court held that the imposition of property taxes on the basis 
of a flat rate per so many sq.ft. of the floor area of the factories was 
discriminatory under Article 14 of the Constitution since the method
23. MOA Report( 196$.
2 4 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. Z i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
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did. not take into account such factors as the locality where the 
building was situated, the age, quality and nature of the building 
etc., and accordingly there was no classification of the factories on a 
rational basis. It declared that a mechanical formula without taking 
into account the conditions of each building is not to be a valid method 
of arriving at the valuation. On a more conservative note, although 
both the Local Finance Enquiry Committee of 1949 and the Committee of 
Ministers of 1963 felt that the rateable value of plant and machinery 
should be taken into account in determining the rateable value of a 
factory building, as in England, because by "excluding machinery and 
plant the industries in India are not contributing adequately to the 
cost of services which are generally provided by a local body", the 
Supreme Court in this Judgement declared that the levying of a property 
tax on plant and machinery was beyond the legislative competence of the 
State, since there is no legislative entry in the Constitution to 
give power to the State legislature to tax plant and machinery, as this 
does not come under entry 49 of list II of the 7th Schedule which reads 
"Taxes on land and buildings". In addition, the Supreme Court declared 
sub-rule 3 of Rule 7 of the Taxation Rules in Schedule A of the BPMC 
Act of 1949, which reads:
— "A statement setting out clearly the classes of plant and machinery 
specified from time to time by the Commissioner under sub-rule 2 and 
describing in detail what plant and machinery falls within each such 
class (liable to tax) shall be prepared by the Commissioner under the 
directionsof the Standing Committee" —
as invalid on account of excessive delegation of power by the legislature
25to the Municipal Commissioner.
25. Supreme Court Reports, "New Manekchowk Spinning and
Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. and Others vs. the Municipal Corporation 
of Ahmedabad." C 67).
The Supreme Court Judgement of February 21st, 1967, however, proved
to be a Pyrrhic victory for the millowners. Since the highly concessional
floor area method had been declared illegal, the Municipal Corporation
had no alternative but to turn to the only other method available and
known to law, which could be applicable in the case of Special Properties
- the contractor’s test method. According to the contractor's test
method, the rateable value was worked out by calculating the present-day
cost of reconstruction of the property involved i.e. the present capital
value of the property taking into account depreciation. Since it was
the present market value, and not the original investment, which was
taken into account in calculating the rateable value, the prices involved
were much higher e.g. in the industrial area of Naroda Road, between 1934
and 1970, the cost of construction had risen four times, and land prices
26had risen from Rs.2 per square yard to Rs.40 per sq. yard. This, 
together with the quadrennial revision of property taxes which was to come 
into effect from the 1st April, 1967; the more radical political climate 
favouring even higher assessments of millowners; and the Janta Parishad's 
pressurization of assessment officers meant that assessments for property 
taxes increased very sharply.
The Budget Estimates of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for the 
year 1967-68 envisaged a rise in the rateable value of residential properties 
and Special Properties to the extent of Rs.225 lakhs and Rs.554 lakhs 
respectively. In the Assessment Book, textile mills and other industrial 
units were assessed at a fantastically high ratio - three to five times 
that of the previous year's average. The gross annual letting value of 
Ahmedabad mills, which was Rs.119*15 lakhs in 1966-67, rose to the figure 
of Rs.502.l6 lakhs in 1967-68. The proposed assessment of taxation of 
textile mills was Rs.166.99 lakhs in 1967-68 as compared to Rs.58.51 lakhs
26. Interview with Mr. N.R. Desai of the Town Planning Department of the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in March 1971•
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in the previous year i.e. almost three times as high. 27 To the astonished
millowners, who had expected that the effect of the Supreme Court Judge­
ment of February 21st, 1967» in excluding plant and machinery from the 
assessment of properties would result in a reduction of rateable values 
and tax by about 20%, the proposed rise in taxation was staggering.
The millowners, previously divided and disunited on this issue,
came together almost to a man, under the guidance of the Millowners1
Association, to oppose these new assessments by the Municipal Corporation.
Their anger was compounded by their psychological insecurity in losing
their ability to control Municipal Corporation affairs since the accession
to power of the Janta Parishad in 1965» and consequent over-reaction on
the issue of municipal taxation of Special Properties. To make matters
worse, the Janta Parishad, whose current Mayor was a Marxist Communist,
Dinkar Mehta, could not provide a bridge for negotiations and constructive
discussions between the millowners and the Municipal Corporation. On
appeal by the millowners, the Deputy Municipal Commissioner for Law
and Revenue reduced the municipal tax on mill properties from almost
three times the 1966-67 figure to double it ,i.e. from Rs.166.99 lakhs
28to Rs.120 lakhs. However, it was still more profitable for the
millowners to go to the Courts than to pay the tax. Thus the Janta Parishad -
influenced Municipal Corporation failed to abide by an important canon 
of municipal administration: increase taxes gradually and in such a way
that it does not become more profitable for the millowners to litigate
29rather than pay tax, thus defeating the purposes of increased taxation.
27
28. Interview with Mr. Panchal, Dy. Municipal Commissioner of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, in March 1971*
29. Interview with Mr. E in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
The financial intransigeance of the millowners was heightened by a 
background of continuing deterioration in the economic conditions of the 
cotton textile industry, resulting in increases in the cost of production 
and a steady fall in profitability. During 1966 and 1967 9 there were 
continued shortages of agricultural raw materials, due to adverse 
climatic conditions, and, consequently, the demand for industrial and non­
industrial goods fell severely. In 1967» there was a sharp increase in 
agricultural prices: the index no. of whole-sale prices of all commodities
reached 221.0 in October, 19^7> as against 194*4 in December 1966. 
Throughout the year the monthly index of industrial production remained 
well below 199*2 - the December 1966 level. Increase in industrial 
production was of the order of 1.7%> as against the Plan target of 5%.
For the third successive year, the cotton textile industry had to face 
serious difficulties. For the third year, the output of cotton was far 
short of the Third Plan target of 70 lakh bales set for the year 1965-66, 
and imports fell far short of requirements and were often delayed.
Although the Central Government raised the price ceilings of Indian cotton 
by 5% from December 1966, prices continued to rule over the ceilings, 
sometimes exceeding the ceiling by 50%. The wage bill rose significantly 
because of the very high rate of d.a., and the prices of coal, chemicals 
and other stores also rose. Shortage of cotton compelled mills to cut 
production by observing extra holidays. The cloth production in 1967 
was only 4>100 million metres as against 4>654 million metres in 1964* 
and y a m  production, which had reached the record of 965 million kilograms 
in 1964, fell to 896 million kilograms in 1967* Lower production, reduced 
export performance and uneconomic returns on cloth output resulted in 
severe shortage of finances for many mills, and some units were forced 
to close down. A comparison of the financial ratios of Ahmedabad mills 
between 1964 and 1967 revealed that gross profits as a % of sales fell 
from 9*5 in 1964 to 6.7 in 1967* and, as a % of total capital employed,
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they fell from 13.8 in 1964 to 8.8 in 1967* Profits after tax as a %
of net worth fell from 5*8 in 1964 to 1*0 in 19 7^• The following seven
textile mills were forced to close down in Ahmedabad in 1967 and 1968:
1. Ananta Mills Ltd.
2. Himabhai Mfg. Co. Ltd.
3. Manekchowk & Ahd. Mgf. Co. Ltd.
4. New Commercial Mills Co. Ltd., No. 1
5. New Commercial Mills Co. Ltd., No. 2
6. Ahmedabad New Textile Mills Co. Ltd.
7. New Manekchowk Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd.
At the end of 1968, more than thirteen mills had closed down in Gujarat
30and six more were on the verge of closure.
An anxious deputation was sent by the MOA to the Gujarat Chief
Minister on the 1st November, 1966; an urgent memo on the deteriorating
situation of the cotton textile industry was sent to Morarji Desai, the
Deputy Prime Minister, soon after?by the Managing Committee of the
Millowners1 Association. Morarji Desai met MOA members on 24th December,
1967* Another memo was submitted by the MOA to the Chief Minister,
Hitendra Desai, urging the State Government to move the Central Government
to take effective steps to assist the industry. Another deputation led
by the MOA President, Balkrishna Harivallabhdas, met the Chief Minister
on 13th February, 1968. In general, the committee of the Indian Cotton
Mills’ Federation, whose President in 1967 and 1968 was the Ahmedabad
textile magnate, Madanmohan Mangaldas, forcefully represented the industry’s
31case to the Government of India.
The demands of the industry at this period were voiced by the 
Gujarat Textile Reorganisation Committee, appointed on 21st December,
1967, under the chairmanship of the Union Commerce Minister, Manubhai Shah,
30. MOA Reports ^967 and 1 968)l
31. Ibid.
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in its Report of August, 1968. The committee was largely dominated by 
textile magnates, including the President of the MOA, Madanmohan Mangaldas, 
Gautam Sarabhai, Jaikrishna Harivallabhdas, his brother Balkrishna 
Harivallabhdas and the President of the Gujarat Mills and Industries* Federation 
with only one trade unionist, Shyamprasad Vasavda,and two government 
members. The Report, voicing the views of the more aggressive textile 
industrialists, demanded scrapping of the weakest mills or their take­
over by more efficient and profitable concerns; immedaiate financial 
relief to marginal mills facing closure due to shortage of working capital 
with State-guaranteed bank loans of reduced margins; removal of partial 
controls on prices and production of cloth; reclassification of the cotton 
textile industry as a Priority industry to enable it to get the benefit 
of a higher development rebate of 55%; granting relief in excise duty 
to the extent of 10% to cover one-tenth of the actual certified total 
capital expenditure on modernization; and the launching of a "crash"
programme of modernization with the help of Central and State
32Modernization Commissioners.
It is against this background of severe economic difficulties for 
the cotton textile industry that the Ahmedabad millowners, united under 
the guidance of the Millowners1 Association, resolved to challenge the 
Municipal Corporation’s greatly increased taxation assessments for 
Special Properties for the year 1967-68. The Millowners1 Association 
circulated to member mills a draft of the complaint to be filed against 
the rateable value entered in the Assessment Book. The Association also 
advised member mills to file supplementary objection application on the 
30th October, 1967» in which it was stated that in case the Municipal 
Commissioner did not accede to the demand of the mills in paragraph 36
i.e. to withdraw the whole of the assessment of special property section
32. Report of the Textile Reorganisation Committee, 
((jovernment of Gujarat? August 1968).
for the year 1967-68 within seven days and prepare a fresh, valid and
legal assessment book for assessing special properties on a correct
basis after excluding plant and machinery, the mills would apply for a
writ in the Supreme Court for quashing the whole assessment book. The
managing committee of the Millowners* Association considered the problem
periodically and carried out a campaign in the local English and Gujarati
dailies in the middle of November, 1967 > to place before the general
33public the views of the industry on the issue.
When the Municipal Corporation refused to change the basis of the 
assessments or the assessments themselves, the millowners challenged this 
in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, in the Gujarat High Court and 
in the Supreme Court of India, bringing all the ingenuity of law to bear 
on the task of destroying the legal basis of the contractor's test 
method and getting the assessments for 1967-68 struck down. The following 
were the major grounds of challenge by the millowners against the 
Municipal Corporation*s valuation of Special Properties for the year
1967-68:54
1. The contractor's method of finding out the annual rental value
involves a fallacious belief that rent of a building is determined by
irke
its cost. Moreover, cost would not reflect value in/case of old buildings 
by reason of the vast rise in building cost. There may have been times 
when cost was a dominant determinant of rent and, therefore, at such times, 
contractor's test method may have been a useful guide in getting a rough 
idea of rental value though even then the method only yielded some 
evidence and represented at best only the maximum rent. But owing to 
the phenomenal rise in the cost of construction after the Second World 
War, cost has ceased to be a major determinant of the rental value.
33. MOA Report ( 1967).
34* Judgement dated 27th October, 19&9> of the Gujarat High Court 
concerning Municipal Valuation.
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2. The contractor's method in the form in which it is recognised in 
England is not applicable in India in those areas where the Rent Rest­
riction Legislation (the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates 
Control Act, 1947) is in force. In those areas the restriction of standard 
rent must necessarily enter in the hypothesis of the definition of 
"annual letting value". When the Court fixes the standard rent, it would 
not take the new cost as the basis of fixing the standard rent for to
do so would be to defeat the object of the Rent Act which is to deprive 
the landlord of the unearned increment in the value of the building.
The rent obtained by the contractor's method would include the component 
of unearned increment in the building value which component is excluded 
from standard rent, which is the only rent the landlord can lawfully 
recover from his tenant.
3. The power to investigate and dispose of complaints was entrusted 
under rule 18 to the Municipal Commissioner, and this power, being a 
quasi-judicial power, could not be deputed by the Municipal Commissioner 
to the Deputy Municipal Commissioner under section 49 sub-section (1).
The purported deputation of this power under the office order dated 
21st April, 1966, was therefore beyond the power of the Municipal 
Commissioner and was ineffective and the Deputy Municipal Commissioner 
had no jurisdiction or authority to investigate and dispose of complaints 
made by the millowners.
The Supreme Court on the 13th December, 1967, made the following
Stay Order in the case of the Arvind group of mills, who had filed writ
petitions challenging the mill valuation for 1967-68:
" Proceedings may go on but no bill will be presented or demand of money
made against the petitioners till the disposal of the writ petitions" —
Other mills were advised by the Millowners1 Association, to secure similar 
35stay orders. Thus the Municipal Corporation's revenues from Special 
Properties dried up and there was a severe ways and means difficulty.
35. MOA Report £ 1967}
37
writ petitions of the millowners should he kept pending till the appeals
filed in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedahad, and the Gujarat High
Court were disposed of, and that the Municipal Corporation would he
entitled to recover tax at the valuation of 1966-67 minus the charge
made in that valuation on plant and machinery. However, despite
this order of 30th April 1968, and the subsequent similar order of
30th December 1968, there was a great shortfall in property taxes
for the year 1967-68, especially regarding Special Properties.
During 1967-68 income from property taxes had been estimated at
Rs.405 lakhs, but against this net income of Rs.228.06 lakhs was
36received, leaving a deficit of Rs.176 lakhs. The following table 
reveals the steep decline in property taxes for the year 1967-68.
TABLE 4. INCOME FROM PROPERTY TAXES, 1964-1968, AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORP.^7
Income from property taxes for following years: Rs. in Lakhs:
1964-65 323.27
1965-66 317.60
1966-67 325.35
1967-68 229.25
This great shortfall was due in part to procedural difficulties on
recovery of property taxes, including the fact that it was not necessary
for the tax-payer to deposit an amount of tax before filing a suit under
section 406 of the BPMC Act of 1949 and a proposal to modify this section
was not entertained by the Corporation until much later. As a result,
despite the relaxation of the stay order by the Supreme Court, no tax
was deposited by factories and mills including many tax-payers who had also
38appealed to the Courts.
On the April, 1968, the Supreme Court declared that the
37* AMC, Budget Estimates, 1970-71.
38. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1969-70»
36. AMC, Budget Estimates^ 1^69-70.
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Municipal Corporation experienced an unprecedented financial crisis
due in large part to the dispute with the millowners over assessment
of Special Properties. The opening plus balance in the year 1965-66,
which was about Rs. 2 crores, was not only reduced but became a minus
39balance of Rs.136 lakhs in the year 1967-68. In view, largely^ 
of procedural difficulties regarding recovery of property taxes,
1968-69 was the first year in the Corporation's history to open with 
a minus balance.^ The Budget Estimate for 1969-70 reported, "In spite 
of drastic cut in expenditure to the extent of Rs.56 lakhs, there still 
remains an estimated minus closing balance of Rs.161.21 lakhs at the 
close of the year 1968-69". The dispute with the millowners coincided 
with a trend throughout the later 1960s for revenue expenditure to exceed 
revenue income to produce an unprecedented financial crisis for the 
Corporation. The Corporation was forced to take an overdraft from the 
banks to the extent of Rs.113 lakhs in 1967-68 and Rs.87 lakhs in
1968-69.^ Thus uncertainty with regard to income from Special 
Property taxation, which formed 40% of the Corporation's total revenue 
income, made the achievement of the Janta Parishad programme of social 
reforms and developmental measures very much more difficult.^
Although the Janta Parishad did not itself create or precipitate 
the financial dispute with the millowners, and, although the dispute 
cannot be represented in the starkly crude stereotypes of the 
capitalists attempting to sabotage the finances of a leftist-dominated 
Corporation, which provided a convenient electoral issue for the Janta 
Parishad in the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections, the 
fact remains that the Janta Parishad naturally relished the situation,
39* AMC, Budget Estimates, 1971-72.
40. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1968-69•
41. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1971-72.
42. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1971-72.
Thus from 1967 onwards for the next two to three years, the
and succeeded in aggravating it in various ways. Their radical 
attitudes and pressurization of the assessment officers made the 
assessments rise particularly steeply on the application of the 
contractor's test method of assessment. If there had been a contin­
uous gradual rise in the assessment of Special Properties rather than 
a sudden steeply upward discontinuity, perhaps not so much opposition 
would have been aroused. In addition, the Janta Parishad made the 
situation more difficult psychologically: they could not play a
successful mediating role in bringing the two sides of the dispute 
together in constructive negotiation. To the millowners, their 
opposition was not just a question of material loss, but was 
compounded by a psychological complex of those accustomed to 
controlling directly or indirectly the Municipal Corporation's 
affairs, that the Municipal Corporation must exercise a certain 
deference with regard to the textile magnates, who contributed so 
much to the city's life. They resented the loosening of their grip
over Municipal Corporation affairs with the accession to power of
43the Janta Parishad.
The legal battle dragged on throughout 1968 and 1969 in the 
Courts with the Judgement of 27th October, 1969, of the Gujarat High 
Court concerning municipal valuation resulting largely in favour of 
the millowners. The writ petitions of the millowners were upheld, 
and the Municipal Corporation's assessments of 1967-68 under the 
contractor's test method were quashed mainly on the grounds that the 
deputation of the power to dispose of complaints against the 
assessments by the Municipal Commissioner to the Deputy Municipal 
Commissioner for Law and Revenue was ultra vires and void, since the
43. Interview with Mr. Z in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
words in section 49 of the BPMC Act of 1949 deputing power to the Deputy 
Municipal Commissioner "subject to the orders of the Municipal Commiss­
ioner" are appropriate only in relation to the deputation of administrat­
ive not quasi-judicial or judicial functions. The Gujarat High Court 
declared that the complaints against the contractors' test method of 
assessment would be left to be decided by the Chief Judge of the Court 
of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, who alone had the power retrospectively to apply a 
method of valuation should the appeals be upheld, as the official year 
of tax had expired, and thus the Corporation would not lose the tax 
altogether.^
The dragging on of the legal battle, the continuation of crisis
conditions for the Municipal Corporation's finances with the additional
burden of expenditure of legal fees to add to continuing budget deficits,
and the victory by the Congress party in the 1969 Municipal Corporation
elections predisposed the parties to negotiate an ad hoc settlement
with the Congress Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairman of the Standing
Committee successfully serving as intermediaries and swinging over the
rest of the Corporation Congress party in favour of an ad hoc settlement.
Slowly improving economic conditions for the cotton textile industry
from late 1968 through 1969 with Government take-over of the sick mills
through the National and State Textile Corporations, fairly generous
Government financial assistance and a rising trend of exports aided by a
45Government export subsidy; the threat from the Corporation to increase 
the rates of property tax and octroi and to levy new taxes,^ and the 
change of regime predisposed the majority of the millowners to come to 
an ad hoc settlement, although fifteen mills still refused to compromise.
44* Judgement dated 27th October 1969 of the Gujarat High Court 
concerning Municipal Valuation.
45- MOA Reportf 196^.
46. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1970-71•
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However, the large, more progressive millowners, such as the Sarabhais,
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas and the Kasturbhai group, came to a
settlement in early 1970. These mills agreed to pay 25% more Special
Property taxation than the Rs.58 lakhs they were paying on the old
b a s i s  i . e .  R s . 7 4  l a k h s  f r o m  1 9 6 7  o n w a r d s .  T h i s  v a l u a t i o n  w a s  a l s o
agreed on for the following four years, i.e. 1970-71 to 1975—74
inclusive, thus ensuring the financial stability of the Congress-
dominated Corporation until the next municipal elections were due in
April 1973.^ Thus the Corporation recovered Rs.2 crores out of the
b a c k l o g  o f  R s . 3  c r o r e s  a n d  w a s  e n a b l e d  t o  s u s p e n d  o v e r d r a f t s  a n d  c a r r y
through important public works. In return, in the Budget Estimates for
1971 - 7 2 , t h e r e  w a s  n o  p r o p o s a l  e i t h e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  p r e s e n t  t a x e s ,
48
e s p e c i a l l y  o c t r o i ,  o r  t o  l e v y  n ew  t a x e s .
47* Interview with Mr. D.K. Patel, Deputy Mayor Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, in March 1971*
48. AMC, Budget Estimates, 1971-72.
3 -B. DIFFICULTIES FACED BY THE JANTA PARISHAD IN ACHIEVING ITS ECONOMIC
PROGRAMME DUE TO THE LIMITED POWERS OF THE CORPORATION VIS-A-VIS 
THE STATE GOVERNMENT, WHICH PROVED UNCOOPERATIVE TO THE JANTA 
PARISHAD-DOMINATED CORPORATION.
The hostility of the textile magnates to the Janta Parishad- 
dominated Corporation, with whom they had a seemingly intractable 
dispute over Special Property taxation, was matched by a lack of cooperation 
and assistance by the Congress State Government to the Corporation during 
the Janta Parishad period of power between 1965 and 1969-
The symbolic and material proof of this lay in the dismantling 
in November 1965, of the City Coordination Council, set up in July 
1961, which had proved so fruitful a means for the Congress Corpor­
ation of getting State-level cooperation and financial assistance
for city projects during the Mayorship of the textile magnate, Jaik-
1rishnabhai Harivallabhdas. Without the ready access to State-level 
patronage and decision-making authority provided by the City Coordin­
ation Council, the Janta Parishad leaders were bound to feel circum­
scribed and hemmed in by the legal restrictions on their power in the 
Corporation imposed by the BPMC Act of 1949* Dinkar Mehta expressed
0this frustration in the Junior Chamber debate in the following words:
— "Municipal laws and rules have become antiquated and need to be 
changed according to democratic ways. There is no power in the 
hands of the Mayor or the elected representatives of the Corporation, 
and the Government has put power in the hands of a few appointed officers." - 
During the period of Janta Parishad power in the Corporation, 
the relations between the State Government and the Janta Parishad were
1. Information on the City Coordination Council provided by Jaik­
rishnabhai Harivallabhdas, Mayor of Ahmedabad between 1961 and 
1965, and some city executives.
2 .  D i n k a r  M e h t a ,  S p e e c h  on t h e  F i n a n c i a l  C o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  A h m e d a ba d  
M u n i c i p a l  C o r p o r a t i o n .  G i v e n  a t  a  d e b a t e  on t h i s  t o p i c  o r g a n i z e d  
b y  t h e  A h m e d a b a d  J u n i o r  C h a m b e r  a t  t h e  Town H a l l  o n  N o v .  2 0 ,  1 9 6 6 .  
( C y c l o s t y l e d  m a n u s c r i p t  t r a n s .  f r o m  G u j a r a t i . )  H e n c e f o r t h  t o  b e  
known a s  D i n k a r  M e h t a  J u n i o r  C h a m b e r  d e b a t e .
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very difficult. The Municipal Corporation applied several times to 
the State Government for aid during the financial crisis, caused by a 
bunching of expenditure with a fairly stationary income, due to the 
maturing of previous loans, expenditure on the completion of unproductive
projects initiated by the former ruling Congress party, such as the
3Tagore Memorial Theatre and the Sardar Stadium, rising developmental 
expenditure and uncertainty about income from Special Properties.
However, the State Government gave no direct loans of its own.
Several times the State Government caused a loss to the Municipal 
Corporation by its delay in sanctioning particular proposals e.g. the 
State Government's delay in giving assent to the revision of the octroi 
schedule, which the Corporation had hoped would come into effect from 
April 1st, 1966, or earlier, and which finally came into effect from 
July 1st, 1966, caused the Municipal Corporation a loss of income of 
Rs.25 lakhs. The Municipal Commissioner had given a clear warning of 
this in the Budget Estimates for 1966-67* stating:
— "It may be clearly stated that this year notwithstanding drastic 
cut in expenditure on all heads of account including such essential 
ones as those on hospitals and dispensaries, maintenance and repair 
of roads and buildings etc. it is not possible to balance the budget 
unless the revised octroi schedule is sanctioned by the Government so 
as to come into effect from 1st April, 1966 or an earlier date." —
The State Government's delay in sanctioning the removal of bus 
substages, which were proving uneconomic, also caused a loss of lakhs 
of rupees. Its delay in sanctioning Rs.74 lakhs for chawl improvement
4in 1966-67 meant that work had to be postponed for a considerable time.
3. See Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Budget Estimates, 1968-69»
henceforth to be known as AMC, B.E. 1968—69«
4. See AMC, B^E. 1966-67.
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executive by changing the Municipal Commissioner within a year, and
in a period of one and a half years there were three successive
Municipal Commissioners, whereas in the normal way a Municipal
5Commissioner was appointed for at least three years.
In addition, the Corporation’s demand for more tax-sharing with 
the State Government e.g. regarding the motor vehicle tax, the enter­
tainment duty tax, the tax on open land and surcharge on the stamp 
duty on the transfer of properties, and its demand for a general purpose 
grant and a per capita general purpose grant went unheeded by the State 
Government.6
Local bodies are dependent to an increasing extent upon the 
financial assistance of the State Government, but, in comparison with 
the assistance given by State Governments to many other Corporations 
all over India, that given to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
during the period was very low. State grants as a percentage share 
in the total revenue receipts of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had 
fallen from 12.68% in 1950~51 to 6.26% in 1967-68.^
According to the Report of the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee, 
under the chairmanship of Balwantrai Mehta, which came out in 1966:
— "The percentage of grants (to total revenue receipts) is high in 
Delhi (33*4%) > Agra and Bangalore (22%), Kanpur and Bombay (21%) and 
Madras (19%)* The percentage of grants varies between as low as 6.1% 
in Ahmedabad to a maximum of 33-4% in Delhi." —
The State Government also interfered in the smooth running of the
5. See Indulal Yagnik's pamphlet, Successful Work of the Maha Gu.jarat 
Janta Parishad in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation,(19^9)*
6. See AMC. B.E. 1966-67.
7. Mahesh Bhatt (Reader in Economics) and M.S Trivedi (Lecturer in 
Economics, University of Gujarat, Ahmedabad), Finances of the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.(1968), p.16-19 henceforth to be known 
as Finances.
This declining trend continued during the Janta Parishad period 
of power, and the share of grants in the total revenue receipts of 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was estimated at 4*33% in 1968-69.
Thus the amount of net resources transferred by the State Government 
to the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was very low and declining 
during this period.^
In addition, there was the problem that there were no clear-cut 
principles for allocating grants to local bodies, thus receipts of the 
grants created uncertainty and many times there was a discrepancy in 
expenditure flow and receipts of these grants, which created unnecessary 
financial strains for the Corporation. This uncertainty about State 
financial assistance was illustrated by a Corporation resolution dated 
March 11, 1968, which claimed that because of the major changes made 
by the State Government through the reservation of large areas for 
housing and improvement of traffic junctions in the Development Plan, 
a great financial burden was placed on the Corporation, which should 
be borne by the State Government. The State Government retorted that 
under Section 10 of the Bombay Town Planning Act of 1954, the State 
Government is empowered to modify the proposals of the Development
Plan, and there is no provision in law for it to pay additional
9finances to the local bodies for such changes.
There was a marked fall in the percentage of grant-in-aid received 
by the School Board: on account of the rise in inadmissible expenditure
the percentage of grant-in-aid for primary education went down to 17*72% 
in 1967-68 as against 43*64% in 1959-60. By 1969, the State Government
8. Ibid.
9. See N.H. Thakkor and N.R. Desai, Metropolitan Planning of the City 
of Ahmedabad with reference to Finance, a background paper to the 
Seminar on Ahmedabad Metropolitan Planning, organised by the 
Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the 9 and 10 January,
1971.
had still not approved the expenditure incurred in relation to the 
abolition of shifts in standards I and II, revision of the pay-scale 
on the basis of the I.G. Thakore Award, the introduction of English 
teaching in standards V, YI and VII, the introduction of ad hoc pay of
10Rs. 5 from May 1st, 1965 and permanency of staff in pre-primary classes.
The State Government also rejected a Janta Parishad proposal to
give honorary salaries to Municipal Corporators - a suggestion which it
later accepted during the following Congress administration consequent
11on Congress’s winning of the 1969 Municipal Corporation elections.
Thus due largely to lack of State-level cooperation and the 
limited powers of the Corporation vis-^,-vis the State Government 
under the BPMC Act of 1949 (as well as to internal factionalism discussed 
in the previous chapter), the Janta Parishad was able to achieve comp­
aratively few of its lofty aims during its period in power in the 
Corporation.
The Janta Parishad, on accession to power in 1965? aimed at 
remodelling the taxation system through radical budgets which would 
be to the advantage of the common man. The taxation system of the 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was riddled with inequalities and 
anomalies, and was indeed, in need of rationalisation.
Property tax and octroi were the two main sources of tax revenue 
for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. According to the 1969-70 
Budget Estimates, the total tax revenue was estimated at Rs.8.10 crores, 
out of which Rs.4*03 crores was income from property tax and Rs. J.QO 
crores from octroi, which together accounted for 96.6% of the total tax 
revenue.
10. See AMC, B.E. 1969-70*
1 1 .  From  D i n k a r  M e h t a  J u n i o r  C h a m b e r  d e b a t e , an d  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  
M r. W i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
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There was great scope for raising additional revenue through 
increasing property taxes by reassessing the rateable values of prop­
erties and revising the rates upward. There were also various reforms
which needed carrying out regarding property taxes on the grounds of
12equity and administrative efficiency.
From the early fifties to the later sixties, there was hardly 
any change in the per capita property tax revenue in money terms, 
in spite of the tremendous growth of building activities due in large 
part to the ready availability of finance for cooperative housing 
societies. In absolute terms, the yield from property tax rose from 
Rs.157»50 lakhs in 1952-53 to Rs.457*46 lakhs in 1968-69. As population 
also rose from 8.62 lakhs to 20.50 lakhs during this period due to 
natural growth and the extension of the area of Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation in 1960, the per capita property tax revenue rose only 
from Rs.18.27 to Rs.22.32 between 1952-53 and 1968-69.
However, the per capita real burden of property tax showed a 
steep fall during the same period in view of the inflationary price 
rises. By using consumer price indices of Ahmedabad for deflation, 
the real per capita burden showed a fall from Rs.18.3 to Rs.11.4* In 
the absence of per capita income figures for Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, assuming that the rate of increase in per capita income 
for Ahmedabad has not been less than that calculated for all India, 
it seems reasonable to say that revenue from property tax as a per­
centage of income has also decreased.
12. See Dr. Shibshankar P. Gupta (Deputy Director, Sardar Patel 
Institute of Economic and Social Research, Ahmedabad),
The Size. Function and Financing of Ahmedabad Metropolitan 
Authority, a background paper to the Seminar on Ahmedabad 
Metropolitan Planning, held on the 9 and 10 January, 1971*
For most properties, particularly for the older properties whose 
rateable values were estimated a long time ago, the existing rateable 
value, which is supposed to be 90% of the annual letting value or 
annual rent that a building or land or premises might reasonably be 
expected to fetch, is a gross underestimation of the "true" rateable 
value. The present practice also discriminates against the new prop­
erties, whose rateable values are assessed currently, because the 
property values and annual rents today are much higher than those which 
existed in the past for similar properties. As a result of the virtual 
freezing of many rateable values, the increases in property values and 
imputed rents are not reflected in the yield from the property tax.
The rateable values of all properties need to be reassessed on the 
basis of annual imputed letting value or rent which a hypothetical 
tenant might be expected to pay. In order to keep the determination 
of the tax base free from local politics, the task of assessing rateable 
values should,perhaps, be entrusted to an independent valuation machinery
set up by the State, for without proper assessment of rateable values
13no major reformation in property tax is possible.
The present system also discriminates by imposing a much heavier 
burden on the tenant than on the owner occupier of similar houses.
The tax advantages to the owner occupier are twofold. In the first 
instance, the assessed rateable value of the owner occupied house is 
much less than what it would have been had the house been let. For 
a newly constructed house, if the house is owner-occupied, the rateable 
value would be 30-40% of the rateable value, had the house been let.
Since the assessed rateable value is less for an owner occupier, the 
tax paid by him is less than that paid by a tenant of a recently con­
structed house (although the tax is usually collected from the landlord,
13. Ibid.
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the tenant usually pays it because of shifting of the tax). Secondly, 
because of the progressive rate structure, and since the rateable 
value is assessed low for the owner-occupier, he pays even lower 
taxes percentage-wise. The ratio of tax liability of an owner-occupier 
to that of a tenant paying market rent could be as low as 1:5.
A concrete illustration will be given to make clear the different 
tax situations applying to the tenant and the owner occupier. Let us 
suppose a house has been newly-constructed and has a floor-area equal 
to 900 square feet, which can be considered to be the "average" floor 
area of newly-constructed two-bedroom houses within Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation. If the house is rented, the expected rent for such a 
house could reasonably be assumed to be around Rs.300 per month or 
Rs.5»600 per annum. Therefore the rateable value, which is 90% of 
the annual rent, would be Rs.5»240. By applying the graduated rates 
of property tax on the rateable value, total property taxes (including 
water and conservancy taxes) on such a tenant-occupied house would 
be Rs.840 p.a. If the same house is owner-occupied, however, the 
rateable value is assessed at present at the rate of Rs.8-14 per 100 
square ft. depending upon the locality. This is a highly arbitrary 
forumula, not based even on the standard rent principle, and applied 
without change since 195*1 • The assessment within the range Rs.8-14 
per 100 sq. ft. is left to the discretion of the valuation officer.
If the rateable value is assessed at Rs. 10 per 100 sq. ft. of floor 
area, then the total property tax liability on such an owner-occupied 
house would be only about Rs.201 p.a.
This discrimination between owner-occupier and tenant has given 
rise to several methods of tax evasion such as not disclosing that 
the house or a few rooms in the house occupied by the owner are actually 
let, manipulation of rent books (or receipts for rent) showing much 
smaller rent than what is actually paid by the tenant etc.
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The present system of using different standards for owner- 
occupier and tenant is largely the result of the notion that when no 
actual rent is paid by the owner-occupier, the Standard Rent, fixed 
under the Rent Control Act by the Rent-Controller, should be deemed 
to be the reasonable rent for purposes of assessment of rateable value. 
In the case of an owner occupied house, the rateable value must be 
based on the reasonable rent which a hypothetical tenant may be 
expected to pay rather than the Standard Rent fixed under the Rent 
Control Act, which has ceased to be standard under the present 
circumstances of rising property and rental values, and which denies 
the Corporation a legitimate share in rising property values.^
Not only should the tax burden be equalised between the owner- 
occupier and the tenant, it should also be equalised between the 
tenant paying market rent and the tenant paying very much less than 
the market rent, another glaring anomaly in the tax system. In some 
properties, particularly the older ones, the actual rent, due to the 
Rent Control Act or because the rent has been frozen for a long time, 
is usually much lower than the rent at which property can be reasonably 
expected to be let today, and much lower than the market rent which 
is being paid in other properties.
It has been calculated that, if these various measures and reforms 
were carried out, the revenue from property tax would rise substantially 
by almost 100%, even without revising the present rates upward. The 
property tax liability of an owner occupier on average is about a 
quarter that of a tenant occupying a similar property at market rent. 
Equalisation of the tax burden of owner occupiers with that now imposed 
on tenants would increase revenue from property tax by 300% from the 
45% of total floor area occupied by the owner occupiers. Equalisation
14* Ibid.
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of the tax burden between tenants paying market rent and those paying 
very much less than the market rent would bring about a further 
increase in revenue of about 40% fo** "the 55% of the total floor area 
occupied by tenants. Thus total revenue from property tax would rise 
from Rs.4.03 crores to about Rs.7«98 crores, or almost double in 
quantity, if a radical reform of property tax was carried out making 
it a tax based largely on land values or land value increments.
15Ahmedabad has, therefore, far from reached its full taxable capacity.
The Janta Parishad, however, due largely to the circumscribing 
of the powers of the Municipal Corporation under the BPMC Act of 1949 
and lack of cooperation from the State Government, was not in a position 
to make a radical reform along the lines indicated above. It only 
succeeded in making essentially marginal, though rational and in some 
senses significant, changes to the tax structure during its tenure 
of power in the Corporation.
16Despite the brave words of Dinkar Mehta:
— "Till now the Corporation incurred a loss in general taxes because 
of the influence of vested interests, who saw to it that the valuation 
of large properties was to their benefit. This system has been changed 
since the last one and a half years, and ‘'taxes according to ability 
to pay5 policy has been adopted, thereby the rateable values below 
Rs.1000 have been given tax relief of 1-2%, while rateable values over 
Rs.1000 have been given tax increment of 1-2%. The tax system till now 
was capitalist, and, because of that, Corporation income was reduced 
by lakhs of rupees. Because of the influence of the rich, valuation 
on their properties was less compared to their ability to pay, therefore 
Corporation income was not enough to carry on public works. Now changes
15. Ibid.
16. See Dinkar Mehta, Junior Chamber debate.
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have been made and relief has been given to lower-income groups." —
The Janta Parishad, in the budget of 1966-67 made really quite marginal 
revisions in the rates of general property tax, raising the rates on 
higher valuation properties. The Janta Parishad cut the level of 
taxation on 150,000 properties from 14% to 12%, the minimum level 
prescribed by the BPMC Act, and increased the level of taxation on 
higher valuation properties with effect from the 1st April, 1966.
In view of the inequalities between owner occupiers and tenants out­
lined above, the cut in the rates of lower rateable value groups might 
well have benefited a lot of fairly well-off owner occupiers, as well 
as more needy lower middle class tenants and hutment and chawl dwellers.
The changes in the rates made by the Janta Parishad are set out in the 
17following table.
TABLE 1. Rates of General Tax on Properties before and after April 1st 
1966, in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
Rateable Value Groups in Rs. Rate before 1.4.66. Rate after 1.4.66
1 - 100 14% 12%
101-200 14% 12%
201-500 15j% 12%
501-1000 16% 15%
1001-2000 21% 22%
2001-5000 21% 25%
5001-5000 25% 28%
above 5000 25% 50%
The rates of Special Property taxation were also raised from 27% to 50%.
The State Government, however, alarmed by the probability that 
the Janta Parishad would raise yet further the rate of general tax 
on high valuation properties, passed an amendment to the Corporation 
Act in 1968, prescribing a maximum ceiling for general property tax of 
50%, although it did not accede to the demand by the millowners that the
17. See Indulal Yagnik's pamphlet, Successful Work of the Maha Gujarat 
Janta Parishad in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation«(1969)«
maximum limit for the levy of general tax in Ahmedabad should be fixed 
at the same level as in Bombay (i.e. 26%) or in any case not higher
than 27%, the previous rate in Ahmedabad for Special Property taxation.
The millowners, however, succeeded in getting the conservancy 
C>-ucr>~ease
tax/on large premises i.e. special properties, which had been raised
from 7"5% to 9%> at the Corporation meeting of the 31st January, 1968,
declared illegal by the Gujarat High Court. The discriminatory rates
of conservancy tax on large premises were declared illegal by its
Judgement of 27th October, 1969,concerning municipal valuation, on the
grounds that, once the rental value is arrived at, the differences
based on factors such as size of the property, its use, its location
etc. would be found reflected in the rental value and, thereafter,
could not again be made the basis of differential treatment in the
matter of rates, unless there is a clear provision to that effect in
the statute, such as the provision for determining the general tax
on a graduated scale and the provision empowering the Corporation
to fix a higher rate of general tax in respect of Special Properties.
The Janta Parishad also wanted to abolish the indirect tax of
octroi, whose incidence falls largely on the necessities of life of
19the common man, as the following table shows:
18
18. Ahmedabad Millowners' Association memo to the Minister for 
Education and Municipalities, Government of Gujarat, in the 
MOA Annual Report (1968), p.l6l~3«
19. Finances, Table 15*
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TABLE 2. Share of different commodity groups in octroi income 
of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
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Most committees on Local Finance have referred to the evils inherent
in the octroi system of taxation, such as difficulty of administration,
as numerous barriers have to be erected for collecting the tax at the
points of entry and a very complicated procedure of refunds has also
to be followed; the giving of wide discretionary powers to low-paid
staff which leads to corrupt practices; the fact that it is expensive
to collect; and that the incidence of octroi is regressive as it falls
21mainly on the necessities of life. The Janta Parishad sent a dep­
utation on this issue to the State Government, which alone has the 
power to change the octroi system of tax, requesting the State Government 
to abolish octroi tax, according to the recommendations of many 
committees on local finance, and convert it into a surcharge on the 
sales tax to be collected by the State Government and distributed to 
the various municipalities. Octroi is payable on goods such as food­
stuffs, whereas no sales tax is payable on them, making the incidence 
of the latter tax less regressive. However, the State Government 
was not willing to consider this seriously. There were certain practical 
problems in the way: at present sales tax is not levied on certain
goods such as cotton textiles, tobacco etc. There are a few other 
commodities also, mainly industrial raw materials, on which the intra- 
State sales taxes cannot be raised beyond a level of J/o under the 
Central Sales Tax Act. Since most of them are presently taxed at 
this maximum level, no further increase in State sales tax is possible 
in this case. However, at this stage, the State Government did not
vigorously explore alternatives to octroi tax, such as the possibility 
22of a turnover tax.
20. See, for example, Zakaria Committee Report (Nov. 1963)-
21. Finances, p.21-25
2 2 . Interview with Mr. F in Ahmedabad in March 1 9 7 1 .
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The Janta Parishad then cUcuAect they would change the incidence 
of octroi from one section of the community to the other, i.e. from 
the common man to the industrialist, by their proposal to abolish 
octroi on foodgrains, promised in their election manifesto of 1965* 
thus making octroi more progressive, and by increasing the levy on 
certain industrial items such as cotton, iron and steel, dyes, chemicals, 
coal, machinery etc.^
The latter proposal came into effect from the 7th July, 1967* 
However, due to representations made by the industrialists to the 
State Government on this issue, urging that the industry i.e. cotton 
textile industry, so important in the city's economy, should not be so 
adversely affected that it could not compete and the cost of production 
would rise, the proposed rates were considerably reduced by the State 
Government. The representatives of the Millowners' Association met the 
Minister for Education and Municipalities, Government of Gujarat, 
on the 24th May, 1967? and expressed grave concern over the increasing 
burden of octroi duty on the mill industry. They impressed upon him 
the need to reduce the burden, particularly in regard to octroi on 
cotton and coal. A copy of the memo on this issue, submitted by the 
MOA to the Municipal Commissioner, was sent to the Secretary to the 
Government of Gujarat's Department of Education and Municipalities on 
the 10th March 1967* This expressed the view that the Corporation 
had singled out the city's mill industry for collecting more and more 
revenue by way of enhanced octroi rates and taxes. When the rates 
were revised in 1964> out of the total additional revenue of Rs.12 lakhs, 
the mills were required to contribute Rs.3*36 lakhs i.e. 28%. Again, 
in 1966, the total additional octroi duty levied on mills amounted to 
Rs.25 lakhs out of the total additional octroi revenue collected of
23. Ibid.
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Rs. 42 lakhs, thereby the mills alone contributed 60%. Under the
revision now proposed, mills would be taxed to the extent of Rs.43
lakhs out of the total estimated increase of Rs.59 lakhs. The
State Government considerably lowered the rates, particularly on
cotton and coal, following the industry's plea that the proposed
increase in the rate for cotton would make the industry uncompetitive
compared to the Bombay industry, where the rates on Indian cotton
would be 2\ times less and the rates on foreign cotton would be 5^
times less; and their plea that the proposed rate of Rs.2 per Metric
Tonne of coal was JsT times the rate in Bombay.^ However, even the
rise that did take place in the octroi levy on industrial raw materials
was bound to be attributed to the cost of production, and thus passed
on to the consumer.^
The former proposal to abolish octroi on foodgrains was ultimately
dropped due to the overwhelming need for more revenue, and the
reasoning by some Janta Parishad leaders that, although the Janta
Parishad wanted to increase the resources of the Corporation without
affecting the position of the common man, octroi on foodgrains was
insignificant in the whole price of the commodity, thus the common
26man would hardly feel the benefit.
One very important and progressive step taken by the Janta Parishad
was to place the octroi levy on the basis of price^i.e. ad valorem,
instead of on the basis of weight as it had formerly been. The 
calculation of octroi on the basis of weight was highly concessional 
to the millowners, since the volume of goods required did not increase 
over time as rapidly as did their price. According to the Budget
24* MOA Annual Report (1967)^*460-8.
2 5 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. Z i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a r c h  1 9 7 1 .
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Estimates of the Corporation, this proposed change, which came into
effect from the 1st April, 1966, would yield an increase in income
27from octroi taxes to the extent of Rs.52 lakhs annually. This
contrasts very favourably, for example, with Jaipur Municipality,
where the decision to revise octroi schedule on an ad valorem basis,taken
on December 22nd, 1967, was reversed after only twenty-two days, due
to strong opposition by the business class and representations to
28the State Government.
Thus, ironically, the tax structure of the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation became more, not less, regressive, with a larger octroi
component, during the Janta Parishad period of power. This was due
largely to the difficulties over the recovery of property taxes,
especially Special Property taxation, owing to litigation, and the
need to raise more revenue for developmental expenditure, against
the background of a slowly rising trend of greater revenue expenditure
over revenue receipts from the mid 60s, resulting in a great increase
29in octroi taxation, as the following figures show:
TABLE 5* Rise in Net Income from Octroi Duty, 1964-65 to 1968-69 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
Year:____________________ Amount of net income in lakhs of Rs:
1964-65 187.66
1965-66 204.59
1966-67 270.40
1967-68 354.33
1968-69 371.00
27. See AMC, B.E. 1969-70
28. See C.P. Bhambhri, Municipalities and their Finances: An Empirical 
Study of the Municipalities of Ra.iasthan,(1969).
29. See AMC, B.E. 1970-71
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Although there has been an increase in the absolute amount of the 
yield from property tax i.e. from Rs.85*12 lakhs in 1950-51 to Rs.206.23 
lakhs in 1967-68, its % share in total tax revenue has fallen from 
67% in 1950-51 to 35*35% in 1967-68, whereas the revenue from octroi 
has risen tremendously from Rs.25*52 lakhs in 1950-51 to Rs.354-33 
lakhs in 1967-68 and its % share has risen from 23*6% in 1952-53 to 
43*4% in 1968-69.50
Thus the Janta Parishad did little to radically remodel the tax- 
structure of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. The financial crisis of 
these years, precipitated by the dispute with the millowners over 
Special Property taxation and a growing imbalance between income 
and expenditure, was exacerbated by other expenditure^ some of which 
resulted from expensive incomplete capital projects, a legacy of the 
previous Congress administration. Among the incomplete capital projects, 
started by the Congress administration, whose financial burden fell 
during the Janta Parishad period of power were the following: the
Tagore Theatre, the Sardar Stadium, the Subhas Chandra Bose Bridge, 
the Municipal Medical College and a huge Sewage Disposal Project.
In many of the projects, rising prices had played havoc with the 
original estimates. The Tagore Theatre, for example, was originally 
estimated to cost Rs.12j- lakhs. This figure had grown to Rs.25.26 
lakhs by the end of 1966. Unexpected tax refunds had had to be made 
by the Corporation for the Open Land Tax, which the Supreme Court had 
declared illegal, and to the Ahmedabad Electricity Company Ltd., which 
had been in dispute with the Corporation since 1951 and which had
30. See Finances, p.20-24*
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finally succeeded in getting the tax dispute resolved in its favour.
The Government grant to municipal employees earning up to Rs.100 a month
was stopped in 1965-66. Establishment expenses were high, since
unnecessary unplanned increases had been made in the municipal staff,
and there had been a proliferation of different grades, and a lot of
fairly generous wage settlements had been made. Expenditures relating
to the Municipal Dairy, the Transport Service, municipal-run hospitals
and the School Board were also high, and a lot of Corporation loans
31had begun to mature, irv this period.
However, despite the ever-present financial crisis, the Janta
Parishad was able to effect some improvements during its years in
power. There was a steady rise in developmental expenditure during
these years, despite the deficit budgets, especially as regards medical
and educational services and chawl improvement schemes. The following
table shows the steadily-rising trend in developmental expenditure,
32maintained during the Janta Parishad years in power:
31. See Dinkar Mehta, Junior Chamber debate.
32. Finances, Table 16.
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TABLE 4. Developmental and Non-Developmental Expenditure of 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 1956-57 to 1969-70 in crores of rupees:
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Per capita developmental expenditure, which was Rs.13-40 in 1950-51
had risen to Rs.48.8O in 1968-69? while the per capita non-developmental
expenditure rose from Rs.5.84 to Rs.17.28 over the same period. There
was a gradual rise in per capita developmental expenditure, especially
on medical and educational services, during the Janta Parishad period
of power except for the difficult year of 1966-67? as the following 
33table shows:
TABLE 5» Per Capita developmental expenditure of Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, 1965-66 to 1968-69 in rupees.
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69
Total Development Expenditure 46.01 41.25 46.75 48.69
Expenditure on medical help 6.60 6.38 6.56 6.83
Expenditure on public 8.92 9.30 9.62 9.56
education
In the year 1968-69? in the per capita expenditure on various items,
the highest expenditure (Rs.13.19) was on the milk scheme, followed
by education (Rs.9.56) and medical help (Rs.6.83).
As regards medical services and expenditure, by 1969? there were
600 beds in the Vadilal Sarabhai Hospital, run by the Corporation at
an annual expenditure of approximately Rs.50 lakhs; beds had also been
substantially increased in the Lallubhai Gordhandas Hospital and Shard-
aben Chimanlal Saraspur Hospital. The Municipal Corporation was also
running an Infectious Diseases Hospital, a T.B. Clinic, an Eye Hospital,
and was building a Children's Hospital. The Corporation was also running
18 maternity homes and 35 dispensaries, and a Medical College with 300
34students at an approximate annual expenditure of Rs.12 lakhs. The
34* See Indulal Yagnik, Successful Vork of the Maha Gujarat Janta 
Parishad in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. (1969). Tg ke.
fe.i'vowi'v ct£ Y<x <^  , S u x c  e s s f  t»U- Wov-fe. C t 9 6 <] ) ,
33* Finances, Table.17
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Corporation was also providing free medical services to all those
with a monthly income of Rs.150 and less, and heavily subsidized
medical services for all those between the monthly income levels of 
35Rs.150-500. It was also providing free milk to school children,
36and milk to pregnant women at subsidized rates. The following 
table shows the relatively high expenditure on medical services of 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation compared to other municipalities in
1969-70: 57
TABLE 6. Comparative expenditure on medical aid of some Indian 
municipalities, 1969-70
City: Total Revenue, Expenditure on % of Expenditure on
1969—70: Medical Aid: Medical Aid to Total
Revenue:___________
Ahmedabad 1023.08 135-94 13-3
Bombay 4356.65 548*93 12.6
Delhi 2512.28 236.92 9.4
Baroda 315*43 3*11 1.00
Surat 179*40 11.26 6.3
Hyderabad 441.28 10.09 2.3
The percentage of expenditure on primary education to total 
expenditure was 13*48% in 1964-65? and it rose to 18.06% in 1968-69, 
due largely to the rising number of schools and teachers, with their 
increases of pay and dearness allowance, the introduction of the teaching 
of English in primary standards V, VI and VII, the abolition of the shift
system in primary standards I and II, and the employment of full-time
38teachers in pre-primary classes. The Janta Parishad-dominated 
Municipal Corporation also started a chawls improvement programme,
35. See AMC, B.E. 1968-69*
36. Ibid.
37* See AMC, B.E. 1971-72
38. See AMC, B.E. 1970-71*
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whereby facilities such as drainage lines, water taps, lighting etc. 
were to be provided to these slum areas with the Municipal Corporation 
and the chawl owners each bearing 50% of the cost.^ By 1970, out of 
the 1,140 chawls in Ahmedabad City, drainage facilities had been 
provided to 889 chawls.^
The Janta Parishad also raised the conditions of service and 
pay of municipal employees, thus contrasting favourably with many 
municipalities where mediocre and inefficient personnel were the 
result of highly inadequate service conditions and incentives for 
municipal employees.
The Shri I.G. Thakor pay award of the Industrial Tribunal, which 
came into force from the 1st October, 1965* had in practice to be 
given effect to in later years. This entailed a sum of Rs.29.85 lakhs 
annually for municipal staff and Rs.11.60 lakhs for Muncipal School 
Board and V.S. Hospital staff.^ Pay-scales of grade IV employees 
were revised from the 1st May, 1965* and an ad hoc pay rise of Rs.8 
per month was given to Grade IV employees.^ The Janta Parishad made 
the striking innovation of giving dearness allowance to municipal employ­
ees on the basis of the rates for Central government employees with 
effect from the 1st April, 1966, whereby the annual income of the 22,000 
municipal employees rose by Rs.60 lakhs. Ahmedabad was the first Mun­
icipal Corporation in the country to take this bold step of placing
d.a. for municipal employees on a par with that for Central Government 
43employees. There was also a further increase in d.a. when Central
39* See Indulal Yagnik, Successful Work (1969).
40. See N.H. Thakkor and N.R. Desai, Metropolitan Planning of the City 
of Ahmedabad with reference to Finance, a background paper in a 
Seminar on Ahmedabad Metropolitan Planning, held on 9 and 10 January 
1971 in Ahmedabad.
41. See AMC, B.E. 1968-69
42. See Indulal Yagnik, Successful Work (1969).
43* Ibid.
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Government rates were revised on the basis of the report of the 
Gajendragadkar Commission with effect from the 1st February, 1967, 
and the 1st June, 1967* This entailed an extra amount of Rs.35 lakhs 
for 1967-68 and 1968-69.44
As regards the various Town Planning Schemes, some of them took 
an inordinately long time to be completed, enabling vested interests 
to take advantage of the impending improvements and soaring land prices. 
Between 1950 and 1965> only five Town Planning Schemes were finalised, 
while after 1965 and the change of regime, within the short period 
of one and a half years, seven more Town Planning Schemes were finalised.4'*
CONCLUSION
Thus discrepancies between parties in power at various levels 
of the political system, and hostility between the Janta Parishad 
and the millowners, was not conducive to a strong impetus towards 
modernisation, although there was a definite rise in the developmental 
expenditure of the Municipal Corporation during the Janta Parishad 
period of power, and a certain amount was achieved.
When the Congress party was returned to power in the 1969 
Municipal Corporation elections, the working partnership of the Majur 
Mahajan and the business elements in the Corporation, with their 
emphasis on negotiation, compromise and gradual progress, was restored, 
and better relations prevailed with the State Government. Thus 
financially and structurally the Corporation was shaping better then 
than in the Janta Parishad period.4  ^ The finances had been given 
stability by the ad hoc agreement negotiated between the Municipal 
Corporation and the millowners by Congress party leaders, and gradual
See AMC, B.E. 1968-69
See Dinkar Mehta, Junior Chamber debate.
Interview with Mr. E in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
44.
45.
4 6 .
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progress was made towards social welfare.
However, the Janta Parishad period of power shook the hold of the 
millowners over Municipal Corporation affairs; it changed to some extent 
the political climate, and gave more bargaining power to the Majur 
Mahajan element in the Congress party. In 1969* the Majur Mahajan 
for the first time obtained one of the three most influential posts 
in the Corporation, the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee. As 
the Janta Parishad 1969 election manifesto declared:
— "The Janta Parishad ran the administration of the Municipal 
Corporation, not looking to the interests of the millowners and the 
occupants of the rich buildings of the Shahibag-Ellisbridge area, 
but keeping in mind the interests of the workers living in the mill 
chawls, and of all the citizens."—
f^. Analysis of the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election
Although the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election 
took place in an economically difficult period with mill closures 
and high unemployment (the closure of eight Ahmedabad textile mills 
had resulted in the unemployment of about 18,000 textile workers'*'), 
with textile mills losing profits and, therefore, not being able 
to give much bonus, left-wing political groups were not able to 
make much political capital out of this in 19&9 as 'they had over 
the dearness allowance agitation and the issue of rising prices 
in the 1965 municipal elections. With the resolution of the dear­
ness allowance issue and the disintegration of the Sangram Samiti 
for reasons outlined earlier, no strong left-wing trade union 
challenge to the Majur Mahajan remained. Left-wing trade union 
strength had dwindled from about 50,000 in 1965 to barely 5»000 
in 1969. In addition, the Majur Mahajan, learning from its earlier 
mistakes over the dearness allowance issue, had reacted fairly 
promptly to the difficult situation in the textile industry by 
negotiating the setting-up of the National Textile Corporation 
and the Gujarat State Textile Corporation to take over the running 
of the sick mills. The Majur Mahajan was well aware of its crucial 
importance to the Congress party in the labour wards at this period 
and even before the election demanded one of the threee chief 
posts in the Corporation, either the Mayorship, the Deputy Mayorship, 
or the Chairmanship of the Standing Committee, for one of its nominees
1 . Times of India (Ahmedabad), 3 March;1969.
2. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 4 March;1969.
3. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 9 February, 1969.
In 1965 the Janta Parishad had succeeded in building an 
alliance between the working class on the dearness allowance issue, 
and the middle and upper middle class on the English language 
issue and the issue of rising prices, in opposition to the Congress 
party. In 1965* many Ahmedabad businessmen and textile magnates 
had thrown in their weight against the Congress on the English 
language issue. In 19&9» however, Ahmedabad businessmen and in­
dustrialists reverted to their normal pro-Congress stance.
Electoral strategy in 19&9 decided at a meeting of Morarji 
Desai, the State Congress boss, with Congress leaders at State and 
City level, including Vajubhai Shah, GPCC President, Brahmkujnar 
Bhatt, GPCC Secretary,Tribhovandas Patel and Thakorebhai 
Desai, ex-GFCC Presidents, Jamnashankar Pandya , City DCC President, 
and Shyamprasad R. Vasavda, Majur Mahajan leader; leading in­
dustrialists including Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Chinubhai Chimanlal 
Sheth, Arvind Narottam, Jayantilal Bhikkabhai, Atmaran Sutaria
and Madanmohan Mangaldas; and other leading citizens including
4advocates, Mr. Ranjan Nanavati and Mr. C.C.Gandhi. Congress
leaders were confident of winning the election with the support 
of leading industrialists who agreed to provide funds and support 
party candidates. Although it was felt tkat other parties might 
try to exploit the textile crisis in the city, Congress could 
counteract this by fielding Majur-Mahajan backed candidates in the 
labour areas.6
4. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 4 February}1969.
5. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 9 February, 1969.
6. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 4 February, 1969.
Despite factionalism within the Ahmedabad City DCC between
supporters of Jamnashankar Pandya, City DCC President, and
7Trikamlal Patel, ex-President of the City DCC, Cor^ess courted 
popularity by infusing fresh blood into the party by adopting 
many new candidates and dropping fifteen of the twenty-two 
sitting Corporators to ensure a clean record of the party in
g
the Corporation. The City Congress organization also gained 
popularity by undertaking a number of welfare activities under 
the leadership of Jamnashankar Pandya during the election year, 
which was a year of long drought, a 'flu epidemic and a generally 
bleak winter. The Congress organization saw to it that those who 
were forced to make their homes on the river-bed were looked after; 
pavement-dwellers were given rugs and clothing during the winter 
months; and thousands of cattle were saved during the period of
famine. The Majur Mahajan acted fairly efficiently to alleviate
9the distress of unemployed millworkers.
The Janta Parishad decided to fight the 1969 municipal 
election as part of a United Front of anti-Congress parties, 
consisting of the PSP, SSP, CPI, CPM and one faction of the Re­
publican party. The Janta Parishad Mayor, Dr. Somabhai Desai, 
declared that the United Front stood for socialism in the civic 
administration and the tax structure. He pointed to Janta Parishad 
achievements in spite of severe financial difficulties. The Con­
gress had raised loans amounting to Rs. 19 crores from 1950-6^.
7. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 10 February, 1969; Times of India
(Ahmedabad), 12 April;1969; see also Chapter V.
8. Western Times (Ahmedabad), 10 March;1969.
9. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 2 April^l969.
The repayment instalment of Rs. 1 crore annually fell due when 
the Parishad took office. For this and other reasons, the Janta 
Parishad had had to find new financial resources by revising 
octroi rates and property tax assessment, thereby raising the 
Corporation's income by Rs. 332 lakhs.^ It claimed to have 
whittled down the incidence of direct taxes on weaker sections 
of the population and levied more taxes on the rich; it had also 
tried to reduce the disparity in taxes paid on owner-occupied 
houses and dwellings taken on rent , even though the party's pro­
gramme had been hindered at every turn by the Congress State Govern­
ment and its nominee, the Municipal Commissioner."^ However, no 
further tax increases were thought necessary, and it had been
found possible to decrease the price of milk supplied by the
12Corporation's dairy.
The Mayor, Somabhai Desai, went on to outline the Janta 
Parishad's main achievements: it had completed capital works
worth Rs. 10 crores, constructed ^,100 tenements under slum clear­
ance programmes, buildings for eleven primary schools, and several 
miles of drainage, water pipe-lines and voads. 22,000 Class IV 
municipal employees were given dearness allowance on a par with
the Central Government staff. The Janta Parishad promised further
1 3extension of all civic amenities to labour areas and chawls.
However, the Congress were quick to point out the disarray 
of the Janta Parishad in the Municipal Corporation and the steady
10. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), k April;19&9•
1 1 . Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 2 April)1 9 6 9 .
12. Gu.jarat Samachar (Ahmedabad), 17 February^ 1969.
13. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 10 March^l969.
erosion of its strength there by successive defections; and the 
financial crisis it had allegedly plunged the Corporation into 
and perpetuated by mismanagement, in a document called "Hold up 
a Mirror to Thyself". In this document the Congress printed 
quotes from United Front leaders themselves criticizing each other's 
parties, e.g. Manubhai Palkiwala was quoted as declaring that the 
Janta Parishad was rotten through and through, while Rajjabhhai
15Mansuri, a Janta Parishad Corporator, declared his party bankrupt.
Cracks and fissures had soon begun to appear in the United 
Front. Indulal Yagnik decided to keep aloof from the Janta Parishad 
and the 19&9 Municipal Corporation elections as he professed him­
self tired of constant internal party bickering and lack of co- 
16hesion. Constituent elements of the United Front, notably the
17SSP, were dissatisfied by the allocation of seats. The United 
Front could not agree on a common minimum programme and a division 
of seats in all the 91 constituencies largely because of the SSP, 
which demanded more seats than had been allocated to it by the co­
ordinating committee, comprising representatives of the PSP, SSP, 
CPI, CPM, JP and one faction of the Republican party. The PSP 
also had clearly separatist ambitions. Finally the constituent 
elements of the United Front were forced to fight the election on
l Stheir own programmes, manifestoes and party symbols. Electoral
l^f. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 2 April;1969.
15. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 5 December^1968.
16. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 15 December;1968.
17. Western Times (Ahmedabad), 17 March^1969.
18. Western Times (Ahmedabad), 3 April ,1969; Indian Express 
(Ahmedabad), k April^l969.
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disagreements persisted with the SSP and PSP fielding candidates 
against each other in Rakhial, Shahpur and Behrampura. Sanat Mehta,
PSP leader, was aggrieved that although the PSP had accommodated 
Kokila Vyas of the SSP in Maninagar, Kamindu Acharya, SSP leader, 
refused to accept the claims of the PSP candidates in Behrampura 
Kankaria. Thus the PSP and SSP found themselves pitted against
19each other in Behrampura, as well as in Shahpur and Rakhial wards.
With the demise of the Sangram Samiti, the Communists were able
to do little to exploit the distress among millworkers caused by
20unemployment and the textile crisis.
Thus the Janta Parishad's difficulties of sustained mobilization, 
party maintenance and goal attainment in the face of a hostile 
State and local power structure, outlined earlier in this chapter, 
paved the way for its massive electoral defeat in 1969.
Voting Analysis
Table 1. Comparison of the Overall Results of the
1963 and 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
elections.
Seats:
Party: 1965 1969
(out of 78 seats): (out of 91 seats): ---------------
1. Congress 13 65
2. Janta Parishad 42 4
3. Republican Party 5 1
4. PSP 9 10
5. SSP 0 3
6. Jan Sangh 0 3
7. Swatantra 0 0
8. Other Parties 0 3
9. Independents __2
Total 78 91
19. Jansatta (Ahmedabad), 5 April,1969.
20. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 2 April,1969.
The 1969 election showed the United Front and the Janta 
Parishad fragmented and in disarray. The Congress scored spectacular 
victories over the leading Janta Parishad figures in the Corporation: 
the then Mayor, Dr. Somabhai C. Desai, was defeated in Khanpur 
constituency (this owed a great deal to the hostile influence of 
Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi, former Janta Parishad Mayor, who had re­
cently defected to the Congress taking with him many influential 
party workers in Shahpur and Khanpur); the Deputy Mayor, Mr. N.P.
Shaikh, was also defeated as was the Chairman of the Standing Com-
21mittee, Mr. Jaimal Thakore. Another prominent United Front candi­
date, Dr. Hirabhai Parekh, the Corporation's Health Committee 
chairman was also defeated.
The PSP maintained its position in its traditional strong­
hold of Khadia, capturing four out of the six Khadia seats, the 
other two seats going to Dr. K.K.Shah of the Janta Parishad and 
the well known Congress candidate, Dr. Occhavlal Talati. Kalupur 
saw a United Front debacle with three seats going to Congress, 
one to an Independent and only one to a PSP candidate. The United 
Front failed to get even one of the two seats in Dariapur which 
both went to the Jan Sangh. Manubhai Palkiwala barely retained 
his seat in Vadigam, and his two panel members were defeated by 
the Congress. Congress swept Khanpur and Paldi and Rakhial. Con­
gress considerably increased its strength in the city wards with 
the PSP emerging as its main rival.
The Majur Mahajan experienced a widespread revival of 
strength in the labour areas. In Saraspur the Secretary of the 
City Communist Party (Rightist), Gordhanbhai Patel, lost to the
21. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 9 April?1969) 10 April^l969«
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Majur Mahajan's Chandubhai Patel. Dinkar Mehta, leader of the
City CPM, saw his majority fall from 2,500 in 1965 to 2^ fl in
1969. Nathusingh Indrasingh, another prominent Left Communist
labour leader, was trounced by the Congress in the mill area of
Chamanpura. Another Marxist trade union leader and prominent
Sangram Samiti figure, Abdulrazak Sheikh, a sitting Corporator
and Deputy Chairman of the Municipal Recreation Committee, was
badly defeated. In its stronghold of Khokera-Mehmedabad, the CPI
(Rightist) was relegated to third position by the Congress and 
22the Jan Sangh. Only three CPM candidates, and no CPI (Rightist) 
candidates at all were returned to power in 19&9. The SSP trade
union leader and Secretary of the Gujarat unit of the party,
2 3Kamindu Acharya, lost his deposit in Behrampura. All leftist 
forces, except the PSP which retained its strength of ten, 
suffered badly in this election. Janta Parishad strength was 
slashed from 29 in 1965 to ^ in 19^91 CPM strength from 8 to 3»
CPI (Rightist) from 5 to nil; and Republican party strength from 
5 to 1. Congress won 33 seats in the mill areas as against 32 
in the city areas.
The massive support the Janta Parishad had gained in the 
labour wards of Ahmedabad City in 19&5 had been whittled away. In 
1965i the Janta Parishad had 23 of its total seats in labour 
areas and high voting percentages in these wards. But in 19^9» 
it had one seat in the traditional middle class stronghold of Khadia- 
2; one seat in Gandhigram constituency west of the Sabarmati in 
a fairly prosperous suburb (part of the old Ellis Bridge constituency);
22. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 12 April^l969.
23. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 1^ April 1^969.
and only two seats in unmistakably labour class wards: one in
Dudheshvar and one in Amraivadi. (The CPM which had been part 
of the Janta Parishad in 1965 only managed to retain three 
labour seats in 1969). In contrast, in 19^91 the Congress was 
again strongly entrenched in thelabour wards, thanks to the re­
vival of Majur Mahajan influence.
2 4
Table 2. A Comparison of the Wardwise /o of Votes and 
.Seats secured by the Congress and the Janta 
Parishad in the 1965 and 1969 Ahmedabad 
municipal elections.
1963 election: 1969 election:
Congress: Janta Ward_: Congress: JantaWard:
Parishad: °/o of No.of 0/0 of No.of 
Votes Seats Votes Seats
Parishad: °/o of No.of °/o 01 No.of
Votes Seats Votes Seats
1. Khadia 1 23.I3 1 23.46 - 1. Khadia 1 36.36 1 - -
2. Khadia 2 19.08 - 33.38 1 2. Khadia 2 26.96 - 19.25 1
3. Kalupur 1 16.62 - 27.30 3 3. S.Kalupur 44.33 2 - -
4. Kalupur 2 32.69 - 50.40 3 4. N.Kalupur 32.37 1. 13.72 -
3. Dariapur 34.3^ - 33.90 3 3. Gheekanta 41.81 1 - -
6. Shahpur 26.19 1 38.97 3 6. Dariapur 24.65 - 12.07 -
7. Jamalpur 30.81 - 19.85 1 7. Vadigam 45.31 2 - -
8. Raikhad 36.99 1 24.31 1 8. Sha hpur 45.82 2 - -
9. S.Ellis-
bridge 44.19 2 - -
9. Khanpur 33.33 3 11.46 -
10. N.Ellis-
bridge 41.28 2 - -
10. Manek
chowk 34.60 1 _ _
11. Sabarmati 33.82 3 18.93 - 11. Jamalpur 4i.8l 2 - -
3-2. Shahibag 23.79 - 38.^8 3 !2. Raikhad 32.49 3 14.15 -
13- Asarva 36.57 - 43.83 3 13- Paldi 48.06 3 24.38 -
14. Saraspur 34.32 45.52 3 14. Gandhi- 
gram 47.97 2 12.85 1
24. Electoral data obtained from Gujarat University School of Social 
Sciences in March 1971. Direct comparisons between 1965 and 
1969 municipal wards are rendered difficult by the almost doubling 
of wards in 19^9 overl965. Correspondingly multi-member
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1965 election: 1969 election:
Congress: Janta Ward: Congress: Janta
Pari shad: Pari shad:o -------/o of No.of °/o of No.of °/o of No.of °/o of No.of
Votes: Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats
15.Rakhial 38.43 * - 37.02 3 13.Vadaj 50.74 3 11.06 -
l6.Gomtipur 35.15 - 47.18 4 16.Sabarmati 58.53 3 - -
1 7.Khokhe ra-
Mehmedabad 35-l8 1 55.93 3 1 7.Budhesh-war 37.42 1 18.56 1
l8.Maninagar-
Behrampura 33k 80 2 13.56 -
l8.Madhu-
pura 47.51 3 30.37 -
Total 32.87 13. 35.72 42
19.Girdhar-
nagar 48.75 3 6.09 -
20.Asarva 42.30 1 11.65 -
21 .Chaman- 
pura 34.67 2 - -
22.Naroda 33.20 1 - -
23.Saraspur 51.2 8 2 10.41 -
24.Potalia 48.30 3 5.29 -
23.Bapunaga-
gar 40.06 2 9.80 _
26.Rakhial 42.17 3 - -
27.Gomtipur 54.56 3 - -
28.Rajpur 41.48 3 - -
29.Amrai-
vadi 4i.oo 1 24.56 1
30.Khokera- 
Mehmeda­
bad 63.36 3
3 1.Maninagar 36.06 2 - -
32.Kankaria 39.52 1 - -
33.Behram-
pura 41.09 2 - -
Total 43.10 65 7.31 4
constituencies which had previously comprised as many as five 
and six members were reduced in 1969 to a limit of two and three- 
member constituencies, although this did not go as far as the 
CPM proposal to have single-member constituencies.
In 1969 the Janta Parishad had indeed lost its broad-based 
support among the electorate which had rested on the foundations 
of an alliance of the middle and upper middle class on the issue 
of the teaching of English in schools, and of the working class 
on the d.a. issue. Its total voting percentage had fallen from 
35.72°/o in 1 9 6 5  to a mere 7.31°/o in 1 9 6 9 .  In 1965* it had 
achieved voting percentages of 37.02 to 55.93 in six out of seven 
principally labour wards. In 1969* its voting percentages ranged 
between 5«29°/o and 30.37°/o in the labour wards. In contrast, 
Congress voting percentages ranged from 33.2°/o to 63.36°/o in the 
predominantly labour wards in 19&9• Congress voting percentages 
in 1969 were highest in the labour wards and in the fairly prosper­
ous suburban areas west of the Sabarmati, and lowest in the inner- 
city wards. Its lowest voting percentage was 2^.65 in the inner- 
city ward of Dariapur.
In 1965» voting was polarized between two main parties, the 
Congress and the Janta Parishad, with 32.87 and 35.72 per cent 
respectively of the total votes. But, in 19691 there was a reversion 
to the traditional pattern of a dominant Congress party with +^3.10°/o 
of total votes and a highly fragmented opposition. The remaining 
5 6 . 2 ° / o  of the total votes was divided between nine opposition 
parties and numerous Independents, with the highest individual voting 
percentage of any opposition party not rising beyond the Jan Sangh's
11.28°/o. The Jan Sangh's capturing of 11.28°/o of the total vote 
as compared to only 1.62°/o in 1965 was one of the astonishing 
outcomes of this electinn, pointing to the increasing significance 
of the communal issue in municipal politics (see £0 tlowing chapter).
In 1969i the percentage of wardwise invalid votes was con­
siderably higher than in 1961, especially in the labour wards, but
it did not reach the peaks attained in many labour class
wards in 1965» indicating a less marked degree of working class
participation, although still considerable. Whereas in 1963
the percentage of invalid votes cast had reached as high as 9.98
in Asarva constituency, in 1969* the highest percentage of invalid
votes was 4.26 in Amraivadi.
25Table 3. Wardwise Comparison of the Percentage
of Invalid Votes in the Ahmedabad Munici­
pal Corporation elections of 1965 1969.
1963 Election: 1969 Election:
Wards: °/of of Wards: %  of
Invalid Invalid
Votes: Votes:
1. Khadia -1 1.92 1. Khadia-1 2.06
2. Khadia -2 1.99 2. Khadia-2 1.99
3. Kalupur -1 2.75 3. S.Kalupur 2.03
4. Kalupur 4.92 4. N.Kalupur 2.73
3. Dariapur 4.86 3. Gheekanta 3.66
6. Shahpur 5.07 6. Dariapur 2.29
7. Jamalpur 4.12 7. Vadigam 2.77
8. Raikhad 4.17 8. Shahpur 2.95
9. S.Ellisbridge 3.01 9. Khanpur 2.4 6
10.N.Elli sbri dge 3.00 10. Manekchowk 2.46
ll.Sabarmati 2.72 11.Jamalpur 3.04
12.Shahibag 4.77 12.Raikhad 3.12
13.Asarva 5.98 13.Paldi 1.31
14. Saraspur 5.67 14.Gandhigram 1.84
13.Rakhial 4.55 15.Vadaj 1.96
16.Gomtipur-Rajpur 3.94 l6.Sabarmati 2.95
17.Khoke ra-Mehmedabad 3.61 17.Dudhe.shwar 3.64
l8.Maninagar-Behrampura 4.98 l8.Madhupura 3.30
23. Electoral data obtained from the Gujarat University School 
Social Sciences in March 1971.
1965 Election: 1969 Election:
Wards: °/o of Wards: °/o of
Invalid Invalid
Votes: Votes:
19 • Gi r dharnagar 3 • 1.2
20.Asarva 2.31
21.Chamanpura 2.97
22.Naroda 3.52
23.Saraspur 2.99
24.Potalia 2.86
25.Bapunagar 3.46
26.Rakhial 3.68
27.Gomtipur 3.25
28.Rajpur 3.05
29.Amraivadi 4.26
30.Khokera-Mehmedabad 2.15
31.Maninagar 2.26
32.Kankaiia 2.77
33.Behrampura 3.70
In 1969» the traditional Congress advantage in multi-comered 
contests and in the multiple-member constituency system was operat­
ive again, whereas in 1965 the special conditions of political 
polarization had operated in favour of the Janta Parishad. For 
example, in 1969i in Khanpur, the Congress with 33.33°/o of the 
total votes secured all the three seats; whereas in 19&5» the Con­
gress with 38.43°/o of the total votes in Rakhial constituency 
failed to secure a single seat.
The solidity of the Congress victory in 19&9 can be seen in
the fact that 11 of its 63 seats were won on over 30°/o of the 
total votes and Zk Congress candidates gained second place. In 
terms of deposits lost, the Swatantra party fared worst with 73°/o 
of its candidates losing their deposits, followed by the Independents 
and one faction of the Republican party with 62°/o. The Jan Sangh 
percentage of deposits lost had fallen from kkmkk°/o in 1963 to 
26°/o in 1969.
26Table 4. A Comparison of the Deposits lost by Various 
Parties in the 19&3 and 1969 Ahmedabad 
municipal elections.
Party: °/o of Candidates losing thei
1963: 1969:
1. Congress 1.28 -
2. PSP 8.00 -
3. Janta Parishad - 3.00
4. SSP - 19.00
3. Swatantra 3^.33 73.00
6. Republican ^6.13 62.00
7. Jan Sangh k k M 26.00
8. Independents 32.31 62.00
In 1969 the Majur Mahajan element in the Congress Corporation 
party increased its number of seats to 33 compared to 29 in 1961, 
although as a percentage of total Congress Corporators the Majur 
Mahajan element fell somewhat from 37°/o in 1961 to 30.8°/o in 
1969. It had completely made up the ground lost in 1963 when n°t 
a single Majur Mahajan candidate had been elected. The business 
component of the Congress Corporation party fell somewhat in 1969
26. Electoral data obtained from the Gujarat University School 
of Social Sciences in March 1971.
compared to 1961 (it is more reasonable to compare the 1969 
election with the 1961 election rather than the 1963 election 
since this was an atypical disaster for the municipal Congress 
party which only secured 13 seats without any Majur Mahajan 
Corporators at all as a result of that election), and the big 
business element fell even more sharply, whereas the professional 
and white-collar elements rose to some degree.
2 7Table 3. A Comparison of the Socioeconomic 
Composition of Congress Municipal 
Corporators in Ahmedabad in 1961-63, 
and 1969-74.
1961 1969
Socioeconomic Category No. of 0 / -p/o of No. of %  of
Congress Congress Congress■ Congress
Majur Mahajan Candidates 
Millworkers/trade
Corporators: Corporators: Corporators: Corporators
unionists
Businessmen/social
20 39)
) 57
26 40 )
) 30.8
workers 9 18) 7 10.8)
Big businessmen 8 15.7)
) 27.3
3 4.6)
) 24.6
Other medium and small 
business men
1
6 1 1.8) 13 20 )
Professional men 7 13.3 12 18.3
White-collar workers l 2 4 6.2
Total. 31 100 63 100
In 1961, big businessmen were eight in number and constituted 
13.7°/o of total Congress Corporators. However, in 19^9* there 
were only three big businessmen in the Corporation, none textile 
magnates, constituting only 4.6°/o of total Congress Corporators.
27. Socioeconomic data provided by the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation.
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The percentage of millworker/full-time trade unionist Corporators 
nominated by the Majur Mahajan remained constant at about 40°/o 
between 1961 and 1969* although the percentage of Majur Mahajan- 
sponsored business/social worker Corporators fell somewhat from
i
l8/o in 1961 to 10.8 /o in 1969. The percentage of medium and 
small-scale businessmen among Congress Corporators rose from
11.8°/o in 1961 to 20°/o in 1969. The percentage of white-collar 
workers and professional men among Congress Corporators also 
experienced an increase from 2°/o in 1961 to 6.2°/o in 1969» 
and from 13.3°/o in 1961 to l8.3°/o in 1969 respectively.
If one examines the leading posts in the Corporation and 
the composition of the most influential Municipal Corporation 
committees in 19^9» one can see an increase in Majur Mahajan repre­
sentation over that of 1961-63. In 1969 "the Majur Mahajan demanded 
and got for one of their leaders one of the three top posts in 
the Corporation, that of Chairman of the Standing Committee for 
Navinchandra Barot. In the Transport Committee, the Majur Mahajan 
increased their representation from one in 1960-61 and 1961-62 and 
nil between 1962 and 1965 to two in 1969-70 and 1970-71. In 
the Public Works Committee, Majur Mahajan membership had been three 
between 1961 and 1964, rising to four in 1964-63. It remained at 
four in 1969-70, and rose to five in 1970-71. In the Housing 
and Improvement Committee, Majur Mahajan representation had been 
two in 1964-63. It rose to five in 1969-70 and four in 1970-71.
419
I r-H I I I I I I I I H  H  H H  I I 1 I 1 I rH |NOy
s s s s se ss s s s s s
A  A  A  A  CM H  A  (\) A  A
I I I 
I A  A
CD £ 
pH CD 
T3 CCS S
f l o r a  
3  ra ra
I CD 
£ 
•HCQ CD 1— 1£ CD A 0
O > -P 1•rH •rH O CQ-P -PCCS CCS£ -P CD • •
o £ i— 1 £
pL CD ccS CD
£ CQ o S
O CD CQ CQ
o £ 1 CQ
ft s CD
1—1 CD £ £CCS £ •rH •H
ft CQ•H £ CD £
o ccS S pq•H *i ;
£j ccS
3 r£ • •
s £CD
1—1 s
ccS £ CQ•rH £ CQ-P •i-: CD£ crt £CD IS, •rH£ bO CQ
1—1 *• •rH £
£ pq pq
£ ccSi— 1
£ £O i— i ££ •rH ccS CD
O +3 •rH X
P>4 £ O £CCS O O<H ft CO
o
£
£ •rH • •
O £•rH r <u-P r£•rH £ oCQ •H ccS
o CD
ft O EH
s ,£
O CQ _
O M•> £
O CQ CD•rH CD
s CD
O -P ccS
£ -PO •rH
oCD § • •
O O £•rH o O
O •P
o o
C/3
5
CVI H  fACVJ LO,4 - I I A -£ "  C\J LA lA
I I i—I I i—I i—I i—I i—I (A  fA I I I I I rH I I CM tA
J - I A I A I A H H r l r l r l H CM CM CM H  | I I I I I rH pH CM CM I
I I pH rH I pH I I I I I I I I pH pH I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
CM CM i— I IA  CM i— I CM i— I i— I rH
rH rH i— I i— I i— I IA  I rH A  CM
pH rH rH pH I I I I CM
pH A  pH i—I i—I i—ICMi—ICMCM
I I i—I CM i—I i—I i—I i— I
I I I I
I I rH
I I I
I A
co
CM
VO
CD i—I 
rQ
CCSEH
I I I I H  H  H  H  I I I I I i—I i—I i—I i—I i—I I I I I I I
S’
CD 
CD 
-P 
•H -P 
XS -H
§ i
-p  o  
CO O
CM A -3- A  VO A-CO On O  pH 
VOVDVOVQVOVOVOVO A- A- I I I I I I I I I I
i I CM A - c f  A  VO A-oO CT\ O
v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o  a -0\ Ov (A A  A  A  A  On O' A  
i—I i—l i —I pH i—I r H r H r H H r H
-P CD 
£ CD 
O -P
g*s 
9 i£  O  
EH O
.CM A  J -  A  VO A-OO ONO H  
VOVOVOVDVOVOVOVO A- IA 
I I I I I I I I I I
L. H CM A ^ t-  A  VO A-OO A O
v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o v o  a -A A A A A A A A A A  i—I i—I i—I i—I i—I i—I i—I i—I pH i—I
CQ
*O
rQ g
£  o  P-i O
CM A  -4- A  v£ rvL 
NO VO VO VO v o  I I I I I i
H CM A - l  A  O vo vo VO VO vO n o  
CTn CTn O v  O v  (Jn  On 
i—I i—I i—I pH pH i—I
OO
CM
S
o
c
io
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 
d
at
a 
p
r
o
v
id
e
d
 
by
 
Ja
ik
ri
sh
na
bh
ai
 
Ha
ri
va
ll
ab
hd
as
.
Na
me
 
of 
Ma
na
ge
ri
al
/ 
Do
ct
or
: 
La
wy
er
: 
Te
ac
he
r: 
So
ci
al
 
Big
 
Me
di
um
;-
sc
?l
e 
Ot
he
r 
and
 
Mi
ll
wo
rk
er
/ 
Wh
it
e-
 
Co
mm
it
te
e: 
C.
A.
 
Wo
rk
er
: 
Bu
si
ne
ss
me
n:
 
Bu
si
ne
ss
me
n:
 
sm
al
l-
sc
al
e 
tr
ad
e 
co
ll
ar
420
P0)
%
o5
HHl I ii—I
P
CQ i-HrH
114-iA 4-lA
P0)
S
CQ
CQa)p•Hw
ml
J -  LA (\jf\J
I I I H I (\J H
CM VO LA O - OO L A J -
fA  IA  IA  CM -4" CM LA
»' H r -)  I i—I I i—I I I H  H
i • •— • i rA  i I I I i I
I I I rH I I r—I I I I I
I I  I I I I I I I
rH  I rH  I rA  CM rH  CM I rH  I
CM I i~i CM | i—| i—I I I i—1 |
I I I I I I I I I I I
CQ
XP
o 0
0
-P
o -P
•H •H
rH g
£> g
2 O
Oh O
TJ P
P P 
cd 0 0  
S  0
C O O N  O  H  hQ 0  -P  L A  VO 0 - 0 0  ON O  H
vO nO  I N I N  £  >  - P V Q V O V O V O V O  0 - 0 -
I I  I I -H  O  H  I I I I I I I
0 - 0 0  A O  CQ p  S J -  l A V O  N O O  A O
N O V O  V D I N  pi p ,  g  VO VO VO  VO VO  VO O -
o v a v a v c j v  o  s  o  a a  a a  a  a a
1— I H  H  i I M  H  Q  r l  i— I r H r H i — I i— I i— I
p
p
cdp
p2
o
O
o
• <
8 TD
•r-j 0
Cd P
, 3 0
cd P
S Pcd
p Xi2 o
•r~i
cd ii
S •
II <•
■sr o*
£1
The Mayor in 1969* Narottambhai Zhaveri, was for the first 
time in many years not a textile magnate, although he had links 
with the textile magnate elite, being a director of many Ahmedabad 
mills, particularly the cotton textile mills of the Kasturbhai 
Lalbhai group.
Thus, in 19^9i the internal balance of power in the Congress 
Corporation party had moved from the big business element to the 
Majur Mahajan element and the medium and small business elements.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE GROWING PLURALISM IN 
AHMEDABAD, AND INCREASING SOCIAL GROUP CONFLICT 
EVIDENT IN THE AGITATIONAL MOVEMENTS OF 
THE 1960S AND IN THE COMMUNAL RIOTS OF 1969'.
By the 1960s, Ahmedabad had become, in socioeconomic terms,
in many ways a more plural society with an increasingly large
migrant element, of which a significant proportion was non-Gujarati.
By 1961, 584,423 persons or 50.82°/o of the total population were
migrants, i.e. were not born in Ahmedabad City. Of these, 71*742
or 12.28°/o were born elsewhere in Ahmedabad district, while
321,642 or 55.04°/o were born in other districts of Gujarat. As
many as 170,313 or 29.l4°/o of total migrants were born in other
States of India, and 20,654 or 3.53°/o were born outside India.
Thus, by 1961, about one-third of the migrant population had come
to the city from areas outside Gujarat.'*' The main States of India
accounting for this large non-Gujarati migration were the
neighbouring States of Rajasthan, U.P. and Maharashtra. In 1961,
Rajasthan accounted for 57*7^3 migrants or 9.88°/o of total migrants.
U.P. accounted for 47*371 migrants or 8.11°/o of all migrants, while Ma-
of
harashtra accounted for 33*924 migrants or 5.80°/o/total migrants.
These three States together accounted for 23.79°/o or almost a
quarter of all migrants to the City, or approximately 83°/o of the
2total number of migrants from other States of India. Out of the 
remaining States of India, relatively large proportions of migrants 
had come from the following States: Madhya Pradesh accounted for
Chapter VIII
1. Census Special Report I, pp. 127-8.
2. Census Special Report III, pp. 6-7.
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11,062 migrants or 2°/o of total migrants to the City; Madras 
accounted for 4,301 migrants or 0.7°/o of total migrants; Pimjab
accounted for 4,288 migrants or 0.7°/o of total migrants; Kerala
accounted for 2,736 migrants or 0.3°/o of total migrants, and West
Bengal accounted for 1,187 migrants or 0.2°/o of total migrants.^
The growing diversity of Ahmedabad City, and the lack of 
integration of non-Gujarati groups in the City with the dominant 
Gujarati culture can be seen in the extent of linguistic diversity 
in the City, and the proportion of those having a non-Gujarati 
mother-tongue, who are bilingual with respect to Gujarati. The 
following table shows the linguistic diversity of Ahmedabad City 
in 1961:
Table 1. Distribution of Major Mother Tongues,
Ahmedabad City, 196l.~4
Mother-tongue: No. of Speakers:
All Mother-tongues 1,149,918 (l00.00°/o
1. Gujarati 803,126 ( 70.02°/o
2. Urdu 148,313 ( 12.91°/o
3. Hindi 91,322 ( 7.96°/o
4. Marathi 38,378 ( 3.33°/o
3. Marwari 19,316 C 1.70°/o
6. Sindhi 16,792 ( 1.46°/o
7. Others 29,869 C 2.60°/o;
Among the other mother-tongues the most important are Tamil with 
6,334 speakers, Punjabi with 3,383 speakers, Telugu with 4,133 
speakers, Malayalam with 2,726 speakers, Rajasthani with 2,667 speakers
3. Census Special Report II, pp. 368-373.
4. Census Special Report I, p.198.
and Bengali with 928 speakers. Bilingualism can be taken as a crude 
indicator of adjustment to and integration with the dominant 
Gujarati culture by non-Gujarati groups in the City. Therefore 
it is very significant that there seems to be a fairly low proportion
of bilingualism with respect to Gujarati among important minorityj
linguistic groups in the City: out of 1^8,313 Urdu speakers in
the City only 32,900 or 21.88°/o speak Gujarati; out of 91*922 
Hindi-speakers, only 11,398 or 12. / o speak Gujarati; out of 
38,978 Marathi-speakers only 8,38^ or 21.73°/o speak Gujarati; out 
of 19,316 Marwari-speakers only 3,626 or l8.38°/o speak Gujarati; 
and out of 16,792 Sindhi-speakers, only 1,931 or 11.30°/o speak 
Gujarati.
The sociostructural pattern, which was beginning to emerge 
in Ahmedabad in the 1960s, of a closely-knit, indigenous, homogeneous 
and highly legitimisd upper class, consisting of the dominant 
textile elite and its middle class appendage, on the one hand, and 
a very fragmented, heterogeneous, increasingly migrant and non- 
Gujarati labour force on the other hand, with an increasing lack 
of communication between the two, has contributed considerably to the 
retarding of social and economic mobility in the City, particularly 
of non-Gujarati groups. Migrants form a crucially important part 
of the total labour force of Ahmedabad: they constitute 233*0^2
workers or 71.36°/o of the total labour force of the City.^ The 
largest concentrations of migrant workers are to be found in manu­
facturing industries other than household, where 133*90^ migrants,
3. Census Special Report I, p.133-
or 33°/o of the total migrant labour force, are employed, con­
stituting 74.07°/o of the total labour force in this category.
Migrants constitute 92,672 t.€.35.8°/o o r one-third of the total 
migrant labour force , or 77°/o of all spinners, weavers, knitters, 
dyers and related workers in the textile industries.^ This is 
followed by the other services group, where 56,680 migrants or 
22°/o of the total migrant labour force are employed, constituting 
72.74°/o of the total labour force in this category. Non-Gujarati 
migrant workers make their largest contribution to the total migrant 
labour force mainly in working-class occupations. Although they con­
stitute only 35°/o of the total migrant labour force in all 
occupational divisions, they form 39°/o of the total migrant labour 
force working in transport and communications; 4l°/o of all migrant 
craftsmen, production process workers and labourers not elsewhere 
classified, and as much as 46°/o of the total number of spinners, 
weavers, knitters, dyers and related workers in the textile industries. 
In the higher status, white-collar middle-class and upper middle- 
class occupations, they constitute far less of the total migrant 
labour force: they form l8°/o of migrant professional, technical
and related workers; 22°/o of administrative, executive and 
managerial workers. In lower middle-class occupations, they con­
stitute only 20°/o of migrant clerical workers, but a larger pro­
portion - 27°/o - of migrant sales workers. UP has the largest 
concentration of its migrant work force in the category of craftsmen, 
production process workers and labourers not elsewhere classified, 
i.e. 23,074 or 7 6 ° / o .  18,078 of these, or 60°/o of its total migrant
6. Census Special Report II, p.302.
labour force, work as spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers and related 
workers in the textile industries. Migrant workers from
Maharashtra, Rajasthan and other States of India also have very
/
large proportions engaged in working as craftsmen, production 
process workers and labourers not elsewhere classified - 8,413 or 
63°/oi 19,294 or 39°/o* and 9*643 or 64°/o respectively. The re­
spective figures for their workers engaged as spinners, weavers, 
knitters, dyers and related workers are: 3*628 or 43°/o, 12,210
or 38°/o,and 6,768 or 43°/o.^
The relatively disadvantaged position of migrants can be 
seen in a preliminary survey of the socioeconomic conditions of 
slum-dwellers in Ahmedabad City carried out by a research team of
g
Gujarat University. This survey of slum families revealed that, 
whereas nor-Gujarati migrants constituted only about l4.2°/o of 
the total population, they constituted as much as 43°/o of slum 
dwellers.
In communal terms, the character of Ahmedabad City was 
changing significantly due to the patterns of migration. The pro­
portion of Jains, a small but highly significant group from the 
point of view of Ahmedabad's cultural ethos, within the City's 
population fell steadily between 1901-61, from 8.31°/o in 1901 to 
3 . 6 0 ° / o  in 1961. The proportion of Muslims in the City fell too 
from 20.33°/o of the total population in 1901 to 13.31°/o in 1961.
The upheavals of Partition, coupled with the nature of migration to 
the city, which was predominantly Hindu,have largely contributed to
7. Census Special Report II, pp. 90-99* 296-303* and III, pp. 6O-I63.
8. See Mahesh Bhatt and V.K.Chawda, A Preliminary Report of the
Study of the Socioeconomic Conditions of the Slum-dwellers in 
Ahmedabad City, . .. (University School of Social
Sciences, Gujarat University? 1911).
naking Ahmedabad City more Hindu in composition and character over
the last few decades. Whereas Hindus constitute 884,756 persons
or 7 6 . 9 4 ° / o  of the City's total population in 1961, and Muslims
173,398 persons or 13.5°/o; in the migrant population in 196l,
Hindus numbered 4791522 persons or 82.03°/o of total migrants, and
Muslims numbered 63,098 persons or only 10.8°/o of total migrants.
Thus migration was having a stronger impact on the Hindu community,
while its impact on the Muslim community was lesser, although still
significant: Hindu migrants constituted 54.2°/o of the total Hindu
population of the City, whereas Muslim migrants constituted 35«37°/o
9of the total Muslim population in the City. However, although the 
City had become by 1961 communally more uniformly Hindu and although 
communal diversity was thus reduced, paradoxically, communal divi­
sions in the City were exacerbated, as Hindu migrants, particularly 
the refugee element from Pakistan and the Hindu migrants from other 
States of India, particularly UP, Rajasthan and Maharashtra, who were 
socially and linguistically dislocated and concentrated in low- 
status, working-class occupations, mainly in the textile industries, 
became fertile ground for Jan Sangh anti-Muslim propaganda in the 60s 
There were important differences in the character of the Hindu 
and Muslim migrants to Ahmedabad City. Muslim migrants tended to be 
more urbanized than their Hindu counterparts. Out of the total 
number of Hindu migrants to Ahmedabad City in 1961, only 121,236 
or 2 4 ° / o  came from urban areas. In contrast, out of the total of 
Muslim migrants in 1961 as many as 28,730 or 46°/o came from urban
9. See Statement VII.8. Numerical strength of major religious
communities in Ahmedabad City, 1901 to 1961, in Census Special 
Report I, p.202, reproduced as Table 8 in Chapter 11,2. See 
also Census Special Report III, p. 6-7.
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areas - this was almost double the proportion of Hindu migrants 
coming from urban areas.
Muslim migrants also tended to be more non-Gujarati in 
character than Hindu migrants to Ahmedabad City in 19 6l. 337*944
Hindu migrants or 70°/o of the total number of Hindu migrants came 
from Ahmedabad district and other districts of Gujarat State. In 
contrast, 37*000 Muslim migrants or 58°/o of all Muslim migrants 
to the City came from outside Gujarat. Thus almost double the 
proportion of Muslim migrants, in comparison with Hindu migrants came 
from States outside Gujarat. U.P. contributes 26°/o of all 
Muslim migrants to Ahmedabad City; Rajasthan l4°/o; Maharashtra 
7°/o; and the other States of India together 12°/o.
It is also interesting to note that migrants tended to be, 
on the whole, better educated than the indigenous population.
322,615 migrants or 55»20°/o of total migrants are literate as 
against 52.74°/o literacy in the general population of the City.
In the various educational levels, the proportionate share of 
migrants is comparatively greater than among the general City popu­
lation. 60. 1 7 ° / o of those literate without educational level 
are migrants, although only 48.23°/o of those with only primary or 
junior basic education are migrants. 60.58°/o of those with matri­
culation or higher secondary standard of education are migrants.
55.12°/o and 58.76°/o respectively of those holding technical diplomas 
not equal to degrees and non-technical diplomas not equal to degrees are 
migrants. 64.87°/o of those with University degrees or postgraduate degrees
10. Census Special Report III, pp. 6-7.
other than technical degrees are migrants. Among holders of technical 
degrees or diplomas equal to a degree or postgraduate degree, 
although migrants constitute only 4l.38°/o of degrees in agri­
culture, 47.88%of degrees in technology and 50°/o of degrees in 
veterinary and dairying studies, they constitute 59.46°/o of holders 
of teaching degrees, 68.66°/o of holders of medical degrees and 
69.73°/o of holders of degrees in engineering. This generally greater 
degree of educational attainment of the migrant, as compared to 
the general population of Ahmedabad City, gave migrants a greater 
potential for active participation and, even leadership, in politics.
This growing pluralism, expressed in an increasingly frag­
mented lower class with very significant proportins of migrants 
and non-Gujaratis, who experienced difficulties in social and 
economic mobility, and the changing communal balance had profound
consequences for Ahmedabad City politics. In the leadership structure
the Majur Mahajan 
of the Congress party and/migrants from other parts of Gujarat
tended to dominate. Among Congress leaders, Trikamlal Patel,
President of the Ahmedabad City DCC after 1965* Narottam Zhaveri,
Deputy Mayor between 1961-65 and Mayor of Ahmedabad from 19&9 to
early 1972, D.K.Patel, who was Deputy Mayor between 1969-72,
Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, Mayor from 196l-63» and all the
other millowners in local politics were all born in Ahmedabad. The
Majur Mahajan had a significant number of leaders who were migrants
from other parts of Gujarat: the powerful Shyamprasad R. Vasavda
himself, General-Secretary of the TLA, was fromSaurashtra; another
influential Majur Mahajan leader, who was elected MLA in 1967» M.T.
Shukla, was born in Wadhvan City, while Shantilal Shah, who became
a Majur Mahajan-nominated State Labour Minister from 1967-72, was
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bom in Nadiad in Kaim district.^
The leadership structure of the Janta Parishad was also
dominated, especially in the early 60s, by those from Ahmedabad
and migraits from other parts of Gujarat State: Manubhai Palkiwala,
Somabhai Desai and Ashok Mehta were all born in Ahmedabad City,
while Dr. Vasudev N. Tripathi was born at Kalol tn Mehsana
district, Dinkar Mehta and Jaimal Thakor were both born in Surat,
and Indulal Yagnik himself was born in Nadiad in Kaira district.
However, although non-Gujarati migrants and Muslim migrants
were not generally prominent in the leadership structure of the
12Congress and the Majur Mahajan, they were given prominent positions
in the trade union and party leadership of the Communist party, e.g.
the second most powerful man in the CPM after Dinkar Mehta was
Abdulrazak Shaikhbiban Shaikh, a Muslim migrant, who came to
Ahmedabad in 193^, and became a millhand, and subsequently joined
13the Communist Party in 1936. Muslim migrants, largely from 
Rajasthan and UP, are more urbanized than Hindu migrants, and the 
nature of Islam makes them more equalitarian and a more monolithic 
group, therefore more susceptible to Communist ideas. Gujarati 
Muslims, on the other hand, are not so drawn to the Communist move­
ment. In the mid- 60s, more non-Gujarati migrants and Muslim migrants 
became politicized by the Janta Parishad with the increasing influence
11. Information obtained from a series of interviews with leading 
politicians and Corporators in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
12. With the exception of the Jamalpur area, which had a Muslim 
majority, and where the Congress party customarily put up 
Muslim candidates. The Majur Mahajan did have one prominent 
Muslim in its leadership, Nurmahomed Shaikh.
13. Interview with Dinkar Mehta, Ahmedabad March 1971.
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within the Janta Parishad of the Communist party, particularly the
CPM, and through the Janta Parishad-led economic agitational
movement of the mid- 60s, centred on the dearness allowance issue.
Non-Gujarati migrants and Muslims were given important leadership
roles in the Sangram Samiti movement, as the following analysis
of the composition of the executive committee of the Maha Gujarat
Mill Mazdur Union, formed as a result of the dearness allowance
agitation, revealed: (Table 2.) The proportion of non-Gujaratis
and Muslims on the Executive Committee of the MGMMU was the remarkably
high figure of 4v2..5°/o.
In the 1965 Municipal elections in Ahmedabad, the Janta
Parishad sponsored a fair number of non-Gujrati migrants, some of
whom were successfully elected, and formed for the first time a
15small non-Gujarati element within the Municipal Corporation.
Table 3.16 Non-Gujarati Corporators in the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation, 1965-69.
Name:
1. Balursm Gupta
2. Hanumansing 
Bajrangsing
3. Pitambar V.Patil
Party:
Janta 
Parisad
Janta 
Pari sad
Janta
Parishad
Caste and Community: Occupation:
Bengali Bania Businessman
Rajput (Punjab)
Maharashtrian
Social worker
Mi11worker
This non-Gujarati element constituted approximately 7.3°/o of 
Janta Parishad Municipal Corporators between 19^5 and 1969. For 
the first time, during the Janta Parishad period of power in the
15. After the 1961 Municipal elections, the Congress had one non- 
Gujarati candidate elected, Madarsing Kalusing, who had 
been nominated by the Majur Mahajan. 
p6. Data provided by the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad.
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Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Non-Gujaratis took part in some 
ofthe more influential committees of the Corporation: Baluram
Gupta was a member of the Standing Committee from 1967-69, Pitambar 
V. Patil was a member of the Housing and Improvement Committee 
from 1969-67. With the electoral eclipse of the Janta Parishad in 
the 1969 municipal elections, the representation of non-Gujrati 
migrants in the Municipal Corporation also ceased.
Muslims too gravitated towards the Janta Parishad in the 
mid- 60s. Muslims formed 19.2°/o of Janta Parishad candidates in 
the 1969 Municipal Corporation election, compared to 7.9°/o in 
the 1961 Municipal Corporation election. Although the percentage 
of Muslim candidates within the Congress also rose between 1961 
and 1969 from 8.9°/o to l^ f.l°/o, in terms of elected Corporators, the 
p«rt£Ktc^ eof Janta Parishad/Corporators out of the total number of 
Janta Parishad Corporators rose from ll.l°/o in 1961 to 1^.9°/o in 
1969, while that of Congress Muslim Corporators fell from 9.8°/o 
of the total number of Congress Corporators in 1961 to 7.b°/o in
1965.17
In the 1969 Municipal Corporation election, the Janta Parishad
suffered a disastrous defeat, and its strength within the Corporation
l8was reduced from bZ in 1969 to a mere b in 1969. However, 
if we analyze the socioeconomic background of candidates from the 
various parties in the 1969 municipal election, we can clearly 
see the importance of the non-Gujarati and Muslim element in the
United Front of the Janta Parishad, CPI, CPM, SSP, PSP and Republican
17. Percentages calculated from municipal election data made
- a v a i l a b l e  b y  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G u j a r a t ,  A h m e d a b a d .
18. The United Front in the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
election, consisting of the CPI, CPM, PSP, SSP and Republican 
party, secured 21 seats - the largest number of which, 11, 
went to the PSP.
party, compared with the Congress party.
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1 9Table 4« Socioeconomic Analysis of the Non-Gujarati
and Muslim candidates of the United Front
parties and the Congress party in the 1969
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation election
Candidates: Party: Ward: Caste and 
Community
Occupation:
1. Rajubbhai C. Mansuri United Front N.Kalupur Muslim Businessman*
2. Nasiruddin P. Shaikh ii Dariapur ti Lawyer
3- Mohmudin A. Quereshi n Khanpur ii it
4* Mohamed Sharif A. 
Kucheravala
ii Manekchowk it ex-
Corporation
employee
5- Gulamali J. Contractor ii Jamalpur ii -
6. Mohamedshafi A. Shaikh ti ii it -
7. Abdulrahim T. Kundivala ii ii ii Owns a screen-
printing
business.
8. Anvar Husein Momin it Raikhad ii Lawyer
9. Dr. A.A. Carvelo ii Gandhigram Christian Doctor
10. Sohrabali Murtuja it Madhupura Muslim Millworker
11. Baluram G. Gupta ii it Bengali
Bania
Businessman
12. Ramswami G. Naidu ii Naroda South
Indian
Millworker
13- Ambalal R. Vora it Potalia Muslim Businessman
14. Pitambar V. Patil n Bapunagar Maharash­
trian
Millworker
15. Abdulrehman Tabassum ti Rakhial Muslim n
16. Nizamudin Mustafa n Gomtipur ii Trade unionis
17. Abdulrazak Shaikhbiban ti Raj pur it ii
18. Pyarelal T. Bhaiyya n Amraivadi U.P. -
19• See Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Election. 1969: Our Candidates, a
booklet published by the Ahmedabad Corporation.
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Candidates: Party: Ward: Caste and Occupation: 
Community
19. Mahomedali Chedialikhah United Front Khokera-
Mehmedabad
20. Mavaji J. Marvadi " Behrampura
21. Mahemudmiya A. Contractor Congress N.Kalupur
22. Ibrahim N. Shaikh " Vadigam
23. Tamizben A. Quereshi " Khanpur
24. Nurmahomed G. Gulivala 11 Manekchowk
25. Abdulkarim G. Shaikh " Jamalpur
26. Rafiudin A. Shaikh 11 Raikhad
27. Ibrahim M. Maniar 11 Gomtipur
28. Alabaksh Nurbhai Shaikh 11 Behrampura
Muslim
Marvari
Muslim
Millworker
Businessman 
(medium scale)
Social Worker
Factory-owner
n
Businessman
Trade unionist
Bleaching
contractor*
* member of the Gujarat Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
It is interesting to note that whereas the Congress party nominated only 8 
Muslim candidates and no Non-Gujarati candidates, the United Front had 14 
Muslim candidates and 6 Non-Gujarati candidates. In addition, a very much 
larger proportion of United Front Non-Gujarati and Muslim candidates, 
particularly those of the CPM, were either millworkers or trade unionists.
The effect of Non-Gujarati migration and the changing communal balance 
was to increase insecurities and tensions within the City.
Net only did the increasing migration affect the indigenous population
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of the City, but jealousies and conflicts between Hindu and Muslim 
migrants to the City themselves proved even more intense, and were 
to erupt into violence in the Communal Riots of September, 1969.
The Bhaiyyas from UP, the largely Sindhi refugees from Pakistan, 
the Marwaris from Rajasthan, as well as the Hindu migTO-rvts from 
other parts of Gujarat found a scapegoat in their Muslim co-migrants 
for their frustrations in being uprooted into a deteriorating urban 
environment. The fact that Muslim migrants tended to be more 
urbanized and more often Non-Gujarati than Hindu migrants exacerbated 
these tensions, particularly among Hindu migrants from other parts 
of Gujarat. The more urbanized and more frequently Non-Gujarati 
Muslim migrants played an important part in the politics of the CPM 
and the Janta Parishad in Ahmedabad City, while the Jan Sangh found 
a particularly sympathetic hearing among the Hindu migrants, parti­
cularly the refugees from Pakistan and those from North Indian States, 
such as the UP where the Jan Sangh had already established a strong­
hold.
The background to deteriorating communal relations in the 
mid and late 60s also lay in increasingly difficult economic cir­
cumstances, particularly for the textile industry during these 
years. Failure of the monsoon and bad harvests in the mid 60s re­
sulted in a shortfall in the amount of raw cotton available. This 
shortage, plus decontrol of cotton prices due to the efforts of 
the farm lobby> resulted in soaring raw material prices for the tex­
tile manufacturers. Wages had also risen sharply during the mid 60s
20due largely to increased dearness allowance. As the following table
20. Report of the Gujarat Textile Reorganisation Committee, 
(Government of Gujarat *Aug. 1968), p.17.
f
shows, by 1967 Ahmedabad was paying the highest dearness allowance 
of any textile centre in India:
Table A Comparison of Dearness Allowance payments of
the Major Textile Centres in India, 1964-67.
Textile
Centres:
Minimum basic 
wage per month:
Average
1964
D.A. for 26 working days in ! 
1965 1966 1967
Bombay 40 113 128 149 168
Ahmedabad 38 104 129 139 173
Nagpur 32 82 98 N.A. N.A.
Madras 36 96 113 123 140
Kanpur 38 83 88 107 133
West Bengal 36 33 38 70 82
N.A. = Not Available.
Devaluation of the rupee in 1966 aggravated the situation, causing 
a countrywide recession and curtailment on the outlay for the Five 
Year Plan. Devaluation had an adverse effect on the textile in­
dustry, reducing the purchasing power of domestic consumers, and
making it more difficult to obtain imports of raw material and
21machinery from abroad. Thus the manufacturing costs of the tex-
22tile mills rose steeply, and markets were reduced. The Report 
of the Government of Gujarat's Textile Reorganisation Committee, 
headed by Manubhai Shah, which was appointed to look into the 
problems of the cotton textile industry in Gujarat, came out in 
August, 1968, and showed up the unsoundness of the textile industry
21. Discussions with Dr. Dholakia, lecturer in Economics, University 
of Gujarat, in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
22. See the Ahmedabad MOA Report (1967). The MOA sent deputations 
to Morarji Desai, then Deputy Prime Minister, on 24 December
1967, and to the Chief Minister of Gujarat on 17 February
1968, urging measures to be taken to relieve the critical 
conditions affecting the textile industry.
and the need for greater rationalization and modernization. Some 
mills, it was found, had followed a more liberal dividend policy 
than justifiable at the cost of providing adequately for moderni­
zation and maintenance of their units. Profits, both before and 
after tax, reached an all time high in 1961, but fell far below 
this in the mid 60s.
27)Table 6. Showing Profit Before and After Tax in the 
Cotton Textile Industry in Ahmedabad,
1991-66 (In crores of rupeesTI
Years: 1991 1996 196l 1969 1966
Profit before tax 6.69 7.29 10.76 3.93 7.81
Profit after tax 3.93 3.89 6.07 O.83 3.19
The Report discovered that the smaller units in terms of number 
of looms installed (i.e. $00 or below), and those units which 
spent considerably less than other units in Block per loom per year 
during the period 1990-66 tended to be more uneconomic. During 
the mid 60s, the cotton textile mills of Ahmedabad were squeezed 
between rising costs and lower margins: in 1966, out of 97 mills
in Ahmedabad, 31 made a profit of Rs. 3.8l crores, whereas the 
remaining 26 made a loss of Rs. 2.27 crores, leaving a surplus 
balance of only Rs. 3.93 crores. Thus, due largely to obsolete 
machinery, financial difficulties and mismanagement, five mills 
were forced to close down, and some others faced the threat of 
closure.
23. Report of the Gujarat Textile Reorganisation Committee, p.21.
p LTable 7. List of closed Cotton Textile Mills 
in Ahmedabad up to mid 1968.
Name of the Mill: Date of 
Closure:
No. of Workers 
affected
1. North Gujarat Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. 21. 2.1965 900
2. Hathising Mfg. Co.Ltd 8. 6.1965 470
5. Ananta Mills Ltd 1.10.1966 1385
4. Himabhai Mfg. Co. Ltd 9. 1.1968 1188
5. Maneckchowk and Ahmedabad 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1. 4.1968 2200
Total 6143
This growing textile crisis in the mid and late 1960sjmarked 
by mill closures and rising unemployment, had a differential effect 
on Hindu and Muslim workers, andpLayed an important part in 
exacerbating the communal tensions which led to the 1969 Communal 
Riots. The textile labour force in Ahmedabad is very much in­
fluenced by the traditional social structure, and the working 
class is still dominated by caste and communal antagonisms. The 
presence of a large Non-Gujrati element, including both Muslims 
and Hindus, has exacerbated these antagonisms, adding linguistic 
and regional divisions. This is largely a reflection of the nature 
of recruitment into the textile industry, and the nature of the 
unionization which arose, subsequently. Workers for over a century, 
since the very beginning of the textile industry in Ahmedabad, 
tended to be recruited into the various departments and sections
24. Report of the Gujarat Textile Reorganisation Committee, p.76.
The Ahmedabad MOA^ in its reply to the Questionnaire of the
National Labour Cdtoimission in 1967» described this form of recruit- 
25ment as follows:
"... with the gradual evolution of the Textile Mill 
Industry in this centre over a period of more than 
a century, there has arisen a certain type of mono­
polistic tendency among workers, with the result 
that certain departments and/or sections of depart­
ments in the mills have been manned more or less wholly 
by workers belonging to a particular caste or community.
Such a development took place because of the fact that 
when the industry was first started in this centre, 
the recruits at the initial stage were naturally drawn 
from the caste and community who were already working 
in similar occupations viz. hand spinning, hand winding 
and hand weaving from yarn both hand spun as well as 
machine spun ... e.g. the spinners were recruited from 
Harijans, inhabitants of North Gujarat who were here­
ditary handloom weavers, while the winders and weavers 
were mostly drawn from the local Muslim Community of 
handloom weavers. Gradually this process took the form 
of a rigid monopoly - Ring Spinning Section for the 
Harijans and weaving for the Muslims - and continued 
thereafter, though at a later stage weaving has been 
taken up as an occupation by non-Muslim communities and 
in a number of cases there is a preponderance of non- 
Muslim weavers over the Muslim Weavers. Today there is no 
bar to any worker to secure employment in any department 
of a mill but there is always reluctance on the part of, 
saya Harijan, to join sis a Weaver when offered such a 
job..."
In the1960s, many of the Muslims who dominated the weaving
sections were Non-Gujaratis, and Harijans still tended to dominate
26the Ring Spinning and Throstle Departments. In dyeing and
27printing, the Muslims still dominated. The occupational structure
in the mills is still predominantly castewise. A retired mill manager
is reported to have said that workers of different castes refuse to
of departments in the mills on the basis of caste and community.
25. MOA Report (1967)1 Appendix 1, pp. 6-7.
26. Interview with M.T.Shukla, Secretary of the Majur Mahajan, 
and Neeru Desai, intellectual and senior journalist in the 
Gujarat Samachar, in Ahmedabad in March 1971.
27. See B.K.Roy Burman, "Social Profile of Ahmedabad", Seminar 
No. 25 (January}1970), pp. 33-38.
sit with one another for lunch and dinner in dining sheds or halls
28of the mills, i.e. following the caste taboo on interdining.
The Majur Mahajan was organized departmentally as a federation of 
craft unions in deference to the pattern of caste and communal 
divisions which had grown up in the industry. Thus it preferred 
to uphold the status quo and work within this structure of caste 
and communal, divisions within the cotton textile industry in 
Ahmedabad, rather than to challenge it, and try and forge a united 
working class based on working-class consciousness. It conducted 
social welfare programmes among the Harijans and other castes, 
particularly the backward castes, and tried to alleviate their lot 
socially and economically, but it did little to educate the workers, 
politically, to fight caste divisions and religious bigotry. It 
even pandered to religious feelings, organizing kirtans and bhajan- 
singing among the Harijans without adequately gauging the effect 
on Muslims in a mixed locality. There was little concerted effort 
to instil a secular ideology among the workers as was attempted 
by the Communist unions.
In these circumstances, the crisis in the textile industry 
and specific economic difficulties were bound to have differential 
effects on communal groups of workers, providing an underlying 
economic motivation for the Communal Riots of 1969. Weavers, 
who were largely Muslims and some upper caste Hindus, were highly 
skilled workers and, therefore, in short supply compared to workers 
of other departments, and, consequently^enjoyed relative job security
28. See Dr. Paresh Majumdar’s unpublished Ph.D.thesis on the 
Majvr Mahajan. ^University of Gujarat, AhmedabadI 1970).
and high wages. Redundancies were not likely to be as severe on
this section of workers. Since those Harijansi who did manage to
become weavers, were mostly confined to coarse weaving, the overall
trend of the Ahmedabad textile industry in switching, particularly
since the Second World War, from coarse and medium varieties to
fine and superfine varieties of cloth has meant a greater degree
of insecurity for Harijan workers than for Muslim workers - this
insecurity was compounded by the textile crisis of the mid and
late 60s. The process of rationalization and change-over to
complicated, high-speed automatic machinery also adversely affected 
29the less skilled.
Communal tension has also been generated through the gradual 
adoption of the Decasualization Scheme, initiated in 19^91 to 
ensure a more rational, efficient and just recruitment of labour, 
which has affected the traditional vested interests of the jobbers, 
who are prone to react by stirring up communal, tensions. ^
Another source of grievance and conflicting interests among 
the textile workers, which expressed itself in terms of caste 
and communal antagonisms, was the problem of wage differentials.
Wage differentials in the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad 
are still on an unscientific basis, with resulting anomalies and 
injustices. The problem is a long and deep-rooted one. As early as 
19^8, when the occupational wages of different categories of em­
ployees in the Ahmedabad cotton textile mills were being standardized
29. See MOA Report (1967), also B.K.Roy Burman, "Social Profile of 
Ahmedabad", Seminar No. 23 (January, 1970), pp. 33-38.
30. See MOA Report (1967).
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Report on scientific wages, urging that wage-rates should be
placed on a scientific basis through a proper assessment of woik-
loads and job analysis based on various factors like skill,
physical strain, degree of danger, fatigue etc. However, the Court
was unable to take this into account due partly to the restricted
nature of its terms of reference and more importantly because of
the sbrong opposition of the TLA, with the result that the Assessor
appointed by the Court recommended wage-scales for different
occupations by increasing existing wage-rates on an ad hoc, not a
scientific basis. Over the years, wage-rates and differentials
continued to be revised on an ad hoc basis, despite continuing
efforts by employers to alter this. As late as 1967* the employers'
scheme to put wages and wage differentials on a scientific basis
was still rejected due to the continuing hostility of the labour 
31unions. The MOA expressed its exasperation to the National Com-
32mission on Labour in the following terms.
"The Labour Union is in the habit of talking about 
the need of fixing wages in relation to work-load 
assessment scientifically, but in practice, they 
are never prepared to come to brass tacks, and claim 
adjustment in wages on ad hoc basis in no way related 
to work-load..."
One of the major underlying reasons for the TLA's refusal to seriously 
reconsider and re-assess wage differentials among different occupa­
tions in the cotton textile industry (bearing in mind that the TLA 
itself is organized in terms of the different departments which are
by the Industrial Court in Bombay, the MOA submitted an Experts'
See Annual Report of the Gujarat Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (1967).
32. See MOA Report (1967)1 Appendix 1,p .44.
divided to a large extent by caste and community) was that this 
would disturb the existing status quo among the different castes 
and communities, predominating in these various occupations.
Thus those groups, who would stand to benefit from a more 
scientific reappraisal of wage differentials and whose demands 
were not championed by the sole representative union in the 
cotton textile industry, would have very little chance of re­
dressing their grievances by negotiation. The TLA, which is 
dominated by strongly paternal, bureaucratic, largely "outsider" 
leaders, full of Gandhian rhetoric, did not provide an adequate 
forum for confrontation, where conflicts between different sections 
of workers could be openly thrashed out by democratic means, and, 
therefore, very often these conflicts and rivalries were forced 
to go underground.
Thus these economic grievances and conflicts, which took 
on a caste and communal character, set against a background of 
growing crisis for the cotton textile industry, coupled with a 
gradually deteriorating communal climate politically, provided 
much of the motivation and raw material underlying the apparently 
fortuitous circumstances leading to the Communal Riots of 1969.
The economic complexion of the Riots can be seen in the fact that, 
unlike all the previous Communal Riots in the City, including the 
Riots at the time of Partition in the mid-^fOs, which had all taken 
place primarily within the walled area of the City where the long- 
established Gujarati Muslim community dwelt, the 1969 Riots, for
T
the first time, spread to the working-class, industrial areas 
outside the old fort wall with their large migrant populations, 
where they assumed a greater intensity and violence.
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Politically and socially the communal climate in Ahmeda­
bad deteriorated during the 19o0s. According to the Report of 
the Inquiry into the Communal Disturbances in Ahmedabad on and 
after the l8th September 1969i this deterioration began soon 
after the Chinese invasion of India in 1962, "and certainly after 
the Pakistan invasion in 1963 when communal organizations and
33political parties began to make their impact upon communal harmony”.
Specific incidents and activities, which contributed to 
the slow building up of communal tension in the months preceding 
the Communal Riots of September 19691 can be traced back to the
3ZfJamiat-Ul-Ulema-e-Hind conference in Ahmedabad in June, 1968, 
and the RSS Rally, held in Ahmedabad from the 27th to the 29th 
December, 1968. Although neither was, on balance, directly 
inciting, both showed that communal organizations were actively 
making their presence felt on the Ahmedabad scene, and increasing 
the tempo of their activities. At the Jamiat Conference, 1,000 copies, 
priced at 0.30 paise each, of a booklet, called "The Communal 
Riots and the harm they have done to the country and the Hindu 
religion”, by Maulana Aklaq Hussain Hashimi, President of the 
Delhi Jamiat-Ul-Ulema, were distributed to Muslims. The booklet 
described the alleged atrocities by Hindus on Muslims, and a speech , 
made at the Conference, by Maulana Asad Madni contained claims that 
the Muslims were a superior community; referred to the RSS theory that 
Brahmin Peshwas of Maharashtra had the right to rule; recounted
33. Report of the Inquiry into the Cptomunal Disturbances at
Ahmedabad and Other Places in Gujarat On and After l8th
September 1969i p.212. The Inquiry was instituted by the
Government of Gujarat on 13 October 1969i and chaired by
Mr. Justice P.Jaganmohan Reddy, Judge of the Supreme Court
of India. The two members of the Committee of Inquiry were
Justice Nusserwanji K.Vakil, Judge of the Gujarat High Court,
and Justice Akbar S.Sarela, also a Judge of the Gujarat High
Court. This Report will be referred to henceforth as the Reddy Report.
34. The Jamiat-Ul-Ulema-e-Hind established itself in Ahmedabad
the sufferings of the Muslims at the hands of Hindu rioters; and 
accused the administration of bias against Muslims. However,i
this was counter-balanced by other references in Maulana Asad Madni's
speech when he exhorted his co-religionists with the words that
Islam will not prosper if Muslims commit oppression, and urged them
not to talk of revenge but to exercise restraint, not to become
communalists but to work for the progress of the country as in
35that lay the prosperity of Muslims.
The ESS Rally, held at Ahmedabad on the 27th, 28th and 29th 
of December, 1968, on open ground at Vivekanand High School in 
Maninagar, and attended by Shri Golwalkar, marked a high-point 
in the activities of the ESS in Ahmedabad and the Jan Sangh with 
whom it was closely related, for many all-India Jan Sanghi leaders 
had paid increasingly frequent visits to Ahmedabad in the later 
60s. Golwalkar's utterances, while not directly inciting, were 
bound to stir up communal feelings. As reported in the Shibir, 
he criticized atrocities committed by Muslims on Hindus in Pakistan
during the partition period, and criticized the Communists and
* 1
the violent tactics adopted by students and textile labourers
to solve their problems. In a press interview Shri Golwalkar gave
i
the local Jan Satta, he alleged that Hindus were being neglected, 
whereas special laws were enacted to protect the minority community 
in India. He declared that he was not an enemy of the Muslims, 
but wanted them to be Indian nationals, and to be loyal to the nation‘ I
in 19^ +5 with its office at Khas Bazaar. Maulana Mohmedmiya 
Surti was the President, and Ahmedmiya M. Peerzada was the 
General-Secretary. Its official membership in 1969 was 5i575.
35- Reddy Report, pp. ^7-51.
36. Reddy Report, pp. 51-32.
An incident, which played a major part in straining
I
communal relations in Ahmedabad, and had far-reaching consequences,
I * *
was the so-called Quran Incident, which occurred on the 10th of
March, 1969. It illustrated how communal passions could flare
up out of a seemingly trivial incident. The Times of India described
the Quran Incident as follows:
"Yesterday nearly 23 persons including 10 police­
men were injured in a violent clash between a 
3000 strong mob and armed policemen near Kalupur 
tower in Ahmedabad in the evening. The trouble 
began when a police vehicle dashed against a hand­
cart carrying religious scriptures of a minority 
community (the Quran). A small crowd nearby de­
manded apology from the policemen for the alleged 
'sacrilege'. Tempers were frayed as the policemen 
refused to oblige the mob which soon swelled to 
1000s."37
Finally, under the directions of Shri Renison, the then Commissioner 
of Police, a police apology was broadcast on a loudspeaker to the 
effect that if the sentiments of any Muslims had been hurt, theyJ
were sorry for it. The police alleged that anti-national, slogans, 
such as "Is se to Pakistan Achha hai. Agar Hindu kamandir jala 
diya to kya hota. Police ko maro, Quran sharif ka upman hua" 
(Pakistan is better than this. What would happen if you set 
fire to a Hindu temple? The Quran has been insulted, strike the 
police ) were shouted by the Muslims in the crowd, but this was 
denied by Muslim leaders.
This incident had serious repercussions on communal relations 
in Ahmedabad. Muslim leaders demanded a judicial inquiry into the 
incident and the death of an eighteen-year-old boy, Mohammed Ghani,
37. See the Times of India (Bombay) ,||March , 1969.
inquiry was also demanded by Dr. Somabhai Desai, the Janta
Parishad Mayor of Ahmedabad, and the Deputy Mayor, Mr. N.P.Shaikh.
Questions regarding the incident were asked in the Gujarat State
Assembly. Both the Gujarati and English press gave very wide
coverage to the incident. Despite widespread demands for a judicial
inquiry, the Deputy Home Minister, Mr. Jairambhai Patel, said in
the Gujarat Assembly that a judicial inquiry was not necessary as
the Government had asked the Police Commissioner to fully investi- 
38gate the incident. This left many, particularly in the Muslim
community, dissatisfied. The police testified that the reaction
of Hindu leaders to the incident was that the Government was soft-
pedalling and appeasing Muslims by asking high-ranking police
officers to apologize. The incident was bitterly recalled by Hindus
in the following months as a prime example of the Government's
39appeasement policy towards the Muslims.
The Quran incident, coming in the sensitive pre-election 
period just before the 1969 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation elections 
of early April, undoubtedly played an important part in the Jan 
Sangh's first-ever electoral success in Ahmedabad, when it won 
three seats in the 1969 municipal elections. Its candidates,
Pramod Chandra C. Patel, a small businessman and a prominent figure 
in the Atrocities Removal Committee (largely concerned with helping 
the Hindu refugees from Pakistan), and Ramchandra G. Panchal, a
in the clash between the police and the crowd. A judicial
38. See the Times of India (Bombay) ,14-March , 1969.
39- Reddy Report, pp. 32-34-.
factory-owner, won both the seats in the inner-city ward of 
Dariapur. Another Jan Sangh candidate, KishQrchandra H. Dikshit, 
a Brahmin lawyer, who was active in white-collar unionism as 
Secretary, Vice-President and honorary member of the Gujarat 
Life Insurance Employees' Society, and as President of the Gujarat 
branch of the General Insurance Employees' Society, was successfully 
elected from the middle-class enclave of Maninagar, which is sur­
rounded by the predominantly working-class suburbs of Khokera- 
Mehmedabad and Baherampura.
If we compare the number of votes, percentage of votes 
and seats won in municipal constituencies in Ahmedabad in the 1961, 
1963 and 1969 municipal elections, and the number and percentage 
of deposits lost, and the spread of constituencies contested, 
we can see that the Jan Sangh had made a fairly deep inroad into 
the electorate largely in the years following the 1963 election, 
and that by 1969 its appeal was fairly widespread, extending to 
the City areas, the middle class suburbs and the working-class 
areas too. (Table 8). The striking expansion in the mass-base 
of the Jan Sangh between 1963 anc^ 1969 can t>e seen in the steep 
rise in the number and percentage of votes in the 1969 election 
as compared to the 1961 and 1963 elections: in 1961, the Jan
Sangh secured 24,677 votes or 2°/o of total votes. These figures 
actually declined in 19^3» when it secured 24,406 votes and only 
1.62°/o of total votes. However, in 1969i its total votes went 
up more than five times to 130,640or 1 1.28°/o of the total votes 
of all parties and Independents. The percentage of candidates who 
lost their deposits fell steadily from 6l.34°/o in 1961 to 44.4°/o 
in 1 9 6 3 »  to 2 3 . 8 6 ° / o  in 1969. With the exception of Khokera-
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Mehmedabad in 1961, where the Jan Sangh secured 12.9°/o of the 
total votes in the ward, the Jan Sangh*s main pockets of strength 
in 1961 were in the inner-city wards of Khadia (8.8°/o of total 
votes) and Raikhad (6.6°/o of total votes) and the affluent suburb 
of Ellisbridge (4.8°/o of total votes). It secured a very small 
proportion of the votes in the other labour areas which it contested,
i.e. Saraspur (2°/o of total votes) and Gomtipur (2.9°/o of total 
votes). In 1963i its pockets of strength were once again in the 
inner-city wards and middle-class suburbs of Dariapur (3.l4°/o of 
total votes), Raikhad (3.83°/o of total votes) and North Ellisbridge 
(6.53°/o). In the labour wards, which it contested, its voting 
percentage was very low, and in Khokera-Mehmedabad, where it had done 
comparatively well in 1961 in terms of percentage of votes,securing 
12.9°/o, its voting percentage in 1963 fell to 2.06°/o. In contrast, 
in 1969i while the Jan Sangh won its three seats from the inner- 
city ward of Dariapur and the middle-class suburb of Maninagar, 
its coverage and support in labour areas increased significantly, 
particularly in Asarva, where it secured 23.21°/o or almost a 
quarter of the total votes, and in Naroda, where it secured 2l.73°/o 
of the total votes. In 1969i for the first time, the Jan Sangh 
secured more than 13°/o of the total votes in six labour wards, 
and more than 10°/o of the total votes in twelve labour wards. Thus, 
by 1969i it had gained considerable support from among the Hindu 
migrants, particularly those from non-Gujarat states where the Jan 
Sangh was already well-established, and from Hindu refugees from Pakistan 
living in the labour areas o f Ahmedabad City, which were to be the 
scene of the greatest violence and destruction in the Communal Riots
of September, 1969. In the 19&9 municipal election, Jan Sangh candi­
dates got second place in eleven seats.
Although the Jan Sangh as an all-India and State-level 
party seems to have had no part in the Communal Riots of September 
1969 individual Jan Sangh leaders and workers in Ahmedabad City 
were found by the Reddy Report to be closely involved in incidents 
which inflamed the communal situation in Ahmedabad in the period 
immediately preceding the Riots, and in the actual Riots themselves.
The A1 Aqsa Procession of August 31st, 1969» in which a huge 
Muslim crowd marched in protest against the alleged desecration of 
the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, served to harden Hindu attitudes 
against the Muslims in Ahmedabad. The police alleged that anti- 
natinnal slogans were shouted and carried on placards by Muslim 
demonstrators. The general resentment felt by Hindus against this 
display of extra-territorial loyalty by the Muslims of Ahmedabad 
was echoed in newspaper articles critical of the extra-territorial 
nature of the agitation. An article by Shri Vasudev Mehta, which 
appeared in the Gu.jarat Samachar on September 7th, 19^91 under 
the title, "Al Aqsa Episode and Muslims of India", contained the 
following critical references:
"Muslims of India, while sharing the anguish with other 
Muslims, made their frenzy more dreadful than Muslims 
of Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia - they should under­
stand the limitations as citizens of a secular State 
like India ... Whenever it suits, cunning politicians 
discover religious ties, even though their policies - 
of the same religious States - are divergent and selfish.
While different Indian citizens - Muslims, communists 
have international loyalties - Hindus have none. Hence 
their citizenship is superior. Serious blunder was 
committed by Mahatmaji, who mixed Khilafat with In­
dependence."^
*fl. Reddy Report, pp. 3^-56.
The depth of Hindu resentment can be gauged by the fact 
that soon after the occurrence of the Jagannath Temple incident, 
which precipitated the communal riots of 1969» many Hindus,
including Swami Harshadasji of the Jagannath Temple, angrily re-
/
called this incident to their minds. Shri Peerzada, prominent
Muslim leader and witness before the Reddy Commission of Inquiry,
testified that Swami Harshadasji had bitterly recalled the A1
Aqsa incident, while speaking to the Peace Committee on September
19th, 1969* the day following the Jagannath Temple incident, in
the following words:
"When the Muslims can take out a procession of 
lakhs when their masjid (the Al Aqsa Masjid) is 
burnt, why the Hindus are sitting silent when 
Vishwa Temple was attacked?"
A communal organization, called the Hindu Dharma Raksha 
Samiti (Committee to Defend the Hindu Religion), which played a 
sinister and inciting role in the Communal Riots of September,
1969, was established by Jan Sangh and RSS leaders in Ahmedabad 
City to agitate against the Government and police handling of the 
Ramayana incident of September 4th, 1969 - the most serious in-
42cident to disrupt communal peace in the period prior to the Riots.
i
The version of the Ramayana incident most widely believed in 
the weeks preceding the Riots, and reported in numerous newspapers 
and quoted by Shri K.G.Motwani, Superintendent of the Special Branch 
at Ahmedabad, in his daily reports was as follows: on the 4th
September, 19&9* "Janmashtami Day", Pandit Balkrishna was conducting 
a "Ramlila" programme and side by side reciting the Ramayana at
42. Reddy Report, pp. 36-67.
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Narayandas Chawl, Baherampura, when the subordinate police staff of 
Baherampura Chowkey (Kagdapith Police Station) prevented him from 
doing so on the grounds that he had not obtained permission for 
playing music. Soon after, Police Superintendent Shaikh, a Muslim, 
of Baherampura Chowkey came personally and humiliated Pandit 
Balkrishna, dispersed the people in the Ramlila by force, and threw 
down the Ramayana and kicked it. The next day, Pandit Balkrishna 
and the residents of Narayandas Chawl sent a protest against the 
conduct of P.S.I.Shaikh to the police and requested that action 
should be taken against him by higher authorities.
However, according to a Special Government Report made by 
the police over one month after the Riots, the Deputy Commissioner 
of Police declared that P.S.I.Shaikh had acted indiscreetly and 
failed to appreciate the sentiments of the people, for which suit­
able action should be taken against him, but that the main allegation 
against him that he had kicked the Ramayana was not true. The 
Special Government Report goes on to establish beyond dispute the 
involvement of local Jan Sangh and RSS leaders and workers in the 
formation of the HDRS to agitate on the Ramayana incident for 
strong action against P.S.I.Shaikh:
"Thereafter on the night of September 9th, 19691 
Shri Balkrishna approached the local Bharatiya 
Jan Sangh workers and through them contacted one 
Shri Harishchandra S. Panchal (an old RSS worker) 
and it was decided that instead of openly supporting 
them in the name of Bharatiya Jan Sangh the same 
may be started in the name of Hindu Dharma Raksha 
Samiti. Accordingly, the 'Samiti' was formed with 
Shri Panchal as its convenor. It was further decided 
that one Shri Sevakram Thakkar, a Sindhi, who is 
running a hotel near the Municipal Office would join 
Shri Balkrishna and resort to an indefinite hunger 
strike outside Kagdapith Police Station in order 
to protest against the actinn of PSI Shri Shaikh
The Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti widely distributed three 
pamphlets. One urged the Government to respect the feelings 
of the Hindu Janta, which had been grievously hurt by the kicking 
of the Ramayana by P.S.I.Shaikh on Janmashtami Day, and to dismiss 
the insolent Shri Shaikh immediately. The second pamphlet earnestly 
requested the Hindu Janta to give cooperation with body, mind, 
and money to the brethren who have gone on fast from 11th September 
1969» opposite Kagdapith PS. It announced that an all-party 
public meeting was arranged at the square near Raipur Darwaja on 13th 
September, and a procession would be taken out on ik th  September 
to disapprove the insult to the Ramayana. The third pamphlet 
declared that P*S.I. Shaikh had uttered obscene words about the 
Ramayana, and that thousands of citizens and leaders were visiting 
the hunger-strikers and giving them support and honouring them by 
garlands, slogans and Bha.jans.
Newspaper reports also contributed to the growing communal 
excitement. The Gu.jarat Samachar of 9th September reported that 
the citizens of Behrampura have clamoured for help before the Chief 
Minister and City Congress President, Jamnashankar Pandya, and 
have demanded action against the police officer who kicked the 
Ramayana, the holy scriptures of the Hindu religion: "In a memoran­
dum submitted with the signatures of citizens it has bfen warned 
that citizens would take stern action against the said non-Hindu 
Police Officer on Government's failure in that regard." In a report
Zf3and demand his removal from the force."
Reddy Report, p.63.
in the Jai Hind of September 17th under the caption "Indefinite
fast against insult to the Ramayana", the following was written:
"A deputation under the leadership of Shri Harish- 
chandra Panchal, convenor of the Hindu Dharma 
Raksha Samiti, met Inspector Parmar of the Kag­
dapith Police Station, and presented a memo addressed 
to the Police Commissioner. It has been stated in 
that memo that, due to such irresponsible, communal 
and anti-Hindu behaviour of Shri Shaikh the feelings 
of the Hindu community have been offended. Shri Shaikh 
has intentionally gravely insulted the Hindu religion.
It has been demanded in that memo to relieve Shri Shaikh 
immediately from his post. If this demand is not 
accepted, the offended feelings of the Hindu community 
will result in agitation and the Government alone will 
be responsible for its consequences. In a meeting, all 
the members of the Sindhi Cloth Market Association ex­
pressed their grief for communal and anti-Hindu acts 
of Shri Shaikh. They have lodged strong protest against 
this."^
Unfavourable comparisons were made between the Government's 
attitude to P.S.I.Shaikh in the Ramayana incident and their appease­
ment policy towards the Muslims in the Quran incident. The Sangharsh 
Samiti consisting of representatives of opposition parties demanded 
a high-level inquiry into the Ramayana incident. Even after P.S.I. 
Shaikh was suspended on September l4th and the fast was given up, 
the feelings of resentment and bitterness among Hindus persisted.
At this highly sensitive period, from the point of view 
of communal relations in Ahmedabad, Balraj Madhok, Ex-President 
of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh of X^vdluv ,came to Ahmedabad and 
delivered two speeches on the l4th and l6th September? in Khanpur 
for the Ahmedabad Military and Rifle Training Association in the 
Captain Modek Memorial Lecture Series on the sul^ pct "Pakistani Threat"
44. Reddy Report, p.62.
43. Reddy Report, p.63.
Chamber on the subject, "India on the Cross-Roads". Although
these speeches were delivered before the intelligentsia and so
could not be said to have fomented mass communal tensions, they
did contain communally disturbing statements. In his first
speech, he said: "What h a v e  we done these twenty years to
oIndianize the Muslims! We have on the contrary kindled the feeling 
of separatism in them. We gave them the right to marry four wives.
To talk about secularism and then bring in religion is wrong." In 
his second speech, he remarked that Indian Muslims staged massive
demonstrations on the issue of the burning of A1 Aqsa Mosque in/
Israel, while they did not take any action against the Pakistan
aggression in 1963* In India, 95°/o of Muslims were pro-Pakistani,
and the Bharatiya Jan Sangn was the only party which had a
kGnational ideology and would bring the country forward.
The Reddy Report came to the conclusion that all these in­
cidents, i.e. the Quran incident, the A1 Aqsa Procession, the Rama­
yana incident, Kadhok’s speeches, taken in isolation did not have 
a direct effect in disrupting communal harmony, yet taken together 
they did create a tense communal atmosphere. They wrote: "The fuel,
in our view, had been gathered, which required only a match to set
4-7it on fire and a fan to fan the city ablaze."
That match proved to be the Jagannath Temple incident, which 
precipitated the Communal Riots of September, 1969. During the 
celebration of Pir Bukhari Saheb's Urs at his Durgah, known as 
Bukhari Saheb' s Chilla, situated near the Jagannath Temple outside
?jqd in the Dinesh Hall under the auspices of the Ahmedabad Junior
k6. Reddy Report, pp. 67-81.
^7. Reddy Report, p.212.
Jamalpur Gate,by the Muslims of Ahmedabad, a batch of Temple cows 
guided by sadhus passed safely through the crowd of Muslims as 
the organizers of the celebration had announced that the cows were 
coming, and the police had cleared the road. However, the crowd 
was not aware that<xsecond batch was coming, and when cows in 
this second batch shied and began to run about frightening women 
and children and toppling over vendors' handcarts, the crowd was 
plainly annoyed, and anti-social elements took advantage of this 
situation. The sadhus were set upon with sticks and stones and pieces 
of broken glass and chased into the Temple. During the course of 
this chase, the glass frame of the pictures of ShriNarsinhdasji, a 
revered Swami of the Temple, and Shri Krishna with a cow, in front 
of the main gate, was shattered. This damage to the holy picture- 
frames was construed as an attack on the Temple, although the Reddy 
Report concludes: "The evidence, in our view, does not disclose
that the incident was an attack on the Temple as such for damage to
48the actual Jagannath Temple was negligible."
Muslim leaders, including Shri Peerzada, made strenuous efforts 
to express regret and apologies to the Mahant of the Temple, but, 
although police officers went into the Temple to prepare the ground 
for their apology, they were never called. Police efforts to bring 
the Muslim leaders and the Mahant. and sadhus together were frustrated 
by one of the sadhus, Ram Harshadasji, who was in line to inherit 
the gadi after the present Mahant, Harshadasji suddenly interfered 
with a bitter speech, saying that Swami Sevadasji . did not desire 
that any person should take pardon from him, and that Swami Sevadasji
48. Reddy Report, pp. 82-90.
had done his duty by asking the sadhus not to retaliate which is 
why the Muslims had escaped uninjured after seriously attacking 
the Temple and disrespecting the late Mahant Narsinhdasji and 
pelting stones on the figure of Lord Krishna. He went on, saying 
that he now left it to the Hindu Janta to decide what course they
j.
should take to relieve the sentiments of the sadhus who had suffered
ZfQin the name of the "Dharma11.
That night several incidents took place at Raipur and Khadia.
A laundry and other shops belonging to Muslims were burnt and Muslim 
religious places were attacked and damaged. The next morning, 
the press flashed the news about the attack on the Jagannath Temple 
in broad headlines in a sensational manner.
Realising the gravity of the situation, the Commissioner 
of Police, Shri E.F.Deboo,and the Inspector-General of Police,
Shri K.S.Pavri, called a peace conference on the morning of the 
19th which went to the Jagannath Temple to enable Muslim leaders 
to make a second attempt to apologize to the Mahant. This was again 
sabotaged by Shri Harshadasji. When Jamnashankar Pandya, President 
of the Ahmedabad City DCC, made a speech asking the sadhus to 
forget and forgive, Shri Harshadasji inflamed Hindu feelings by 
bursting out that the sadhus would not accept any apology, the 
incident in the Temple must be avenged, and that, when the Muslims 
could take out a procession in lakhs when their masjid was burnt,
50why were the Hindus sitting silent when Vishva Temple was attacked. 
Soon after their mid-day prayers, another large Muslim crowd
j
gathered in an angry mood on hearing news that a durgah situated 
opposite the Jagannath Temple was alleged to have been damaged by
^9. Redd.y Report, p.96.
50. Reddy Report, p.93.
the sadhus. Ultimately the police persuaded them to disperse after 
a complaint had been filed about this. However, this gave rise to 
the rumour that there had been another attack on the Jagannath 
Temple, and the course of the Riots was set, for from then on 
incidents of violence and destruction intensified.
Sensational newspaper reporting, incendiary pamphlets and 
wild rumours fanned the flames of the Riots. The Jai Hind of 
September 19th bore the headline "Fanatical attack on the Jagannathj 
Temple". The Jan Satta had an anti-Government slant in its report­
ing of the meeting held under the auspices of the Hindu Dharma
Raksha Samiti on the evening of the 19th, which the police had
1
ordered to be cancelled. Under the caption of "Meeting held in
defiance of ban", it reported:
"A big meeting was held today (19th) at seven 
o'clock in the evening outside Raipur Gate under 
the auspices of the Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti 
to express feelings on yesterday's incident at the 
Jagannath Temple. In spite of the announcement 
that the meeting was cancelled, crowds had started 
assembling there. Shri Shajiibhu Maharaj informed 
the people that the Chief Minister, Shri Hitendra 
Desai, paid a visit to the Jagdish Temple, when 
we informed him, 'If steps are not taken to our 
satisfaction in the matter of the Jagdish temple, 
we would start a big agitation.'... In the meeting 
Shri Shambhu Maharaj said, 'I have defied section 
144. If police desire to take my head off for this 
offence, they may do so."'
The most outrageous piece of reporting was of an incident of the
rape of Hindu women and girls in Rakhial, which was found to be
false. Despite the issue later on of a special handout by the
Director of Information contradicting the alleged incident, the
damage had been done. The Sevak, the afternoon edition of Sandesh,
reported on September 20th:
"An inhuman and shocking incident has occurred in 
the Gandhi Park Society situated in Rakhial near 
Lai Mill today in the early hours. ... The persons 
resident in the surrounding areas of the Park not 
only made an attack with scythes, hockey sticks and 
kabbal etc., but also stripped unmarried and married 
women naked and outraged their modesty in early 
morning. ... The deplorable aspect of this incident 
as reported is that the police were present when 
this took place. This incident has occurred because 
the Park is surrounded by the population of the other 
community.'’
Messages on the Dariapur Futi Masjid and Dariapur Kadia Naka
blackboards gave highly exaggerated versins of the Jagannath
Temple incident, and called upon Hindus to take the law in their
own hands. Vitriolic, anti-Muslim pamphlets were circulated on
the 19th: the authorship of one, called "Hindus Beware", was
anonymous, another called "Jagdishaya Namal, Public Appeal, was
issued under the name of the Jagdish Temple. Another pamphlet called
"A public meeting condemning the heinous attack on the holy Jagannath
Temple of Hindus" was written under the name of Ratanlal Gupta,
Ward Convener of the HDRS. Another pamphlet, called "Total strike"
in protest against the attack by communal Muslims on the Jagannath
Temple" was openly attributed to the HDRS. Inciting rumours were
also widely current. Among the most damaging were the rumours that
a sadhu, who had been injured in the Jagannath Temple incident, had
died in hospital; the Mahant had died; and the Municipal dairy
milk had been poisoned. This last rumour was actually broadcast on
all-India radio in a news item warning people not to drink municipal
milk. It was only after the milk had actually been tested that
51people were informed that the rumour was false.
51. Reddy Report, pp. 102-113.
Although the Riots began in the walled city area, when a 400- 
strong Hindu mob broke open the Notabene Washing Company, owned by 
a Muslim, and set its articles on fire at about 23.30 hours on the 
l8th at Raipur Chakla near Chhabila Hanuman under the Gaekwad 
Police Station, they soon spread to the suburban industrial areas 
where they gained in intensity and violence. The worst incidents 
of destruction of Muslim property and murder of Muslims were not 
in the city areas with their comparatively large Muslim populations 
or in the affluent Western suburbs of Ellisbridge and Navrangpura 
with their tiny proportion of Muslims, but in the industrial suburbs 
east of the Sabarmati with their sizeable number of Muslims, mostly 
migrants, residing in mixed localities of Muslim and Hindu workers.
The following table gives a picture of the distribution of Hindus 
and Muslims in the various Police Stations both in the walled city 
and suburban areas.
52Table 9. The Distribution of Hindus and Muslims by 
Police Station in the Walled City and 
Suburban areas of Ahmedabad.
Name of Police Station: No. of No. of No. of
Walled City Area: Hindus: Muslims: Others
1. Gaekwad Haveli 89,000 66,000 3,000
2. Karanj 165,900 82,000 2,100
3. Kalupur 185,000 100,000
Suburban Area:
4. Ellisbridge 138,825 2,000
5. Navrangpura 143,000 2,000
6. Madhupura 120,421 16,000 4,000
7. Sherkotda 114,100 11,300
8. Sardarnagar 98,000 2,000
52. Figures compiled from information contained in the Reddy Report, 
pp. 23-30.
Name of Police Station: 
Suburban Area:
No. of 
Hindus:
No. of 
Muslims:
No. of 
Others:
9. Kagdapith 113,900 2^,000 2,100
10.Gomtipur 158,013 60,000 7,630
11.Maninagar 101,835 3,315 -
The Police Station areas where Muslims were most at risk were 
mainly those where they constituted over 10 and under ^0°/o of
the population, and those with extensive mills and factories where)
Muslim and Hindu workers, largely migrant, lived side by side in 
chawls and tenements. These areas came under the following Police- y I
Stations: Madhupura, Sherkotda, Sardarnagar, Kagdapith and
Gomtipur.
^ery few killings took place in the Walled City Area. However,
when the Riots spread to the suburban industrial areas, large-
scale killings, particularly in the Gomtipur area, became a feature 
of the Riots. The most appalling murder was that of 100 Muslims 
together in Khokhra Housing Block No. 86-92 at Amraiwadi by a
crowd of 1,000 Hindus. This was a Housing Block built by the
Gujarat Housing Society and occupied mostly by millhands. It 
was alleged that some Bhayyas from UP were injured causing the 
Hindus to get excited and set fire to Muslim houses and kill 
their inhabitants. It was the Amraivadi murders of the 20th that 
appear to have first caused the authorities to think of calling in 
the army. The following table, which gives a picture of the extent 
of damage to property and injury and loss of life in the various 
Police Stations, brings out clearly the greater violence and 
destruction in the Police Stations of Madhupura, Sherkotda, Sardarnagar, 
Kagdapith and Gomtipur with their large industrial labour and
migrant populations and numerous areas of mixed Hindu and Muslim 
chawls and tenements:
53Table 10. The Extent of damage to property, injury
and loss of life during the Communal Riots 
in Ahmedabad in September, 1969, by Police 
Station area.
Police Station: No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of
Incidents: houses, religious persons persons
huts and places injured: killed:
shops affected: 
affected:
1. Gaekwad Haveli 6l 190 6 4 1
2. Karanj 82 355 12 19 9
3* Kalupur 107 480 8 2 5
4. Ellisbridge 11 23 5 2 -
3. Navrangpura 88 4l4 7 21 48
6. Madhupura 57 413 3 31 78
7. Sherkotda 35 660 3 34 28
8. Sardarnagar 28 392 2 60 22
9. Kagdapith 102 1,307 14 25 18
lO.Gomtipur 88 1,995 5 176 296
11.Maninagar 100 222 _ 6 22
The Ahmedabad edition of the Times of India also reported
on September 20th, 1969* that it was largely people of the working-
class and lower-middle class who were hardest hit by the Riots:
"Three people were killed in day-long violent clashes... 
Reports pouring in from various hospitals said many 
were injured in violent clashes at Jamalpur, Khadia,
Khanpur and Dariapur ... armed arsonists went berserk, 
setting fire to shops and houses belonging to the minor­
ity community... The people of low and middle income 
groups suffered most in the riots as most of the shops
33* Figures compiled from Tables 'A1 to 'H' contained in the 
Reddy Re-port, pp. 143-163.
1 6 6
looted, pulled down or burnt belonged to small 
traders. Hooligans made a bonfire of shop furni­
ture and articles on main roads and the scene was 
reminiscent of the Holi-fire."
On September 21st, the Ahmedabad edition of the Times of 
India reported:
"..• the main attack of arsoners was on laundry, 
bakeries and small trade establishments. The 
minority community has almost a monopoly in
this trade.”54
It was widely claimed that the Riots showed definite 
signs of planning and organization. Ajit Bhattacharjea, 
Editor of the Hindustan Times wrote in his paper on Octo­
ber 5th, 1969:
"Eye-witnesses told of fleets of cars shuttling 
up and down carrying rioters and petrol tins."
Shri Prabhu, Secretary of the Congress party, who had 
gone round the affected areas during the riots, said, "Per­
haps it was not intended for this day, but it must be 
admitted that preparations were there." Even the Governor 
of Gujarat, Shriman Narayan, said in Ahmedabad on September 
2 8 th that he was convinced that behind the recent riots
55in Gujarat were groups which must be exposed and crushed.
The Government Commission of Inquiry into the Riots too 
found unmistakable evidence of organization of the Riots, 
although it criticized the Special Branch for not making 
greater efforts to trace the groups organizing the Riots. 
However, the Reddy Report accepted the evidence that Jan 
Sangh leaders and workers of Ahmedabad were closely involved 
with the Hindu Dharma Raksha Samiti and took part in
54. See Ahmedabad Riots X-rayed by a Research Worker in
Ahmedabad.
55- See t'he Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,l?Sept. , 1969-
467
Mahamadali Sherali, stated that on the 19th one Ratanlal
Gupta of the Jan Sangh (Jan Sangh candidate in the 19^9
Ahmedabad municipal elections) had distributed inciting
pamphlets in the Saraspur area, and, on the 20th, he and
two others were leading a crowd with a list of Muslim
houses in their hands, and Ratanlal Gupta was directing
the crowd which was shouting "Jai Jagannath, Maharaj-ni-
Jai". The Report stated:
"•••It appears from this evidence that crowds 
were being directed by persons who were leading 
them and they had lists of Muslim houses in 
their hands ... the evidence as a whole indicates 
that the police had reason to believe that some 
local Jan Sangh leaders and workers were actively
participating in the riots ......  But we have
nothing to indicate that Bharatiya Jan Sangh 
party and for that matter Hindu Mahasabha 
party or RSS Organisation as such, as an all- 
India party or organization, had taken part or 
was involved. The evidence relating to partici­
pation of some of the workers of these parties 
or organizations is not by itself sufficient to 
justify the inference of the participation of 
the aforesaid parties as all India parties or 
organizations."56
There was considerable evidence that lorries containing 
weapons had been moved about. In a few cases, police 
officers themselves admitted this (although the police 
as a whole took the stand that the Riots were not organ­
ized) . Shri Deboo admitted that there was information 
that two lorries were moved with weapons. Shri A.J.M.
Shaikh and Shri I.A.Shaikh even admitted they had appre­
hended a lorry with Hindus in it and with weapons. Many 
other witnesses testified that there were lorries carrying 
rioters on from one place to the other. Brigadier Sukhwaftt 
Singh, Army Commander, gave further evidence that the crowds 
were directed by describing diversionary tactics used to
organizing the Riots. Government Witness No. 17,
5 6 . Reddy Report, pp. 215-218.
draw out and overawe defenders. There was further evi­
dence that a large number of workers were involved in 
the Riots, many with technical skills which were used 
in the destruction of buildings, etc. Thus the Reddy 
Report concluded that although the Jagannath Temple 
incident itself was spontaneous,
"the action of Hindu crowds was massive 
and became organized as the course of the 
rxots continued."57
The role of the police during the Riots was heavily 
criticized by the Reddy Report. The conduct of the 
police showed hesitancy, indecision and lack of firmness 
throughout. There was an unreasonable delay in imposing 
a curfew, and even then, at 10 p.m. on the 1 9 th,it was 
only imposed an the walled city areas, although it was 
becoming increasingly obvious that The greatest violence 
and destruction was in the suburban areas. The Inspector 
General of Police was anxious to seek Government approval 
before imposing the curfew, although the Report points 
out:
"... it is an elementary proposition that 
all persons, charged with the responsibility 
of law and order, are empowered, under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, to proclaim 
orders, xncluding curfew, under Section 144, 
and they and they alone are responsible for 
such a declaration, without the need to 
consult anybody."
57* Reddy Report, pp. 215-218.
The Report concluded that the IGP's statement that he had in­
sufficient force to impose the curfew in the suburban areas 
earlier was inaccurate. More than 4,000 men of the regular police
force including the SRP were available at 7.00 hours on the 20th.
* - \
Thereafter only 390 men were added beween 6.30 hours and 18.00 hours
on the 20th except for about 300 BSF who were not utilized. The
curfew in the suburban areas was only imposed at 22.00 hours on
the 20th. The implementation of the curfew was found wanting:
curfew passes were issued in vast numbers. Few people were arrested
for breach of curfew. There was ineffective patrolling by foot
and not by mobiles. The Report states:
"Shoot at sight orders issued simultaneously with 
the curfew orders postulated the issue of the necessary 
firearms, but there was an economy in this issue 
which is not easy to understand particularly when the 
situation was deteriorating so fast. At no time during 
the peak days was the entire stock of muskets exhausted 
and the stock of rifles remained almost untouched."
The number of arrests made during the Riots was ridiculously small,
and surprisingly enough more Muslims than Hindus were arrested’
The Report stated:
"... during many appalling incidents, very near Police 
Stations, no arrests were made . ... e.g. in respect 
of the Kamar Hostel and Shahebwani mosque and durgah 
in particular, we are left with the impression that , 
the rioting crowds were allowed, notwithstanding the inti­
mation to the police, to proceed unhindered in the 
systematic destruction of the hostel and mosque and 
durgah."
The inadequacy of the Special Branch in getting advance intelligence 
was pointed out by the Report, as also the failure to round-up and 
arrest miscreants, trouble-makers and certain political workers and 
communal-minded persons who were creating trouble and spreading 
rumours. The Report criticized the ineffective way in which rumours
were counteracted, and the failure to appreciate the need for
calling in the army earlier:
"... the IGP was reluctant to advise the calling of 
the army on a misappreciation of the ability of 
the police forces to deal with the situation and 
probably because he may have thought that the prest­
ige of the police might be affected if the army is 
called."
Even after the army arrived, they were asked to do a flag-march 
only in certain specified areas, and it was only when the situation 
had further deteriorated that the flag-march was cancelled, and 
the army was asked to take charge of certain localities. Even 
then they were not given full charge of the entire city until 
the afternoon of the 22nd. The Report also maintained that there 
was communal feeling on the part of individual policemen, although 
not in the force as a whole. It recommended that an inquiry should 
be held into the communal partiality of the police and into the fact 
that more Muslims than Hindus were arrested at the time of the Riots.
The Government's handling of the Riots, particularly that 
of the Chief Minister, who was also the Home Minister, also came
i
in for criticism by the Reddy Report. The tardy decision to call
in the army was criticized:
"That the Government was not able to assess the 
situation on its own so as to realise its serious­
ness and overrule the advice of the IGP (against calling 
in the army) shows that there was breakdown in the in­
formation services and the absence of sufficient aware­
ness of the developing situation because ultimately it 
was for the Government to decide whether to call the 
army or not... the information which was being passed 
on by the control room about incidents hour by hour and 
a large number of political and religious leaders who 
were seeing the Chief Minister and the other Ministers, 
and appraising them of the situation, ought to have 
given them an appreciation of the seriousness of the 
situation."
38. Reddy Report, p.214.
However, wilder allegations against the Government of complicity 
in the Riots were unfounded. So also was the observation, 
owing much to hindsight, that the Congress(0Government;since the 
Congress(0)was moving closer to the Jan Sangh at the national 
level, turned a blind eye to the communal activities of the Jan 
Sangh in Gujarat. Regarding relief to the victims of the Riots 
and the thousands of Muslim refugees gathered in Government camps, 
the Report concluded that, although there was no "intentional 
callousness or unwillingness on the part of the Government to pro-
59vide relief for Riot victims, the measures taken were inadequate".
In conclusion, the Communal Riots of September, 1969, i*1 
Ahmedabad epitomize the growing pluralism of Ahmedabad society 
and its resultant tensions, aggravated by a situation of economic 
difficulty where economic grievances were likely to have a differential 
effect on different communities, and where the trade union structure 
did little to counteract caste and communal feelings and rivalries.
This is underlined by the fact that the Riots were most intense in 
the suburban areas of the City where industrial labourers and migrant 
workers including Bha.yyas of UP, Sindhis and refugees from Pakistan 
live uneasily side by side with Muslims, who are often non-Gujarati 
migrants. The displacement of widespread frustrations regarding 
economic hardship and substandard living conditions on outgroups as 
scapegoats lies at the root of much of the violence in Ahmedabad 
City which culminated in the Riots of 1969. ^  It was the tensions
arising out of the growing pluralism of Ahmedabad society and poor
59. Redd.y Report, pp. 218-222.
60. See Ali Ashraf (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur), Study of Urban Politics 
in India: A Note,(1971).
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living conditions, particularly among migrant groups, which provided 
much of the im petus behind the politics of agitation and violence 
in the City, which continually interplays with Ahmedabad's traditional 
political ethos, articulated by Gandhi and characterized by 
stable sociopolitical relations, pragmatism and a willingness to 
negotiate and compromise. This "seamier" side of the political 
face of Ahmedabad City rose to the surface during the 1960s, 
reaching a climax in the 1969 Communal Riots.
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STATE-LOCAL LINKAGES AND REALIGNMENT OF STATE AND CITY FACTIONS AFTER 
THE CONGRESS SPLIT OF 1969
The Congress split in November, 1967, posed a difficult dilemma
for the GPCC. Its first instinct was to remain aloof from both wings of
the Congress and function as an independent State unit. However, due
to the persuasive efforts of Morarji Desai, this decision was reversed
-|and the GPCC plumped for Congress (0). The split in the Congress party- 
created a new and effective opposition force in Ahmedabad and Gujarat 
politics, one that was nationally-based, operated at all political 
levels with considerable Central Government resources, and could 
genuinely challenge the Organisation Congress in Ahmedabad and Gujarat. 
Many of the political forces that had been in opposition to the Hitendra 
Desai Ministry throughout the 60s found a unique opportunity to challenge 
that Ministry under the aegis of the Congress(R).
The disintegration of the Janta Parishad during the last years of 
its rule in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and its rout in the 1969 
Municipal Corporation elections threw leftist political forces in 
Ahmedabad into disarray, and many of these eagerly seized the opportunity 
presented by the Congress (R) challenge to the Congress (0) in Ahmedabad 
and Gujarat. Many prominent former Janta Parishad leaders, such as
Dr. Yasudev Tripathi and Dr. Somabhai Desai, both former Mayors of the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, and Manubhai Palkiwala, gravitated 
towards Mrs. Gandhi’s party in the months following the split. They 
strengthened the leftist Forum for Socialist Action group within the 
Congress(R). Even the CPM leader, Dinkar Mehta, although maintaining
1. Times of India (Ahmedabad),lIMarch , 1971•
2. Interview with Janta Parishad leaders in Ahmedabad in March 1971;
see also Indian Express (Ahmedabad),^ October , 1971 and
3December , 1971•
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a separate political identity, decided to cooperate with the newly-
formed Congress(R) union, the Ahmedabad Mill Mazdur union, set up by
a dissident section of Majur Mahajan workers. On the bonus issue in 1971»
the CPM formed a joint strike committee with the Congress (r ) rebel union
3and organised joint protest meetings and processions.
Saurashtra leaders, after long years in the political wilderness, 
seized the opportunity presented by the Congress (r) to re-enter the 
political fray in Gujarat. The old guard Saurashtra leaders, Jivraj Mehta, 
Rasiklal Parikh and Ratubhai Adani, built up a Congress (r) organisation 
in Saurashtra.Control over panchayati raj institutions proved a crucial 
factor in/mid-term elections of 1971» and in many Saurashtradistricts the 
Congress (r) managed to secure control over these institutions. In 
Rajkot, several district Congress (0) leaders were alienated by the 
Central Congress (o) leaders' demand that Minoo Masani, the national 
Swatantra leader, should be allowed to seek re-election from Rajkot Lok 
Sabha constituency under the Grand Alliance plan. The president of the 
Rajkot district panchayat, Mr. Vallabhbhai Patel, a firm opponent of 
the Alliance plan, left Congress (0) on the eve of the election to work 
for the Congress (r) candidate. In Amreli constituency, Dr. Jivraj 
Mehta himself had been persuaded to stand for election in the mid­
term Parliamentary elections of 1971 by the Central leadership of the 
Congress (r). He was held in such high esteem in the district that 
several prominent Congress (o) leaders, including Mr. Dwarkadas Patel, 
president of the district panchayat, had refused to canvas against him.^ 
In Surendranagar Rasiklal Parikh was able to carry almost the entire 
Congress organisation in the district with him following the split.
3. Interview with Dinkar Mehta in Ahmedabad in March 1971? see also
Indian Express (Ahmedabad) ,|$Oct. , 1971.
4. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,||March , 1971 •
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district panchayat. In Junagadh too, the president of the district
panchayat and other senior Congress (0) workers were openly working for
the Congress (R) candidate. The Central Congress (R) party lent its
full support to regionally disgruntled and dissident groups in Gujarat
State, realising that the main strength of the Congress (o) government
lay in mainland Gujarat.^
North Gujarat also had long nursed grievances of regional neglect
by the Hitendra Desai Ministry. The spokesman of North Gujarat in the
Gujarat Assembly was Gangaram Raval, and he and his dissident group were
highly discontented about the location of an agricultural university
in North Gujarat, and had identified themselves with the Young Turks
7in the Congress Parliamentary party. Gangaram Raval and Mrs.
Shantaben Patel, Mehsana district leaders, led the campaign for an 
agricultural university in North Gujarat, and demanded a thermal 
power station for the North Gujarat region in the pre-split days.
The Hitendra Desai Ministry ultimately conceded these demands. On 
April 10, 1970, the Gujarat government modified an earlier decision 
to install a 480 megawatt thermal power plant in South Gujarat, and 
proposed instead to install two 240 megawatt plants, one in South 
Gujarat, the other in the north. The demand for an agricultural
Q
university for North Gujarat was also conceded. However, North Gujarat
5. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,UMarch , 1971 •
6. Howard Spodek , "The Case of Injustice to SaurashtraJ1
Asian Survey, *rol. 2, no. 14),pp. ^-16
7. Times of India (Bombay) ,11 April , 1969*
8. Spodek loc.cit.
In Jamnagar, the Congress (R) candidate was the president of the
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leaders continued to feel that had they not protested so vigorously
their demands would never have been met. Thus Gangaram Raval, Mrs.
Shantaben Patel and other North Gujarat leaders were among the first
gto defect to Mrs. Gandhi's party after the Congress split. Many 
leaders in Kutch also had grievances of regional neglect by the Hitendra 
Ministry. To strengthen its hand, the Congress (o) was forced to accept 
the entry of the former Swatantra leader,Jaideepsinhji of Baria, and 
his group into its ranks on October 1970.
Not only did leaders of these discontented peripheral regions of 
Gujarat express political hostility to the Hitendra Desai Ministry by 
supporting the Congress (r) in many instances, they also united in a 
demand for economic justice. On June 5> 1970, leaders from all the major 
political parties and several organisations including the Presidents 
of the Rajkot Chamber of Commerce,the Small Industries Association and the Rajkot 
Engineering Association, met to form the Saurashtra-Kutch Welfare Association, 
whose aim was to provide strong representation of regional economic 
grievances. Although this was initially dominated by Rajkot leaders, 
the Association made attempts to broaden its membership base both in other
parts of Saurashtraand in other peripheral regions of Kutch and North
n . 1°Gujarat.
During this difficult period of political crisis, the Congress (0)
Ministry did try to make regional concessions, particularly on the 
economic front, and it even appointed a committee to examine the patterns 
and potentials of regional development in the State, chaired by the highly- 
respected Saurashtrianleader, Jaisukhlal Hathi, who had served for several 
years as a minister in the national government. This succeeded to some 
extent in reducing economic tensions, but not in quelling the growing
9. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,Zf?Feb. , 1971 •
10. Gujarat Samachar ,6June , 1970.
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Congress (r ) political support in the peripheral regions of Gujarat.
Many Congress (0) leaders made their final decision to split
with the Congress (0) and join the Congress (r ) on the issue of the
Grand Alliance, which was put forward at the Lucknow session of the
AICC (o). There was bitter opposition from the GPCC to the plan of a
Grand Alliance with the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra parties in the
12coming 1971 mid-term election. It seemed a complete reversal of 
principle to ally with the very Swatantra party which had provided 
the strongest opposition force to the Hitendra Desai Ministry after 
1967> and which had allied with other opposition parties to topple 
the Chief Minister from power. Both Hitendra Desai and Vajubhai Shah, 
the GPCC President, objected, but Morarji Desai, who was regarded 
as the custodian of Gujarat's interests in the national arena, man­
aged to persuade the bulk of the Gujarat Congress (0) to go along 
with the Grand Alliance resolution. However, many Congress (0) 
leaders made their final break with the Congress (0) on this issue.
Three senior Ministers, Mr. Jashvant Mehta, Mr. Gordhandas Chokawala 
and Mr. Chimanlal Patel, defected to the Congress (R) on this issue,
as did Mr. Ghanshyambhai Oza of Saurashtra who was Chairman of the
13Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation.
The Grand Alliance proved a very mixed blessing to the Congress 
(0) in Gujarat. In many constituencies, just before the 1971 mid­
term elections, many of the Grand Alliance partners were at loggerheads.
1 1
11. Spodek, loc. cit.
1 2 .  I n t e r v i e w  w i t h  M r. L i n  A h m e d a b a d  i n  M a rc h  1 9 7 1 .
13. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 8 and 11 Mcu-clx, l^ll.
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Mehsana was one of the six constituencies in Gujarat where the Grand
Alliance partners were fighting against each other: here Mr.
Natvarlal Patel, the Congress (0) candidate was engaged in a fight
against Mr. Shankalchand Patel, the Congress (r ) candidate, but the
situation was complicated by the Jan Sangh1s decision to put its
own candidate, Mr. Navnitlal Shah, into the field too.^ In Dhandhuka
constituency, the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra were contesting against
each other. Vadilal L. Mehta was contesting on behalf of Congress (R)
against Mr. H.M. Patel of the Swatantra party and Shambhu Maharaj
of the Jan Sangh. A dissident Swatantrite, Mr. R.K. Amin, contesting
as an Independent, further complicated the situation. In Junagadh
too, Mr. VirendraShah, a Swatantrite fighting curiously on the
Congress (o) symbol, was the Grand Alliance candidate against Mr.
Nagjibhai Vekharia of the Congress (R). However, he also had to
15contend with Mr. Hemendra Radiya, the Jan Sangh candidate. In
Rajkot, Minoo Masani of the Swatantra claimed to have been sabotaged
both by angry Congress (0) workers and by Jan Sangh workers, who
were busy in the neighbouring constituency of Junagadh canvassing
16for their party's candidate there. In Jamnagar constituency, the
Jan Sangh was pitted against its Grand Alliance partner, the Swatantra
1 7party, and in Bulsar against its Congress (o) partner.
Thus the 1971 mid-term elections reveal an interesting regional 
alignment in Gujarat with peripheral regions leaning towards the 
Congress (r ) and the Congress (o) deriving its main support from 
the Central and Southern regions of the Gujarat mainland. This 
regional configuration was very marked in the election results.
14* Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,28Feb. , 1971*
15. Times of India (Ahmedabad),3March , 1971 -
16. Times of India (Ahmedabad),||March , 1971*
17• Times of India (Ahmedabad),^Feb. , 1971 •
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Against all expectations, the Congress (r ) in Gujarat won 11 out of the
24 Lok Sabha seats, the Congress (0) won an equal number and the
Swatantra party's Lok Sabha strength fell heavily from 12 in the 1967
General elections to 2 in 1971* The Congress (r) had only 3 seats in
the dissolved Lok Sabha. It gave a crushing defeat to the two national
figures, the Swatantra President, Minoo Masani, in Rajkot constituency
and Mr. S.K. Patil, the Congress (0) leader in Banaskantha constituency.
The Congress (R) won the following seats: Rajkot, Junagadh, Banaskantha,
Amreli, Jamnagar, Broach,Surendranagar, Dabhoi, Mandvi, Kutch and
Ahmedabad. Congress (0) won the seats of Bhavnagar, Baroda, Kaira,
Anand, Mehsana, Patan,Surat, Bulsar,Dohad and Gandhinagar; and
Swatantra won only the two seats of Godhra and Dhandhuka. Thus,
except for Bhavnagar, where the Congress (R) candidate, Jasvant
Mehta, was seriously handicapped by not having shown sufficient
militancy over the issue of the location of SaurashtraUniversity,
Congress (R) made a clean sweep of the seats in the Saurashtra and
Kutch regions; whereas on the mainland, Congress (0) captured 10 seats
to Congress (r/s 5- The Congress (0) was particularly strong in the
Southern and Central Gujarat constituencies of Surat,Bulsar,Broach,
18Baroda, Kaira, Anand and Gandhinagar.
Ahmedabad politics were profoundly influenced by these far- 
reaching changes in Central and State politics. Congress (0) forces 
managed to retain control of the Ahmedabad City DCC and the Municipal 
Corporation; Jamnashankar Pandya defected to the Congress (r ) but he 
was not able to take any city wards or committee members with him, 
and up to the mid-term elections, only six Municipal Corporators had 
defected to the Congress (r ).^ The Majur Mahajan too took the fateful
18. Times of India (Ahmedabad),||March , 1971*
19. Information supplied by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.
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decision to stand by the Old Congress, even to the point of accepting
a textile millowner, Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas, former Mayor of
Ahmedabad, as the Congress (0) candidate for the Lok Sabha seat from
Ahmedabad. It was pointed out that Vasavda had lost twice, and that,
due to a lack of party funds, the chosen candidate had to have ample
means and be largely self-financing; since the Lok Sabha elections
were for the first time delinked from the State Assembly elections, it
was more difficult to raise resources, for it was no longer possible
to pool the resources of all the State Assembly candidates too. Thus
the Majur Mahajan was persuaded to accept Jaikrishnabhai as the Lok
Sabha candidate from Ahmedabad City, and they campaigned vigorously
20on his behalf especially in the labour areas of the city. However, 
although on the surface the fabric of Ahmedabad politics seemed little 
changed, below the surface events at the national and state levels 
were exerting an enormous influence on the political situation.
All leftist opposition elements were supporting Indulal Yagnik,
who fought for the Ahmedabad Lok Sabha seat as an Independent, though
on the Congress (r ) symbol and with "men, money and munitions" supplied
21by the Congress (r ). An Indicate union, the Ahmedabad Mill Mazdoor 
Union, whose President was Krishnakant Vekharia, had sprung up with 
the help of a dissident section of Majur Mahajan workers. Indira 
Gandhi's charisma,communicated through speeches and tours in Ahmedabad 
in the pre-election days, had a powerful effect. The Muslim vote was 
mobilised in favour of the Congress (r ) because of Muslim alienation 
against the Congress (0) government in power during the September 1969 
Communal Riots in Ahmedabad, which had resulted in widespread destruction 
of Muslim life and property; and because of Indira Gandhi's national 
alliance with the Muslim league. Harijans too were mobilised in favour
20. Interview with Dinesh Shah and Majur Mahajan leaders in Ahmedabad 
in March 1971 •
21. Interview with Indulal Yagnik in Ahmedabad in March 1971 -
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of Indulal Yagnik by the active campaigning of Jagjivan Ram, the 
Central Congress (R) party boss. Political loyalties in Ahmedabad 
were polarised between the two candidates, one a millionaire textile 
magnate and the other the champion of the poor. The issue projected 
by Indulal Yagnik was "Socialism for progress"; Jaikrishnabhai had 
rather negative issues to play with: vilification of Indira Gandhi
as a dictator usurping the constitutional rights of the people and as 
a stooge of the Russians, and the desire to thwart the Communists who 
were in alliance with Indira Gandhi. As the "Times of India" graphically 
described it:
— "In the costliest campaign ever seen in the city, Mr. Harivallabhdas 
had literally plastered the city with hoardings, posters, slogans, 
handbills all of which loudly proclaimed that he alone would save 
the country from lawlessness, dictatorship and prevent another Bengal 
in Gujarat" — ^
The Congress (o) alliance with the Jan Sangh further alienated the 
Muslims, and a vast army of Jan Sangh workers were deployed in the
Ahmedabad election to the dubious advantage of Jaikrishnabhai.
23Thus, despite the "Madison Avenue method^1 of Jaikrishnabhai and 
the unstinting support of the Majur Mahajan, Indulal Yagnik scored 
an impressive electoral victory over him. The more affluent Ellis 
Bridge areas, on whose enthusiastic support and high voting turnout 
Jaikrishnabhai was relying, failed to give him a significant lead 
over Indulal Yagnik. Khadia gave Jaikrishnabhai a slender lead 
of 3>198 votes due to Jan Sangh penetration in this area, but all 
other Assembly segments of the Ahmedabad Lok Sabha constituency went 
for Indulal Yagnik, as the following table shows:
22. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,llMarch , 1971.
23. Ibid.
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The Muslim-dominated constituency of Jamalpur gave Jaikrishnabhai 
the least number of votes, and three times as many to Indulal Yagnik. 
Kalupur, an inner-city ward, gave a lead of 4,422 votes to Indulal 
Yagnik, but two other assembly segments, Dariapur and Shahpur, with 
a sizable working class population, gave enormous majorities to Indulal 
Yagnik. Perhaps the most worrying feature of the whole election for 
the Majur Mahajan was its total failure to galvanise the industrial 
worker for Jaikrishnabhai in the wholly industrial labour assembly 
segment of Asarva which gave only 13,063 votes to Jaikrishnabhai 
compared to 32,083 votes to Indulal Yagnik. The PSP Chairman, Mr. 
NatvarlalShah, said on hearing the election results that the victory 
of Mr. Yagnik and the defeat of the Congress nominee was a rout
for' the Majur Mahajan, which had made an all-out bid to get labour
25votes for Jaikrishnabhai.
By aligning itself with the Congress (0), the Majur Mahajan 
effectively cut itself off from proximity to Central and State power 
structures, which had been the key to so much of its strength and 
power in the past, for the Congress (0) suffered national defeat in 
the 1971 mid-term election, being reduced from a naticnal party to a 
party with a few pockets of regional strength. Even its regional 
power-base in Gujarat crumbled soon after the 1971 elections, when 
the Hitendra Desai Ministry fell from power barely one month after the 
1971 elections, to be replaced by a period of President's rule until 
the 1972 State Assembly elections. The Congress (0) party organisation 
in many Gujarat districts became very shaky after the 1971 elections. 
Even in the former Congress (0) stronghold of South Gujarat, party
25. Times of India (Ahmedabad),IIMarch , 1971•
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observers predicted major changes in the district panchayats of Surat,
Baroda and Broach in the near future. In Kaira and Panchmahals too,
26"disenchantment" with the Congress (0) was apparent.
Faced by growing defections from Congress (0) legislators consequent 
on the stunning victory of Mrs. Gandhi's party in the mid-term elections, 
the survival of the Hitendra Desai Ministry hinged on the support of the 
22-strong Swatantra party, which had been reduced to a rump after the 
defection of the group led by Jaideepsinhji of Baria the year before. 
However, the Swatantra party was on the verge of splitting again on the 
issue of the Grand Alliance. Most Swatantra legislators were in no mood 
to continue to support the Hitendra Ministry unconditionally, for, 
according to them, the party had forfeited the peoples' confidence 
by giving up the role of an Opposition in the Assembly and taking part 
in the Grand Alliance. Strong views were expressed at a meeting of 
Swatantra MLAs, presided over by Mr. Liladhar Patel, leader of the party 
in the Assembly, at which Mr. H.M. Patel, Chairman of the State Swat­
antra party, was also present. The meeting was specifically called to
discuss the stand the party should adopt towards the Hitendra Desai
2 7Government in view of the failure of the alliance. Swatantra party 
MLAs felt that they were supporting the Congress (0) Ministry without 
even having the satisfaction of sharing the spoils of office with the 
Congress (0). They felt that the present situation, brought about by 
the party's President, M.R. Masani, should only be allowed to continue 
if the Chief Minister agreed to form a coalition Ministry with the 
Swatantra party in the State. Swatantra MLAs said the party would die 
a slow death if the present state of affairs was allowed to continue, 
and that, if a whip was issued asking members to support the present 
Ministry, the party would split. It was alleged that by wooing Jaideep-
26. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,M>March , 1971 •
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sinhji's group, Hitendra Desai himself was responsible for reducing
the party's strength from 66 in 1967 to its present 22. Mr. H.M. Patel
and Mr. Liladhar Patel tried to counteract this by advising that nothing
should be done to mar the prospects of the Alliance partners in the
next Assembly poll. The Secretary of the Jan Sangh, Mr. Vasant
Gajendragadkar also declared that the Grand Alliance was a mistake:
28"We would have won many more seats but for it." Thus the Grand 
Alliance was verging on collapse after its crushing defeat in the 
1971 elections.
Hitendra Desai sought to ward off a full-fledged revolt by Congress
(0) legislators by stressing, at an emergency meeting of the legislative
Congress (0) party in Gandhinagar on March 16th,1971,the importance
of a "collective decision" at such a crucial period, and the strategy
of waiting till the current budget session of the Gujarat Assembly
29was over on March 31st. Defections continued apace. On March 21st, 
two Congress (0) MLAs from Rajkot and Jamnagar districts joined Congress 
(R), reducing the strength of the ruling party to 96 in a House of 164, 
and raising that of Congress (R) to 35*^ Pacing the possibility of 
further MLA defections, the Chief Minister tried to negotiate an under­
standing with the Swatantra group in the House. Mr. Liladhar Patel, 
the Swatantra leader in the House, insisted that any support to the 
ruling party would be given only on certain conditions, and they
discussed a proposal for the inclusion of some Swatantra members in 
31the Cabinet. However, rank and file Swatantra legislators declared 
they would bring a no-confidence motion against the leadership if it
28. Times of India (Ahmedabad) .IZMarch , 1971.
29. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,l^ March , 1971
30. Times of India (Ahmedabad) JlMarch , 1971.
31. Times of India (Ahmedabad) .li^ March , 1971.
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insisted on helping Hitendra Desai to remain in power, for if the
party was to survive it would have to function as an effective
Opposition. On March 26th, at a meeting of the Legislative Swatantra
party, it was decided to vote with the rest of the Opposition even if
that brought about the fall of the Ministry. Mr. H.M. Patel conveyed
to the legislators that the State unit had now been given full freedom
in this regard by the Central leadership for the Grand Alliance no longer 
32existed. On March 29th, with the defection of 17 Congress (0) MLAs
to the Congress (R), the Hitendra Desai Ministry lost its majority in
the Gujarat Assembly. The defections began with the resignation of
the Minister for Cooperation, Mr. Madhavlal Shah and by the afternoon
the strength of the Congress (0) Legislature Party was reduced to 78 in
a l64-member House (4 seats were vacant), while the main Opposition
party, the Congress (R), raised its strength to 53*^ Thus the survival
of the only Congress (0) Ministry in the country hinged on the support
of the Swatantra group, as most of the remaining Opposition members
(3PSP,1 Jan Sangh, and 8 Independents) were likely to vote against the
Government. On March 30th, in a surprising development, three Cabinet
colleagues of Hitendra Desa-i: Mr.premjibhai Thakkar, the Revenue
Minister, Mr. Babubhai J. Patel, the Finance Minister and Mr. Jairambhai
Patel, Home Minister, came out with a plea for unity with the Congress
(R), thus further demoralising Congress (0) ranks, which had lost two
more members to Congress (r ) earlier in the day. In spite of the Chief
Minister's acceptance of the Swatantra Party's demand for the abolition
of land revenue on smallholdings, a majority of Swatantra members would
not support the Government. Thus, with the certainty of a no-confidence
motion being passed against him, Hitendra Desai at last resigned from the
34Chief Ministership.
32. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,27March , 1971*
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Thus the Majur Mahajan, which remained loyal to the Congress (0)
(following the Congress split, Mr. Gulzarilal Nanda had tried to win
over the Majur Mahajan for the New Congress, but failed and was
35\ousted from Gujarat ), found itself isolated from both Central and
State power structures, the former basis of much of its political
and administrative power. When, in addition, it took the fateful step
of severing its relations with the INTUC, its isolation and loss of
influence seemed complete.
Joint action, particularly on the issue of higher bonus, was launched
by leftist trade unions of the CPI, CPM, the Republican party and rebel
Congress (r ) group in an attempt to undercut Majur Mahajan support
among the workers. On October 11, a strike call by the four party
trade union"action committee", demanding an increase in bonus to 8.33%,
was answered by four Ahmedabad mills: the Saraspur Mills, the Ashok
Mills, the Swadeshi and New Cotton Mills. However, the effectiveness
of the strike was limited to mills where there was a disparity in the
payment of bonus to units in the same group; and the Majur Mahajan's
ability to negotiate effectively with the Ahmedabad millowners still
36gave it considerable local authority.
However, as the INTUC at the Central level and in other States
moved closer to the Congress (r ), the Majur Mahajan grew more and more
restive. On October 10, 1971» a meeting of the "labour cell" of the
AICC disclosed a proposal to set up a coordination committee at all
levels between the Congress (r ) and the INTUC to settle disputes that
might arise from time to time. The coordination committee would consist
37of representatives of the AICC and the INTUC.
35» Indian Express (Ahmedabad),^OOctober , 1971*
36. Indian Express (Ahmedabad), 11,12 and 13 Octob'er, I SI I.
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With these developments, the Majur Mahajan had gradually begun
to dissociate itself from the INTUC. Soon after the 1971 elections,
the Majur Mahajan1s contingent on the INTUC committees ceased to
participate in INTUC meetings. The Majur Mahajan's disillusionment with
the INTUC stemmed from its differences in approach to labour problems.
Mr. Vasavda charged the INTUC leadership with deviating from Gandhian
38principles of trade unionism. The national body, he alleged, was 
sliding towards leftism and communism. On October 19» 1971» announcing 
his decision to abstain from the coming Nagpur session of the INTUC, 
the Majur Mahajan leader said the INTUC leaders were leading the workers 
to the path of agitation by "offering them wrong temptation", instead 
of trying to secure justice through Gandhian methods. He also said that 
the representatives of the Majur Mahajan workers would meet within a 
fortnight to ratify the leadership's decision to completely break away 
from the INTUC. He also hinted that the Majur Mahajan would undertake 
to start an independent workers' political party, distinct from both the 
Congress R and the Congress (0). Mr. Vasavda said he would advise 
Majur Mahajan followers to dissociate themselves from party affiliations 
and independently contest the forthcoming State Assembly elections. He 
felt that no party was in a position to help the working class whom he 
advised to help itself, saying, "The time has come for workers to play 
their part in politics".
The Majur Mahajan break with the INTUC was officially announced 
on October 29, 1971* In support of their complaints that the New 
Congress was trying to bring former communists forward into the labour 
front, the Majur Mahajan leaders pointed out that traditionally two 
INTUC representatives were chosen for the International Labour Confer­
ence, whereas this year the Union Labour Ministry chose a Communist
39as one of the two representatives. This decision of Majur Mahajan
38. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,3D0ctober , 1971*
39. Indian Express (Ahmedabad) ,3X>ctober , 1971-
leaders was endorsed by the joint representatives' council of the Majur 
Mahajan on November 4> 1971> which also resolved to organise itself as 
an independent political party and field its candidates independently 
in the forthcoming State Assembly elections. On November 5> the 
Gujarat branch of the INTUC also formalised its break with the national 
organisation.^
The GPCC (r ) determined to storm the INTUC fortress in Ahmedabad, 
Baroda and other industrial areas in an organised bid to woo the sizable 
labour vote in the coming Assembly elections, and its labour cell prepared 
a five-point programme to woo the working class on bonus, wages, prices, 
employees' State insurance facilities and workers' participation in the 
management of public-sector undertakings in Gujarat.^ The Congress (R)- 
led Ahmedabad Mill Mazdur union demanded the deletion of Section 127 
of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act which gave a monopoly to a 
recognised union to make sole legal representation of the workers' case.
A deputation of the union, led by the GPCC (r ) President, Mr. Ratubhai 
Adani, the Union President, Mr.Krishnakant Vekharia,and its Vice- 
President, Mr. Maganbhai Barot, met the Governor, Mr. Shriman Narayan,
42 , vin Ahmedabad to voice this demand. The labour wing of the Congress (R)
was further strengthened by the defection of Mr. Natvarlal Shah, former
chairman of the State PSP and well known labour leader,to the Congress (R)
45in early November, 1971*
On November 18, 1971» the Working Committee of the INTUC at its 
Nagpur Session felt it should support the Congress (r ) in the forthcoming 
elections to various State Assemblies as a "logical step arising out of 
the unity of purpose, plans and programmes". While emphasising its 
ideological affinity with the Congress (R), the Working Committee wanted 
the INTUC to retain its independent character organisationally so that
40. Times of India (Ahmedabad), . 5 and 6 1911.
41. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ^ October , 1971.
42. Times of India (Ahmedabad)^October , 1971 -
43* Times of India (Ahmedabad),llNovember , 1971*
it could function as a vanguard movement of the working class for the 
early realisation of socialistic aims.^ On the 19th, the INTHC Working 
Committee disaffiliated the Ahmedabad TLA for making "baseless alleg­
ations", with political considerations, of pro-Communist leanings.
The Working Committee felt that instead of bringing these allegations 
before the proper forum the TLA and its leaders chose unilateral action.
The Working Committee also decided to set up a political committee at 
the Centre and at State-level as a step towards institutionalising 
the relations between the Congress (R) and the INTUC.^
Thus, by late 1971» with the labour wing of the Congress (R) at 
both Local, State and Central levels growing in strength continually, 
the Majur Mahajan embarked on the rather risky venture of trying to set 
up a new labour party, the National Labour Party, independent of both 
Congress parties. An ad hoc committee was formed in early December 1971 
under the convenorship of Navinchandra Barot, an important Majur Mahajan 
leader, to mobilise all Gandhian labour unions to establish a new 
labour party to be confined to Gujarat to contest the coming State 
Assembly elections independently.^ However, its attempts to dissociate 
itself from the Congress (o) were hardly convincing: it had an electoral
understanding with the Congress (o) not to contest the same constituencies, 
and it maintained its support for the Congress (0) in the Ahmedabad 
Municipal Corporation, which was still a Congress (o) stronghold, 
although a somewhat shaky one. In fact, the Majur Mahajan contingent 
was the mainstay of the Old Congress in the Corporation.
As the Congress (0) majority in the Corporation came under the 
increasing pressure of defections, the Majur Mahajan remained the hard
44» Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,l9November , 1971*
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491
core of its strength. On November 5> 1971»^  about 200 PSP workers 
from Gujarat, including the Gujarat PSP chairman, Mr. Natvarlal Shah, 
announced their decision to join the Congress (r ). Three PSP 
Municipal Corporators, Dr. Ajit Patel, Mr. Mahomedsharif A. Kucherawala 
and Mr. Vinod Dakwala, were also among the defectors. This raised the 
Congress (R) strength in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to 16 as 
against 60 Congress (o) Corporators, 4 CPM Corporators, 3 Socialist 
Party Corporators, 2 Jan Sangh Corporators, 1 Janta Parishad Corporator,
1 Republican Party Corporator and 4 Independent Corporators. On the
municipal School Board, the Congress (R) strength rose to 6, and the
A8Congress (0)'s strength was 8. Another Old Congress Corporator,
Mr. Bhudarbhai Motibhai Prajapati from Shahibag Ward 18, defected from
the Congress (o) a little later. For the present, he decided to sit 
49as an Independent. The most severe blow to Old Congress strength in
50the Corporation came towards the end of December 1971» when 12 leading
Corporators of the Congress (0), including the Mayor,defected to the 
Congress (R). This coupled with the defections of 12 Congress(o) Corporators
on December 24th reduced the Old Congress to a minority of only 36
members. In contrast,by this time Congress (R)strength had risen to 40* Majur Mahajan Corporators, led by Navinchandra 
Barot, Chairman of the Standing Committee, had remained loyal to the 
Congress (0), but were forced by events to offer their resignations 
from their posts in the civic body when their party was reduced to a
minority in the Corporation. With the resignation of'the Mayor and
Deputy Mayor, the Corporation had to elect new office-bearers to conduct 
its meetings, and these elections for Mayor, Deputy Mayor and Chairmen 
of the various committees were scheduled for the General Board meetings 
on January 8 and 11, 1972. Although the Congress (R) did not have an
47. Times of India (Ahmedabad),bNovember , 1971*
48. Times of India (Ahmedabad)^November , 1971*
49- Indian Express (Ahmedabad),^ November , 1971*
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absolute majority in a House of 91» it was the largest single party,
and it hoped to be in a position to elect its members as office-bearers
with the support of some of the other Opposition members. However,
factionalism within the Congress (r ) between a group of Congress (R)
Corporators led by Narsinh Makwana and the 12 recent Congress (0)
defectors, led by the ex-Mayor, coupled with the willingness of the 15
councillors belonging to the CPM (4), Socialist party (3), Janta Parishad
(2), Jan Sangh (2) and Independents (4) to prop up the Old Congress
enabled the Congress (0) to unexpectedly regain control of the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation with Krishnavadan Joshi as the new Mayor, and the
Majur Mahajan leader, Navinchandra Barot, resuming his powerful position
51as Chairman of the Standing Committee. However, the Congress (0)
was under heavy attack throughout the following Corporation session by
the Congress (r ) Corporators, who alleged mismanagement of the Municipal
Dairy and corruption in the Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service.
The Congress (0) experienced great difficulty in getting through its
52budgets for the School Board, AMTS etc.
Thus, despite attempts to stress independence of the Congress (0), 
the Majur Mahajan's newly-sponsored National Labour Party leaders, 
particularly in Ahmedabad, could be seen to be working closely with the 
Congress (0) in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. This proved a 
distinct disadvantage to them in the 1972 State Assembly elections.
State-level factions had an important bearing on the 1972 State 
Assembly elections in Ahmedabad City. After the mid-term elections, there 
was an increasing volume of defections from Congress (0) ranks to the 
Congress (r ), including many Gujarat mainland politicans. Thus the 
virtual monopoly of the Congress (R) organisation enjoyed by the old
51. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,l/f January ^February andlSMarch , 
1972.
52. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 3 and 11 Pebru.ur^  ^ 91X.
Saurashtrianleaders, Jivraj Mehta, Ratubhai Adani and Rasiklal Parikh, 
came to an end, and the Congress (r ) became a broad-based party, no 
longer predominantlySaurashtrian in composition. The Central Congress 
(r ) leadership no longer felt the need to support peripheral regions 
and dissident groups within Gujarat State and adopted a policy of 
neutrality towards them. Cross-cutting political ties developed 
between Saurashtriangroups and mainland politicians. In order to under­
cut the influence of the old guardSaurashtrian leaders within the 
Congress (R), mainland leaders sought to ally themselves with another 
powerful Saurashtriangroup, the farm bloc, led by Vallabhbhai Patel.
The Saurashtrianfarm bloc, whose grievances against the oil levy had 
been met in 1970> decided there would be more to gain in an alliance 
with mainland leaders in terms of economic advantages than with the 
older Saurashtrianleaders, who were more responsive to urban groups, 
who had formed their support-base in the early 1950s, than to the 
rural interests, which had grown rapidly in significance in the 1960s. 
The relations between Ratubhai Adani, the old guard Saurashtrianleader 
who had become State Congress (r) President, and Vallabhbhai Patel
became so strained in September 1971 that Mrs. Gandhi herself was
55forced to mediate between them. Thus, divided among themselves, 
Saurashtrianleaders lost their predominant political leverage within 
the Congress (r ). Rivalry between Rajkot and Bhavnagar leaders was 
an endemic feature of Saurashtra politics.^4
In the State factional pattern that developed within the Congress 
(R) preceding the 1972 State Assembly elections, there were cross­
cutting political alignments between Saurashtraand mainland Gujarat 
leaders and an important ideological element. The three major factions,
55. Times of India (Ahmedabad)^September , 1971*
• A.
54. Spodek loc. cit.; see also D.N. Pathak, "State Politics in India: 
Some Determinants" In Iqbal Narain (ed.) State Politics
in India. C 1^ 65).
which emerged, were the leftist, rather militant, Congress Forum for 
Socialist Action, led by Himatsinhji of Mansa; a faction led by the 
GPCC(r ) Vice-President, Chimanbhai Patel of Baroda; and a faction 
led by the old guard Saurashtraleader and GPCC(r ) President, Ratubhai 
Adani, supported by Kantilal Ghia, another GPCC (R) Vice-President 
and a key Ahmedabad District leader. The major points of dispute 
between the three factions revolved around the problemof the reconstit­
ution of District Congress (r ) committees, and the policy to be adopted 
towards Congress (o) and other defectors to the Congress (r ), both of 
which could radically alter the sensitive balance of power between the 
three £*ctto*al groups. Perhaps the bitterest source of conflict was 
the struggle for the Chief Ministership of the new State Assembly.
While certain DCCs of the Congress(r ) had been recognised, others, 
particularly Baroda and Rajkot DCCs, still had to be reconstituted,
causing serious disputes between the faction leaders who struggled
55for control over the selection of the DCC members. A particularly
sensitive question was the reconstitution of the Baroda Congress (R)
DCC, for Baroda was the home power-base of Chimanlal Patel. He managed
to secure the Presidentship of the Baroda DCC (R) for his ally, Mr
Pradhyuman Bhatt, but this was bitterly opposed by the pro-Adani group
in Baroda which included the former Mayor of Baroda, Mr. Nanalal
Choksi, Mr. Prabhudas Patel MP, Mr. Sanat Mehta, the powerful former
PSP labour leader, and Mr. Laxmidas Patel, former President of the 
56ad hoc City unit. The Forum for Socialist Action also felt agg­
rieved over the issue of DCC(r ) reconstitution: it complained that
55* Times of India (Ahmedabad), 27 and 29
56. Times of India (Ahmedabad),November , 1971 •
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Mr. Adani was trying to keep out Forum supporters from district 
committees and was stocking these units with defectors from the Old
The Forum was particularly anxious to refuse Congress (o) def­
ectors admittance to the party, and to exclude those that were ad­
mitted from gaining party posts and being given tickets in the ensuing 
State Assembly elections, for it felt that many Congress (0) defectors 
would help strengthen the more conservative Adani-Ghia faction with 
whom they were more ideologically attuned, and would weaken the forces 
of socialism within the Congress (R). The district Forum circles 
in Rajkot protested against the admission into the Congress (R) of 
the Princes of Vankaner and Rajkot, who had stood on Swatantra tickets 
in the 1967 General Elections backed by the Jan Sangh, declaring that 
they had all along opposed the progressive policies of Mrs. Gandhi
CO
and, therefore, had no place in the Congress (R). Forum leaders also 
opposed the Congress (r ) High Command’s decision to admit Jaideep- 
sinhji of Baria, the arch defector, into the Congress (r ). Jaideep-
organised a mass exodus from it in June 1971* They also opposed the 
acceptance into the party of Premjibhai Thakkar, former Revenue 
Minister in the Hitendra Desai Ministry and a leading Kutch politician,
the Forum welcomed an influx of 200 PSP workers from Gujarat, including 
the Gujarat PSP Chairman and Vice-President of the All-India Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha, Natvarlal Shah, on November 5'th, 1971» as an addition
if a general condition were imposed forbidding admission to those who
57* Indian Express (Ahmedabad),1 December , 1971 -
59* Indian Express (Ahmedabad^Movember , 1971? and Times of India 
(Ahmedabad) ,71 November andllDecember , 1971*
57Congress and the Swatantra.
sinhji had dealt the most when he
59and Brahmkumar Bhatt, the powerful GPCC(o) Secretary. However,
of strength to socialist forces within the Congress (R). It felt that
58. Times of India (Ahmedabad)^ November , 1971*
had "criticised the Prime Minister in the past", this would work to
the benefit of the anti-Adani factions.^
In view of the intransigeance of factionalism between the three
contending groups, whom Mrs. Gandhi had urged unsuccessfully to "mend
your ways" while on a visit to Gujarat for the party’s first State
61political conference, the CEC made it a rule that where there was
no unanimity in the PEC about the Congress (r ) candidates to be selected
in a particular constituency, the PEC would have to send a panel of
names to the CEc, and the DCCs would be directed to send a list of
62three candidates for each constituency. Thus final powers of
selection rested squarely with the Congress (r ) High Command, which
would be able to weight the selection in favour of whichever faction 
63it chose. In the event, the CEC selection favoured the old guard, 
Conservative Congressmen of the Adani-Ghia faction, and included a 
mere half a dozen representatives of the Forum. Naturally, the Forum, 
which had felt itself to be ideologically the closest ter Mrs. Gandhi, 
regarded this as a stab in the back. The Forum had been promoted by 
Indira Gandhi after the Congress splitin 1969 in an attempt to build 
up her power in the Congress (r ). Its leader, Himatsinhji of Mansa, 
a political nonentity till then, was made a GPCC(r ) Vice-President.
So widespread was the view that only the "leftist elements" in the 
party would enjoy Mrs. Gandhi's backing that Chimanlal Patel, a shrewd 
opportunist politician, was persuaded to link his faction for a time
60. Indian Express (Ahmedabad),(^November , 1971•
61. Indian Express (Ahmedabad)^November , 1971•
62. Times of India (Ahmedabad)ioNovember , 1971 •
63. See "Gujarat: A Free Hand for the Prime Minister", Economic 
and Political Weekly, vol. 7> no. 2 (8 January^1972), p. 59-
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with the Forum on the calculation that the latter had the Prime 
Minister’s direct hacking and would he favoured in the selection of 
candidates. The Adani-Ghia faction was similarly taken in, otherwise 
it would not have heen so much on the defensive in the struggle for the 
GPCC leadership and yielded significant ground to the Forum.^
The impact of these State-level factional conflicts on Ahmedahad 
City was considerable. The main factional conflict was between the 
Congress Forum for Socialist Action faction, which had strong support 
in Ahmedahad City, and the Adani-Ghia faction which was particularly 
powerful in Ahmedahad district and was gaining ground in Ahmedahad 
City too. With the influx of many former Janta Parishad members at 
an early stage into the Congress (R) in Ahmedahad City, the Socialist 
Forum element was strongly represented in the Ahmedahad City DCC (R) 
whose President, Dr.Vasudev Tripathi, former Janta Parishad Mayor 
of Ahmedahad, was a staunch Forum leader. The executive convenor of 
the Gujarat Congress Forum for Socialist Action was Mr. Manubhai 
Palkiwala, a former Janta Parishad and SSP leader, and now a prominent 
member of the Ahmedahad City DCC(R).
However, Kantilal Ghia was also extending his support from Ah­
medahad district into the city, and he sought to contest the elections 
himself from the Ahmedahad industrial labour constituency of Rakhial.
The Forum made a bid in early December, 1971> to preempt the selection 
of Congress (R) candidates from Ahmedahad City and to comer all 
Congress (R) nominations from Ahmedahad City. However, the Forum itself 
was split by factional strife. A list of nominees of the Forum's 
choice was drawn up at a closed door meeting at the residence of Mr. 
Himatsinhji of Mansa, chairman of the Gujarat unit of the Forum, in 
Ahmedabad by one Forum faction, led in the City by Dr. Vasudev
64. "The Cards are on the Table", Economic and Political Weekly, 
vol. 7, no. 8 (19 February^1972), pp. 451-2.
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Tripathi, President of the City DCC(r ). Dr. Tripathi issued a state­
ment soon after^advising ward committees not to recommend any names 
of candidates. A rival Forum leader, Mr. Vidyut Thakkar Secretary 
of the Ahmedabad City DCC(r ), and his group of former PSP men, 
immediately condemned the way the list was finalised, accusing the 
other faction of using "sly methods" and ignoring ward committees.
They were quick to come out with a rival list of candidates. Congress 
(r ) party circles in Ahmedabad were amazed at the omission in the first 
list of prominent party leaders, such as Mr. Kantilal Ghia, the GPCC 
(r ) Vice-President, Mr. Prabodh Raval, GPCC(R) Secretary, Mr. Narsinh 
Makwana, leader of the Congress (R) in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, Dr. Ajit Patel, prominent city former PSP leader, and 
Mr. Natvarlal Shah, former Gujarat PSP chairman, although the Forum 
claimed to have approached the latter offering him a nomination which 
he refused. Party circles were also opposed to the inclusion of Mr. 
Himatsinhji of Mansa's name in the list, since he had no base in the 
city at all. The Congress (R) labour wing in Ahmedabad City, led by 
Maganbhai Barot, senior Vice-President of the Ahmedabad Mill Mazdur 
Union, was shocked at the complete neglect of labour representation, 
pointing out that, although there were three industrial labour con­
stituencies in the city, none of the labour leaders' names had been
6 5mentioned in the Forum list.
Intense rivalry between prospective MLA candidates for Ahmedabad 
City constituencies followed. However, the final list handed down by 
the CEC(R) tried to form a compromise and represent as many important 
elements on the Ahmedabad scene as possible: Kantilal Ghia was to
stand for the Congress (R) from the industrial labour constituency of 
Rakhial, and Prabodh Raval from Kalupur constituency. The Congress 
(R) labour leader, Mr. Maganbhai Barot, stood from Asarva constituency. 
Former PSP City leader, Dr. Ajit Patel,stood from Khadia constituency;
65* fiidian Express (Ahmedabad) ,3December , 1971.
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Narsinh Makwana, the Congress (R) leader in the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation, was accommodated from Kankaria (SC) constituency; and 
Socialist Forum leaders, Dr. Vasudev Tripathi and Mr. Manubhai 
Palkiwala, were accommodated from Shahpur and Dariapur-Kazipur 
constituencies respectively. A Muslim, Lalbhai Kundiwala, who had 
criticised the Hitendra Desai Ministry’s handling of the Ahmedabad Communal 
Riots of 1969» stood from the Muslim-dominated Jamalpur constituency, 
and a relative newcomer to politics, Mrs. Kokilaben HaripmadVyas, 
a College teacher, stood from Ellis Bridge.
However divisions within the Congress (r ) ranks did not end here:
Dr. Somabhai Desai, an active Forum member and former Janta Parishad 
colleague of Dr. Vasudev Tripathi and now his rival for selection 
as candidate of the Congress (r) for the Shahpur seat, resigned when 
the seat was not allocated to him. He resigned with 18 other Congress 
(r) workers, including 5 office-bearers of the Shahpur ward committee,
who declared that the CEC(R) had acted undemocratically in rejecting
66Dr. Desai's name which was recommended by the district unit. Dr.
6 YDesai later decided to contest the seat as an Independent. He was
soon after expelled from the Congress (R), after a GPCC(r ) decision
to expel for 6 years all those who contested or worked against official
68candidates in the forthcoming elections. Two other dissident Congress 
(R) members, Mr. Kashinath Dalai, president of the Amraiwadi taluka 
ward committee, and Mr. Amrutlal Barot, a lawyer, were also expelled 
for filing nomination papers against the official Congress (r ) candidate, 
Kantilal Ghia, in the Rakhial constituency. The CPI in Ahmedabad City, 
despite the national level alliance between the Congress (R) and the
66. Times of India (Ahmedabad),4-February , 1972.
67. Times of India (Ahmedabad),7February , 1972.
68. Times of India (Ahmedabad),#February , 1972.
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national CPI, decided to support Mr.Amrutlal Barot, the dissident 
Congress (R) candidate against Mr. Ghia, although not to support Dr.
69Somabhai Desai.
However, despite considerable faction infighting in the Congress 
(R) in Ahmedabad, and also on the State level, where Jaideepsinhji 
had decided to contest the elections as an Independent on being denied 
a Congress (R) ticket and many districts had rebel Congress (r) candid­
ates standing against official Congress (r) nominees, Mrs. Gandhi’s 
shrewd handling of the Bangladesh refugee situation and victory in the 
war with Pakistan virtually assured a massive victory to the Congress 
(r) at the polls, and at both the local level in Ahmedabad City and 
the State level the Congress (r) secured a landslide victory in 1972.
The Congress (R) in Gujarat had strengthened its hand by taking over 
many district panchayat organisations and cooperative institutions.
It captured 159 of the 167 State Assembly seats in a House which would 
have no recognised opposition, since the Congress (0) won only 16 seats. 
The Swatantra party was annihilated, winning no seats at all. The CIM 
also drew a blank, although the CPI scored its maiden victory winning 
one seat, while the Jan Sangh won 5 seats, 2 more than in 1967* Most 
of the Congress (R) rebels who had sought election as Independents, 
with the exception of Jaideepsinhji and his group who scored impressive 
victories, were routed. There were 8 Independent MLAs in the New House. 
In regional terms, the Congress (R) asserted its dominance in all the 
major regional areas: it won 26 of the 28 seats in South Gujarat,
32 of the 41 seats in Central Gujarat, 37 of the 46 seats in North 
Gujarat, and 44 of the 52 seats in Saurashtraand Kutch. Thus it had 
conquered the Central and South Gujarat strongholds of the Congress (0), 
and was no longer a party of the peripheral regions of Gujarat. Thus 
regional conflicts would once again be internalised within the dominant
69. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 9 and 11 Pebnru.ar\j > I ^ 7 Z ,
Congress (r ) party.
7 1In Ahmedabad, the Congress (R) captured all nine of the City's 
State Assembly seats with massive margins of victory. The Majur 
Mahajan, which had cut itself off from Central and State power 
structures and had not been able to dissociate itself effectively 
from the Congress (0), found its electoral support in Ahmedabad 
labour constituencies annihilated. In its prestige contest in 
the Rakhial constituency, where the National Labour Party leader,
Mr. Navinchandra Barot, was pitted against the GPCC (r ) Vice-President, 
Kantilal Ghia, it was decisively rejected and Ghia won by an over­
whelming margin of 23,855 votes over Navinchandra Barot, who came 
second.
TABLE 2 . Voting pattern in Rakhial constituency in the 1972 State 
Assembly Elections.
Total Electorate: 101,937 Votes Polled: 77,680 Invalid Votes: 5,649
Candidates: Party: No. of Votes polled:
70
Kantilal F. Ghia Congress (R) 42,049
Navinchandra Barot NLP 18,194
Dr. Balwantray G. Dave Jan Sangh 3,296
L.P. Chauhan Socialist party 390
Bhogilal H. Dave Ind. 124
N.N. Desai Ind. 132
Amrutlal M. Barot Ind. 881
Ikramali Sayed Ind. 865
The National Labour Party had suffered serious setbacks in the few
months preceding the elections in Rakhial: its prominent leader from
Rakhial constituency, Mr. Maganlal Raj guru, and 50 Majur Mahajan workers
7 2defected to the Congress (R) on March 3, and Trikamlal Patel, who was
70. Times of India (Ahmedabad), 12 and 13 1911.
71. Ibid.
72. Times of India (Ahmedabad) March , 1972.
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denied a ticket try the Congress (0),actively campaigned
against Navinchandra Barot in Rakhial,delying the tacit electoral
n-z
understanding between the Congress (o) and the NLP.
In Dariapur-Kazipur constituency, the NLP candidate Mr. Bachubhai 
M. Shukla suffered an even more crushing defeat at the hands of the 
Congress (r ) candidate, Manubhai Palkiwala. Bachubhai M. Shukla 
scored only 8,752 votes compared to Palkiwala*s 52,260 votes. The 
CPM leader, Dinkar Mehta, who had been so close to winning this seat 
in 1967, lost his deposit.
In Asarva constituency, the veteran Majur Mahajan leader, a 
Secretary of the TLA and former MLA, Manharlal T. Shukla was ignom- 
iniously defeated by the Congress (r ) labour leader, Maganlal R.
Barot, to the extent of losing his deposit. Manharlal Shukla secured 
only 6,652 votes compared to 28,740 votes secured by Maganlal R. Barot, 
Vice-President of the Congress (R) union, the Ahmedabad Mill Mazdur 
Union. Maganbhai Barot, a youthful lawyer, established himself as a 
factor in labour politics after his relentless and successful agitation 
to get the Jupiter Mills reopened under the National Textile Corpor­
ation. He also successfully organised the semi-clerks of the textile 
mills and the employees of the Provident Fund Commissioner's office.
74He played a major part in building up the labour wing of the new Congress.
In Kankaria (SC) constituency, which Jesingbhai G. Parmar the 
Majur Mahajan leader and NLP candidate, had held through three successive 
General Elections, he was decisively beaten by the Congress (r ) candidate 
and leader of the Congress (r ) in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation,
Mr. Narsinh Makwana. Jesingbhai only polled 6,621 votes compared to
Mr. Narsinh Makwana's 12,475 votes.
75» Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,2lFebruary , 1972.
74* Times Of India (Ahmedabad),2March , 1972.
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In the other Ahmedabad City Assembly constituencies, the popular 
Muslim former MLA, Lalbhai Kundiwala of the Congress (R),had an easy 
victory over the little-known Congress (o) Hindu candidate, Dr. Kantilal 
G. Mehta^in Jamalpur constituency, securing 28,922 votes compared to 
Dr. Mehta's 16,347 votes. In Ellis Bridge, the Congress (0) fielded 
a fairly strong candidate, Miss Charumati Yoddha, a popular Gandhian 
social worker, but even she was beaten by a Congress (r) relative 
newcomer, Mrs. Kokilaben Vyas, by 30>580 votes to 19,186. In Shahpur 
constituency, the Ahmedabad City DCC(R) chief and Forum leader, Dr.
Vasudev Tripathi scored a convincing victory over his rivals, including 
the rebel Congress (r) candidate, Dr. Somabhai Desai;who stood as an 
Independent, and Jayantilal P. Shah of the Congress (o). Dr. Tripathi 
won 17,423 votes to Dr. Desai's 9,628. In Khadia constituency, a 
traditional PSP stronghold for more than a decade, Dr. Ajit Patel, 
the former PSP leader, now standing from the Congress (r), defeated his 
nearest Socialist Party rival , Dr. Jayendra Pandit,by 15,401 votes 
to 11,321. Chandrakant M. Patel, the Congress (0) candidate, secured 
a mere 3,823 votes. In Kalupur constituency, Prabodh Raval, Congress (R) 
GPCC Secretary, discovered his main rival to be not the Congress (0) 
candidate, Jayant K. Raval, who only secured 2,868 votes but Pramodchandra 
C. Patel, the Jan Sangh candidate, who secured 17,245 votes compared 
to his own 26,164 votes.
Thus in the years following the Congress split, a radical real­
ignment of forces at the Central and State level had a profound 
repercussion on city politics, particularly for the Majur Mahajan, 
whose tremendous influence at the State and Central levels, built up 
over many years, was effectively curtailed.
EPILOGUE
After the Congress (R) landslide electoral victoiy of 1972, the
contest for the Gujarat Chief Ministership became intense. For the
first time, Ahmedabad had a major contender in the race: Kantilal
Ghia, although he faced fierce competition from Ratubhai Adani and
Chimanlal Patel. The factional impasse was so great that eventually
the senior party leaders, including Ratubhai Adani and his four
Vice- Presidents . gave an undertaking to the Prime Minister in writing
75to abide by her decision as to the Chief Ministership. Indira
Gandhi deputed Uma Shankar Dixit to gauge the situation. He sounded
opinion, but failed to bring about a consensus; thus a formula was
worked out during high-level talks between Mrs. Gandhi, the Congress
President, D. Sanjivayya, and other senior party leaders that Dixit
would advise the party to elect Ghanshyambhai Oza, Union Minister of
State for Industrial Development, as its new leader. Oza, it was felt,
would be an acceptable candidate to all since he had not been actively
involved in the regional and factional power struggles of the State
unit,as the Times of India put it , "Mr. Oza’s non-involvement in
group politics has won him the plum of Chief Ministership". On
March 15, 1972, he was unanimously elected leader of the State Leg-
76islature Congress (r ) party.
The new Cabinet ministers were carefully chosen in consultation 
with the Prime Minister. The Chief Minister kept the portfolios 
of Home, General Administration and Planning. Adani had the portfolios 
of Agriculture, Forests, Parliamentary Affairs and Cooperation. Ghia 
was made Finance Minister; Chimanbhai Patel Industries and Power 
Minister; Jashvant Mehta Minister for Public Works; Chokawala Minister
75* Times of India » (Ahmedabad) ,IOMarch , 1972.
76. Times of India , (Ahmedabad), 15 and 16 rtarek, 197k
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for Education; Vasudev Tripathi Minister for Health, Family Planning
and Municipalities, including Town Planning; and Sanat Mehta Minister
for Labour, Civil Supplies and Housing. Thus, after more than a decade
since the creation of Gujarat State, the Labour Ministry went to a
non Majur Mahajan candidate, Sanat Mehta, a former PSP labour leader,
and the Majur Mahajan's monopoly on the Labour Ministry came to an end.
However, Ahmedabad's representation in the Ministry increased with two
full-fledged Ministers, Ghia and Vasudev Tripathi, representing Ahmedabad 
77in the Cabinet.
The 1972 State Assembly elections showed the Congress (r ) to be 
predominant in both the labour and city areas of Ahmedabad. However, 
on achieving dominance, it also reverted to the pattern of factional 
infighting of a dominant party, which permitted an Independent candidate 
of slender financial means, Mr. Purushottam Mavlankar, an Indian 
academic, to capture the Lok Sabha seat from Ahmedabad City in the by- 
election , occasioned by the sudden death of Indulal Yagnik in mid 
1972, by an impressive margin of 25,447 votes over the Congress (r ) 
candidate and Forum leader, Manubhai Palkiwala. The GPCC (R) President, 
Mr. Jinabhai Darji, and the Chief Minister, Mr. Oza, had actually 
favoured fielding Mr. Umashankar Joshi, Vice-Chancellor of Gujarat 
University, as the Congress (r ) candidate in the by-election, or 
alternatively Mr. Natvarlal Shah, PCC(r ) Secretary and leader of the 
powerful Hind Mazdur Sabha. However, the High Command, in a bid to 
secure a compromise candidate between right and left, chose Mr. Pal­
kiwala, a Socialist Forum leader, who was also acceptable to the 
rightists, Ghia and Chimanlal Patel. Oza-Darji and Ghia-Patel rivalries, 
combined with tactical errors like the Gujarat Government's request 
to millowners to close the mills on voting day to help secure a large 
labour vote for Palkiwala and, on their refusal, the Industries Minister,
77. Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,$March , 1972.
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stop electricity supply to the mills which also caused disruption of
supply to workers1 chawls, thus proving counterproductive in securing
a large labour vote for Palkiwala, so effectively sabotaged Palkiwala's
candidancy that he even lost in assembly segments which had for years
7 f tbeen considered his strongholds i.e. Dariapur and Shahpur. In
addition Manubhai Palkiwala was President of the Ahmedabad Postal
Trade Union, which was on strike for higher wages. When Palkiwala
advised the postal workers to withdraw from strike action, the postal
79employees went against him. This by-election too high-lighted the 
complex interrelationship between local, State and Central politics - 
a crucial factor in the analysis of the politics of Ahmedabad City.
Chimanlal Patel1s demand that the Ahmedabad Electricity Company should
78. See A.R. Vyas, "The lesson of Ahmedabad", The White Star, 
(December 1972).
79• Interview with Jaisukhlal Hathi, Deputy Leader of the Congress 
(R) and leading Gujarati politician from Saurashtra in London 
in June 1975*
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The death of Shyamprasad R. Vasavda in early 1973 
marked the end of an era in Ahmedabad City politics. By that 
time the Majur Mahajan had ceased to have much power at the 
State level, although numerically it still commanded the support 
of most of Ahmedabad*s textile workers and relations with the 
employers continued to be good. In 1972, the convention, 
established many years before, that the State Cabinet Minister 
for Labour would be nominated by Shyamprasad Vasavda from among 
the Majur Mahajan1s leadership, thus ensuring that State-level 
policy on labour, housing and social welfare was basically the 
policy of the Majur Mahajan, came to an abrupt end with the appoint-
i
ment by Indira Gandhi's chosen Congress (R) Chief Minister, 
Ghanshyambhai Oza, of Sanat Mehta, former PSP labour leader from 
Baroda, as the new State Labour Minister. With the radical 
Sanat Mehta as Labour Minister, the Majur Mahajan faced many diffi­
culties in solving problems with the State Government. The problems 
of Congress (R) trade unions, with whom the PSP had merged, were 
listened to more sympathetically than those of the Majur Mahajan, 
which no longer had ready access to State-level cooperation, 
patronage and decision-making authority.
The Chairmanship of the Gujarat State Housing Board which 
had been held by a Majur Mahajan nominee, Nurmahomed H. Shaikh, 
from the first of September 1967, to the end of 1969, was given 
to a Government official, Shri Kantilal M. Kantawala, Chief Engineer 
in the Gujarat State administration. Another Congress (R) labour
80
80. On the death of Shyamprasad R. Vasavda, power was transferred
relatively smoothly to Arvind Buch, who had been a leading Majur 
Mahajan figure for more than twenty-five years, and who now 
succeeded as General-Secretary of the Ahmedabad TLA.
leader, former PSP trade unionist, Natvarlal Shah,, was rewarded in 
1972 with the Chairmanship of the Gujarat State Road Transport 
Committee.^ "*"
However, in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, the Majur 
Mahajan, the main element in the Congress (0), managed to preserve 
its leadership but only by the rather incongruous support of its 
former political enemies, the CPI, CPM, Jan Sangh and SSP, in fact 
all opposition parties except the Congress (R). Krishnavadan 
Joshi of the Congress (0), a social worker and far cry from the 
textile magnate Mayors of the past, was made Mayor on the defection 
to the Congress (R) of Narottambhai Zhaveri and his followers. 
Navinchandra Barot had still managed to retain control of the 
Chairmanship of the Standing Committee. The Congress (R) and Congress 
(0) were fairly evenly balanced in the Corporation with about 30-32 
members and J>6 members respectively. Due to the failure of the 
Congress CP) to wrest political power totally from the Congress (0) 
in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, although the ostensible 
reason was because of the famine conditions in Gujarat, the State
Government extended the sitting Corporation's tenure, postponing
due in April 1973 the municipal elections/to give the Congress (®) time to inflict a
coup de gr&ce to the Congress (0) element in the Corporation.
Direct business influence over city politics declined with 
the defeat of Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas in the mid-term eleptions 
of 1971. Linkages between Ahmedabad business leaders and the State 
Government have also become tenuous, and there has been a marked
8l. Interviews with Jaikrishnabhai Harivallabhdas and Jaisukhlal- 
bhai Hathi, leading Gujarat State politician and Deputy leader 
of the Congress (R) party, in July and June 1973 respectively.
change in the pattern of selection of Chairmen of important 
State-level Corporations. Ahmedabad textile magnates no longer 
play so prominent a role as Chairman of State Corporations as they 
did in the early 60s. (See Table ^).
Jayantilal Bhikabhai's appointment as Chairman of the 
Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation was terminated in 
December 1972. The Chairmanship of the Gujarat State Finance 
Corporation, which had been in the hands of prominent Ahmedabad 
industrialists, Amrutlal Hargovandas, Navnitlal Sakarlal Sodhan 
and Balkrishna Harivallabhdas till the end of 1970, in recent years 
has gone to a political leader from Jamnagar, Kantilal P. Shah, 
and then to Shri Lalitbhai R. Dalai, ICS officer and Chief 
Secretary to the Government of Gujarat. The Chairmanship of the 
Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation has passed to another 
ex-ICS officer, Shri Bhogibhai P.Patel. The Chairmanship of the 
Gujarat Small Industries Corporation was in the hands of an Ahmedabad 
industrialist, Chinubhai Manibhai, for more than ten years, but 
was transferred to a technocrat, Shri Lalit B. Bhagwati in December 
1972. In the Gujarat State Fertilizers Corporation, although it 
is still chaired by Ahmedabad textile magnate, Jaikrishnabhai 
Harivallabhdas, the Congress (R) State Government, soon after 
coming to power in 1972, asked for the resignation of Arvind 
Mafatlal, Rohit Chinubhai and other prominent Ahmedabad industrial­
ists who were on the management committee, and put their own nominees 
in their place.^
82. Discussions with Professor Howard Erdman at Dartmouth College, 
Hanover, New Hampshire, USA, in October 1972. Professor 
Erdman was engaged on a study of the political relations of 
the GSFC.
83. 
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2. Recent Developments in Gujarat and Ahmedabad Politics
Since the 1972 State elections, the High Command steadily- 
lost -the initiative in controlling factional conflicts in 
Gujarat State politics. Ghanshyambhai Oza, who was originally 
chosen as Chief Minister by the High Command because he was 
above the factional conflicts in the State Congress party, 
ultimately fell from power because, lacking any political base of 
his own, he became too closely identified with one of the major 
factional groups - the Ratubhai Adani-Jinabhai Dar ji group - 
thus antagonizing the other major faction - the Kantilal Ghia- 
Chimanbhai Patel group.
0:?a, ai the behest of the Adani-Darji, group, tried to under­
mine the strength of the Ghia-Patel faction both in the government 
and in the party organisation. Oza took away the Industries 
portfolio from Chimanbhai Patel, making him Minister of Planning 
instead, a less powerful position. Adani, who held the portfolio 
of cooperation and Panchayati Raj, set about dislodging many of 
Ghia's and Patel's supporters from Panchayati Raj institutions 
and cooperatives.^
In the 1972 GPCC Presidential election, Jinabhai Dapji of 
the Adani faction had defeated the nominee of the Ghia-Chimanbhai 
Patel group, Krishnakant Vekharia, a Congress (R) labour leader 
from Ahmedabad City, and was elected President. With Darji 
as President, the Adani group was able to keep the supporters of 
Ghia and Chimanbhai Patel out of important positions in the party
^'Gujarat letter: A Second Sardar Patel?'> _ Economic and
Political Weekly, vol. 8 ; no. 29( July 21, 1973), pp. 1273-127^.
organization.
In retaliation Chimanbhai put up Kantilal Ghia as a candi­
date for the Presidency of the GPCC against Jinabhai Darji in 
early 1973. However,Darji outwitted him by striking off the 
rolls many of Chimanbhai's supporters in Baroda and else­
where who had not completed twelve months as Congress party 
members and therefore were ineligible to vote in the organizational 
elections. Many of Chimanbhai's local lieutenants, including 
Thakorebhai Patel of Baroda, lost supporters because they were 
struck off the rolls, becoming ineligible to vote. There was also 
a damaging allegation against Ghia current at that time that he 
had accepted large sums of money for his campaign from in­
dustrialists, notably wealthy industrialists from Ahmedabad.
SSIn the event Ghia lost the election.
Ahmedabad City and District were controlled at this time 
by the Ghia-Patel group - Ghia controlled the Zilla Parishad 
and many cooperative institutions within the city and district, 
and Chimanbhai Patel had considerable influence among the Uni­
versity professors and students of Ahmedabad. City politics were 
strongly affected by this State-level factionalism: the Oza-
dominated Ministry, particularly the Labour Minister, Sanat 
Mehta, the former PSP leader, who now led the PSP element in 
the Congress (R) which was allied to the Adani-Darji-Oza faction, 
created difficulties for the Majur Mahajan within the city. The 
problems of Congress (R) unions, which were largely based on
85. Interview with Mr. FF in June 1974.
former PSP unions, were listened to more sympathetically than 
those of the Majur Mahajan. Sanat Mehta sought to pass fairly 
radical legislation, which would have altered the existing pattern 
of Majur Mahajan-business relations in the textile industry, 
giving workers a greater share in management. Previously, on 
questions of rationalization and welfare measures in the well- 
managed units of certain mills, there had been committees with 
labour representation, but the extension of this principle to 
management committees and the Boards of Directors was a novel 
and radical departure. The Oza-dominated Ministry also postponed 
indefinitely the municipal elections which were due to take place 
in Ahmedabad in April 1973, ostensibly because of famine condi­
tions in Gujarat, but actually because the Congress (0) and the 
NLP were stiH in control of the Ahmedabad City Municipal Corpor­
ation, and the Ghia-Patel faction controlled the Ahmedabad City 
DCC.
Chimanbhai Patel, having failed to make Ghia President of 
the GPCC, turned his attention to ousting Oza. Although many in 
the Government (where only two deputy ministers originally sup­
ported him), twelve MPs from the State as well as a majority in 
the PCC opposed him, he set about gathering support to topple 
Oza. He had Ghia's support but Ghia's effective influence was 
limited to Ahmedabad district and city. He also gained the 
backing of industrialists from Ahmedabad and Bombay, and controlled 
the Baroda region, and in Saurashtra, through his lieutenants, 
he controlled certain areas in Jamnagar, Junagadh, Gondal, Rajkot 
and Amreli. Before the Congress split he had been head of the 
Sevaj Dal and the Gujarat Youth Congress and a popular Professor
in Ahmedabad, and so had the support of many students and professors 
there. However his main strategy was to build a Patel- 
Kshatriya dominated coalition against the mainly Brahmin-Bania 
dominated Adani-Oza group. Most of the Patidar MLAs in the 
Legislature supported Chimanbhai. He gained the support of 
former Swatantra party members led by the Kshatriya leader, 
Narendrasinh Jhala, whereas the s u p p o r t a ®  of the Adani group 
came mostly from the Congress (0).
The economic control the Banias and traders exercised over 
the villages, since they were moneylenders and purchased the 
products of the farmers and which meant they could usually count 
on the support of a section of the Patels and Kshatriyas, was 
slowly being undermined by the increasing prosperity of the farmers 
who could now obtain credit and other facilities through Govern­
ment-sponsored cooperative institutions and were beginning to be­
come traders and to process agricultural products themselves. 
Chimanbhai secured the support of the more prosperous farmers in 
Saurashtra, the Leuva Patels who had become oil millers as well 
as groundnut farmers. The somewhat less prosperous Kadwa 
subcaste of the Patels was still largely with the Adani group, 
who by and large also had the support of the disadvantaged Adi- 
vasis and Harijans.^
By building up this coalition of support, Chimanbhai was 
able to topple Ghanshyambhai Oza. Emboldened by this, he nurtured 
ambitions to become Chief Minister himself. The High Command was 
dismayed by this turn of events and sent mediators to the scene,
Ibid.
Deputy Leader of the Congress (R), to try to reach some sort
of settlement or compromise between the two major factions over
who should succeed as Chief Minister. Ratubhai Adani was the
second man in the Cabinet after Oza, but Chimanbhai was not
prepared to accept him as Chief Minister, so the High Command
mediators persuaded Ratubhai to agree not to contest for the
Chief Ministership. These mediators offered the Chief Minister­
'S?ship to Ghia, leader of the Ghia - Patel faction, as a means 
of bringing the two groups together. Ghia made the mistake of 
consulting Chimanbhai on this. Chimanbhai, himself anxious to 
become Chief Minister, realising that Ghia had very little personal 
support in the faction, insisted that the question should be 
decided by putting it to the vote of their faction supporters.
Ghia, sensing that he had no chance of a majority vote, defected 
to Ratubhai's group, and was put forward as a rival candidate for 
the Chief Ministership against Chimanbhai Patel in place of 
Ratubhai Adani since Adani's men believed, mistakenly, that he 
would bring with him his supporters from the dissident faction.
(As It turned out, he could carry no one with him from the dissident 
group and all the 62 votes he secured in the subsequent elections 
for Chief Ministership were those of the Adani group.)
Even at this stage the External Affairs Minister, Swaran 
Singh, and the AICC General Secretary, M. Chandrasekhar, came to
notably Jaisukhlalbhai Hathi, senior Gujarat politician and
Up till then Ghia was recognised as the nominal head of the 
faction, even by Chimanbhai Patel, since Ghia had been the first 
Congress (0) senior leader to defect to the Congress (R), and 
build up the new organization in Gujarat. Ghia had established 
himself on excellent terms with Indira Gandhi and was for some 
time consulted by her on all matters affecting Gujarat.
Gujarat as the High Command's observers and tried to work out 
a consensus in the Congress Legislature party. Singh called 
both the prospective candidates for Chief Ministership, Ghia 
and Chimanbhai, and asked them to suggest a compromise candidate 
acceptable to both, but they could come to no agreement. Ghia 
told Singh that he was prepared to leave the choice of Chief 
Minister to the Prime Minister, but Chimanbhai forced the High 
Command to permit theleadership question to be settled through 
an election, insisting on the democratic right of the Legis­
lative Assembly members to elect their leader. A last minute 
attempt by the High Command to work out a compromise or leave 
the decision to the Prime Minister in Delhi, where the ballot 
box had been taken for the counting of votes, was foiled by 
Chimanbhai, who threatened to go to a court of law if the 
votes were not counted. In the event, Chimanbhai was elected 
Chief Minister by a margin of only ten votes.
Chimanbhai soon tempted Ghia back by offering him the 
Number 2 position in the new government, the Finance portfolio, 
but he was well aware that Ghia had no support in the Congress 
(R) Legislature party (he had only six followers in the Legis­
lative Assembly) and could be no threat to him.
Thus by mid-1973 it was clear that the Majur Mahajan had 
no State-level power base and had lost its direct representation 
in State factional conflicts. Neither of the State-level 
factions - the Adani-Darji faction nor the Ghia-Patel faction - 
had any sympathy for the Majur Mahajan. Ahmedabad business
88^'Gujarat letter: A Second Sardar Patel? ') Economic and
Political Weekly, vol. $ > no. 29 ( July 21, 197£^pp. 1273-127^.
elements remained important sources of party finance, but had 
little direct influence on political outcomes. With the split 
in the Congress, opposition Janta Parishad leaders had tended to 
join the Socialist Forum wing of the Congress (R), and 
opposition became internalized in Congress party factional 
conflicts with the Socialist Forum largely in opposition to 
the Ghia-Patel faction, which mainly controlled Ahmedabad city 
anddistrict politics at this time.
Opposition in Ahmedabad city politics had become internalized 
in Congress party factions with the Congress (o} NLP and Jan Sangh 
still significant political actors; but it was soon to take to 
the streets in an agitational outburst.
Urban Unrest and the Downfall of Chimanbhai Patel
The mainspring of the movement to overthrow the Chief 
Minister, Chimanbhai Patel, was the deteriorating economic situ­
ation in Gujarat, and growing disparities in living standards.
The most vocal outcry against food shortages and spiralling 
living costs was in the major cities of Gujarat, especially in 
Ahmedabad. During January and February 197^ more than 73°/o of 
the total urban population of Gujarat was at one time or the 
other under either a 'bandh' or a curfew, and there were orders 
prohibiting the assembly of four or more persons in other places. 
Repeated rioting took place in almost all the Corporation and 
near-Corporation size cities, and in a large number of towns 
with populations up to 10,000. A universal feature of the riots 
was that grainshops and godowns were the targets of attack on 
an unprecedented scale. The rural areas that were affected were 
almost invariably in the hinterland of large cities and towns.
The Government's failure to deal effectively and rationally 
with the critical economic situation laid it open to attack 
for failing to protect the common people, or provide them with 
food, or keep down prices. The Government arrived at an agree­
ment (Sam.juti) with the oil millers to reduce the prices of 
groundnut oil, but instead the price went on increasing and 
free trade in oil was allowed to continue. Nationalization of 
the wholesale trade in wheat was found impossible to enforce.
A levy was imposed on paddy, and, despite the fact that farmers 
in only three talukas of Surat out of the whole of Gujarat 
refused to comply, the Government arrested the leaders of the 
farmers on January 2, thereby incensing the kheduts who threatened 
that, if their leaders were not released, Gujarat would be in 
flames. The irrationality of the Government's move was underlined 
by the fact that the farmers' organisation, the Khedut Samaj, 
actually promised to give more paddy than required under the 
government order, provided the levy was abolished and it was 
made voluntary. They wanted a 'Samjuti', which was how the Govern-
89ment had dealt with the oil millers/
All this laid the Government wide open to allegations of 
corruption. People came to attribute food scarcity and rising 
prices to corruption in the Ministry. Chimanbhai Patel bore 
the brunt of the anti-corruption feelings. It was alleged that 
he collected about 25 lakhs of rupees from the oil merchants by 
allowing them to retain 60°/o of oil for local distribution where 
they could make enormous profits in the scarcity conditions. It 
was also alleged that Chimanbhai, for a large consideration, 
exempted many farmers from complying with the levy on millet on
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. f , no. 5 ( Feb. 2, 197^ ),
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on the false grounds that their produce w<*£ dangerous for 
human consumption. Another allegation current at the timei
was that despite the banon the sale or transfer of vacant
plots of land without the permission of the Government,
Chimanbhai granted such permission to owners of '.vacant plots
in return for bribes. Too late, after much of the damage had
been done, Chimanbhai sought to appoint a Vigilance Commissioner
to look into cases of corruption and to bring a law against
corruption, but by this time he could not muster enough support 
110to carry this.
University and student politics was also a major factor 
in the urban riots and unrest. Chimanbhai controlled over 70 
colleges all over the State. He also had a large following in 
Gujarat University and its colleges. The governing body of Gujarat 
University, the Senate, is very powerful politically and distri­
butes educational resources. Chimanbhai succeeded in packing 
the University Senate with his followers. Most importantly he 
had the longstanding Vice-Chancellor of Gujarat University, Uma 
Shankar Joshi, replaced by one of his followers, Ishwarbhai Patel. 
When the students, starting in a college at Morvi in&aurashtra 
and spreading to Ahmedabad and many other educational centres 
all over Gujarat, complained against the rising cost of their
J
mess bill, eventually widening their complaint to rising prices 
in general, Uma Shankar Joshi and other displaced Professors 
sympathized and some actively participated in the student move­
ment of protest.
90. Interview with Mr. FF in June 1974.
The militant students formed a committee to organize agitation 
against high prices and food shortages and ministerial corruption - 
the Nav Nirman Samiti (the New Purity Committee) - 
led by Manishi Jani and Umakant Mankad, and some University 
Professors also joined the Nav Nirman Samiti. The students 
organized bandhs and processions to compel merchants to sell 
commodities at cheaper rates. Their main targets were the rich 
groundnut farmers and oil millers of Saurashtra and big business­
men and industrialists who, they felt, were in league with a 
corrupt Government to exploit the common people. Many of the 
bandhs took a violent turn - many shops were burnt and looted 
and about 70 lives were lost largely due to police repression. 
Student grievances also came to the fore - students agitated for 
promotion without examinations. Students started disrupting and 
walking out of examinations. Rather late in the day, Chimanbhai
unsuccessfully attempted to set up a commission to look into
91the educational system and student grievances.
Middle-class white-collar unions, such as bank workers' 
unions - the Ahmedabad branches of the All-India Banking Federation 
and the National Banking Workers' Federation - and the union of 
government employees - the Gujarat Sarkar Karmachari Sangh - led 
by Mr. Devyakand Untani, a government servant from Rajkot now 
based in Ahmedabad, and Mr. Jkcharajani, supported the student 
protest movement. Doctors sympathized with the agitation and 
lawyers protested by not going to the courts. Unorganized labour,
for example construction labourers, household industry workers, 
domestic servants and artisans of all kinds, was also involved 
in the rioting and disturbances.
Factionalism within the Congress and the disruptive activities 
of opposition parties further intensified the political crisis.
When Chimanbhai became Chief Minister, the High Command insisted 
he should accommodate three of Ratubhai Adani's group in the 
Ministry. Ratubhai himself was offered a place in the Cabinet 
but he would not agree to work under Chimanbhai's leadership. 
Ultimately, the three from Adani's group were: Amul Desai, former
PSP leader, who was made Minister of Finance, Dwivekanand 
Nanavati, who was made Law Minister, and Amarsey Chaudhary, an 
Adivasi engineer, who was made Minister for Social Welfare. 
Chimanbhai tried unsuccessfully to dislodge these three from 
Adani's group. He tried to create a rift between them and between 
each of them and Adani by carrying misleading tales about one to 
the other so as to create suspicion in each other's minds and 
in Ratubhai's mind. For example, he spread a story in the press 
that Amul Desai had said that the Nav Nirman Samiti was being 
financed by Ratubhai. He had press statements made by the Cabinet 
against Ratubhai printed in the press without the qualification 
that Amul Desai, Nanavati and Chaudhary dissociated themselves 
from them. When the political unrest in Gujarat started these 
three openly revolted against Chimanbhai, and when the High Com­
mand sent Mr. K. C. Pant, the Irrigation Minister, to assess the 
situation in Gujarat they gave him a written statement against 
Chimanbhai, denouncing him for corruption. This disrupted the 
Cabinet, and paved the way for the Chimanbhai Patel Ministry's
downfall. Chimanbhai was never on good terms with Jinabhai 
Darji, the Gujarat GPCC President, and there was a clearly 
visible split at this time between the organizational wing and 
the ministerial wing which hampered the working of Govern­
ment. Jinabhai criticised the Government in the party and alienated
V
the members of the party from the Chief Minister. Chimanbhai, 
who had the power of patronage, retaliated by seeking to allocate 
the chairmanships of various corporations judiciously to win 
over party men.
The opposition parties also capitalized on the situation.
The major opposition parties at this time were the Jan Sangh and 
the Congress (0) - the Communist and Socialist parties were too 
weak to be significant. The Congress (R) had adopted a leftist 
stance, stealing the thunder from the Communists and Socialists, 
and the only viable opposition parties were the parties of the 
right - the Jan Sangh and the Congress (0). In a by-election, 
shortly before the agitation, for the Lok Sabha seat in Sabarkantha, 
the Congress (0) candidate, Maniben Patel, daughter of Sardar 
Patel, was elected with a sizable majority. Congress (R) had 
also fared badly in recent Panchayati Raj elections, especially 
in Bhavnagar and other places. The Congress (0) in contrast with 
the Jan Sangh seemed content to issue statements against Congress 
(R) attacking it on policy issues rather than calling for bandhs 
as the Jan Sangh did.
The Jan Sangh was particularly active in opposition. The 
Jan Sangh had penetrated deep into the student world by establish­
ing bodies like the Vidyarthi Parishad, which became influential 
among University students. Young students and professors were 
attracted to the Jan Sangh by its stress on a vigorous cultural
nationalism, physical fitness and social discipline. Jan 
Sangh and RSS literature is full of terms like 'courage', 'virility' 
'order' and 'discipline', and emphasizes the need to re­
establish the social coherence and discipline of an idealized 
mythical past. Some members of the Jan Sangh student body, 
the Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, were members of the Nav Nirman 
Samiti. The Jan Sangh helped the students.in organizing meetings 
and bandhs: it organized the largest number of bandhs in differ­
ent parts of the State and in organizational efficiency surpassed 
both the Congress (0) and the Congress (R). All the Jan Sangh 
ward units in Ahmedabad City were involved in organizing agitation. 
The Jan Sangh and the Congress (0) accused the Congress (R) not 
only of failing to cope with food shortages and rising prices, 
but also of failing to solve the Narmada dispute in Gujarat's 
favour, of nationalizing trade, especially the wheat trade, 
and damaging production by its land legislation. These parties 
also tried to raise the Naxalite bogy in Gujarat.
Eventually the Ministry fell on March 13, 197^, and Chima-
bhai Patel was expelled from the Congress (R), although he still
had a core of MLA followers in the Gujarat Legislative Assembly,
q iand President's Rule was declared.
Although the students continued agitating to bring down oil 
prices and the prices of all essential commodities - on May 26,
1974, about a hundred students led by Manishi Jani, President of 
the Nav Nirman Samiti, vowed before the life-size statue of the 
Mahatma near the income-tax office in Ahmedabad that they would
'Gujarat: Beyond the Ken of Organized Politics0, op.cit.
continue their struggle against spiralling prices and rampant 
corruption, and Mr. Jani wrote a letter to the Prime Minister 
demanding the fixation of the price of oil at Rs. 5.^0 a kilogram 
and its distribution through an edible oil corporation at the 
rate of one kilo per head per month, and sharply criticized 
the Congress (R) for not bringing the hoarders, profiteers and
yssmugglers to book - the student movement was itself riddled 
with factionalism. Some student leaders favoured non-violent 
agitation? others, notably Umakant Mankad, preached violence.
Nav Nirman Samitis mushroomed all over Gujarat and began to 
behave as they liked. More militant rival student bodies arose, 
such as the Mongvari Hataon Samiti (Committee to stop Increases 
in the Cost of Living), led by Ashwin Vaidya. Mavlankar, an 
Ahmedabad Professor and MP from Ahmedabad City, who had been 
President of the Nav Nirman Samiti, resigned in opposition to 
violent methods being employed by students. Student leaders 
were also divided on the issue of whether to appear for examinations 
or not, and some student leaders resented the influence the Jan 
Sangh was gaining in the student agitation. Manishi Jani, 
student leader, who had been elected President of the Nav Nirman 
Samiti after Mavlankar, resigned from the presidency and the 
primary membership of the Nav Nirman Samiti, along with Shailesh 
Shah, secretary of the Samiti, and about thirty office-bearers of 
the Maninagar and Behrampura units of the Nav Nirman Samiti.
Jani described the Samiti as strife-ridden following the in­
filtration of vested interests and said he would try to organize
^Times of India (Ahmedabad) ,21 May , 197^ -.
a new forum. Umakant Mankad, general secretary of the
Samiti and opponent of Jani, said he was about to be removed
any way, as he along with thirty other members of the executive
committee had signed a memo demanding his 'dismissal’. Mr.
Mankad said sharp differences existed between him and Mr.
Jani who he alleged strove to toe the Congress line. He said
the rift began when Mr. Jani's name appeared along with leaders
of several political parties who were to go on a hunger-strike
in support of the striking railway employees. Mr. Mankad said
the railwaymen's strike was politically motivated and as such
the Samiti could not become a party to it. Mr. Jani, he
alleged, disagreed and started a campaign of vilification against 
<?S~him.
Thus the student protest movement of the winter of 1973-7^ 
disintegrated in internecine strife.
^^Times of India (Ahmedabad) 31 May , 197^.
^Times of India (Ahmedabad), I June , 197^.
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Chapter X 
CONCLUSION
Ahmedabad politics is characterized by the interplay of
1agitational and institutional political modes. The political 
and socioeconomic reality which underlies this interplay consists 
of the gradual breaking-down of the old stable political and socio­
economic system, which depended on an indigenous, homogeneous and 
strongly legitimized elite and a mass population sharing elite 
cultural values and norms. This system was based on economic ex­
pansion and prosperity, particularly in the textile industry, and 
its political expression lay in the political alliance and co­
operation between the textile magnates and the business element, 
on the one hand, and the dominant labour union, the Majur Majur 
or Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association, on the ether hand, within 
the Congress party.
Textile magnates headed the Corporation from its very in­
ception in 1930: Chinubhai Chimanlal Sheth, a member of the highly
influential millowning family of Lalbhai Dalpatbhai, had been 
Chairman of the Standing Committee in Ahmedabad Municipality from 
19^ -2—^6 and President of the Municipality from 19^6 to 1930* when 
he became the Mayor on the conversion of the Municipality into a 
Municipal Corporation in 1930, a position which he held un­
interruptedly till 1961, when another textile magnate, Jaikrishna­
bhai Harivallabhdas, succeeded him. Their power was based on the 
control of the business element in the Corporation and alliance 
with the important Majur Mahajan element in the Corporation. Majur 
Mahajan leaders in the Corporation: Vasa.vda, Shukla and Buch worked
hand-in-glove with the textile magnates. Through great prestige
1. For a general discussion of agitational versus institutional
forms of political action, see David H. Bayley, "Public Protest 
and the Political Process in India”, Pacific Affairs, vol. -^2,
no. 1 (Spring^1969), pp. 3-16.
I
within the city and strong linkages with higher political levels 
external to the city yet with great influence over city affairs, 
particularly the State level, they were able to achieve an impress­
ive record of civic projects and schemes, aimed largely at satisfy­
ing the interests of their clientele, the middle class, particularly
those in the private sector, and the labour aristocracy of textile
2industrial workers. Despite the formally restricted 
statutory powers of the Municipal Corporation, the existence of 
a powerful alliance with the Majur Mahajan, strong State-level 
linkages and financial expertise enabled the textile magnate Mayors, Chi- 
nubhai and Jaikrishnabhai, to accomplish extensive projects of 
city beautification and Town Planning. The internal balance between 
the Majur Mahajan and the textile magnates changed in favour of the 
former through the 1960s.
This stable political and socioeconomic system, unique in many 
ways to Ahmedabad, which had evolved as a logical projection of its 
cultural, historical and economic traditions, was experiencing a series 
of disruptive challenges and threats particularly during the 1960s, 
due to far-reaching changes in the underlying socioeconomic reality
2. During the heyday of this political alliance in the 1950s,
the major discussion of municipal matters was not on the floor 
of the Corporation, but in Congress party meetings where muni­
cipal problems were discussed freely and a solution thrashed 
out. No Congress Corporator was permitted to speak on the 
floor of the house unless he was sponsoring or supporting a 
resolution already decided on at the party meeting. At that 
time the opposition parties were extremely weak, and Corporation 
work went on incredibly smoothly. Even if there were 200 
resolutions on the agenda they were passed within V? minutes or 
one hour. The big business-Majur Mahajan dominated Corporation 
Congress party earned the nickname of 'Manjur Mail1 ('Agreement 
Express'), because Corporation business was resolved so quickly. 
At this time the Municipal Commissionertoo was subservient to 
the powerful leader of the Congress party, discussing any 
problems directly with Chinubhai, who would then put the matter 
before the party at the next party meeting. From an interview 
with Chinubhai Chimanlal Sheth in July 197^.
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The previously culturally and socially homogeneous and 
unified society of Ahmedabad was becoming ever more plural in 
character (plural in the sense of having an increasing proportion 
of migrants, many of whom came from other districts of Gujarat, 
and a significant number from other States of India) due to the 
pressures of rapid urbanization and large-scale migration, 
resulting in increasing elite/mass alienation, and diverging 
cultural and political perspectives. The communal character of 
the City too was changing to some degree: in communal terms,
the City was, interestingly enough, growing less diverse and 
more uniform. It was a paradoxical situation, however, for 
Ahmedabad was becoming less diverse communally, but more divisive 
in terms of Hindu-Muslim conflict. The economic base of this 
growing alienation and group conflict lay in the strains imposed 
on the City*s economy by rapid urbanization and large-scale 
migration, and the increasingly difficult and urgent problems 
facing the textile industry during the mid and late 60s due to 
chronic raw material shortages, caused by monsoon failures and 
bad harvests, and failure by many mills to plough back profits 
into modernization of plant and machinery, and subsequent shortage 
of finances for modernization. Rapid inflation, especially during 
the 60s and 70s was another cause of political agitation.
Ahmedabad has been the nerve-centre of agitational movements 
in Gujarat politics, which have largely been confined to urban 
areas. The Inguistic agitation of the 1930s, the dearness allow­
ance agitation of the early 60s, and the recent student riots in 
early 197^ have all centred on Ahmedabad and on other large urban
of the City.
areas and their hinterlands. The most volatile element in the 
Ahmedabad urban scene has been the middle class, particularly of
students and white-collar workers on fixed salaries mainly in the 
public sector, such as clerks, teachers, government employees, 
bank employees etc., who have suffered most from the effects of 
inflation. Unlike textile industrial workers who axe protected 
to some extent from inflationary effects because their dearness 
allowance is linked directly with increases in the cost of living 
index, white-collar employees do not get this protection and their 
dearness allowance is not linked directly with increases in the 
cost of living index. Although the textile industrial workers of 
Ahmedabad agitated in the early 60s against the outdated and 
anomalous cost of living index series on which their dearness allow­
ance was then calculated, the textile workers led by the Majur 
Mahajan were conspicuous by their absence in the linguistic agitation 
of the 1950s and the recent riots in Ahmedabad in early 197^. The 
TLA publicly declared that they would remain outside the agitational
j
movement of early 197^. Their leader, Arvind Buch, declared that, 
following the true Gandhian spirit, the Majur Mahajan never joined 
any bandhs and went on to say that the only remedy to bring down 
prices was greater production. Most textile workers followed the 
TLA lead. Unorganized labour, however, is also a volatile element 
in city politics, especially the household industry workers, artisans,
i.e. furniture-makers, leather workers, carpenters, blacksmiths etc., 
and all self-employed persons.
i
3. Interview with Jaisukhlalbhai Hathi in June 197^*
The salaried middle class, unorganized labour, and small- 
scale self-employed persons were the force behind the linguistic 
agitation, the main support of the opposition Janta Parishad party 
(which also managed to mobilize a section of the textile labour force 
and the badli workers on the dearness allowance issue, as well 
as the urban periphery of the unemployed and underemployed and 
radical migrant groups) and the force behind the 19 7^ riots.
Thus the Majur Mahajan-textile magnate alliance within the Con­
gress party provided a stabilizing, conservative force in the City's 
political life, interacting with periodic agitational movements, in 
a frame-work in which State-local linkages were crucially important 
for City politics. The strong support of the Gujarat Congress boss, 
Morarji Desai, was crucial for the textile magnate Mayors of the 
City, Chmubhai and Jaikrishnabhai, just as State-level linkages 
with Khandubhai Desai, senior State-level Congress leader and Majur 
Mahajan leader, and the ability of Vasavda, who was both a local and 
State-level leader, to appoint a Labour Minister at the State level 
from the Majur Mahajan leadership were vitally important for the 
political effectiveness of the Majur Mahajan. The agitation-based 
Janta Parishad, when in power in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 
in the mid 60s, suffered from difficulties of sustained mobilization 
of support for its trade union wing, the Sangram Samiti; difficulties 
of party maintenance arising from its being a coalition of heterogeneous 
elements rather than a disciplined unified party; and difficulties 
of goal attainment, all due in large part to lack of access to State- 
level patronage and decision-making authority.
As Rajni Kothari indicated, urban centres have become 
.the crisis points in the Indian political system. The relative 
stability which distinguished the Ahmedabad political system, 
dominated for so long by the unique business-Majur Mahajan alliance 
within the Congress party, is now coming into line with a broader 
all-India trend of growing urban political instability.
*f. See Rajni Kothari, Politics in India.( Little Brown Country 
Series; 1970^
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